JUDGMENT B. D. Agarwal, J. - The U. P. State Handloom Corporation Limited (Corporation for short) is a U. P. Government undertaking. On March 23, 1983 advertisement was made in newspapers inviting applications for appointment to posts of Project Officer/Assistant Project Officer in the Corporation in the pay-scale of Rs. 1310-2100 and Rs. 900-1770 per month besides perks respectively. The qualifications specified in the advertisement for these posts were as under: - 1. Project Officer Pay scale Rs. 1350-2100 plus perks. Qualification A degree/diploma in Textile Experience : Minimum 7 years experience in Weaving Department of a reputed textile mill or in Handloom Sector out of which at least 4 years should be in officer cadre. Age 30 to 40 years, Relaxable by 5 years in case of SC/ST candidate. 2. Assistant Project Officer Pay scale Rs. 900-1770 plus perks. Qualification : Degree in Textile Technology/Diploma in Handloom Weaving Technology. Experience : Minimum 5 years experience in weaving department of a reputed textile mill of in Handloom sector out of which at least 2 years experience should be in the capacity of shift officer. Age : 25 to 35 years. Relaxable by 5 years in case of SC/ST candidates. 2. The petitioners in Writ Petition No. 11164 of 183 applied for appointment to the posts of Project Officers. On May 13, 1983, letter was issued by the Secretary asking them to appear for interview before the Selection Committee on June 4, 1983. The interview took place before the Selection Committee over which the Managing Director of the Corporation presided. On July 1, 1983, letter was issued to these petitioners under the signature of the Managing Director to the effect that consequent upon the interview held on 4th June, they had been selected for the post of Project Officers on the terms and conditions discussed at the time of interview. the salary offered was in the scale of Rs. 800-1450 per month instead of 1350-2100 as advertised. The letter also recited that formal appointment orders will be issued to the candidates as and when they reported for duty at the head-office. The petitioner No. 1 reported for duty on 12th July, 1983 ; the petitioner No. 3 did so on 2ld July, 1983. 800-1450 per month instead of 1350-2100 as advertised. The letter also recited that formal appointment orders will be issued to the candidates as and when they reported for duty at the head-office. The petitioner No. 1 reported for duty on 12th July, 1983 ; the petitioner No. 3 did so on 2ld July, 1983. We leave out the case of the petitioner No. 2, who has since taken to some other service and it has been stated on his behalf that be is no longer interested in pursuing this petition. Training in the Quality Control Section of the Corporation was given to the petitioners for one week from July 25 to July 30, 198 5. Before the letter of appointment could, however, issue to any of the n or they could be paid any remuneration, the U. P. Hathkargha Nigam Karmchari Union filed Writ Petition No. 7689 of 1983 contending that the selection held on June 4, 1983 contending that the selection from the minimum qualifications laid. That writ petition was dismissed in limine on August 25, 1983, but upon the facts narrated therein coming to light there was a review made in the Corporation. The Chief Production Manager and the Senior Divisional Manager (Administration) submitted joint report dated 26th August, 1983, to the Managing Director, who had taken charge of the post on August 26, 1983. After review the Corporation decided to appoint the petitioners Nos. 1 and 3 to the post of Assistant Project Officers in the pay scale of Rs. 550-1200 stating also that the time scale was likely to be revised as per pay Commission Report. This was on 9th September, 1983, and the decision of the Corporation was communicated to the petitioners under the signature of the Managing Director. Aggrieved the petitioners have approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking writ of certiorari to quash the order, dated 9th September, 198 3, which is Annexure-IX to the writ petition and also mandamus directing the Corporation to appoint them on terms and conditions contained in the letter dated 1st July, 1983 (vide Annexure-III). 3. In the other Writ Petition No. 11165 of 1983 the three petitioners were candidates for the posts of Assistant Project Officer. 3. In the other Writ Petition No. 11165 of 1983 the three petitioners were candidates for the posts of Assistant Project Officer. In their case, too, letter, dated 1st July, 1983, was issued intimating that consequent upon interview held on 4th June, 1983, they had been selected for the post of assistant Project Officer on the terms and conditions discussed at the time of interview. The formal order of appointment was to issue when the ^candidates reported for duty at the head-office. In this case, too, there was review made by the Corporation on the facts relevant being brought to notice, namely, that the Selection has taken place without there fulfilling the required qualification of experience of five years in the weaving department of some reputed concern and this was followed by letter, dated 9th September, 1983, conveying the decision of the Corporation to the effect that they were appointed Superintendent Production in the time-scale of 400-750 likely to be revised in pursuance of the report of the Pay Commission. These petitioners have challenged the decision, thus, taken by the Corporation and sought direction for being given appointment on terms and conditions contained in the letter dated 1st July, 1983. 4. Sri S. R. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioners in both these petitions, raised two broad contentions in the alternative before us: - (i) the petitioners are to be regarded as duly appointed to the respective posts for which they were candidates as appearing from the letter, dated 1st July, 1983, issued by the Managing Director following the interview for the selection, which had taken place on -th June, 1983, and hence it did not remain open to the Corporation thereafter to rescind ; (ii) the petitioners are entitled to benefit on the principle of promissory estoppel since acting on the representation contained in the letter, dated 1st July, 1983, they resigned from their earlier jobs, which were much more lucrative than the terms offered by the Corporation in the their letter of 9th September, 1983. 5. Upon hearing the learned Counsel at considerable length and a close scrutiny of the record we do not find merit in any of these contentions. 6. The Corporation is a Government Company registered under the Companies Act. 5. Upon hearing the learned Counsel at considerable length and a close scrutiny of the record we do not find merit in any of these contentions. 6. The Corporation is a Government Company registered under the Companies Act. In exercise of the powers under Article 127 of the Articles of Association, the Board of Directors have framed the U. P. State Handloom Corporation Limited (Officers and Staff) Service Rules, 1981, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules Appointing Authority is defined in Rule 3(ii) as meaning the authority empowered by these Rules or by any delegation to make appointments for service under the Corporation. According to Rule 14. - "The Board or the Managing Director or any other authority to whom powers in this behalf have been delegated shall lay down the minimum essential qualifications, preferential qualifications and also experience required for the various posts." 7. Rules 20 and 21 in Chapter-lV (Recruitment, Appointment and Promotions) are relevant also and they read as under : - "20. Creation of posts. - The power to create posts, including the determination of their classification and emoluments, shall vest in the Board. The Board may also delegate its power of creation of posts to the Managing Director or any Officer or Authority of the Corporation, subject to such conditions, it any, as it may deem fit. 21. Appointing Authority. - [I) The appointing authorities for the various posts shall be as per delegations made by the Board from time to time. (2) Appointments shall be made only on posts created by the Board or by an authority or officer under the powers delegated by the Board ; 8. Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules appointments may be made to any post in the Corporation on ad-hoc basis for a period not exceeding one year for all categories of posts by the Managing Director to meet any emergent situation. The Managing Director shall, however, bring before the Board in its next meeting bases of all such ad-hoc appointments and obtain the Boards approval. Rule 24 provides that the appointing authority shall make appointments on the advice of the Selection Committee constituted by the Managing Director. 9. There may be no denying, as is indeed manifest from these rules, that the power to appoint posts in the Corporation as a body corporate. Rule 24 provides that the appointing authority shall make appointments on the advice of the Selection Committee constituted by the Managing Director. 9. There may be no denying, as is indeed manifest from these rules, that the power to appoint posts in the Corporation as a body corporate. The Corporation has the power to create posts, to lay down the qualifications thereof for recruitment there and to make appointment against the same. To the extent these powers are delegated to the Managing Director, he may, no doubt, exercise the same. The Board of Directors, through the medium of which the corporation functions, is expressly given the power to make the delegation. The Board of Directors by its resolution No. 5 dated 13th February, 1981, delegated power to the Managing Director to create posts and make appointment in time-scale upto the maximum of Rs. 1300 per month only (Annexure-SCA-Il) On 13th May, 1983, the Board of Directors resolved further whereby pending structural re-organisation embargo was placed against creation of new posts or appointment on the same (Annexure-SCA-III). In paragraph 4 of the Second Supplementary Counter-Affidavit the Corporation has specifically stated that the posts in question with which we are herein concerned did not exist prior to 3th February, 1981. Further particulars in this respect will appear from the Third Supplementary Counter-Affidavit filed on their behalf As per invitation to applications through the advertisement made on 23rd March, 1983, the posts of Project Officer/Assistant Project Officer carried salary beyond Rs. 1300 per month in the upper limit. In terms of the resolution of the Board of Directors, dated I3th February, 1981, the Managing Director did not have the power either to create these posts or to give appointment against the same. There is nothing on the record from the side of the petitioners to suggest that sanction to the creation of these posts had been accorded by the Corporation. It is established thus that the Managing Director did not have authority delegated to him to issue appointment to the posts of Project Officer/Assistant Project Officer for which the petitioners herein lay claim. 10. It is contended by the learned Counsel that in the letter dated 1st July, 1983, it is recited that consequent upon the interview held on 4th June, 1983, the petitioners had been selected for the respective posts and that on the basis thereof they should be deemed as appointed. 10. It is contended by the learned Counsel that in the letter dated 1st July, 1983, it is recited that consequent upon the interview held on 4th June, 1983, the petitioners had been selected for the respective posts and that on the basis thereof they should be deemed as appointed. This also, in our opinion, is untenable. The letter recites as well that formal order of appointment will issue when the petitioners have joined. Admittedly, no order of appointment came to be issued to any of the petitioners in two writ petitions ; the petitioners admit as well that they were not paid salary. Upon the petitioners reporting for duly, they were placed in the Quality Control Section for one week to acquaint themselves with the general working in the Corporation ; but this was before they were appointed or formally taken into the respective posts. The selection, it is well settled, does not clothe the petitioners with the legal right to get themselves appointed by the Corporation In Jatinder Kumar and others v. State of Punjab, 1985(1) SCC 122 the selection had been made by the Public Service Commission. The State Government did not find itself in agreement with the recommendation of the Commission. It was held that the appellants could not assert legal right to be given appointment on the strength of the selection or the recommendation made in their favour. (See also A. N. D. Silva v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1130 ; State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha and others, AIR 1973 SC 2216 . In R. Tindwari v. Reserve Bank of India, 1985(1) SLR 719 (Guj HC), which is a recent decision of the Gujarat High Court, it was observed that some expectancy of being taken in service or the pre-recruitment formalities being gone through does not necessarily create a promise, which the employer would be estopped from ignoring or refusing to act upon. It it true that in public service a candidate, who is otherwise fit, able and appropriate person for appointment cannot be ignored on extraneous consideration, but at the same time every applicant or every person who is being considered for appointment cannot claim that he or she is, as matter or right entitled to be appointed to the post for which he or she is a candidate just because he or she has gone through some procedural formality. It is upto the employer to keep the quality of suitability of the would be employees open upto the last moment before the appointment. A candidate may be dropped from being considered for being appointed on ground of unsuitability at any stage before appointment. We are in respectful agreement with this view. In (supra) the Commission recommended appointment of candidates to the Provincial Civil Services (Judicial Branch) who had secured 45% marks. Government decided not to take any person securing less than 55%. It was held by the Supreme Court that on the mere strength of selection made through the Commission or the existence of vacancies, there could be no right to be appointed asserted by the candidate. 11. For both these reasons, therefore, namely, that since the Managing Director did not have delegated authority to create the posts or to give appointment to the same and the Corporation neither sanctioned the creation or appointment of the petitioners and also because the selection held on 4th June, 1983, does not confer legal right upon the petitioners, the first contention raised on their behalf fails. 12. Learned Counsel relies next on the doctrine of promissory estoppel which is an equitable principle evolved by the courts for doing justice. It is acknowledged that courts must do justice by the promotion of honesty and good faith as far as it lies in their power. The application of this doctrine is, however, hedged in with limitations which are well recognized. In the leading case of Union of India and others v- M/s. Anglo Afghan Agencies etc., AIR 1968 SC 718 it was held that the Government is not free to go back on its representations where the individual has charged his position to his detriment. The application of this doctrine is, however, hedged in with limitations which are well recognized. In the leading case of Union of India and others v- M/s. Anglo Afghan Agencies etc., AIR 1968 SC 718 it was held that the Government is not free to go back on its representations where the individual has charged his position to his detriment. Shan, J. speaking on behalf of the court observed : - "Under our jurisprudence the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex-parte appraisement of the Circumstances in which the obligation has arisen." (Emphasis supplied) What the court did in this case was to estop the Government from going back from its representation contained in the scheme arbitrarily or whimsically against the individual who relying on it changed his position to his detriment. The court did not claim to estop the Government from changing its policy for genuine reasons. Following and reiterating the law laid down in Anglo Afghan Agencies case, (supra) Bhagwati, J. on behalf of the Court observed in M/s. Motilal Padumpal Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U. P. and others, (1979) 2 SCC 409 : - "The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a result of this decision, that where the Government makes a promist knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promise and, in fact, the promisee acting in reliance on it alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee". His Lordship laid emphasis upon the observation of Shah, J. in Anglo Afghan Agencies case (supra) that Government cannot claim to be exempt from the liability to carry out the promise on some indefinite and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency. His Lordship laid emphasis upon the observation of Shah, J. in Anglo Afghan Agencies case (supra) that Government cannot claim to be exempt from the liability to carry out the promise on some indefinite and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency. "If the Government wants to resist the liability, it will have to disclose to the court what are the facts and circumstances on account of which the Government claims to be exempt from the liability and it would be for the court to decide whether these facts and circumstances are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the liability against the Government." The reason and justification for the charge shall have to be placed before the court for its satisfaction. 13. In Jit Ram Shiv Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and others, (1981) 1 SCC 11 Kailasham, J. speaking for the Division Bench expressed certain reservations in regard to the decision in Mrs. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills case (supra) but in so far as relevant for purposes of the instant case, there is unanimity of opinion. It was observed that Anglo Afghan Agencies Ltd. case (supra) is authority for the proposition that "the authority cannot go back on the agreement arbitrarily or in its mere whim." There was complete agreement expressed with the view taken in Mrs. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills case (supra) that the Government would not be bound by the acts of its officers and agents, who act beyond the scope of their authority. A person dealing with an agent of the Government must be held to have noticed all the limitations of his authority. It was also agreed that the person claiming benefit under the doctrine must be shown to have acted on the representation to his disadvantage. Defining the scope of the plea based on this doctrine, it was laid down inter alia :- "(1) When the officer of the Government acts outside the scope of his authority the plea of promissory estoppel is not available. Defining the scope of the plea based on this doctrine, it was laid down inter alia :- "(1) When the officer of the Government acts outside the scope of his authority the plea of promissory estoppel is not available. The doctrine of ultra vires will come into operation and the Government cannot be held bound by the unauthorised acts of its officers ; (2) when the officer acts within the scope of his authority under a scheme and enters into an agreement and makes a representation and a person acting on that representation puts himself in a disadvantageous position, the court is entitled to require the officer to act according to the scheme and the agreement or representation. The officer cannot arbitrarily act on his mere whim and ignore his promise on some undefined and undisclosed grounds of necessity or change the conditions to the prejudice of the person who had acted upon such representation and put himself in a disadvantageous position." In regard to these propositions there is complete unanimity between the observations of Bhagwati, in Motilal Padampat Mills Col. Ltd. case (supra) and of Kailashan, J. in Jit Ram Shiv Kumar [bee Seervai; Constitution Law of India. Vol. 1 (3rd edition) p. 627j. 14. The case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Mrs. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd., (1983) 2 SCC 370 cited for the petitioners is illustrative of the application of the plea of promissory estoppel on the facts and circumstances thereof. There the Gujarat State Financial Corporation (an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution) was found to have entered into the agreement to advance the loan in performance of the statutory duty cast on the Corporation by the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951, under which it was created and set up. The further finding upon facts was that on its solemn promise the respondent incurred expenses, suffered liabilities to set up a hotel. Presumably if the loan was not forthcoming, the respondent may not have undertaken such a huge project. The further finding upon facts was that on its solemn promise the respondent incurred expenses, suffered liabilities to set up a hotel. Presumably if the loan was not forthcoming, the respondent may not have undertaken such a huge project. Acting on the promise of the appellant evidenced by documents, the respondent proceeded to suffer further liabilities to implement and execute the project, the principle of promissory estoppel was applied to the case in the backdrop of this incontrovertible factual situation Having noticed the view taken in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills case and referring to the subsequent decision in Jit Ram Shiv Kumar case (supra), Desai, J. speaking on behalf of the court observed thus as to the common denominating factor between the two where these decisions converge : - "Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana, which slightly differs from the view taken by this court in the aforementioned decision at any rate would not help the appellant because it only lays down that the principle of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from discharging its functions under the law. Even there it was held that when the officer authorised under a scheme enters into an agreement and makes a representation and a person acting on that representation puts himself in a disadvantageous position, the court is entitled to regulate the officer to act according to the scheme and the agreement 01 the representation. The officer cannot arbitrarily on his mete whim ignore his promise on some undefined and undisclosed grounds of necessity or changed the conditions to the prejudice of a person which had acted upon such representation and put himself in a disadvantageous position. On this point, both the decisions concur and the ratio would govern the decision in this appeal The respondent acting upon the solemn promise made by the appellant incurred huge expenditure and if the appellant is not belt to its promise, the respondent would be put in a very disadvantageous position and therefore also the principle of promissory estoppel can be invoked in this case " 15. The irresistible position emerging from these authorities, therefore, as discussed above is (i) the representation impugned must proceed from Government, or, where the authority is a Corporation, the Corporation or an officer having authority on its behalf: (ii) the promisee must have acting on the representation altered bis position to his detriment : in Estoppel by Representation : Spencer Bower and Turner, 3rd edition p. 393 learned authors observe that there may possibly remain some case in which it will be impossible to maintain that any detriment resulted, and yet it can still be said that the promisee has "acted on" the promise. It is difficult perhaps to imagine such cases, "which would qualify in all other requirements as promissory estoppel cases." (iii) the Government or the Corporation, as the case may be, cannot go behind the representation made arbitrarily or on mere whim ignoring the promise on some undefined and undisclosed grounds of necessity : Anglo Afghan case (supra) also affirms the proposition that Government could not go back upon promises made in the exercise of discretionary power as embodied in a scheme, "merely on a whim" (Seervai : Constitution Law, Vol 3rd Edition p. 606). 16. Assuming that the Corporation we are concerned within the instant case is an instrumentality of the State Government, Sri S. R. Singh learned Counsel did not find it possible on the material placed before us to demonstrate that the representation sought to be relied by the petitioners proceeded from the Corporation acting through the Board of Directors or that the Managing Director had authority delegated in this behalf. This aspect we have dealt with above and there needs be no repetition made of it. 17. On the point of detriment suffered, there is no foundation laid on material facts. In relation to none of the petitioners there is mention made of the erstwhile employers. No particulars are given of the respective terms of employment like the natural thereof ; the pest held; the standing or tenure concerned ; the prospects for promotion if any; the scale if pay or the remuneration drawn etc. There is no specification of any of these details either in the writ petition or in the two rejoinders filed thereto despite contest on the other side. We do not have no record affidavit from any of the erstwhile employers or any other document in this behalf. There is no specification of any of these details either in the writ petition or in the two rejoinders filed thereto despite contest on the other side. We do not have no record affidavit from any of the erstwhile employers or any other document in this behalf. All that has been stated without the aid of any supporting material is that the petitioners have resigned and the remuneration offered in the Corporation letter, dated 9th September, 1983, is less than what they received from the previous employers. In the absence of relevant data which is within the petitioners knowledge it is impossible to make a comparison. The prospects in service area after all assessed on cumulative consideration of the terms and conditions attached to the job ; the immediate salary drawn though relevant is not decisive. It was held in Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fisherman Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 145 that the respondent could not invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel because he was unable to show that, relying on the representative of the Government he had altered his position by investing money and the allegations made by him in that behalf were "much too vague and general" and there was accordingly no factual foundation for establishing the plea of promissory estoppel. This dictum was cited in Mrs. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills, (1979) 2 SCC at p. 449 without dissent. 18. From Anglo Afghan Agencies to Gujarat State Financial case (supra) Corporation the running them moreover is that despite other conditions being satisfied, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked where the departure from the representation made is not arbitrary or whimsical but founded on rational justifiable basis. Applying this test, it will be noticed that there existed cogent ground in the present for the selection made of the petitioners on 4th June, lv83, being not approved by the Corporation. We have referred above to the prescribed qualifications for appointment advertised in the news papers. The petitioners with the exception of Mohd. Abid petitioner No. in Writ Petition No. 11165 of 1983 do not dispute before us that they did not possess the required experience in weaving department. In relation to none of them it is averred that they were placed in the Officers Shift Officers grade in weaving department of any reputed concern for the specified period. Abid petitioner No. in Writ Petition No. 11165 of 1983 do not dispute before us that they did not possess the required experience in weaving department. In relation to none of them it is averred that they were placed in the Officers Shift Officers grade in weaving department of any reputed concern for the specified period. The contention is that they have had experience in spinning. At one stage learned Counsel urged even that the two are overlapping though later this stand was rightly given up. Spinning is drawing out and twisting into threads; it is drawing out a thread as spiders do (Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, 1972 at p. 1302). The word text is derived, from the latin 'texere' which means to weave and means any woven fabric, when yarn whether cotton, silk, woolen, rayon, nylon or of descripted which has been spun is oven into a fabric, it results into textile. In most of the textiles the method of weaving adopted is of the warp and woof pattern. With huge variety of fabrics manufactured from materials hitherto unknown and the tremendous advance in technology the weaving process does not rem fin however confined to this pattern (See Portitts and Spencer {Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (1979) 1 SCC 82 ). 19. SiDce the petitioners did not have the required experience in weaving department, the decision taken by the Corporation was to nullify their selection for the posts of Project Officers/Assistant Project Officers respectively. The selection on 4th June, 1983, had transgressed the qualification required as essential. Upon being appointed the petitioners will have been required to supervise and keep a check on the work of those engaged in the weaving department of the Corporation. It is legitimately canvassed by Sri A. P. Singh learned Counsel for the Corporation that the petitioners could not be expected to discharge their duties effectively or with efficiency in the absence of technical experience. We are not pursuaded to regard the departure made by the Corporation on this ground as either arbitrary or whimsical. The Corporation has on the other hand successfully established the sound rationale behind the refusal to take in the petitioners straight away to the posts for which they were the applicants. 20. It was submitted for the petitioners that they had placed their cards before the Selection Committee and there was no fraud or misrepresentation from their side. The Corporation has on the other hand successfully established the sound rationale behind the refusal to take in the petitioners straight away to the posts for which they were the applicants. 20. It was submitted for the petitioners that they had placed their cards before the Selection Committee and there was no fraud or misrepresentation from their side. The Corporation does not accuse them of any of these things either. the material fact however is that the Selection Committee is not shown to have been vested with the power to refax the qualifications. As per Rule 14 (quoted above), the Board or the Managing Director or any authority to whom powers in this behalf have been delegated shall lay down the minimum qualification, preferential qualifications and also experience required for the various posts. The determination of classification and emoluments vests in the Board which could no doubt delegate its power of creation of posts of the Managing Director (Rule 20). The function of the Selection Committee is only advisory (Rule 24); the power to appoint rests with the appointing authority. The Committee, therefore, even though the Managing Director was the Chairman thereof, did not have the authority to proceed to select in definance of qualifications specified; and the candidates thus selected may not seek a mandate against the Corporation to give them the respective appointments. The Corporation has, to an extent but to that alone, as reflected from its decision communicated on 9th September, 1983, chosen to take in the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 111( 4 of 1983 as Assistant Project Officers ; and the petitioners in the other petition as Supervisors. The court may not in the circumstances by its fiet direct the corporation to give a go-bye to requirement for requisite experience in weaving. The Corporation was within its competence as the appointing authority to make a review and to dissent on ground of lack of essential qualification. Learned Counsel cited an unreported decision of this court, dated 4th January, 1972, in Writ Petition No. 9497 of 1969 Jama Inter College, Nagra (District Ballia) and others v. District Inspector of Schools, Ballia and others. The Corporation was within its competence as the appointing authority to make a review and to dissent on ground of lack of essential qualification. Learned Counsel cited an unreported decision of this court, dated 4th January, 1972, in Writ Petition No. 9497 of 1969 Jama Inter College, Nagra (District Ballia) and others v. District Inspector of Schools, Ballia and others. his follows a decision of Division Bench to the effect that the Committee of Management of an educational institution governed by the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, was bound to appoint a person a teacher, who had been duly selected by the Selection Committee and whose name had been approved by the District Inspector of Schools for appointment. This, in our opinion, bears no analogy to the facts hereof. the decision in that case was in the light of the statutory provisions governing to the educational institution. As per Rule 24, referred to above, the jurisdiction of the Selection Committee in the instant case was only advisory; the power to appoint or not on the basis of the recommendation is kept reserved with the Corporation or the delegated authority, as the case may be. The approval given by the District Inspector of Schools in that other case was in itself a material factor. It does not appear moreover that the candidate, referred to therein, did not possess the qualification required to be fulfilled for the purpose of being appointed. That decision consequently does not assist the petitioners. 21. Taking up now the case of petitioner No. 1, namely, Mohd-Abid in Writ Petition No. 11165 of 1983, it was averred that he possesses the required experience for appointment to the post of Assistant Project Officer. The only piece of evidence, Which the petitioners learned Counsel referred to in this connection is the certificate from M/s. Cawnpore Textiles Limited, dated 20th December, 1978, which certifies that Mohd Abid had been working as a Supervisor in the weaving department of that concern since December 1, 1976, (vide Annexure-RA-I). Assuming this certificate to be genuine it does not take the matter further for the obvious reason that it covers a period of two years only during 1976-78. The experience required for the post of Assistant Project Officer in terms of the advertisement is of five years in weaving department of which at least two years should be in capacity as Shift Officer. The experience required for the post of Assistant Project Officer in terms of the advertisement is of five years in weaving department of which at least two years should be in capacity as Shift Officer. None of these requirements can be said to be made out on the strength of the aforementioned certificate. A perusal of paragraph 3 of the rejoinder-affidavit along with which this certificate was filed by the petitioner does not show moreover that this was placed before the Selection Committee at the time of the interview held on 4th June, 1983. There is no substance consequently in the assertion for this petitioner No. 1 that he fulfilled the required qualification to be appointed Assistant Project Officer. 22. For these reasons the second contention for the petitioners based on promissory estoppel falls through. 23. Learned Counsel also contended that one K. S Yadav was also one of the candidates selected for Project Officer on 4th June, 1983, and he is being retained in the Corporation to that post besides Yaspal Khubbur selected for Assistant Project Officer. A case of discrimination against the petitioners cannot be made out on the strength merely of these averments without there being proof that these two persons did not fulfil the requisite qualification as per terms of the advertisements inviting applications for appointment. Even if the Corporation has chosen to ratify the appointment in their case, the petitioners do not acquire legal right for themselves, unable as they are, to establish that they fall within the requisite qualifications. 24. Lastly, the counsel for the petitioners submitted that their performance during the period they have continued in appointment by virtue of the interim order of this court has been upto the mark and that they have given complete satisfaction. It is for the Corporation to take this into account; in case the petitioners appear to have gained adequately in experience and have given proof of their efficiency otherwise ; the Corporation may take a more compassionate view in the form of appointing them hence forth to the respective posts for which they were the candidate. 25. Consideration being had to the discussion made in the above, these petitions fail and are dismissed accordingly. The interim order, dated 15th September, 1983, is discharged without affecting adversely the salary drawn by the petitioners on the basis thereof during this period. 25. Consideration being had to the discussion made in the above, these petitions fail and are dismissed accordingly. The interim order, dated 15th September, 1983, is discharged without affecting adversely the salary drawn by the petitioners on the basis thereof during this period. There will be no order as to costs.