JUDGMENT D.N. Jha, J. 1. The petitioners have directed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, feeling aggrieved by the order dated 1751978 and the order dated 5121979 passed by the Prescribed Authority and the IInd Addl. Distt. Judge, Faizabad, respectively. 2. In brief, the facts are that one Smt. Meera Paul was the tenant of the house in question, of which opposite party No. 3 admittedly is the landlady. While Smt. Meera Paul was staying in the premises Smt. Sunita Paul along with her husband Krishna Das Paul, sometime in 1963, came to Faizabad from Burma and started living in the said house along with Smt. Meera Paul. The husband of the landlady died while she was staying at Kanpur and thereafter in 1971 she shifted to Faizabad. She had earlier filed a suit on the ground that Smt. Meera Paul had become defaulter and was in arrears of rent. It was also pleaded that Smt. Meera Paul had sublet the premises in question to Smt. Sunita Paul and Krishna Das Paul. This suit was hotly contested between the parties and ultimately it was dismissed. It was observed in the aforesaid suit that opposite party No. 3 may initiate proceedings under Section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act No. 13 of 1972). On 641977 the landlady Smt. Asghari Begum applied for release of the accommodation on account of vacancy having occurred in pursuance of Section 12(1)(a) of Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter called, the Act). Inquiries were made. The Prescribed Authority after considering the evidence led by the parties held that it was a case of deemed vacancy and the premises thereafter were released in favour of opposite party No. 3. The present petitioners filed a revision feeling aggrieved by the order dated 1751978 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer releasing the accommodation in favour of the landlady. The revision was also dismissed by the IInd Additional District Judge, Faizabad, vide order dated 5121979. This is how the petitioners have preferred this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and gone through the averments and crossaverments in the respective affidavits of the contesting parties. The revision was also dismissed by the IInd Additional District Judge, Faizabad, vide order dated 5121979. This is how the petitioners have preferred this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and gone through the averments and crossaverments in the respective affidavits of the contesting parties. In my opinion both the Prescribed Authority and the revisional court fell into error by approaching the entire dispute from altogether an erroneous angle. The courts below concentrated on the definition of family laid down in Section 3(g) of the Act. The word family has been defined as under : 3(g) family in relation to a landlord or tenant of a building, means his or her (i) spouse, (ii) male lineal descendants, (iii) such parents, grandparent and any Unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant as may have been normally residing with him or her, and includes, in relation to a landlord any female having a legal right of residence in that building. 4. Obviously, the admitted relationship is that Smt. Sunita Paul is the sister of Smt. Meera Paul who was admittedly tenant of the premises. Krishna Das Paul is the husband of Smt. Sunita Paul. The tenancy rights of Smt. Meera Paul, therefore, could not be inherited by Smt. Sunita Paul or Krishna Das Paul. At one stage the learned counsel for the petitioners tried to impress upon the court that the premises were occupied by the father of Smt. Meera Paul and. therefore, Smt. Meera Paul and Smt. Sunita Paul both inherited the tenancy. There is not an iota of evidence on record to show that at any point of time father of Smt. Meera Paul was the lawful tenant of the premises in question. It may be that father might have been residing with Smt. Meera Paul but the fact remains that the premises in question were allotted in the name of Smt. Meera Paul and she continued to pay rent of the same. I, therefore, do not find myself in agreement with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that Smt. Sunita Paul or Krishna Das Paul had legally inherited the tenancy rights. 5. I, therefore, do not find myself in agreement with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that Smt. Sunita Paul or Krishna Das Paul had legally inherited the tenancy rights. 5. The learned counsel, however, vehemently urged before this Court that admittedly Smt. Sunita Paul and Krishna Das Paul came to reside in the premises along with Smt. Meera Paul when she was the tenant in the year 1963. This fact has not besn disputed and has been admitted by both the courts below. The legal position, therefore, that remains to be examined, as urged by the learned counsels for the petitioners, is that Smt. Sunita Paul and Krishna Das Paul having continued in possession of the premises it would not be a case falling under Section 12(1) (a) of the Act. Therelevant provision is as under : 12(1) A landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if (a) he has substantially removed his effects therefrom, or (b) he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family, or (c) in the case of a residential building, he as well as members of his family have taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere. On scrutiny of the above provision in my opinion the case of the landlord does not fall within any of these categories hence it would not be a case of deemed vacancy. On the other hand, I find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the case of the petitioners would be deemed to be covered by Section 14 of the Act which provides for regularisation of occupation of an existing tenant. Section 14 reads as under: 14. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law fur the time being in force, any licensee (within the meaning of Section 2A) or a tenant in occupation of a building with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976 not being a person against whom any suit or proceeding for eviction is pending before any court or authority on the date of such commencement shall be deemed to be an authorised licensee or tenant of such building. 6. 6. In order to appreciate the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners it may be stated that Smt. Meera Paul was admittedly transferred to Varanasi where she started living. In 1971 Smt. Asghari Begum, landlady of the premises, had shifted to Faizabad and the petitioners Smt, Sunita Paul and Krishna Das Paul had continued to be in possession of the premises and from 1971 till 1977 no proceedings excepting for the filing of a suit against Smt. Meera Paul had been resorted to by the landlady and uninterruptedly she continued to stay. In the circumstances it would not be a case of deemed vacancy. It may be that since in 1977 proceedings had been initiated, therefore, the application under Section 14 strictly may not Shave been maintainable. The Court in fact had to examine how for such a long period from 1963 Smt. Sunita Paul and Krishna Das Paul continued to stay in the premises and even after Smt. Meera Paul had been transferred to Varanasi they continued to occupy the premises. The learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Miss Nirmal Handoo v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad (1983) (I)ARC 485). In similar circumstances like the present the Court held : Even the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has found as a fact that at least since 1952 the petitioner had been living with R.N. Zutshu On these facts it seems difficult to take the view that the case is covered by Section 12(1)(b) of the Act even if the provision contained therein may be retrospective. Secondly, the question which is to be determined in the instant case is whether on the 10th February, 1981 when the vacancy was declared by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Section 12(1)(b) of the Act was or was not applicable. As already seen above, on the death of R.N. Zutshi on 25th March, 1980 the petitioner inherited his tenancy rights and with effect from that date her possession was not that of a person who was not a member of the family of the deceasedtenant but as a tenant himself. As already seen above, on the death of R.N. Zutshi on 25th March, 1980 the petitioner inherited his tenancy rights and with effect from that date her possession was not that of a person who was not a member of the family of the deceasedtenant but as a tenant himself. If on the 10th February, 1981 the petitioner was in possession over the house in question as a tenant it is not possible to conceive as to how the provisions of Section 12(1) by of the Act could still be held to be applicable on that date for declaring; vacancy ire respect of the accommodation in question. 7. I find myself in agreement as the facts of the present case arealmost identical to the one in which a decision has already been rendered; by this Court. In this view of the matter the impugned1 orders dated 1751978 and 5121979 are liable to be quashed as they cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 8. It appears that the application for allotment of the premises, was submitted by the petitioners but it had been rejected, I do not wish to pass any fresh orders in that connection, I have adjudicated the dispute between, the parties only with respect to the question of law involved in the writ petition, to which my answer is that it is not a case of deemed vacancy, In however., leave it open for the opposite party, landlady, to initiate any such proceedings which are warranted under law for seeking relief against the petitioners, but this shortcut of deemed vacancy in my opinion is not available and the impugned orders call for interference by this Court. 9. In view of the aforesaid discussion the impugned orders dated. 1751978 and 5I2I979 passed by the Prescribed Authority and the IInd Additional District Judge, Faizabad,, contained in Annexusres 7 and 8, respectively,, are hereby quashed. Let certiorari issue accordingly. The rent deposited in this Court or in any other court by the petitioner will be withdrawn by the opposite party Smt. Asghari Begumy who is the landlady. I further order that the petitioners will continue to pay rent to opposite party No. 3 regularly failing which right will accrue to opposite party No. 3 in accordance with law for seeking, relief. In the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.