ORDER 1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 20th May, 1985 contained in Annexure 3 to the writ petition by which Civil Judge, Malihabad, Lucknow allowed the application moved by the opposite party No. 2 Siddiquie Ahmad, on 21-5-1985 for restitution of possession to him over the premises in suit namely, House No. 52, Subhas Marg, Chheda Khawaspura, Lucknow of which he was a tenant. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner Smt. Harnam Kaur who is the owner-landlady of the aforesaid premises, filed a petition under S. 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act) for short, `the Act', seeking eviction of the opposite party No. 2 who was in occupation of the premises as tenant thereof. The ground on which the ejectment of opposite party No. 2 was sought was that the petitioner, required the said premises on the ground of bona fide needs for self-occupation. It appears that treating the service of notice on opposite party No. 2 to be sufficient, the Prescribed Authority (Civil Judge, Mohanlalganj), Lucknow proceeded ex parte against him and by order, dated 28th July, 1982 the shop in question bearing House No. 52, Subhas Marg, Chheda Khawaspura, Lucknow was released in favour of the petitioner and in execution of the said order passed by the Prescribed Authority, the petitioner obtained possession of the premises in question on 4th Dec. 1982. Opposite party No. 2 thereupon moved an application for restoration on 9th Dec. 1982 and asserted that no notice was served on him nor he had any knowledge of those proceedings. This application was opposed by the petitioner. After hearing both the parties, the application for restoration moved by the opposite party No. 2 was allowed on payment of Rs. 30/- as costs, vide order dated 20th May, 1985 and the ex parte order dated 28th July, 1982 was set aside. Since the awarded costs were not accepted by the petitioner, the opposite party No. 2 had deposited the same in court. 30/- as costs, vide order dated 20th May, 1985 and the ex parte order dated 28th July, 1982 was set aside. Since the awarded costs were not accepted by the petitioner, the opposite party No. 2 had deposited the same in court. The opposite party No. 2 thereupon moved an application on 23-5-1985 for restitution and prayed that he be put back into possession over the premises in question as the ex parte order dated 20th July, 1982 has been set aside on the basis of which the petitioner had obtained possession in execution of that order. This application has been allowed by the opposite party No. 1 vide order dated 29th May, 1985 contained in Annexure 3. Petitioner has challenged this order in this writ petition and has prayed for quashing the same. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri P. K. Khare, Advocate, urged that while setting aside the ex parte order dated 20th July, 1982, the Prescribed Authority has not considered that the opposite party No. 2 was served `by refusal' as was endorsed by the postman on the notice. Learned counsel further contended that since the postman was not examined in this case, and, as such, the burden to establish that the notice was not served, lay heavily on opposite party No. 2, which he had failed to discharge. I am unable to agree with this contention. In the affidavit filed by opposite party No. 2 it was averred that no notice was served on the opposite party No. 2. The postman or any Process Server never brought the notice or summons to the opponent nor did he ever refused to accept the notice. The endorsement of refusal of notice is forged and the same has been obtained in conspiracy with Vijai Kumar and others as the deponent never met with the Postman nor any Process Server nor he had any occasion to see the so-called notices or registered envelope. It has further been averred by the opposite party No. 2 in his affidavit that he had no knowledge of the pendency of the aforesaid case or the execution proceedings thereof till 4-12-1982, when all of a sudden at about 6 P.M. the police of Police Station Naka Hindola, Lucknow came to his place to execute the order dated 28th July, 1982. Since 4-12-1982 was Sunday and so on 6-12-1982 the opposite party No. 2 moved an application for inspection and inspected the records of the case on 8-12-1982. The application for setting aside the order was thereupon filed on 9-12-1982. This application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority, vide order dated 20th May, 1985 on payment of Rs. 30/- with costs. There appears to be no error in that order. This order has also not been challenged in the present writ petition. I, therefore, find no substance in the aforesaid arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the application for restitution moved by the opposite party No. 2 and for putting back into possession over the premises in question was not maintainable because provisions contained in S. 144 of the Civil P.C. have not been made applicable to the proceedings under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 for short `the Act'. Learned counsel referred to R. 22 framed under S. 34(1) (g) of the Act and urged that the District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or the appellate or revising authority, for the purposes of holding any enquiry or hearing in the appeal or revision under the Act, have been vested with the same powers as are vested in the civil courts under the Civil P.C. 1908 when trying a suit, in respect of the matters enumerated under clauses (a) to (e). Referring to R. 22(f) learned counsel urged that it is ultra vires as it travels beyond the rule-making power conferred under S. 41 of the Act. Learned counsel strenuously contended that R. 22(f) falls beyond the rule- making power as it has not been indicated to meet any specific purpose of the Act for which the rule could be validly framed. According to him under S. 41, the State Government may by notification in the gazette make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act, including any rules prescribing fees in respect of any proceedings under this Act. According to him under S. 41, the State Government may by notification in the gazette make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act, including any rules prescribing fees in respect of any proceedings under this Act. Learned counsel thus contended that since under the Act the District Magistrate and the Prescribed Authority or the appellate or revisional authority has not been conferred inherent powers to pass any order, for the ends of justice and, as such, no power could be conferred on these authorities under the rules, as has been done under R. 22(f) of the Rules, which reads as under : "22(f). The power referred to in Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned." According to the learned counsel the said rule is ultra vires being beyond the authority of rule-making power conferred by S. 41, and as such, it could not be resorted to for the purposes of passing the impugned order of restitution dated 29-5-1985 by the Prescribed Authority. In support of his contention learned counsel has placed reliance upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in Chandra Kumar Sah v. The District Judge, AIR 1976 All 328 , wherein it has been held : "The expression 'for purposes of the Act" in Section 41, connotes that the rule which is made under its canopy should be restricted to the same field of operation as that marked out by the Act. The rule-making authority cannot enlarge legislatively that field. As R. 16 (2) contemplates a comparison between the needs of the landlord and the tenant which is not the intention of S. 21, it clearly does not carry out the purposes of this Act and is beyond the rule-making power conferred by S. 41." At the first flash, the argument, no doubt, appears to be attractive, but on a careful scrutiny I find no substance in it. The enforcement of eviction orders, be it ex parte order or on merits, is to be made under S. 23 by the Prescribed Authority. The enforcement of eviction orders, be it ex parte order or on merits, is to be made under S. 23 by the Prescribed Authority. It is provided that the Prescribed Authority may use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary for evicting any tenant against whom any order has been passed under S. 21 of the Act or in appeal under S. 22, as the case may be, or against any other person found in actual occupation. If an ex parte order for eviction is passed against the tenant it can be set aside by the Prescribed Authority on the sufficient cause being shown by the tenant. The power to proceed ex parte in the case and also to set aside an ex parte order has been conferred on the Prescribed Authority as well as on the appellate or revisional authority u/s 22(b) (under R. 22(f)?) of the Rules. If the ex parte order is set aside the question of restitution would inherently arise in the proceedings and thus the restitution has got to be made in exercise of inherent powers and it cannot be refused to be made merely on the ground of want of specific rule on the subject. When an order passed either ex parte or on merits, has been executed, the question of restitution would certainly arise when such order stands subsequently set aside. It would be the duty of the Court to grant restitution under its inherent powers when a person has been evicted from the premises in execution of an eviction order which has been subsequently set aside or modified. The restitution has got to be made under R. 22(f) and this provision cannot be said to travel beyond the scope and purpose of the Act and it cannot be said to be ultra vires as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. In AIR 1975 All 102 (FB), Gangadhar v. Raghubar Dayal this court held that Sec. 144 was not exhaustive and restitution could be granted by the court under its inherent powers. 5. In AIR 1975 All 102 (FB), Gangadhar v. Raghubar Dayal this court held that Sec. 144 was not exhaustive and restitution could be granted by the court under its inherent powers. On the authority of established principle and on the principle contained in the maxim `actus curiae neminem gravabit' it was really the duty of Court to grant restitution under its inherent powers when a person had been deprived of his property due to an order of court which had subsequently been varied or reversed as being erroneous even if such party could not invoke the powers of court u/s 144. 6. Similar view was expressed by a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Puvvada Changayya v. Sub Collector, Ongole AIR 1966 Andh Pra 4, wherein it was held (Para 6) :- "There is an inherent power in every court to grant restitution when justice of the case demands, because court would not be allowed to work injury on the suitors where its order which granted a relief to a person, has been varied or reversed. Where certain actions are taken as a consequence of orders passed which are subject to appeal or are liable to be quashed, the very object of reversing or setting aside these orders is to restore the parties to status quo ante existing at the time when the proceedings commenced." In Ram Prasad Rajgharia v. British Insulated Calender's Cables Ltd., the Divisional Bench of the Calcutta High Court AIR 1954 Cal 13 held : "Though the Rent Controller was not a Court within the meaning of the Civil P.C. and hence S. 144, C.P.C. could not in terms apply to the case, it was manifestly just and proper that the provisions of restitution that are incorporated in S. 144 should apply to the Rent Controller and the amount should be refunded to the tenant." However, learned counsel for the petitioner had referred to a Full Bench decision in this court in Syed Ajaz Ali Khan v. Mohammad Rafiq, AIR 1974 All 178 , wherein while dealing with the question of restoration of occupation under the provisions of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (Act No. 3 of 1947), it was held : "Provisions of Ss. 144 and 151, Civil P.C. apply to Courts only and not to authorities or tribunals. 144 and 151, Civil P.C. apply to Courts only and not to authorities or tribunals. In the absence of an express statutory provisions, an authority or tribunal cannot order restitution ex debito justitiae. The resulting situation may be unfortunate but if there is a lacuna, it would be for the Legislature to provide for the situation." It was further held : "An authority or tribunal of limited jurisdiction not being a Court, can have no inherent power, unless the statute confers such a power on them; and in the absence of any such conferment of power, the authority or tribunal can pass only such orders as the provisions of the Act under which they are created provide for. Special authorities and tribunal are constituted under special statutes and for special objects and, therefore, it is not possible to imply inherent powers in them. Therefore the power to restore occupation der S. 7-A of the U.P. Rent Act by the unauthorised occupant cannot justified by invoking inherent jurisdiction, which does not exist in authorities or tribunal, by relying upon the equitable prie principles of restitution." 7. The aforesaid decision rendered by the Bench in Syed Ajaz Ali Khan's case AIR 1974 All 178 (supra) was considered by Hon'ble A. N. Varma, J. in Kapoor Chand v. Add. District Judge, Agra, 1983 All LJ 133 and in para 7 of the report, it was observed :- "Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, placed strong reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Syed Ajaz Ali Khan v. Mohd. Rafiq, AIR 1974 All 178 . I have examined the case and find it of little assistance. The said authority held that there was no power under U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 to restore possession to a party dispossessed in pursuance of an order passed under that enactment. The Full Bench observed that in the absence of provisions like Ss. 144 and 151 of the Civil P.C. the authorities constituted under that Act cannot claim any such powers. This decision, concerned as it was, with the interpretation of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act which has no corresponding provisions such as one finds under S. 34(1)(g) and S. 34(8) read with R. 22(F), is clearly distinguishable. Under cl. 144 and 151 of the Civil P.C. the authorities constituted under that Act cannot claim any such powers. This decision, concerned as it was, with the interpretation of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act which has no corresponding provisions such as one finds under S. 34(1)(g) and S. 34(8) read with R. 22(F), is clearly distinguishable. Under cl. (1) of R. 22 the authorities constituted under the present enactment have been specifically invested with the powers referred to in Ss. 151 and 152 of the Civil P.C. to make any orders in the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of authorities concerned. These provisions were significantly absent from the predecessor enactment, namely, U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 referred to above. This distinguishes the Full Bench." Further in the above referred case the argument of the learned counsel was also that certain specific provisions of Civil P.C. have been made applicable to the proceedings under this enactment but S. 144 of the Civil P.C. is not among those powers. The Prescribed Authority does not enjoy the powers of the Civil Court under S. 144 of the Civil P.C. This argument was repelled and in para 6 of the report in Kapoor Chand's case (1983 All LJ 133) (Supra) Hon'ble A. N. Varma, J. observed : "It is not necessary for me to dwell on this point at length as the matter stands already concluded by an authoritative pronouncement of this Court in the case of Sheo Kishan Das v. Prescribed Authority, Pilibhit reported in 1980 All Rent Cas 369 : 1980 All LJ 611. In this case a Division Bench of this Court considered the power of the authorities constituted under U.P. Act No. 3 of 1972 to direct restitution of possession at some length. It referred in particular to S.34 and R. 22 of the Rules framed under that Act and upon an analysis of the said provisions came to the conclusion that the authorities constituted under the Act do have power to order restoration of possession by way of restitution. In that case also an ex parte decree had been set aside and in pursuance thereof the landlord had not only taken possession but had proceeded to demolish the building under tenancy altogether. In that case also an ex parte decree had been set aside and in pursuance thereof the landlord had not only taken possession but had proceeded to demolish the building under tenancy altogether. The tenant had approached the Prescribed Authority for relief by way of restitution which was declined by the Prescribed Authority on the ground that he did not enjoy any such powers under the Act. This Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of the Prescribed Authority and held that the Prescribed Authority have power to direct restoration of possession under the aforesaid provisions of the Act." 8. The Division Bench decision of this Court in Sheo Kishan Das v. The Prescribed Authority, Pilibhit 1980 All LJ 611 and in Kapoor Chand's case (1983 All LJ 133) (supra) deal squarely with the controversy at hand and being on all fours I follow the same. I am also in respectful agreement with the statement of law contained therein. 9. It is thus settled that the doctrine of restitution which S. 144, C.P.C. incorporates, is based on the principle that the acts of court should not be allowed to work injury on the suitors. According to doctorine of restitution, the reversal of judgment of court raises an obligation on the party who, receives the benefit of erroneous judgment to make restitution to the other party for what he had lost and it is the duty of the court to enforce that obligation. The obligation arises automatically on the reversal or modification of the decree or order and necessarily carries with it the right of restitution of all that has been done in execution of the erroneous decree or order passed in any suit, or proceedings or in appeal or revision, and the court in making restitution is bound to restore the parties to the same position in which they were in at the time when the court by its erroneous action had displaced them. Broadly speaking, it is the right of a party to be placed in the same position which he occupied before the decree or order which has subsequently been varied or reversed. The successful party in restoration proceedings is entitled to be restored to property free from all incumbrances and restitution should be enforced not only against the party but also against persons deriving title from him or holding under him or on his behalf. The successful party in restoration proceedings is entitled to be restored to property free from all incumbrances and restitution should be enforced not only against the party but also against persons deriving title from him or holding under him or on his behalf. 10. The aforesaid R. 22(f) permits the authorities under the Act to exercise power in Ss. 151 and 152 of the Civil P.C. and to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of law. 11. The above rule specifically entitles the authorities under the Act to exercise powers for the ends of justice. The doctrine of restitution as contained in S. 144 is not exhaustive and restitution can be granted by the court under its inherent power. It is really the duty of the Court to grant restitution under the inherent powers when a person has been deprived of his property due to an order of Court which has subsequently been varied or reversed. 12. In view of the above I do not find any error of fact, law or jurisdiction in the impugned order of restitution dated 29-5-1985 passed by the opposite party No. 1. No interference is called for by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.