JUDGMENT P. D. Desai, C. J.- On August 8, 1977, a disciplinary proceeding was commenced against the petitioner, who was, at the material time hi District Manager of the respondent-Bank (The Himachal Pradesh State Co-operative Bank Ltd.) at Chamba, on the basis of a list of charges Annexure-A. The charges, briefly stated, were : (1) that the petitioner had delivered pledged stock of cigarettes against the cash credit account of a client without receiving consideration or without information knowledge and/or approval of the competent authority ; (2) that he had subsequently managed to obtain a mortgage over the immovable property of one of the partners of the said client in order to secure the advance contrary to the bye-laws and without information, knowledge and/or permission of the competent authority ; (3) that he had accepted unapproved securities to secure the advance without prior approval and knowledge of the competent authority ; and (4) that he had failed to inform the competent authority regarding" the factual position of.............the pledged godowns in a proper systematic way" when he took over as Manager- One Mr B.S.Chauhan a Director of the respondent-Bank, was appointed a< the Inquiry Officer by a letter dated November 21, 1977 issued b? the General Manager of the respondent-Bank. The Inquiry Officer held the disciplinary inquiry in the months of July and October, 1978 and November, 1979 and submitted his report on November 20, 1979, Annexure-B. The Inquiry Officer found that the petitioner was negligent in the discharge of his duties in that he failed to acquaint the competent authority with the prevailing position of the account of the said client at the time of his taking over charge and in further allowing the operation of the account without consideration. He, however, further found that "the plus point" in favour of the petitioner was that, firstly, he obtained a mortgage of the immovable property as well as additional securities to secure the advanced amount and, secondly, he did not allow the debit balance in the account to increase from the level at which it stood at the time of his taking over. The report of the Inquiry Officer was placed before the Board of Directors of the respondent-Bank at its meeting held on December 21, 1979. The report of the Inquiry Officer was placed before the Board of Directors of the respondent-Bank at its meeting held on December 21, 1979. The Board, as a result of its deliberations, found the petitioner guilty of "grave misconduct" and, in exercise of the powers vested in it under Service Rule No. 21, resolved to dismiss the petitioner from service with immediate effect, vide Annexure-D. Pursuant to the decision of the Board, a formal order dismissing the petitioner from service was passed on the same day, that is, December 21, 1979, vide Annexure-E. The petitioner was consequently relieved on the next day, that is, December 22, 1979. 2. The petitioner filed a review application which was considered by the Board of Directors in its meeting held on February 18, 1980. The Board decided that in case the petitioner was prepared to vacate the post voluntarily by tendering his resignation, the orders of dismissal be modified accordingly, that is, the petitioner be treated as having vacated his post voluntarily by tendering resignation. The decision was conveyed to the petitioner but he did not accept the offer. The order of dismissal, therefore, held the field. 3. The petitioner challanged the order of dismissal by way of an appeal preferred before the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Himachal Pradesh, under Service Rule No. 28 on or about February 18, 1980. The appeal remained pending with the said authority till the present petition was initially instituted on April 30, 1985. The appeal was ultimately disposed of by the Additional Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Himachal Pradesh, on July 1, 1985 pursuant to the interim directions issued by this Court. The appeal was dismissed. The petition was thereafter amended and the order of dismissal as well as that of the Appellate Authority are now under chalenge herein. 4. Several challanges have been levelled in the petition against the impugned orders. It is, however, not necessary to examine the validity of all of them because, in our opinion, the petitioner is entitled to succeed on the ground that the impugned dismissal has been ordered without affording to him a reasonable opportunity to defend in the course of the disciplinary proceedings held against him and the rules of natural justice have been thus violated. 5. 5. It is not in dispute that the only evidence against the petitioner in the course of the disciplinary proceedings consisted of a statement of the Presenting Officer, Mr. R. L. Sharma, which was recorded by the Inquiry Officer on July 11, 1978 and a few other documents. Apart from the question whether the Presenting ^Officer could have validity changed the role and turned into a witness in the course of the disciplinary proceedings, the fatal invalidity which attaches to the statement being treated as evidence is that the petitioner is not shown to have been afforded an opportunity to cross examination the Presenting Officer in respect of his statement. The original record of the inquiry, which was shown to us, does not show that at any point of time, the Presenting Officer was offered for cross-examination to the petitioner. True it is that the statement of the Presenting Officer recorded by the Inquiry Officer bears at the foot the signature of the petitioner. However, the mere act of appending the signature by the petitioner at the foot of the statement is not indicative of an admission on his part of the truth of the statement since he was vigorously contesting the charges levelled against him. Under the circumstances, it was necessary to afford to the petitioner an opportunity to correct or controvert the said statement, inter alia, by cross-examination of the Presenting Officer. 6 In Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 3C0, the question was as to what is the content of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against a Government servant under Articles 311 (2) of the Constitution. 6 In Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 3C0, the question was as to what is the content of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against a Government servant under Articles 311 (2) of the Constitution. It was there held that a reasonable opportunity envisaged to the Government servant by the provision contained in Article 311 (2) includes ; (a) an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him and the allegations on which such charges are based ; (b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence ; and finally (c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the inquiry is over and after supplying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the Government servant tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to the Government servant, 7. Though the aforesaid dicta have been laid down in the context of Article 311 (2) prior to its amendment by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 and they pertain to a disciplinary inquiry against a Government servant, the principles enunciated in propositions (a) and (b) are nevertheless applicable with equal force to a disciplinary inquiry conducted against an employee by any employer since no order adverse to the employee can be made consequent upon such inquiry except after affording to the concerned employee a reasonable opportunity to defend himself In the present case, we are concerned with the proposition (b), namely, the affording of an opportunity to the employee to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced by the department against him and in view of the fact that no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to cross-examine the Presenting Officer, in connection with his statement recorded by the Inquiry Officer, there is no manner of doubt that there was a clear denial of a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself The vice which thus attaches to the inquiry proceedings has been accentuated by the fact that the documentary evidence that has been used against the petitioner is also not shown to have been legally brought on the record of the case. The Inquiry Officer appears to have straightaway taken those documents on record without those documents having been formally produced before him by their author (s) and without, in any case, affording a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to meet with the material contained in those documents, although they were used against him in the course of the disciplinary inquiry, by cross-examining the person (s) concerned. It is thus manifast that there has been a grave breach of rules of natural justice in the course of the disciplinary inquiry. 8, These, however, are not the only fatal infirmities. There is one more to which reference needs to be made. It is thus manifast that there has been a grave breach of rules of natural justice in the course of the disciplinary inquiry. 8, These, however, are not the only fatal infirmities. There is one more to which reference needs to be made. When the report of the Inquiry Officer was placed before the Board of Directors of the respondent-Bank in its meeting held on December 21, 1975, a memorandum was circulated which was taken into consideration by the Board, The memorandum contained a reference to certain matters which were extraneous and which travelled beyond the charges held proved against the petitioner and those matters were referred to in order to recommend that no "soft line" should be adopted in the matter of imposition of penalty upon the petitioner. The relevant portion of the memorandum is extracted hereinbelow to appreciate the point: "But if this were the only case of grave negligence and dereliction of duty on the part of Sh. I. D. Gupta, a recommendation to the Board of Directors to spare him with a comparatively minor punishment would have been in order. However, in view of several other instances of rank inefficiency bordering on callousness towards duty and utterlack of foresightedness in discharge of duties as a District Manager on his part which have been noticed in the recent past and which are dealt with in next paragraphs it does not seem proper to adopt a soft line in this case too." The memorandum then proceeded to list those other instances of alleged inefficiency, etc. on the part of the petitioner and concluded: "In view of the aforesaid instances of grave negligence, rank inefficiency and dereliction of duty on the part of Shri I. D. Gupta, it is very difficult to adopt any lenient attitude towards him." 9. In State of Mysore v. K. Mancha Gowda, AIR 1964 SC 506, the question was whether the earlier acts of commission or omission on the part of a delinquent Government servant could be taken into consideration in the matter of imposition of penalty without disclosing those facts to him and without affording to him a reasonable opportunity to explain those circumstances at the stage of the second opportunity required to be afforded xo him under Article 311 (2) prior to its amendment. While upholding the contention that since the second show cause notice did not mention that the previous punishments imposed on the delinquent were intended to be taken into consideration in proposing to dismiss him from service, there was a denial of a reasonable opportunity within the meaning of Article 311 (2), it was observed as follows: "If the proposed punishment was mainly based upon the previous record of a Government servant and that was not disclosed in then notice, it would mean that the main reason for the proposed punishment was with held from the knowledge of the Government servant. It would be no answer to suggest that every Government servant must have had knowledge of the fact that his past record would necessarily be taken into consideration by the Government in inflicting punishment on him; nor would it be an adequate answer to say that he knew as a matter of fact that the earlier punishments were imposed on him or that he knew of his past record. This contention misses the real point, namely, that what the Government servant is entitled to is not the knowledge of certain facts but the fact that those facts will be taken into consideration by the Government in inflicting punishment on him. It is not possible for him to know what period of his past record or what acts or omissions of his in a particular period would be considered. If that fact was brought to his notice, he might explain that he had no knowledge of the remarks of his superior officers, that he had adequate explanation to offer for the alleged remarks or that his conduct subsequent to the remarks had been exemplary or at any rate approved by the superior officers. Even if the authority concerned took into consideration only the facts for which he was punished, it would be open to him to put forward before the said authority many mitigating circumstances or some other explanation why those punishments were given to him or that subsequent to the punishments he had served to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned till the time of the present enquiry. He may have many other explanations. The point is not whether his explanation would be acceptable, but whether he has been given an opportunity to give his explanation. He may have many other explanations. The point is not whether his explanation would be acceptable, but whether he has been given an opportunity to give his explanation. We cannot accept the doctrine of "presumptive knowledge" or that of "purposeless enquiry", as their acceptance will be subversive of the principle of "reasonable opportunity. We, therefore, hold that it is incumbent upon the authority to give the Government servant at the second stage reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment and if the proposed punishment is also based on his previous punishments or his previous had record, this should be included in the second notice so that he may b3 able to give an explanation." 10. The principle underlying these observations would apply to the present case even though the petitioner is not a Government servant and there may not be any stage of the second show cause notice and inspite of the fact that the situation here is reverse since what is sought to be taken into consideration against him is not his previous but subsequent conduct. Unless the matters sought to be relied against him were disclosed to the petitioner and an opportunity was afforded to him to explain why those circumstances should not be taken into consideration against him, those matters could not have been validly taken into consideration. Even from this point of view, therefore, the order imposing the penalty upon the petitioner must be regarded violative of rules of natural justice. 11. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition succeeds and it is allowed. The impugned order of dismissal is declared null and void and as having no effect in the eye of law. Consequently, the petitioner will be deemed to have continued in service as if the impugned order was not passed and he would be entitled to all the consequential benefits. The consequential benefits accordingly becoming available to the petitioner will include the payment of back wages and consideration in the matter of promotion, if any, etc. Those benefits will be worked out on and from December 22, 1979, that is, from the day the petitioner was relieved till the date on which the petitioner attained the age of superannuation, that is November 30, 1983. Those benefits will be worked out on and from December 22, 1979, that is, from the day the petitioner was relieved till the date on which the petitioner attained the age of superannuation, that is November 30, 1983. By an order made on December 10, 1985, an opportunity was afforded to the parties to place on record the material, if any, relating to the engagement, if any, of the petitioner in any alternative income producing employment during the intervening period. The petitioner has accordingly placed on record by way of an affidavit the information that between January 15,1981 and November 30, 1983, he was employed with the Vashisht Alloys, Kala-Amb, District Sirmaur, H. P., and that in all he had received a total sum of Rs. 29,522.10 towards wages, Alongwith the affidavit, the petitioner has produced a certificate dated December 12, 1985 issued by the Vashisht Alloys confirming the version set out by the petitioner in the said affidavit. The respondent-Bank has not placed on record any material showing that the petitioner was gainfully employed during the relevant period nor has it challenged the version of the petitioner as set out in the supplementary affidavit. Under the circumstances, the court directs that while working out the back wages becoming due and payable to the petitioner, a sum of Rs. 29,522.10 will be deducted from the amount becoming due and payable to him towards back wages and that such deduction will be so effected as to correspond in period with the period during which the petitioner was employed with the Vashisht Alloys. The court further directs that the back wages payable in lump sum will be spread over year wise for the entire period between December 22, 1979 and November 30, 1983, after making deduction aforesaid in the corresponding accounting period. The respondent-Bank will bear this direction in mind and will give to the petitioner the benefit of section 89 of the Income-tax, Act, 1961 and Rule 21-A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, so far as the relief of spread over is concerned and the deduction at source on account of income-tax, if any, will be worked out on the said basis. The respondent-Bank will, in case deduction becomes necessary on account of income-tax, take all necessary steps to obtain relief for the petitioner under section 89 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 21-A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. The respondent-Bank will, in case deduction becomes necessary on account of income-tax, take all necessary steps to obtain relief for the petitioner under section 89 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 21-A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. The pensionary benefits becoming due and payable to the petitioner upon his retirement will also be worked out on the footing that he had continued to be in service till the date of his attaining superannuation. All the monetary benefits becoming due and payable to the petitioner in terms of this order will be worked out and paid to him on or before January 31, 1986. 12. The allegations against the petitioner, which were the subject-matter of the disciplinary inquiry, pertained to the period between 1974 and 1977. The petitioner was dismissed from service under the impugned order in December, 1979. Even if he had continued in service, he would have retired on November 30, 1983. The petitioner is now in his sixities. The report of the Inquiry Officer shows that the petitioner had tried to protect the interests of the respondent-Bank by securing the advances against mortgage of immovable property as well as by obtaining security in other forms. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it appears to be just and proper to direct that the disciplinary inquiry in regard to the same subject-matter shall not be resumed or instituted afresh against the petitioner, even if it is permissible so to do in accordance with law. 13. Rule made absolute accordingly. The respondent-Bank will pay the costs of this petition to the petitioner which are quantified at Rs. 350. 14. Before parting with the case, it would not be out of place to mention that when the case was earlier heard, we had expressed the view that this was a fit and proper case in which it was in the best interest of the parties to arrive at a settlement on reasonable terms The Court had then suggested to the parlies: (a) That the petitioner should tender his resignation from service effective from the date of the order of dismissal; (b) That the resignation tendered accordingly shall be accepted and the disciplinary proceedings resulting in the dismissal of the petitioner shall be deemed to have been annulled : and (c) That the petitioner shall be paid a sum of Rs. 75,000 in lump sum in addition to the sum of Rs. 46,297.24 being the amount credited to the provident Fund Account of the petitioner as on June 30, 1985 and interest accruing due on the said amount thereafter till the date of the payment, that is, January 1, 1986. The petitioner expressed his agreement to abide by the formula suggested by us in order to finally settle the dispute on the said basis. Time was applied for and granted to the respondent-Bank in order to consider the proposal which, according to its counsel, was in the best interest of the Bank and worthy of acceptance (vide : interim order dated November 11, 1985), On December 10, 1985 we were informed that the respondent-Bank found itself unable to accept the suggestion made by us. Under these circumstances, the matter has been disposed of on merits in accordance with law, 15. Mr. P. A. Sharma, who was appointed amicus curiae, has rendered valuable assistance to the Court and the Court places on record its sense of appreciation for the services rendered by him. Petition allowed.