JUDGMENT K. Nath, J. - The plaintiffapplicant Smt. Prem Lata Bhargava is the ownerlandlord of a building, Roop Narain Gupta, the defendantopposite party is the tenant of the open roof of The building. The roof was leased out on 181267 whereon the opposite party made certain permanent structures with the consent of the applicant. 2. On 1578 the plaintiff filed a small cause court suit for ejectment of the opposite party and for the recovery of arrears of rent from 1178 to 30478 as also for pendente lite and future damages. Among the various points raised by the opposite parties, benefit of Section 29A of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 13 of 1972 was sought. When the case was taken up for hearing on 18584, a statement in the nature of settlement, as contained in Annexure 1 to the counter affidavit in this revision, was made by the counsel for both the parties. The important features of this statement may be stated as follows : (i) Parties agreed that Section 29A of U. P. Act 13 of 1972 was applicable for the purposes of the suit. (ii) In view of subsection (1) and (2) of Section 29A aforesaid, rent payable by the opposite party was to be fixed at the rate of 10 per cent of the market value. (iii) The market value was to be determined in accordance with Section 29A (6) of the Act. (iv) The rent was to be fixed for the period from 1178. (v) All other pleas were specifically given up. 3. Among the issues framed, issue No. 11 concerned determination of market value. Both the parties obtained the reports of the experts who are the retired Chief Engineers of the Government of U. P. and produced oral evidence. On a consideration of the evidence the lower court held the value of the land to be Rs. 2,96,215/ and on that basis fixed the payable rate of rent to be 2, 468/ per month with effect from 1178. The court below dismissed the suit on 29584 for ejectment but decreed it for recovery of rent at the rate of Rs. 2,468/ per month for the period from 1178 to 30478. 4. During the pendency of this revision C.M. application No. 40(M) of 1985 was made requesting that the defendantopposite party be directed to deposit a sum of Rs. The court below dismissed the suit on 29584 for ejectment but decreed it for recovery of rent at the rate of Rs. 2,468/ per month for the period from 1178 to 30478. 4. During the pendency of this revision C.M. application No. 40(M) of 1985 was made requesting that the defendantopposite party be directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 2,09,760/ within 15 days being the amount payable according to the lower court decree for the period from 1178 to 31st January, 1985. In the counter affidavit, it was pointed out that rent at the rate of Rs. 500/ per month (the rate originally agreed between the parties prior to the filing of the suit) had been deposited in the lower court for the period fro n 1176 to 30684 and that the opposite party had always been willing eversince the decision of the lower court to pay the amount fixed by the lower court. It was also pointed out that that revision itself is not maintainable. When these applications came up for hearing, it transpired that the matter involved in the applications substantially arose in the main revision itself. The main question relates to the application and effect of Section 29A of the U. P. Act 13 of 1972. The hearing of the matter, therefore, was postponed and it was indicated that the case itself was likely to be disposed of on merits. The learned counsel for both the parties have advanced the arguments on the merits of the revision. 5. The first point urged by the learned counsel for the applicant is that the determination of rent by the court below is erroneous because it has not considered the evidence and has based it on the mean of the amounts calculated by the two Engineer Experts. The contention cannot be accepted. The learned small cause court has discussed the evidence of both the parties in detail and has recorded sound reason for the rate fixed by him. Within the limit of the scope of a revision, it is not possible to reanalyse the evidence and determine the race here. 6. The next point raised by the learned counsel for the applicant is that the value of the first floor area, which is in dispute, could have been fixed at the rate of 40 per cent of the value of the ground floor area, which is not in dispute. 6. The next point raised by the learned counsel for the applicant is that the value of the first floor area, which is in dispute, could have been fixed at the rate of 40 per cent of the value of the ground floor area, which is not in dispute. There would have been some substance in this contention but for the fact that the experts on both the sides have stated that ratio to be the proper basis for fixing the value of land for the purposes of Section 29A of the Act. Since both the plaintiff and the defendant relied upon the evidence and opinion of their Experts, and both the Experts have stated in common that the proper basis for fixing the value of the first floor area (including the second floor area) ought to be 40 per cent of the value of the ground floor area, there could be no reason for the lower court to depart from that basis. The learned counsel for the applicant contended that there can be no estoppel against the statute. So far as it goes, the proposition is correct, but the learned counsel has not been able to show any statute which prohibits assessment on a basis which is the common agreed basis of the Expertswitness of both the parties. At any rate, the adoption of that basis cannot be held to be illegal nor is capable of being interfered with in the revision. 7. In this connection it is urged that what the lower court was required to determine, was the market value of 'land' and not the market value of the first floor area. It appears to me that for the purposes of this case, as agreed by the parties in their statement dated 18584 before the lower court, the first floor area, which was in dispute, has to be treated as land. The expression 'land' has not been defined in U.P. Act 13 of 1972. Subsection (1) of Section 29A stipulates that for the purposes of Section 29A the word 'land' is to be read for the word 'building' in the definitions of the expressions 'tenant' and 'landlord' in Section 3 clauses (a) and (j) respectively of the Act. The expressions 'tenant' and 'landlord' as defined in clauses (a) and (j) of Section 3 of the Act refer to building in respect of which rent is payable. The expressions 'tenant' and 'landlord' as defined in clauses (a) and (j) of Section 3 of the Act refer to building in respect of which rent is payable. For the purposes of Section 29A it would refer to land for which rent is payable. The only land for which rent is payable in this case is the first floor area. The court below, therefore, correctly evaluated in the first floor area as contradistinguished from the groundfloor area. 8. The last point urged by the counsel for the applicant is that under Section 29A (6) of the Act the tenant was required to make a 'payment' of the amount and since that was not done, the protection of that section could not be available. The learned counsel for the opposite party points out that the court below did not fix a time during which the amount was to be paid or deposited by the defendantopposite party and, therefore, it could not be done. 9. Subsection (6) (a) of Section 29A speaks of a suit or appeal or other proceeding pending immediately before the commencement of that section and requires that the tenant within a period of three months from the commencement of this section by an application to the court, unconditionally offers to pay to the landlord, the enhanced rate of rent of the land for the entire period in suit and onwards at the rate of ten percent per annum of the prevailing market value of the land together with costs of the suit (including costs of any appeal or of any execution or their proceedings). The period of three months, it is obvious, is to apply to the cases pending on the date of the commencement of Section 29A. This is not a case of that type and, therefore, the duration fixed therein cannot be made applicable. It may be mentioned here that under subsection (2) of Section 29A the provisions of Section 29A have been made applicable to land let out, either before or after the commencement of the section. The parties had agreed, as stated earlier, before the lower court on 18584 that the provisions of Section 29A would be applicable for the purposes of the suit. Section 29A does not lay down any other specific period during which a tenant was expected to deposit the amount. The parties had agreed, as stated earlier, before the lower court on 18584 that the provisions of Section 29A would be applicable for the purposes of the suit. Section 29A does not lay down any other specific period during which a tenant was expected to deposit the amount. Clause (c) of Section 29A(6), on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the applicant runs as follows : (c) Upon payment against a receipt duly signed by the plaintiff or decreeholder or his counsel for deposit in court of such enhanced rent with costs as aforesaid made by the tenant within such time as the court may fix in this behalf, the court shall dismiss the suit, or, as the case may be, discharge the decree for eviction, and the tenancy thereafter, shall continue annually on the basis of rent so enhanced. 10. The counsel for the applicant says that the provision requires the tenant to make an actual payment to the landlord against a receipt duly signed by the landlord or his counsel. He says that since the tenant has not made the payment, he should not have been entitled to the benefit of Section 29A of the Act. He has referred to the case of Smt. Riazi Begum v. Adarsh Kumar Jauhari (1985 Allahabad Law Journal 680). However, clause (c) aforesaid stipulates the alternative of ''deposit in court of such enhanced rent with costs as aforesaid made by the tenant within such time as the court may fix in this behalf. It is obvious that in this case the rate of rent payable by the tenant to the landlord was still to be determined by the court, and since the rate to be determined was the amount to be paid, it could have been paid subsequently for which purpose the court was necessarily to fix an appropriate time under the clause. It would have been impossible for the tenant to pay an amount which was not known, and even when the amount was made known by determination by the court, it could not be expected to be paid then and there. The statute contemplates the fixation of a period of time by the court itself for the purpose. There is no question, therefore, of the opposite party physically paying or depositing the amount as a condition precedent to have the benefits of Section 29A of the Act. The statute contemplates the fixation of a period of time by the court itself for the purpose. There is no question, therefore, of the opposite party physically paying or depositing the amount as a condition precedent to have the benefits of Section 29A of the Act. The case of Smt. Riazi Begum v. Adarsh Kumar Jauhari (supra) is of no help to the applicant in this connection. 11. The result is that the court below fell into an error for failing to fix a date by which the tenant was required to deposit the rent. It is also clear that the court was required to direct payment of amount not only for the period prior to the filing of the suit but also for the subsequent period upto the date of the decision of the case. It is in these respects that the decision of the lower court requires to be modified and the tenant is to be required to deposit the appropriate amount within a specified time. 12. C.M. Application No. 40(M) of 1985 and the revision are partly allowed and the order passed by court below is set aside. It is directed that the opposite party shall deposit in the court below the entire amount of rent for the period from 1178 to 31st July, 1985 at the rate of Rs. 2,468/ per month plus the applicant's costs in the court below within a period of two months from today. The applicant will be entitled to withdraw the amount from the lower court on representation of a proper application for repayment. 13. In the event of the failure of the opposite party to deposit the amount as aforesaid, the court below shall proceed with the further hearing of the suit as if provisions of Section 29A of U. P. Act 13 of 1972 were not in force for the purposes of the suit. Parties shall bear their costs of this Court. (Partly allowed)