JUDGMENT V. P. Bhatnagar, J.—This order is meant to dispose of Regular First Appeal No. 10 of 1975 as well as Regular First Appeal No. 61 of 1975. Both appeals have arisen as a result of the award made by the learned District Judge, Simla on August 23, 1974. The Regular First Appeal No. 10 of 1975 has been preferred by the State of Himachal Pradesh whereas Regular First Appeal No, 61 of 1975 by Shri Liaq Ram whose land was acquired. 2. The controversy between the parties has been considerably shortened inasmuch as the learned Advocate General who has argued this case on behalf of the State of Himachal Pradesh and Shri Kailash Chand, Advocate representing Shri Liaq Ram have both submitted during the course of arguments that the only point which required determination for the purpose of disposing these appeals is about the correct valuation of 58 apple trees standing on Khasra No. 609/1 belonging to Shri Liaq Ram. It is also the case of both the parties that the area of the aforesaid Khasra number is 1 Bigha 5 Biswas. 3, The Land Acquisition Collector fixed the ages of the aforesaid 58 apple trees as 5 years and, therefore, assessed their value at Rs. 1,740 according to "Basic Principles and method of valuation of fruit trees" by Dr. Harbans Singh. The learned District Judge, while disposing of the reference made to him under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, fixed the age of those very trees as 6 years and, applying the same principles, assessed the valuation to be Rs. 49,800. Here, it may be stated that it is once again agreed to by learned Counsel for both the parties that the valuation of the trees has to be determined in accordance with the formula worked out by Dr Harbans Singh, 4. The first point which needs consideration in this appeal is the correct age of 5fc apple trees in question. Shri O. P. Awasthy, Horticulture Inspector, who has put in his appearance in the witness-box as PW 3, gave the age to be 5 years in his report Ex. RW I/A. According to Shri Kailash Chand, learned Counsel for Shri Liaq Ram, some typographical error has crept in while giving the number of apple trees against. Khasra No. 609/1 in the report Ex. RW I/A. According to Shri Kailash Chand, learned Counsel for Shri Liaq Ram, some typographical error has crept in while giving the number of apple trees against. Khasra No. 609/1 in the report Ex. RW-l/A, I need not go into that question since, as observed above, both the parties do admit for the purposes of the disposal of these two appeals the existence of 58 apple trees in Khasra No. 609/1. The perusal of the report Ex. RW-l/A, however, shows that the age of the trees standing in Khasra No, 609/1 has been given as 5 years. Now, PW 3, Shri O. P. Awasthy has stated in his examination-in chief that his assessment was made in June, 1968. In other words, he was of the opinion that the above-mentioned 58 apple trees were 5 years old in June, 1968. His testimony on the point of age will be deemed to have been accepted by the opposite party as he was not cross-examined at all. If these trees were 5 years old in June, 1968, the same must have become more than 6 years old in December, 1969, when the Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was admittedly published. It may be stated here that the relevant date for the purposes of determining the market value of these trees would be the date of the publication of the Notification under section 4, ibid and cannot be June, 1968, when Shri O. P. Awasthy inspected these trees at the spot. The age thus fixed tallies with the testimony of PW 4, Shri Liaq Ram. There is no rebuttal worth the name. The statement of RW 1, Shri N. C. Khosle cannot be acted upon for the simple reason that he went to the spot after these trees had been up-rooted and the road constructed. Therefore, he had no occasion to inspect these trees, which he has clearly admitted in his cross-examination. Thus, the only conclusion pertaining to the age of 58 trees on the basis of the evidence which has been adduced by the parties can be that these trees were 6 years old on the day of the publication of the Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and that the finding of the learned District Judge in the matter is un-assailable. 5. 5. The next point which falls for determination pertains to the classification of the apple trees. Once again, the only evidence available before this Court is the report Ext. RW I/A, made by PW 3, Shri (X P, Awasthy. His report is silent with respect to the category in which these trees are to be placed. RW 1, Shri N. C. Khosla has, however, graded the trees standing in Khasra No. 609/1 as of Class-II. His report has no evidentiary value for the reasons already stated above. While in the witness box, PW 3, Shri O. P. Awasthy has deposed that the trees belonging to Shri Liaq Ram were either of I-Grade or II-Grade. This part of his statement, however, pertains to "the other plants", but that would give some indication of the conditions prevalent in or about the land which was acquired. This leaves us with the sole testimony of PW, Shri Laiq Ram, who is the petitioner himself. He has, of course, forcefully maintained that these trees belonged to Grade-I. The learned District Judge has categorised these plaints as belonging to Grade-II and Mr. Kailash Chand learned Counsel for Shri Liaq Ram, has agreed during the course of arguments that he would not challenge the said findings about classification. The learned Advocate General, on the other hand, has urged that these plants should be graded in category VI, but he has not been able to support his contention from the evidence adduced by the parties. His contention, therefore, completely lacks any basis whatsoever. In the totally of the circumstances, I up-hold the findings of the learned Court-blow that 58 trees belonged to Class II for purposes of the formula enunciated by Dr. Harbans Singh. 6. The learned District Judge has, however, fallen into a manifest error in allowing Shri Liaq Ram a sum of Rs. 49,880 as the value of 8 Grade-II apple trees, due to the reason that it apparently escaped his notice that 58 trees cannot be commercially planted in an area measuring 1 Bigha 5 Biswas. RW 1. Shri N. C, Khosla has stated that 3 to 6 plants of apple sapplings can be planted scientifically in an area of 5 Biswas. In other words, one apple tree requires one biswa of land. RW 1. Shri N. C, Khosla has stated that 3 to 6 plants of apple sapplings can be planted scientifically in an area of 5 Biswas. In other words, one apple tree requires one biswa of land. It follows that 25 apple trees ought to have been planted in Khasra No. 609/1 measuring 1 Bigha and Biswa in order to be commercially viable. Instead, the number of plants found there was 58. 7. Under the subhead "Remarks" at Item No. 5 of Dr. Harbans Singhs formula, it has been provided that "If the distance between the trees in the orchard is less than the minimum recommended in the kind, the value will be reduced corresponding to the reduction in distance." Xs 58 trees stood planted in the acquired land instead of 25, the valuation will have to be reduced correspondingly by 57% which means that Shri Liaq Ram is entitled to be paid the remaining 43% of the sum of Rs 49,880. This amount works out as Rs. 21,448. The Land Acquisition Collector, however, allowed a sum of Rs. 1,7-0 to Shri Liaq Ram towards the value of these 58 apple trees. Shri Liaq Ram is, therefore, entitled to be paid the balance amount of Rs. 19,708 as enhanced compensation for the value of the said trees. 8. As regards the question of determination of Solatium and interest which is payable to Shri Liaq Ram on the facts of this case, the provisions relating thereto have been drastically amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act No. 68 of 1984). The scope of section 30, ibid governing transitional provisions was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, (1985) 3 SCC 737, 9. In that case, the Collector made the Award on October 9, 1975. The Award of the Court was made on July 31, 1975. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in appeal enhanced the amount of compensation by his order made on November 10, 1981. Ihe Letters Patent Appeal was, however, disposed of by a Division Bench on December 8, 1982. The matter was finally agitated before the Supreme Court which decided it on August 14, 1985. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in appeal enhanced the amount of compensation by his order made on November 10, 1981. Ihe Letters Patent Appeal was, however, disposed of by a Division Bench on December 8, 1982. The matter was finally agitated before the Supreme Court which decided it on August 14, 1985. In other words, the Awards on the Collector and the Court and the order of the ^earned Single Judge of the High Court in appeal were made before April 30, 1982 (see section 30, ibid), but the Letters Patent Appeal and the appeal by Special Leave before the Supreme Court were decided after that date. On the above facts, the Supreme Court, as stated above, held that the amended provision of stib-section (2) of section 23 and section 28 would apply in determination of the amount of compensation. 10. The award in the present case was given by the Collector on April 23, 1972. The Court decided the reference made under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on August 23, 1974, aggrieved from which both the parties have preferred the appeals which are now under consideration. On these facts, there is no scope for doubt that the amended provisions of section 23, sub-section (2) and section 28 would apply to this case in accordance with the ratio of the decision in Bhag Singhs case (supra). 11. The learned Advocate General has, however, contended that solatium at the enhanced rate of 30% should be awarded only on the enhanced amount of compensation as was done in Bhag Singhs case. This submission, in my view, is against the express provisions of section 23, subsection (2) as amended by Act No. 68 of 1984 and, if 1 may say so, militates against the very ratio of Bhag Singhs case (supra), as noticed above. Subsection (2) of section 23 reads as under :— "In addition to the market-value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition." The plain language of sub-section (2) of section 23 quoted above makes it abundantly clear that the solatium of thirty per centum is to be awarded on the market-value. Under no stretch of imagination, it can be stated that the enhanced amount of compensation is the market-value of the land As held in Joginder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another, AIR 1985 SC 3&2, the process of qualification of compensation passes through several stages from the Land Acquisition Officer to the District Judge and thereafter to the High Court. The process is merely one of computing the value of land on the principles enacted in the Land Acquisition Act. However, the right to the compensation so quantified refers back to the date of acquisition. In fact, this date has been clearly specified in the first clause of sub-section (1) of section 23 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 wherein it has been provided that the market-value of the land has to be determined at the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1), 12. Once it is conceded that the amended provisions of section 23, subsection (2) regarding the award of solutium would govern the determination of this appeal, as held in Bhag Singhs case (supra), no distinction can be made in between the amount awarded by the Collector or the amount enhanced later on by the District Judge, the High Court, or the Supreme Court. 13. Another argument addressed by the learned Advocate General on this point may also be noticed. He has drawn may attention to the definition of the expressions "Collector" and "Court" as incorporated in Clauses (c) and (d) of section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It has been contended that the expression “Court" has been used in section 23, sub-section (2) and that the Court can only enhance the amount of compensation, and, consequently, allow solatium under this sub-section, on the enhance amount only. This contention merely needs to be stated in order to be rejected. Section 23, no doubt, enjoins upon the Court to take into consideration the matters stated therein in determining the compensation. But these very guidelines would positively govern the determination of compensation by the Collector as well. No separate guidelines have been provided in the Act for the Collector and rightly so because the Collector and Court have to perform the same task viz., the determination of the market value of the land compulsorily acquired and the payment of just compensation to its owner. No separate guidelines have been provided in the Act for the Collector and rightly so because the Collector and Court have to perform the same task viz., the determination of the market value of the land compulsorily acquired and the payment of just compensation to its owner. Obviously, there cannot be two standards for achieving the same object. 14. Shri Liaq Ram is, therefore, awarded solatium at the rate of 30% at the total market-value of the land. Besides, the Collector, shall pay interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum at the enhanced amount allowed by this Court from the date on which the Collector took possession of the acquired land to the date of payment of such excess amount for the period of one year and interest at the rate of 15% per annum on it after the expiry of the said period of one year in accordance with the provisions of section 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Act No. 68 of 1984. 15. No other point has been urged before me. Both the appeals are accordingly disposed of. December 16, 1985. Order accordingly.-