JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - The present Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 4th Sept. 1982 (Annexure `5' to the Writ petition). This order was passed by the Management of the M/s. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. Bhitaura Rubber Factory, Bareilly, Respondent 2, while accepting the letter of resignation dated 26th Aug. 1982 (Annexure `1') submitted by the petitioner. The petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 4th Sept. 1982 (Annexure `5'). The petitioner has further prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to treat the petitioner in service. 2. The facts lie in a very narrow compass and they are these. The petitioner was appointed as Expediter in Materials Department (Purchase) pertaining to M/s. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. Bhitarua Rubber Factory, Bareilly. The petitioner also alleged that this rubber factory was under the control of the State of Uttar Pradesh, respondent 1. But no such facts have been given or details furnished in the writ petition to enable us to come to that conclusion. The petitioner was promoted as Store Supervisor on 5th Sept. 1973 and he in fact was driving a loco engine in the factory on 7th Nov. 1982 and by that engine one Raghunath Singh was crushed. He was prosecuted for an offence under Ss. 279/304A I.P.C. and was ultimately acquitted by the judgment dated 11th Nov. 1983 rendered by the Judicial Magistrate IXth Bareilly in Criminal Case No. 752 of 1983. He was forced to resign on 26th Aug. 1982 (Annexure `1' to the petition) which was accepted by the Management of Respondent No. 2 by the impugned order dated 4th Sept. 1982 (Annexure `5'). 3. After having heard Sri A.P. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner we were of the opinion that the petition was devoid of merits and consequently the same was dismissed summarily on 20-5-1985. We, however, proposed to give reasons for dismissal later on. This is how we are going to pass a detailed order. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the letter of resignation submitted by the petitioner was accepted. But that resignation was obtained by exercising undue influence upon the petitioner and he was deprived of his livelihood which was included in term `his life' under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the letter of resignation submitted by the petitioner was accepted. But that resignation was obtained by exercising undue influence upon the petitioner and he was deprived of his livelihood which was included in term `his life' under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Further protection of life and personal liberty was a fundamental right guaranteed to every citizen. He urged that the impugned order was hit by Article 21 of the Constitution. The provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution are set out below :- 21. Protection of life and personal liberty. No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law." 4A. The learned counsel next urged that ours being a welfare State where State has a solemn duty to bring such a social order where justice, social, economic and political shall inform all the institutions of the national life. It was urged that right to work and public assistance in cases of unemployment and a living wage having been ensured the petitioner should continue in service. He strongly relied upon Articles 37,42 and 43 of the Constitution of India (Under Part IV, The Directive Principles of State Policy). He further relied upon Begulla Bapi Raju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1073 , Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802 : (1984 Lab IC 560), Neeraja Chaudhary v. State of M.P., AIR 1984 SC 1099 : (1984 Lab IC 851), Rohit Vasavada v. General Manager IFFCO, AIR 1984 Guj 102 and State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan, 1984 UPLBEC 722 : (1983 Lab IC 1128) (SC). 5. We propose to consider these cases a bit later and first we want to clarify the concept of protection of life and personal liberty as fundamental right enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the word 'life' should include 'livelihood' of the petitioner who was in service of Respondent No. 2, namely, the Rubber Factory and according to him the petitioner should not have been deprived of his livelihood, i.e. his letter of resignation should not have been accepted except according to the procedure established by law. 6. 6. It is also pertinent to mention that principles under Article 21 of the Constitution had been borrowed from the Amendment (Article) V and Amendment (Article) XIV of the American Constitution. The relevant portion of Amended Art. V is set out hereunder :- "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." The relevant portion of Amended Art. XIV is set out below "Nor shall any State deprive any of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of law." 7. The American Constitutional Law by Laurence H. Tribe (1978 Edn.) page 508 interpreting Articles 5th and 14th Amendment is as follows :- Fifth and Fourtneenth : Amendment: Due process clauses as interpreted in the Supreme Court's substantive due process analysis have furnished broad definition of the `liberty' that was in turn afforded procedural protection against arbitrary deprivation." 8. Gerald Gunther in his Constitutional Law 10th Edn. page 647 observes as under : `Liberty' includes just about every interest of significance to an individual or more accurately that the phrase `life, liberty or property' in due process clause is unitary concept embracing all interest valued by sensible men." 9. In interpreting this clause C. Herman Prichett in his commentary on the American Constitution 3rd Edn. has observed as follows :- Such Fundamental rights belong to every free person ......... the great fundamental rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and the right to travel, to go anywhere he pleases. This is the right which belongs to the citizen of each State." (See also "Corfield v. Goryell, 6 Fed. Cases 320). 10. In American Constitutional Law by Alpheus Thomas Magon, William M. Beaney 6th Edn. the great fundamental rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and the right to travel, to go anywhere he pleases. This is the right which belongs to the citizen of each State." (See also "Corfield v. Goryell, 6 Fed. Cases 320). 10. In American Constitutional Law by Alpheus Thomas Magon, William M. Beaney 6th Edn. page 469 there is an observation as follows :- In this connection it is proper to state that every rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression cannot be impaired by wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by the State Authority in the shape of laws................wrongful acts of an individual unsupported by any such authority is simply a private wrong or a crime of that individual, an invasion of the right of the injured party, it is true whether to affect his person, his property or his reputation, but if not sanctioned in some way by the State or not done under the State authority, his rights remain in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for redress." 11. In view of the observations made above by different authorities on American Constitutional Law, it is evident that fundamental right to life, liberty and property is sacrosanct. The same cannot be denied or violated without due process of law. But it is further clear that what can be questioned is the denial of violation done by the State. If some individual violates those fundamental rights, that cannot form the basis for a cause of action. Its persuasive function is to exact from the States observance of basic liberties. As clearly indicated by the language used, the Fourteenth Amendment constitutes a limitation on the powers of States but not on the Federal Govt. In other words, the purpose of Fourteenth Amendment was to place the same limitations on the States as was imposed on the Federal Govt, by Fifth Amendment. 12. These guarantees do not apply to the acts of individuals but only to the acts of States In Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 16-A, P. 568 there are relevant observations to the following effect :- The guarantee of the (Federal Constitution or of the State Constitutions) does not apply to the acts of individuals which affect other individuals except for violation of Federal Statutes enacted in pursuance of the Federal Constitution. 16-A, P. 568 there are relevant observations to the following effect :- The guarantee of the (Federal Constitution or of the State Constitutions) does not apply to the acts of individuals which affect other individuals except for violation of Federal Statutes enacted in pursuance of the Federal Constitution. So Vth amendment is not directed against and does not limit, the actions of the individuals, or private persons and cannot when violated be the basis of any cause of action against individuals, decisions of the constitutional questions raised under the amendment requires, as a condition precedent, that Government action be found. Likewise, the protection offered by the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the acts or conduct of individuals or more precisely to acts or conduct of private individuals, as such or to the wrongs done by the individuals not acting for the State or under colour of State Authority" 1953-346 US 865 : 98 Law ED 375. 13. Coming to the facts of the present case we are of the view that it is not the act of the State of U.P. which was being questioned as no allegations have been made in the petition nor details have been furnished how State of U.P. was concerned with the management of Respondent No. 2. It was accordingly the individual act of Management against which petitioner was claiming his relief. 14. We now propose to consider the argument of Mr. Singh that the term `life' under Article 21 of the Constitution should include livelihood of the petitioner which was being denied to him by the impugned order as Article 21 of the Constitution was couched in such a language that such arguments could have been advanced. But we find no substance in the same. The concept of the livelihood of the petitioner can be derived from Article 16 and Article 19 of the Constitution and it could never be the intention of the legislature to include the concept of livelihood in the word `life' as provided under Article 21. As regards the case of Mrs. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 relied upon by the learned counsel that was a case in respect of impounding of the pass-port of Mrs. Maneka Gandhi and it was in that light that various aspects of Articles 14, 16 and 19 of the Constitution were considered by the Supreme Court. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 relied upon by the learned counsel that was a case in respect of impounding of the pass-port of Mrs. Maneka Gandhi and it was in that light that various aspects of Articles 14, 16 and 19 of the Constitution were considered by the Supreme Court. But we are of the firm opinion that the case aforesaid is of no help to the petitioner in the present case. 15. In Re; Sant Ram AIR 1960 SC 932 on page 935 (para 11) it has been held by the Supreme Court that the word `life' in Article 21 does not include `livelihood'. The observations are as these :- The argument that the word `life' in Article 21 of the Constitution included livelihood has only to be stated to be rejected. The question of livelihood has not in terms been dealt with by Article 21 of the Constitution. That question is included in the freedom enumerated in Article 19, particularly Cl. (g) or even in Article 16 in a limited sense but the language of Article 21 cannot be pressed into aid of the argument that the word `life' in Article 21 includes `livelihood' also." 16. In. in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1126 on page 1131: (1982 Lab 1C 161 at p. 166) (para 7) it was held by the Supreme Court as follows : As regards Article 21 the first premises of argument that the word 'life' in that Article includes livelihood was considered and rejected. "In Re : Sant Ram AIR 1960 SC 932 ". 17. In Begulla Bapi Raju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1073 on page 1081 (para 22) it was held as under : The contention that life includes livelihood within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution was repelled in these two cases (i.e. in Re Sant Ram & A. V. Nachane supra) and Maneka Gandhi's case did not take into consideration the case of Sant Ram (supra). These cases, therefore, still hold the field." 18. It is accordingly evident that the petitioner cannot derive any benefit from Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 as regards the submissions that word `life' under Article 21 includes `livelihood'. 19. It was next urged relying upon Articles 37, 42 and 43 of the Constitution. These cases, therefore, still hold the field." 18. It is accordingly evident that the petitioner cannot derive any benefit from Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 as regards the submissions that word `life' under Article 21 includes `livelihood'. 19. It was next urged relying upon Articles 37, 42 and 43 of the Constitution. These Articles are contained in Part IV of the Constitution under the heading of Directive principles of State Policy. Article 37 is to the effect that the provisions contained in this part shall not be enforceable by any Court but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country. 20. Article 38 provides that the State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order, knowledge, justice, social economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life. 21. Article 42 of the Constitution provides that the State shall make the provisions for securing just and humane conditions and for maternity relief. Article 43 states that the State shall endeavour to secure by suitable legislation or economic organisation or in any other way to all workers agricultural or industrial or otherwise, work a living wage, conditions of work ensuring decent standard of life, etc. 22. Now we have to ascertain the concept, value and the usefulness of the Directive Principles of State Policy under Chapter IV of the Constitution. We need not say that Part IV of the Constitution is based on the corresponding provisions in Irish Constitution. Article 37 lays down the objects of the Directive Principles of State Policy. It lays down in clear terms that this part IV shall not be enforceable by any Court but the principles are fundamental in the governance of the country. It would not be out of place to quote a portion of speech of Dr. Ambedkar while-introducing this part IV in the Constituent Assembly :- The Directive Principles are like the instruments of Instructors which are issued to the Governor-General and the Governors of the Colonies and to those of India by the British Govt, under the Government of India Act, 1935. What called Directive Principles is another name for Instrument of Instructions. The only difference is that they are instructions to the Legislature and the Executive. What called Directive Principles is another name for Instrument of Instructions. The only difference is that they are instructions to the Legislature and the Executive. Whoever captures power will not be free to do what he likes with it. In the exercise of it he will have to respect these Instruments of Instructions which are called Directive Principles. He cannot ignore them." 23. Prof. Kenneth C Where, in his article on India's New Constitution observes as follows :- The British student will feel perhaps that the Constitution contains rather too much assertion of abstract rights for, like the Irish Constitution, the Indian Constitution undertakes to guarantee a wide range of rights and privileges to the people." 24. We are of the view that the Directive Principles of State Policies (as contemplated under Chapter IV of the Constitution) are different than the conventions of the British Constitution. Even though the conventions in British Constitution can also not be enforced in a Court of law. The Directive Principles can very aptly be described as political morality. The Directive Principles are the social and economic policy of India. They are guidelines for the States and the Union Govt. This enjoins upon the State a duty to promote the welfare of the people by securing protection as effectively as it can a social order in which justice, social, economic and political shall pervade all walks of national life. They are the principles to be kept in mind by the High Court and the Supreme Court while interpreting the Constitution. At the same time the Directive Principles cannot override the Fundamental Rights as contained under Chapter III of the Constitution. But the State and the Union of India should make law as quite consistent with the directive principles but they should not abridge or take away the fundamental rights. 25. In K. Rajendran v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1982 SC 1107 the Supreme Court held as follows on page 1125 : (1982 Lab IC 876 at p. 896) (para 48). These Articles (i.e. 38 & 43) are in Part IV of the Constitution. 25. In K. Rajendran v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1982 SC 1107 the Supreme Court held as follows on page 1125 : (1982 Lab IC 876 at p. 896) (para 48). These Articles (i.e. 38 & 43) are in Part IV of the Constitution. They are not enforceable by Courts but they are still fundamental in the governance of the country." In Randhir Singh v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 879 it was held by the Supreme Court on page 881 : (1982 Lab IC 806 at p. 810) (para 8) as follows :- Directive principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read with the fundamental rights as ] a matter of interpretation." 26. As regards the cases cited, Begulla Bapi Raju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR . 19f83 SC 1073 (supra) has already been considered. 27. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 802 : (1984 Lab IC 560) (supra) was a case where the writ petition was filed on behalf of the petitioner which was an organisation taking cause of release of Bandhua labourers of the country, further Parliament enacted Bonded Labour System Abolition Act. 1976. The question was whether Bonded Labourers were entitled to live free from exploitation. In that context Article 21 was made applicable. But it cannot apply to the facts of the present case particularly when word `Life' under Article 21 did not include `livelihood'. 28. Neeraja Chaudhary v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1984 SC 1099 : (1984 Lab 1C 851) (supra) was also a case pertaining to the bonded labourer system and facts are entirely different and the petitioner cannot derive any assistance from this case as also from the Bandhua Mukti Morcha case (supra). 29. State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Bhan. 1984 UPLBEC 722 : (1983 Lab IC 1128) (SC) (supra) was also a case based on entirely different facts pertaining to payment of subsistence allowance at the rate of Re. 1 /-per month. The facts of the present case are, however, entirely different. 30. Rohit Vasavada v. General Manager, 1FFCO, AIR 1984 Guj 102 supra) was also a case based on different facts pertaining to the bonded labourer and here the facts of the present case are not of the bonded labourer. Hence the petitioner cannot derive any benefit from that case. 31. The facts of the present case are, however, entirely different. 30. Rohit Vasavada v. General Manager, 1FFCO, AIR 1984 Guj 102 supra) was also a case based on different facts pertaining to the bonded labourer and here the facts of the present case are not of the bonded labourer. Hence the petitioner cannot derive any benefit from that case. 31. The maxim "Nullus Commodum Capere Potest De Injuria Sua Chotia" which obviously means that no man can take advantage of his own wrongs to gain favourable interpretation of law. We are surprised that the petitioner wants to take advantage of his own wrongs as he has submitted his resignation and wants to resile from it. Before tendering the resignation the petitioner being prudent man was supposed to know the consequences of his own act. The petitioner has not said anywhere in the petition nor he has made any application to the higher authorities including to the police, etc., to the effect that undue pressure was being exercised upon him to submit his resignation. We are not prepared to accept that the petitioner has submitted his resignation on account of pressure or undue influence exercised upon him. Even though if it may be assumed that the petitioner has submitted his resignation which under the circumstances may have been on account of pressure exercised by the Management. In that event this is a question of fact which can be investigated by some other appropriate authority or Court but not by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 32. We now turn to consider the scope of certiorari or mandamus prayed for by the petitioner. 33. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, writ of certiorari will issue to quash the determinations of any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the subjects and having the duty to act judicially. (See R. v. Electricity Commissioners (1924) 1 KB 171 at pp. 204, 205). 34. In R. v. Electricity Commissioner (supra) it was held by Atkin, L.J. as follows : - "A certiorari may issue wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subject and having duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority." 35. 204, 205). 34. In R. v. Electricity Commissioner (supra) it was held by Atkin, L.J. as follows : - "A certiorari may issue wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subject and having duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority." 35. It is thus clear that the certiorari would lie against inferior Courts, against administrative tribunals, against local authorities and other statutory bodies discharging public functions. But the certiorari will not issue to private arbitral body which derives its jurisdiction from a contract. See R. v. National Joint Council (1953) 1 QB 704. 36. Further a writ of certiorari lies on the application of the person aggrieved to bring a proceeding of any inferior tribunal before the High Court for review or consideration by the High Court so that the Court can determine whether they shall be quashed. It should quash a determination for excess of lack of jurisdiction, error of law on the face of the record or breach of the rules of natural justice or while determination was procured by fraud, collusion or perjury. (See R. v. Parke (1903) 2 KB 432 at p. 439) and IR. v. Chancellor, 1948(1) KB 195). 37. The object of the writ of certiorari is to keep exercise or powers by a body of persons assigned to them by law and to restrain from acting their authority. It is thus clear that a body of persons having legal authority to determine questions pertaining to a right of subject, having the duty to act judicially and to act in excess of their legal authority a writ of certiorari may issue. Unless all the conditions are satisfied mere inconvenience or absence of other remedy does not creat a right of certiorari. 38. It is further crystal clear that a writ of certiorari would not lie against a private individual or domestic tribunal having no statutory power. (See Commissioner, Lucknow Division v. Kumari Prem Lata Mishra AIR 1977 SC 334 : (1977 Lab IC 169)). Further requirement is that certiorari will not be issued against the executive act or even ministerial act of a judicial authority. It is issued only if the act is done by the inferior body or authority in the judicial act and this term also includes the concept of quasi judicial act. Further requirement is that certiorari will not be issued against the executive act or even ministerial act of a judicial authority. It is issued only if the act is done by the inferior body or authority in the judicial act and this term also includes the concept of quasi judicial act. Further certiorari is also not available against non-statutory body or the bodies not exercising any statutory functions. 39. In the instant case no foundation has been laid down in the petition that the Respondent No. 2 M/s. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. Bhitaura Rubber Factory, Bareilly through its director who has passed the impugned order i.e. order dated 4th Sept. 1982 (Annexure 5) accepting the resignation tendered by the petitioner was a statutory body having a legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of the petitioner, nor it has been alleged in the petition that Respondent 2 has any duty to act judicially nor it has been alleged that the said authority acted in the excess in his legal authority. Further it is well settled that a writ of certiorari will not be issued against a private body or individual. In the case it has not been stated that the Respondent 2 was a statutory body or that it was under some legal obligation to determine the rights of the petitioner. Even it has not been stated that there were some rules pertaining to the service of the petitioner and those rules have got statutory force and according to those rules it has not been stated again by the petitioner that the resignation tendered by the petitioner could not have been accepted by respondent 2 without taking further evidence or without hearing the petitioner. We are, therefore, satisfied that the petitioner was not entitled to the said prayer made in the writ petition, namely, "to issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 4th Sept. 1982 (`Annexure' 5) accepting the resignation tendered by the petitioner. 40. As regards the writ of mandamus claimed by the petitioner being relief No. 2 there is an observation in Judicial Review of Administrative Action (III Edn) by S.A.de Smith on page 481 which runs as follows :- Mandamus lies to secure performance of a public duty, in the performance of which the applicant has a sufficient legal interest. 40. As regards the writ of mandamus claimed by the petitioner being relief No. 2 there is an observation in Judicial Review of Administrative Action (III Edn) by S.A.de Smith on page 481 which runs as follows :- Mandamus lies to secure performance of a public duty, in the performance of which the applicant has a sufficient legal interest. The applicant must show that he has demanded performance of the duty and that performance has been refused by the authority obliged to discharge it. It is pre-eminently a discretionary remedy and the Court will decline to award it if other legal remedy is equally beneficially convenient and effective. The duty to be performed must be of a public nature. Mandamus will not lie.. to seek the enforcement of a duty which is essentially of a private character." 41. The concepts of the mandamus and certiorari have been considered by the Supreme Court in M/s Chingleput Bottlers v. M/s Majestic Bottling Co. ( AIR 1984 SC 1030 ). It has been held that the writ of mandamus is a necessary adjunct to a right of certiorari and further it was held that the writ of mandamus would lie to seek the enforcement of the legal duty imposed on the authority and that the said legal duty was sought to be enforced in connection with the legal right of the petitioner and no mandamus lies where the duty sought to be enforced was of a discretionary nature. 42. In this connection it is also pointed out that it is well known that the mandamus is issued against public authority including administrative and local bodies being under a legal duty imposed by a statute to act under the Act or to perform a particular duty in a particular way. If that authority or person refrains from doing that act or refrains from performing that duty which under the law he is bound to do, the Court will by a writ of mandamus direct him to do what he should do. Further, it is also well settled that the petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus must say that he has legal rights to the performance of legal duty. (See Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, AIR 1964 SC 1617 ). 43. Further, it is also well settled that the petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus must say that he has legal rights to the performance of legal duty. (See Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, AIR 1964 SC 1617 ). 43. In the present case the petitioner did not indicate any rules pertaining to his service nor any foundation was laid down in the petition that the petitioner has any legal right in the sense that the petitioner did not indicate that even after tendering resignation from his service voluntarily he has a legal right to remain in service or in other words he did not allege in the petition that even after tendering resignation he has a legal right to the effect that his resignation may not be accepted by respondent 2 nor it was alleged in the petition that the respondent 2 has any legal duty to perform before accepting the resignation nor it was indicated any mode of acceptance or the resignation tendered by the petitioner.! Therefore, it could not be said that any legal duty cast on respondent 2 by any statutory rule was not performed by the said authority except just a baid allegation in the petition that the petitioner has to tender the resignation on account of undue influence and coercion but no details were given Even no indication was given as to which form of the coercion or undue influence was exercised upon the petitioner. The petitioner was a prudent man and he was supposed to know the consequences of his own act and if he does any acts without considering the consequences he is not entitled to any relief. Therefore, the petitioner is also not entitled to the writ of mandamus applied for by relief No. 2 in the petition. 44. In view of the discussions made above, the petition lacks merits and it is hereby dismissed summarily.