JUDGMENT N.N. Sharma, J. - This is a defendant's appeal directed against the judgment and decree of Sri B. P. Shukla, learned III Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur dated 6th Sept. 1974 who allowed Civil Appeal No. 54 of 1973 and set aside the judgment and decree recorded by Sri S. K. Saxena, learned III Addl. Munsif, Gorakhpur dated 9-1-1973 dismissing Original suit No. 278 of 1971 with costs filed by plaintiff. 2. Respondent was employed by Adhyaksh, Zila Parishad, Gorakhpur by his order dated 18-11-1964 as a paid Apprentice in a clerical establishment of the Zila Parishad on a fixed pay of Rs. 30/- per month plus dearness allowance admissible under the Rules on one year's probation. After completion of probationary period plaintiff became a permanent employee of Zila Parishad and was working as a clerk in the Education Office of the Zila Parishad, Gorakhpur in grade of Rs. 60-3-90-5-120 revised scale Rs. 75-4-95-EB-5-120-EB-6-150 and was getting Rs. 79/- per month besides D.A. as his pay. 3. While plaintiff was working as such he was charge-sheeted by the Adhyaksh Zila Parishad on 30-4-1970 and was later on removed from service by the Mukhya Adhikari Zila Parishad, Gorakhpur on 3-12-1970. That the said order of removal passed by Mukhya Adhikari dated 3-12-1970 was illegal, unconstitutional and void and was not binding on the plaintiff on the grounds set out in para 4 of the plaint. Relief sought was for declaration that the order of removal passed by Mukhya Adhikari Zila Parishad on 3-12-1970 against the plaintiff was illegal unconstitutional and was not binding on the plaintiff and the plaintiff was still in service of Zila Parishad Gorakhpur. Costs of this suit were also claimed. 4. Defence was that Mukhya Adhikari was the appointing authority of the post held by the plaintiff at the time of termination of his service. Plaintiff attempted to embezzle Rs. 3014-15 Pay, by remitting 15 money orders in his name instead of sending the same to Schools. On the report of the Post Master, Zila Parishad made enquiry and then charge-sheeted the plaintiff. When the charges were established, a show cause notice was served on the plaintiff. After giving reasonable opportunity, when charges were proved, the removal order of the plaintiff was passed against the plaintiff. 5. Zila Parishad was superseded and Collector became Adhyaksh and A.D.M. (P) became Mukhya Adhikari. When the charges were established, a show cause notice was served on the plaintiff. After giving reasonable opportunity, when charges were proved, the removal order of the plaintiff was passed against the plaintiff. 5. Zila Parishad was superseded and Collector became Adhyaksh and A.D.M. (P) became Mukhya Adhikari. Then Adhyaksh, Zila Parishad delegated his powers under S. 59(1) of U.P. Kshettra Samities and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam (Act No. XXXIII of 1961) to Mukhya Adhikari for appointment, punishment and dismissal of employee getting pay from Rs. 40/- to 100/-. Mukhya Adhikari was competent authority to remove the plaintiff from his service. The plaintiff according to his statement was getting Rs. 79/- per month as pay at the time of his removal from service so Mukhya Adhikari was competent to remove him from service. Plaintiff was not confirmed. As Adhyaksh, Zila Parishad delegated his powers to Mukhya Adhikari on 14-7-1970, Mukhya Adhikari was competent to serve show cause notice and the order of the removal on the plaintiff. There was no violation of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, nor the aforesaid Article was applicable to employees of Zila Parishad. The order of removal was not mala fide and not against CCS. Rules. Departmental remedy had not been exhausted and no notice was served on Zila Parishad, hence there was no right to institute the suit. 6. Learned Munsif found that in his oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by plaintiff vide Ext. 4 plaintiff was in the pay-scale of Rs. 50-100 at the time of his removal from service. Plaintiff failed to prove that that scale had been revised to Rs. 75-150 as alleged by him. Thus at the time of removal from service plaintiff was running in the pay grade of Rs. 50-100 and so he was well covered by the order of delegation Ext. A-l dated 14-7-1970 which authorised Mukhya Adhikari to remove from service employees running in the grade of Rs. 50-100/-. He further found that provisions of Article 311 of Constitution of India were inapplicable. The order of removal was not mala fide. His services were validly terminated by Mukhya Adhikari after perusing the explanation of'plaintiff vide Exts. A5 and A6. In the result the suit was dismissed with costs. 7. 50-100/-. He further found that provisions of Article 311 of Constitution of India were inapplicable. The order of removal was not mala fide. His services were validly terminated by Mukhya Adhikari after perusing the explanation of'plaintiff vide Exts. A5 and A6. In the result the suit was dismissed with costs. 7. In appeal learned lower appellate court not only considered the oral testimony of P.W. 1 but also took into account the revised pay scale slip filed by plaintiff in the pay scale of Rs. 60-3-90-5-120 to 75-4-95-EB-5-120-EB-6-150 and found that at the time of removal from service he was getting Rs, 79/- as his pay and dearness allowance Rs. 65/- and thus totalling Rs. 144/- per month and his salary inclusive of D.A. exceeded the pay scale of Rs. 100/- and he was not removable by Adhyaksh Zila Parishad. In the result the appeal was allowed and it was held that the order of removal of plaintiff from service was bad and the plaintiff shall be deemed still tobe in continuous service of Zila Parishad. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. On behalf of the appellant my attention was invited to oral and documentary evidence aforesaid and the contention raised was that the learned court below erred in holding that pay was interchangeable with salary. Salary and pay are distinguishable. This distinction was pointed out in V. Srinivasan, v. Padmasini Ammal reported in AIR 1957 Mad 622 relied upon by learned lower appellate court. It was observed at page 622 : It may be that people were so sure that a contention that dearness allowance was not part of the salary would never meet with acceptance by Courts that the contention was never raised so far. It was observed at page 622 : It may be that people were so sure that a contention that dearness allowance was not part of the salary would never meet with acceptance by Courts that the contention was never raised so far. The mere fact that dearness allowance is not `basic pay' means nothing and gives no guidance for the solution of this question for the last many years, ever since the introduction of dearness allowance, there has been a ceaseless agitation all over the country to convert the dearness allowance into basic pay and to make it a permanent thing, and, in some cases, a certain proportion of the dearness allowance has been converted into basic pay but the rest allowed to continue as dearness allowance, or temporary addition to salary so that the State may not be overburdened for all time with the entire charge of the dearness allowance. The character of the dearness allowance differs in no respect from the character of pay, except in its temporary nature, as an addition to pay which may be decreased or increased, according to circumstances, or abolished altogether. Mr. Venkatasubramaniam urged that dearness allowance is intended to meet increased cost of living. That may be so, but, then, pay also is intended to meet the cost of living. The very phrase living wage" will show the basis of the basic pay itself. I am therefore clearly of opinion that `dearness allowance' will be part of a man's salary like acting allowance, when a man is discharging the duties of a higher office for the prescribed period under the rules and is entitled to it. Names may differ, but the character of the payment is the same. Dearness allowance fulfils the very same function as basic pay, and must therefore be deemed to be part of the `salary', unlike travelling allowance, housing allowance, etc. which are meant for particular purpose and are confined to particular occasions, and sometimes is particular areas". Thus there is a distinction between basic pay and salary. Salary included dearness allowance, etc. Such distinction was pointed out in Chandra Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 1968 All LJ 491 relied upon by the court below which reads:- U P. Municipalities Act draws a distinction between the terms `pay' and `salary'. Thus there is a distinction between basic pay and salary. Salary included dearness allowance, etc. Such distinction was pointed out in Chandra Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 1968 All LJ 491 relied upon by the court below which reads:- U P. Municipalities Act draws a distinction between the terms `pay' and `salary'. It uses the word pay along with allowances in Sec. 50(b) and in the context it may be urged that the word pay does not include the allowances that may be payable. But that restricted connotation is not available when the import of the word `salary' used in the Act, specially, in Sec. 75 isconsidered. The word salary used in Sec. 75(a) includes dearness allowance." 10. In P.C. Wadhwa v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1981 SC 1540 : (1981 Lab IC 815) while considering deputation allowance permissible for an I.P.S. Officer who had been sent on deputation to Electricity Board which was a body Wholly or substantially owned by the State Government words `pay and salary' were used with different connotations. 11. It was further argued that under delegated powers Mukhya Adhikari was competent to appoint as well as remove the employees in the pay scale of Rs. 50-100/-revised pay scale Rs. 75-150/-and under such circumstances the learned lower appellate court erred in allowing the appeal on this ground only. It was also successfully pointed out that learned lower appellate court should not have awarded the declaration in the terms sought by the plaintiff and the portion of the declaration "plaintiff continues still to be in the service of Zila Parishad " was not awardable. In this connection reliance was placed on Executive Committee of U.P. State Weare housing Corpn. Lucknow v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, reported in AIR 1970 SC 1244 : (1970 Lab IC 1044) which-posited : "Normally a contract of personal service will not be enforced by an order for specific performance nor will it be open for a servant to refuse to accept the repudiation of a contract of service by his; master and say that the contract has never been terminated. The remedy of the employee is a claim for damages for wrongful dismissal or for breach of contract. The remedy of the employee is a claim for damages for wrongful dismissal or for breach of contract. But when a statutory status is given to an employee and there has been a violation of the provisions of the statute while terminating the services of such an employee, the latter will be eligible to get the relief of a declaration that the order is null and void and that he continues to be in service, as it will not then be a mere case of a servant. The exceptions to the normal rule that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be granted are (1) a public servant who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311(2) reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Law or by Labour or Industrial Tribunals (3) A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligations imposed by statute." 12. Similar view was held in Smt. J. Tiwari v. Smt. Jawala Devi Vidya Mandir reported in AIR 1981 SC 122 . 13. A similar question came up for consideration in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain reported in AIR 1976 SC 888 : (1976 Lab IC 576). It was laid : A contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a Court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and -consent of the employer. This rule, however, is subject to three well recognised exceptions (i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute." 14. In this view of the matter the appeal is allowed. Impugned order is set aside and the case is remitted to the court below for rehearing of the appeal on merits. Costs of this court shall be easy. Send the record at once to the court below for a quick dispatch as the suit is hanging on for so many years.