JUDGMENT R.K. Shukla, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by Shri Vachaspati, petitioner against the Chairman. Board of Revenue, U.P. and the Collector, Dehradun, praying for an appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the impugned orders dated 21-3-1971 and 31-3-1971 (Annexures XII and XIII), being illegal, unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14, 16, 19 and 311 of the Constitution of India. 2. The facts giving rise to the present petition are that the petitioner was appointed as a peon under Amin, Bhumi Bhavan Kar, Mussoorie, a temporary department, by the Additional Collector, Dehradun in the year 1965. On 10-8-1968 the petitioner was promoted as Collection Amin by the District Magistrate, Dehradun. About two years later Naib Tahsildar, Mussoori made a report dated 9-10-1970 in respect of some embezzlement of collections made by the petitioner. He was suspended from the service on 26-10 1970 by the District Magistrate, Dehradun. A charge sheet dated 5-4-1971 was served on the petitioner and disciplinary proceedings commenced against him. Since the petitioner was under suspension the subsistence allowance as payable under rules was duly paid to him, until 30-4-1971. 3. Later on in pursuance of the Board of Revenue's order No. 1948-200/6 BBK-1/71 dated 26-3-1971, one month notice was issued by the District Magistrate, Dehradun on 31-3-1971 to all the staff, including the petitioner, working in the realisation of Bhumi Bhavan Kar, terminating their services with effect from 30-4-1971. This notice is annexed as Annexure XII with the petition and as GA I with the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the opposite parties. In addition to the aforesaid common notice, termination order dated 31-3-1971 issued to the petitioner contained the following ; "But departmental proceedings will be continued. From 1-5-1971 no subsistance allowance will be paid to you." 4. It is relevant to note that a First Information Report was also lodged with the police regarding the embezzlement of money by the petitioner. Twelve cases were registered against the petitioner and trials were held. The petitioner was convicted in all the twelve cases and the maximum sentence awarded to him was for four years' R.I. in one case and lesser sentence in other cases. According to the averment made in para 4 of the counter affidavit, it appears that the petitioner has under gone the sentences. The petitioner was convicted in all the twelve cases and the maximum sentence awarded to him was for four years' R.I. in one case and lesser sentence in other cases. According to the averment made in para 4 of the counter affidavit, it appears that the petitioner has under gone the sentences. He was admitted to jail on 25-2-1975 and released on bail on 3-4-1976. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court and his sentence was reduced to fine of Rs. 1800/-. With this modification the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 9-11-1981. Thereafter fifteen more cases were instituted against the petitioner which were subsequently quashed by the Supreme Court vide order dated 24-3-1983. It was observed that no useful purpose would be served by prosecuting the petitions on various small charges after his conviction on the main charge. Other similar criminal cases pending against the petitioner were quashed vide order dated 13-2-1983, passed by another Division Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in writ petition No. 2988 of 1983. 5. It appears from paragraphs 4 and 10 of the affidavit of the petitioner that petitioner filed two writ petitions nos. 615 of 1984 and 11211 of 1984 in the Supreme Court. Writ petition no. 615 of 1984 was for the issue of mandamus to the respondents to pay to him his subsistance allowance from 5-4-1971 onwards. Their lordships said, "As the petitioner has received subsistance allowance till April 1971 the writ petition is dismissed." Writ petition No. 11211 of 1984 was against the order of termination of the services of the petitioner. This writ petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 3-5-1984... "The petition does not lie under Article 32 of the Constitution. The writ petition is allowed to be withdrawn." 6. Now the petitioner has filed this writ petition in this court after 4711 days from the date of the impugned order, praying for writ and order as mentioned above. The petitioner argued his case himself. The main argument of the petitioner is that the notice of termination dated 21-3-1971 and termination order dated 31-3-1971 (Annexures XII and XIII) were not in existence and were not served on him prior to the same having been filed in the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The petitioner argued his case himself. The main argument of the petitioner is that the notice of termination dated 21-3-1971 and termination order dated 31-3-1971 (Annexures XII and XIII) were not in existence and were not served on him prior to the same having been filed in the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the alternative he urged that even if there is an order of termination of the services of the petitioner, the same would be illegal and unconstitutional. 7. On the other hand it has been specifically stated on behalf of the opposite parties that the letter of termination dated 31-3-1971 was served on the petitioner and it was in his knowledge from the beginning. In this respect the learned standing counsel drew our attention to various paragraphs of the counter affidavit, particularly paras, 10(iii) and 13. Para 13 of the counter affidavit has been specifically denied by the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner. Only this much has been stated that para 12 and onward of the counter affidavit are denied as false. From a perusal of Annexure XII, it appears that Sri Vachaspati petitioner shown at serial no. 15 has signed on 31-3-1971 in token of having received this order. Not only this, but from para 13 of the counter affidavit and a perusal of Annexure CA IX to the counter affidavit, it is quite clear that with reference to the applications of the petitioner dated 8-7-1975 and 14-7-1975, the District Magistrate, Dehradun vide his order dated 12-8-1975 informed the petitioner that his services were terminated with effect from 30-4-1971. From Annexure CA IX, it is quite clear that the aforesaid order dated 12-8-1975 passed by the District Magistrate, Dehradun, was personally received by the petitioner on 12-8-1975. In view of these facts we are fully satisfied that the order of termination was already in existence and it was not fabricated as alleged by the petitioner. We are further satisfied that this order of termination was personally served on the petitioner at least on 12-8-1975. 8. There is no doubt that the note in Annexures XIII viz., "But the departmental proceedings will be continued" is patently wrong. After the abolition of the Bhumi Bhavan Kar Department itself, and the termination of service of the petitioner, there could be no jurisdiction to continue the departmental proceedings. 8. There is no doubt that the note in Annexures XIII viz., "But the departmental proceedings will be continued" is patently wrong. After the abolition of the Bhumi Bhavan Kar Department itself, and the termination of service of the petitioner, there could be no jurisdiction to continue the departmental proceedings. The future scheme of realisation of the Bhumi Bhavan Kar is quite clear from the order no; 1948-200-6/BBK-1/71 dated 26-3-1971 attached as Annexure V to the counter affidavit. In pursuance of this order of the Board of Revenue, services of the petitioner and others were terminated and termination order was served on the petitioner. It is now well settled by various decisions of the Supreme Court that the abolition of post may have the consequence of termination of services of Government servant. Such termination is not dismissal or removal within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The abolition of post is an executive policy decision. Whether after the abolition of the post the Government servant, who was holding the post would or could be offered any employment under the State would, therefore, be a matter of decision of the Government. Since the abolition of the post does not confer on the person holding the abolished post any right to hold a post, therefore, we find nothing wrong in the termination order and we find no merit on this point. An argument was also advanced that some of the persons whose services were terminated along with the petitioner have been re-employed in other departments. The petitioner is convicted for mis-appropriation of rent etc. and his conviction has been upheld by the Supreme Court. Under these circumstances, non-employment of the petitioner in Government service cannot be faulted. Therefore, in our opinion there is no discriminatory treatment meted out to him. 9. Now the only thing that remains to be considered is as to whether the petitioner is entitled to any pay from the date of suspension, i.e. 20-6-1970 to 30-4-1971. Under these circumstances, non-employment of the petitioner in Government service cannot be faulted. Therefore, in our opinion there is no discriminatory treatment meted out to him. 9. Now the only thing that remains to be considered is as to whether the petitioner is entitled to any pay from the date of suspension, i.e. 20-6-1970 to 30-4-1971. There is no doubt that the Supreme Court vide its order dated 7-3-1984 in writ petition 615 of 1984 mentioned above, has observed, "As the petitioner has received subsistence allowance till April 1971, the writ petition is dismissed." The learned standing counsel has fairly conceded that when the services of the petitioner were terminated, there was no justification for continuing the departmental proceedings, consequently, the petitioner was entitled to his pay for the aforesaid period. It is evidence from the affidavits of the parties that the petitioner was paid subsistance allowance up to 30-4-1971. In our opinion with the abolition of the department, Departmental proceedings automatically terminated. It is also not disputed that the services of the petitioner have been terminated with effect from 30-4-1971. Having considered all the facts and circumstances, we are full satisfied that the petitioner is entitled for his fully pay for the period 26-10-1970 to 30-4-1971. He has only been paid the subsistance allowance. The petitioner is entitled to the balance amount of his pay for the aforesaid period only. 10. In the result the writ petition is partly allowed. The termination notice and termination order (Annexures XII & XIII) are upheld, But he opposite parties are directed to pay the salary and allowances to the petitioner for the period 26-10-1970 to 30-4-1971, less what has been paid as subsistence allowance for the said period, within three months from today. Under the circumstances