JUDGMENT Kamleshwar Nath, J. 1. This is a petition to take action for contempt of Court against and to punish the opposite parties described above. By order dated 1.7-8-1983 the opposite parties were required to show cause as follows :- "Issue notice to the opposite parties requiring them to show cause why they may not be punished for committing contempt of this Court by not making payment of the petitioner's salary as directed in Court's judgment dated 31-3-1983 in Writ Petition No. 827 of 1980. Notice shall be returnable by 30-9-83 on which date the case shall be listed in Court. On the date fixed the opposite parties need not appear in person." The facts leading to this petition may be stated. 2. Applicant Sunil Kumar was working as Stenographer in the office of Executive Engineer under orders of the Superintending Engineer, Central Equipment and Stores Procurement Organisation (for short, the organization) of the Irrigation Department at Lucknow. In Writ Petition No. 827 of 1980 the applicant prayed, inter alia, for quashing of Annexure-4, an order dated 15-2-1980 of the Superintending Engineer on the basis of a direction of the Chief Engineer, by which he was reverted from his post in consequence of appointment of one Km. Kanchan Sharma at the post held by him. The order provided that in consequence of Km. Kanchan Sharma taking charge of the post of Stenographer, the applicant would be absorbed on the post of routine grade clerk in the organization. 3. On 21-7-1980 an interim order was passed by this Court containing, inter alia, the following direction :- "The appointment of Km. Kanchan Sharma in place of the petitioner shall be subject to the result of the writ petition and in case the petitioner succeeds, he will of course, be allowed the difference, for the duty period between his salary as Stenographer and his salary as R. G. C. He will, therefore, in the meantime, discharge his duties as R. G. C. subject to the result of the writ petition." By order dated 31-3-1983 the writ petition was allowed as follows :- "In the result, the petition is allowed with costs. The impugned order dated 15-2-1980, copy of which is Annexure-4 to the Writ Petition, is quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to receive his salary and other consequential benefits." On 4-4-1983 the applicant submitted joining report to opposite party no. The impugned order dated 15-2-1980, copy of which is Annexure-4 to the Writ Petition, is quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to receive his salary and other consequential benefits." On 4-4-1983 the applicant submitted joining report to opposite party no. 4 (Sri Girish Chandra, the then Executive Engineer of the Organization, who advised the applicant to approach the Superintending Engineer (Sri Shyam Behari Lal Gupta), Opposite party no. 2, because Km. Kanchan Sharma was already working on the Stenographer's post under the order of the Superintending Engineer. Consequently, the applicant submitted a joining report to opposite party no. 2 who accepted it on the same day. Till that stage, copy of this Courts judgment was not produced by the applicant who promised to do so when received. The applicant was not assigned any particular post. 4. On 15-4-1983 the applicant submitted a copy of this Court's judgment to opposite party no. 2 with a request to take action in accordance with the judgment. Opposite party no. 2 then addressed a letter dated 20-4-1983, Annexure-4, to the Chief Engineer, N. C. Jain, opposite party no. 1, informing the latter that there was no vacant post of Stenographer and that the Chief Engineer may take appropriate action to comply with the orders of the High Court. ON 9-5-1983 oposite party no. 2 wrote a letter, Annexure-10 to the Secretary to Government in the Irrigation Department, with a copy to the Chief Engineer, Opposite party no. 1, mentioning that the Standing Counsel of the government had reported having submitted his opinion, about the decision of this Court, to the government and, therefore, Opposite party no. 2, wanted to know the government's decision on the question of an appeal against the order of this Court, so that a decision might be taken on the question of the applicant's joining a post. ON 28-5-1983 Opposite party no. 1 passed an order, Annexure-12, transferring Km. Kanchan Sharma to the post of Stenographer in the Material Management Cell of the office of the Superintending Engineer and directed the applicant to join on the Stenographer's post held by the lady. Accordingly, on that very day the applicant took charge of the Stenographer's said post in the office of the Executive Engineer, Opposite party no. 4 of the Organization. Accordingly, on that very day the applicant took charge of the Stenographer's said post in the office of the Executive Engineer, Opposite party no. 4 of the Organization. It appears that subsequently on 23-6-83 the Chief Engineer transferred the applicant to the Stenographer's post in the Material Management Cell of the office of Superintending Engineer, but the applicant appears to have proceeded on medical leave on 24-6-1983. By order dated 2-7-1983 the Opposite party no. 2 called upon the applicant to report for joining at the Stenographer's post in the Material Management Cell vide Annexure-16 and informed the applicant that he was treated as relieved with effect, from 24-6-1983 from the Stenographer's post in the Organization. The applicant consequently joined on the new post on 2-7-1983, but on 8-7-1983 he made an application to the Chief Engineer, vide Annexure-17, for payment of his salary and about his transfer. It must be mentioned at this stage that this Court has not called upon the opposite parties to show cause the grievances of the applicant in respect of his delayed posting or transfer from the post. The show-cause notice is confined to the non-compliance of this Court's order insofar as the question of payment of the applicant's salary is concerned. The first application by the applicant for payment of his salary is letter dated 30-4-1983, Annexure-7 ; addressed to Opposite party no. 2, wherein he had asked for payment of his salary for the month of April 1983. The next letter for payment of salary by him is dated 2-6-1983, Annexure 14-A, addressed to Opposite party no. 2, where again he demanded salary for the months of April and May 1983. Opposite party no. 2 was transferred some time after 2-7-1983 ; his successor-in-office, Opposite party no. 3 Sri M. L. Sahdev, took charge on 8-7-1983. 5. On 14-7-1983 the applicant wrote a letter, Annexure-18, to Opposite party no. 3 specifically requesting for the payment of his salary for the period prior to April 1983. He claimed difference in salary by refixation in the revised scale of pay from 1-7-1979 to 14-2-1980 which was a period before the order of his revision, quashed by this Court, for the period pendentelite from 15- 2-1980 to 31-3-1983 and for the months of April, May and June 1983. He claimed difference in salary by refixation in the revised scale of pay from 1-7-1979 to 14-2-1980 which was a period before the order of his revision, quashed by this Court, for the period pendentelite from 15- 2-1980 to 31-3-1983 and for the months of April, May and June 1983. In para 21 of this application the applicant has referred to this letter and went on to add in Para 22 that the opposite parties have absolutely no regard for the orders passed by this Court in the said writ petition and that " his salary from 15-2-1980 till date has not been paid. " ON this basis the applicant moved this Court to punish the opposite parties for having committed contempt of Court. 6. Counter affidavits, rejoinder affidavits, supplementary counter affidavits and supplementary rejoinder affidavits have been filed. There is case for punishing Opposite party no. 4 for Contempt of Court. He has stated in his counter affidavit that he was helpless in the matter because he did not have a vacant post in his office when the applicant reported to him on 4-4-1983 to join in consequence of the order of this Court because Km. Kanchan Sharma was already working on the Stenographer's post. He, therefore, advised the applicant to approach the Superintending Engineer who was the competent authority in the matter. It is not said in the rejoinder affidavit that there was a post to which he could be posted by Opposite party no. 4. Indeed, the insistence of the applicant throughout had been to occupy the post held by Km. Kanchan Sharma. Opposite party no. 4 was not a party to writ petition and above all the only prayer made by the applicant to Opposite party no. 4 was to permit him to join the post. The motion for contempt is being considered only for non-payment of salary. Clearly, Opposite party no. 4 is not liable. 7. Opposite party no. 2 has adopted the statement of defence made by Opposite party no. 3 in his counter affidavit. It was stated in Para 14 of the counter affidavit of Opposite party no. The motion for contempt is being considered only for non-payment of salary. Clearly, Opposite party no. 4 is not liable. 7. Opposite party no. 2 has adopted the statement of defence made by Opposite party no. 3 in his counter affidavit. It was stated in Para 14 of the counter affidavit of Opposite party no. 3 that the applicant's salary for the period from 4-4-1983 had been drawn, and by letter dated 16-7-1983 the Superintending Engineer Material Management Cell, where the applicant was working, had been requested that the applicant may be advised to collect his pay, but the applicant refused to receive the same. Annexure-A-1 is the copy of letter dated 16- 7-1983 of Opposite party no. 3, but it does not speak of the applicant's salary for the period prior to 1-6-1983. It is not specifically stated in the counter affidavit on which date the so-called salary for the period from 4-4-1983 had been drawn or the date on which the applicant refused to receive payment. There is an allegation of oral refusal in letter dated 17-9-1983, Annexure-A-2, by the Superintending Engineer of the Material Management Cell. That is not material because this Court had already issued contempt notice under order dated 17-8-1983. In Para 10 of his rejoinder affidavit the applicant has stated that he never received any communication, either orally or in writing, to report and collect the salary. It is established, therefore, that the applicant was not paid his salary for the period ever since he reported on duty on 4-4-1983 despite his demands by Annexure-7 dated 30-4-1983, Annexure 14-A dated 2-6-1983 and Annexure-18 dated 14-7-1983. 8. In respect of the period from 15-2-1980 to the date of judgment of this Court and subsequently till 4-4-1983, the counter affidavits of Opposite parties nos.1 to 3 make a common defence. It is urged that eversince the applicant was relieved from his post on 15-2-1980, the applicant did not report for duty as routine grade clerk. It is said that since the applicant did not work as a routine grade clerk, he was not entitled to any salary because no salary can be paid during the period when an employee does not work at all. It is said that since the applicant did not work as a routine grade clerk, he was not entitled to any salary because no salary can be paid during the period when an employee does not work at all. It is also urged that, in any case, Opposite parties nos.1 to 3 bonafide believed that the applicant was not entitled to the salary during the period in question because he had been required by this Court's interim order dated 21-7-1980, extracted above, to discharge his duties as routine grade clerk. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that although the impugned order dated 15-2-1980, had deprived him of his post as stenographer, it had not specifically assigned a post of routine grade clerk to him. It was further stated in Para 16 of the applicant's rejoinder affidavit dated 27-10-1983 that the applicant had made four applications between 25-7-1980 to 9-9-1982 (including a registered post application dated 23-2-1981) to the Superintending Engineer, then holding office, requesting for specific posting as routine grade clerk, but that was not done. In reply to this averment in the applicant's rejoinder affidavit, Opposite party no. 3 filed a supplementary counter affidavit dated 1-12-1983, but it did not make any specific denial of the applicant's averment of making the four applications above mentioned. 9. The reversion order dated 15-2-1980 leaves no manner of doubt that while it specified that Km. Kanchan Sharma would take charge of the post of Stenographer held by the applicant, it simply said that the applicant "would be absorbed on the post of routine grade clerk in the Organization. ' This could not constitute a specific assignment of any particular post of routine grade clerk to the applicant. It is also established that no particular post of routine grade clerk was ever assigned to the applicant despite repeated requests by the applicant to be assigned one. In these circumstances, there was no question of the applicant being able to work on any post since after he was relieved in consequence of the impugned order of reversion dated 15-2-1980. Opposite parties nos.1 to 3 have, therefore, no excuse to refuse salary of the applicant for the period from 15-2-1980. 10. In these circumstances, there was no question of the applicant being able to work on any post since after he was relieved in consequence of the impugned order of reversion dated 15-2-1980. Opposite parties nos.1 to 3 have, therefore, no excuse to refuse salary of the applicant for the period from 15-2-1980. 10. In this connection learned counsel for the applicant emphasises that the opposite parties had obtained opinion of the Law Officer of the department as also of the Law Department of the State Government, who both had advised that in view of the fact that no specific post of the routine grade clerk was ever assigned to the applicant, the latter must have been paid his salary for the entire period since 15-2-1980 and the question of the applicant's working or not working as a routine grade clerk, in the meantime, did not arise at all. Learned counsel for opposite parties objected to the consideration of this opinion of their Law Officers on the ground that it was a privileged communication ; and that according to them, it would indicate the oblique and unfair conduct of the applicant as government servant. Communications in the nature of the legal advice are dealt with in Sections 126 and 129 of the Evidence Act. Section 126 is inapplicable because a departmental Law Officer does not fall into any of the categories set forth there. The advice of the Law Officer/Law Department is certainly privileged to a limited extent under Section 129 of the Evidence Act and cannot be looked into as a piece of evidence. It is totally privileged if the person obtaining it does not intended to offer it as evidence. The intention to offer it as evidence may appear from his using it in his affidavit or appearing as a witness. That may be the position when he pleads bona fide action on the basis of legal advice. In such cases, Section 129 of the Evidence Act authorises the court to compel disclosure thereof in order to explain the evidence tendered. Where the person does not rely upon legal advice, there can be no compulsory disclosure ; after all, the ultimate responsibility of taking the decision rests on the said person. In the present case, the legal advice was totally privileged. Where the person does not rely upon legal advice, there can be no compulsory disclosure ; after all, the ultimate responsibility of taking the decision rests on the said person. In the present case, the legal advice was totally privileged. The fact that the applicant has been able to procure copies of the advice and filed them, in these proceedings does indicate that he has tried to approach quarters whom he was barred from approaching as a part of his conduct as a government servant ; but, that does not affect the responsibility of Opposite parties nos.1 tol 3. The applicant had specifically approached the then Superintending Engineer of the Organization by letters dated 25-7-1980 (Annexure-24), 23-2-1981 (registered letter Annexure-25) and 23-10-1981 (Annexure-26). The noticeable feature is that none of these letters is by name and it has not been specifically stated by the applicant whether the Superintending Engineer to whom these letters were addressed are any of Opposite parties nos.2 and 3. Even so, the fact remains that the applicant had made demand to the appropriate authorities for assignment of a particular post of routine grade clerk and that was not done by them. In any case, the opposite parties had applied their mind to the interim order passed by this Court and should have been able to appreciate that the applicant was not in a position to join as routine grade clerk because, in terms, the impugned reversion order had only visualised that the applicant would be absorbed as routine grade clerk in the Organization an act which was still to follow and had not been accomplished. 11. Learned counsel for the opposite parties then says that during the pendency of these contempt proceedings a bank draft for Rs. 26,908-80 was delivered to the applicant in this Court on 22-5-1985 as salary from 18-2-1980 to 3-4-1983. The submission is that the order of the Court has been carried out by the opposite parties. Learned counsel for the applicant says that the bank draft does not cover the entire amount which is payable to the applicant, but that is outside the scope of these proceedings as the controversy seems to concern certain revisions of pay under the orders of the State Government from time to time. Learned counsel for the applicant says that the bank draft does not cover the entire amount which is payable to the applicant, but that is outside the scope of these proceedings as the controversy seems to concern certain revisions of pay under the orders of the State Government from time to time. The applicant may have his forum elsewhere in those matters ; but there is substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the payment of the amount by delivery of the bank draft on 22-5-1985, after the show-cause notice had been issued by this Court on 17-8-1983, may be an extenuating circumstance but is not an exonerating circumstance. On a consideration of all the matters carefully, T am satisfied that opposite parties nos.2 and 3 have wilfully disobeyed the order of this Court. 12. The position in respect of Opposite party no. 1 seems to be slightly different. Although he has set up the same defence as Opposite parties nos.2 and 3, demand of payment of salary does not appear to have been made from him. The demand had been made from Opposite parties nos.2 and 3 vide Annexure-7 dated 30-4-1983, Annexure-14-A dated 2-6-1983 and Annexure-18 dated 14-7-1983. On the matter which had been referred to Opposite party no. 1 by Opposite party 2, the former had straight away passed an order of transfer of Km. Kanchan Sharma by Annexure-12 with a direction to post the applicant in her place. Although in his letter dated 20-4-1983, Annexure-4, Opposite party no. 2 had requested Opposite party no. 1 " to take appropriate action to comply with the orders of the High Court, " of which a photostat copy was annexed, the emphasis therein was particularly upon the question of taking of charge by the applicant on same post. If, Opposite party no. 1 had paid a little closer attention to the copy of the judgment of High Court, perhaps he would have also ordered payment of the applicant's salary as indeed he had passed order dated 28-5-1983 posting the applicant to the post of the stenographer. Even in the letter dated 9-5-1983, Annexure-10, of Opposite party no. 2, addressed to the Secretary to the Government in the Irrigation Department and copy endorsed to Opposite party no. Even in the letter dated 9-5-1983, Annexure-10, of Opposite party no. 2, addressed to the Secretary to the Government in the Irrigation Department and copy endorsed to Opposite party no. 1, information was sought regarding the opinion of the Standing counsel of the government so that a decision could be taken on the question of the applicant's joining a post ; there was no particular reference to the question of payment of salary. In these circumstances, the failure of Opposite party no. 1 to direct payment of salary of the applicant does not seem to be wilful; it may be negligent. A mere negligent disobedience would not amount to defiance of the Court's order-see the case of Ram Dular v. A. P. Singh, 1966 AWR 759 (H. C). His support to the stand taken by the Superintending Engineer i.e., Opposite parties nos.2 and 3, on the matter of salary, is only mis-informed and misguided. In these circumstances, the apology tendered by him may justly be accepted and the notice to him may be discharged. Explanation to Section 12 (1) of Contempt of Courts Act 1971 bars the rejection of an apology only on the ground that it is conditional. The following observation of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of State v. S. N. Dikshit, 1973 CrLJ 1211 (at page 1218) is noticeable :- "Prior to this provision even where an apology was tendered at the earliest opportunity the courts frequently rejected the same on the ground that it was not unequivocal or was conditional. That power of the court has now been taken away by the explanation. But the court is not bound even under the new provision to accept a conditional apology in all circumstances." Though the apology may not be accepted, it may be taken into consideration for the purposes of sentence. Certain circumstances in this connection are noticeable. 13. The applicant, having reported for duty on 4-4-1983, demanded payment of his current salary by letters addressed to Opposite party no. 2, Annexures-7 and 14-A dated 30-4-1983 and 2-6-1983. It is not shown that Opposite party no. 2 took any action to enable the applicant to receive his salary. On 14-7-1983 the applicant made demand by letter, Annexure-18, both in respect of his current salary and the past salary. Here again, Opposite party no. 3 does not appear to have acted promptly. It is not shown that Opposite party no. 2 took any action to enable the applicant to receive his salary. On 14-7-1983 the applicant made demand by letter, Annexure-18, both in respect of his current salary and the past salary. Here again, Opposite party no. 3 does not appear to have acted promptly. A plain reading of this Court's interim order, dated 21-7-1980, would have shown that the applicant, if as succeeded in his writ petition, was entitled to receive difference in pay as stenographer and as routine grade clerk ; a plain reading of the final order dated 31-3-L983 would have shown that the applicant was entitled to receive his salary and other consequential benefits in view of the order dated 15-2-1980 of his reversion having been quashed by the Court. The minimum that the Opposite parties nos.2 and 3 were expected to do was to direct payment of the salary of the applicant although calculation of salary might have waited. The applicant had claimed revision of his pay since July 1979 ; and it would certainly have taken some time to work out the actual amount which was payable to the applicant till 4-4-1983. In the case of Union of India v. S. C.Sharma, (1980) 2 SCC 144 it has been observed that time is bound to be taken in reinstating a dismissed employee with back wages over a long period of time as orders have to be obtained at various levels, files to move and notings to be made before implementation. Due consideration to this natural lapse of time has to be made by the court. But, it is one thing to say that it would take some time to work out the salary payable to a person, and another to go on defaulting in considering whether any salary has at all to be paid despite the clear orders of the Court declaring the right to receive the pay. This is not a case where Opposite parties nos. 2 and 3 directed that the applicant's salary be paid, but the office routine took time to do the needful. No doubt, delay in carrying out orders of the Court also constitutes punishable contempt. This is not a case where Opposite parties nos. 2 and 3 directed that the applicant's salary be paid, but the office routine took time to do the needful. No doubt, delay in carrying out orders of the Court also constitutes punishable contempt. The responsibility of an officer, flowing from the directions of the Court, consists not merely in the performance of the orders of the Court, but in performing it "forthwith and without avoidable delay." The case of Aligarh Municipal Board v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union, 1970 CrLJ 1520 SC may be seen in this connection. The decision would also show that a person, who is officially responsible for compliance with a direction, after being apprised of the direction, either prevents compliance or fails to take appropriate action for performance of the duty of obeying the order is guilty of disobedience and may be punished for contempt. In this case, not only requisite steps for payment of the salary of the applicant had not been taken by Opposite parties nos.2 and 3, but when they ultimately found it necessary to make payment, they took almost two years to do so during the pendency of these proceedings. No justification or cause for this delay is made out. 14. At the same time, the applicant himself appears to have lost patience and made certain communications to his officers which were not quite becoming or appropriate. In his letter, dated 20-4-1983, Annexure-5, he stated in Para 10 that according to the judgment of the High Court Km. Kanchan Sharma was to vacate the post for him, that in the light of the judgment she had no right to adhere to, what he described, " my place and post of stenographer. " He described his so-called right to hold the said post as his fundamental right and demanded orders of his posting immediately " for my old place and post of stenographer. In his letters dated 30-4-1983, Annexure-8 and 9, addressed to Opposite party no. 2, he again pressed for his posting to 'his' so-called post and place. By Annexure-6, another letter of the same date, he assumed the function of advising his superior, Opposite party no. 2, to pervent some officers from spoiling the good administration and discipline of his office. The judgment of the High Court did not say that the appointment of Km. By Annexure-6, another letter of the same date, he assumed the function of advising his superior, Opposite party no. 2, to pervent some officers from spoiling the good administration and discipline of his office. The judgment of the High Court did not say that the appointment of Km. Kanchan Sharma was illegal ; her appointment was not quashed. She was not even a party to the writ petition. The applicant could be entitled either to the post held by Km. Kanchan Sharma or an equivalent post, he had no business to pester his officers for being posted on the very post held by Km. Kanchan Sharma and no other. As already indicated, he started reaching for the opinions of the department's Law Officers and indicated in his letter dated 12-5-1983, Annexure-11, that the Law Officer of the Irrigation Department as well as the standing counsel of High Court had advised that he must be allowed to join on his initial post where he was working on 14-2-1980. This kind of a conduct of a subordinate official would have partially contributed to a stiffening in the attitude of the officers. The situation, however, could not have justified the opposite parties to adopt a palpably untenable stand in respect of the order to delay the compliance of the orders of the Court beyond a reasonable time. On a consideration of all the circumstances and features of the case, I am not inclined to accept the apology tendered by Opposite parties nos.2 and 3 and to discharge them on that basis. Benefit of the apology may be given to Opposite parties nos.2 and 3 only to the extent of remission of the punishment that may be awarded to them as contemplated by the Proviso to Section 12 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971. 15. For the reasons stated above, the notices issued to Opposite party no. 1, Sri Naresh Chandra Jain, and Opposite party no. 4, Sri Girish Chandra, are quashed. 16. Opposite party no. 2 Sri Shyam Behari Lal Gupta and Opposite party no. 3 Sri M. L. Sahdev, are held guilty of committing contempt of court and each one of them is punished to pay a fine of Rs. 200/-; but in view of their apologies and the applicant's conduct the payment of fine is remitted.