JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - These two appeals arising out of the same suit are being disposed of by a common judgment First Appeal No. 59 of 1972 has been filed by some of the defendants who were arrayed in the suit as the defendants third set, while First Appeal No. 64 of 1972 has been filed by the plaintiffs. The suit which was for possession over properties described in schedules `A' and `B' of the plaint and for declaration that the plaintiffs were owners in possession of property No. 2 of Schedule `C' of the plaint was partly decreed and partly dismissed by the court below. The plaintiffs are aggrieved by the dismissal of part of their claim while the defendants are aggrieved by the decree of the court below by which relief has been granted to the plaintiffs in respect of the properties specified in the decree under challenge. 2. It will be convenient to set out separately the plaint case in respect of different properties involved in the suit which have been described under the three schedules of the plaint, namely, A, B and C. 3. In regard to the property of schedule `A' the plaint case was that under the sale deed dated 24-4-1953, one Radha Ballabh purchased a part of it from its owner Lalit Narain Dubey for a consideration of Rs. 1,000/-. The same day one Bashir Uddin and Siraj Uddin executed a deed of exchange whereuuder in lieu of a part of the property comprised in schedule `B' Radha Ballabh transferred the property purchased by him to Bashir Uddin and Siraj Uddin who in their turn sold the same to one Jagnnath (Jagarnath) Prasad under a sale deed dated 31-7-1954 for Rs. 500/- with stipulation for resale of the property to them within an agreed period. Thereafter Jagannath Prasad sold that property for Rs. 700/- to Smt. Naraini Devi, wife of Radha Ballabh under a sale deed dated 25-5- 56. This transaction was Benami in character, the real owner being Radha Ballabh. Under a Dastabardari (surrender) both Bashir Uddin and Siraj Uddin surrendered their right of repurchase available against Jagannath Prasad in favour of Radha Ballabh. Subsequently they executed a fresh dastabardari in favour of both Radha Ballabh and Smt. Naraini Devi. This transaction was Benami in character, the real owner being Radha Ballabh. Under a Dastabardari (surrender) both Bashir Uddin and Siraj Uddin surrendered their right of repurchase available against Jagannath Prasad in favour of Radha Ballabh. Subsequently they executed a fresh dastabardari in favour of both Radha Ballabh and Smt. Naraini Devi. The remaining portion of the property of schedule `A' was purchased by Bashir Uddin aforesaid from one Kishan Lal through a sale deed dated 26-9-1960 which he transferred in the name of Smt. Naraini Devi as Benamidar for Radha Ballabh for Rs. 1,000/- only by means of a sale deed dated 2-9-1961. In this way Radha Ballabh became the owner of the property of schedule 'A'. 4. So far as the property specified in schedule `B' goes, the plaint case was that the property shown by letters R B A H Q K L V T U in map No. 1 attached to the plaint was purchased by Radha Ballabh at a court auction sale on 21-2-1940 which was duly confirmed on 26-3-1940. Some dispute arose in regard to this property which led to Radha Ballabh's instituting suit No. 286 of 1951 against Bashir Uddin and others which was decreed on 26-2-1952. An appeal was preferred against that decree during which a sale deed dated 5-7-1952 was obtained by Radha Ballabh in the name of Smt. Naraini Devi as Benamidar from one Hasib Ullah and Salim Ullah in respect of a kothari which was now included in schedule `B'. Subsequently on 7-7-52 Radha Ballabh and Bashir Uddin entered into a compromise with respect to this property as a result of which a sale certificate dated 31-5-1957 was issued in the name of Smt. Naraini Devi as Benamidar for Radha Ballabh. Another sale deed dated 25-9-1958 was obtained by Radha Ballabh in the name of his wife Smt. Naraini Devi as a Benamidar for Radha Ballabh from one Bashir Uddin alias Chhotey and Media widow of Bashir Uddin in respect of the Kotha now included in the property of Schedule `B'. That is how Radha Ballabh became the exclusive owner of the entire property specified in Schedule `B'. 5. Regarding item No. 2 of Schedule `C' the simple case of the plaintiffs was that it was purchased by Radha Ballabh from one Damodar Das and the name of Smt. Naraini Devi was added only as a Benamidar for him. That is how Radha Ballabh became the exclusive owner of the entire property specified in Schedule `B'. 5. Regarding item No. 2 of Schedule `C' the simple case of the plaintiffs was that it was purchased by Radha Ballabh from one Damodar Das and the name of Smt. Naraini Devi was added only as a Benamidar for him. 6. In respect of all these properties described under different schedules A, B and C the plaintiffs' case is that Smt. Naraini Devi was only a Benamidar, the real owner being Radha Ballabh, who remained in possession as owner thereof till his death on 16-8-64. On 21-9-1963 Radha Ballabh executed a registered will whereby he bequeathed his entire property to his wife Smt. Narain Devi but giving her only a life estate therein. It was also provided that she will not have any right to alienate the properties. It was also provided that after the death of Smt. Naraini Devi the properties belonging to Radha Ballabh would go to his sister and her sons who were arrayed as defendants 15 to 17. Thus Smt. Naraini Devi had no right to alienate any part of the disputed property. The plaintiffs had a vested right in the same as provided under the will. Smt. Naraini Devi who was initially arrayed as defendant No. 1 in the suit also died during the pendency of the suit whereafter the plaintiffs became full owners of the, properties specified in schedules A, B and C. However, Smt. Naraini Devi unauthorisedly and under the influence of some interested persons transferred portions of the property in suit to different persons. Thus by a sale deed dated 2-3-1965 she sold the property of Schedule `A' to the defendants second set and executed a waqf deed dated 14.4.65 regarding the property of schedule `B' in favour of defendants 4 and 14, namely, Smt. Naraini Devi Trust and Sri Shivji Maharaj, appointing defendants Nos. 5 to 13 as trustees thereof for the construction of a temple and Dharmshala. The sale deed and waqf-deed are void and ineffectual in law and can not bind the plaintiffs who became full owners of the disputed properties in terms of the will dated 21-9-1963 made by Radha Ballabh. 5 to 13 as trustees thereof for the construction of a temple and Dharmshala. The sale deed and waqf-deed are void and ineffectual in law and can not bind the plaintiffs who became full owners of the disputed properties in terms of the will dated 21-9-1963 made by Radha Ballabh. In this view, the plaintiffs became entitled to recover possession over the properties of schedules A and B and to a declaration of their title over the property mentioned in item No. 2 in schedule `C'. 7. The suit was contested by the defendants second set as well as defendants Nos. 4, 6 and 14 out of the defendants third set. The defence of the defendants second set was that Smt. Naraini Devi was the full owner of the property of schedule `A' which was in the shape of a vacant plot only and that she had validly transferred the same in their favour through the sale deed dated 2-3-1965. The said property was purchased by her out of her own funds and not as a Benamidar for Radha Ballabh. These defendants also denied the execution of the will and said that the same was a fictitious and forged document conferring no right, title or interest on the plaintiffs. They also pleaded that the suit was barred by estoppel and acquiescence. 8. The defence of the defendants 4, 6 and 14 (the appellants of appeal No. 59 of 1972) was that the will set up by the plaintiffs was a forged and fictitious document and was not executed by Radha Ballabh. In any case it was not a voluntary or conscious act of Radha Ballabh, who was at the relevant time too old and weak in mind and body suffering from prolonged illness to be able to understand the implications of what he was doing. The defendants also denied that Radha Ballabh had purchased the property of schedule `A'. According to them Smt. Naraini Devi was a full and rightful owner of all the disputed properties and she had an absolute disposing power over the same. The waqf deed in question was hence perfectly valid and effective in law. Further the plaintiffs were fully aware of the execution of the waqf deed and had 'even participated in the foundation laying ceremony of the temple and Dharamshala which has since been completed at a cost of Rs. The waqf deed in question was hence perfectly valid and effective in law. Further the plaintiffs were fully aware of the execution of the waqf deed and had 'even participated in the foundation laying ceremony of the temple and Dharamshala which has since been completed at a cost of Rs. 10,000/- The suit was, therefore, barred by estoppel and acquiescence. 9. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed by the court below. 1. Whether Radha Ballabh deceased was the owner of the properties detailed in schedules `A', `B' and `C' of the plaint? 2. Whether Radha Ballabh deceased executed the will dated 21-9-1963 relied upon by the plaintiffs, if so, its effect? 3. Whether Radha Ballabh purchased any property in dispute Benami in the name of his wife, Smt. Naraini Devi? 4. Whether Smt. Naraini Devi purchased any suit property Benami in the name of her husband Radha Ballabh? 5. Is the suit bad for multifariousness? 6. Whether the defendant No. 1 had only a life interest in the properties in suit and was not competent to transfer any interest in the properties in suit? If so, its effect? 7. Is the suit undervalued and the court fees paid is insufficient? 8. Is the suit barred by section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act? 9. Is the suit barred by estoppel and acquiescence as alleged? 10. Whether the sale deed executed by Smt. Naraini Devi in favour of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in respect of the property of schedule `A' is for legal necessity? 11. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? 12. Whether the defendant No. 10 has no concern with the property in suit, and he has been unnecessarily impleaded. and is entitled to special costs under section 35-A of the C.P.C.? 13. Whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief of declaration for reasons given in para No. 20 of the Additional W.S. of defendants 4, 6 and 14 paper No. 239A? 10. Having set out the issues, I proceed to consider the merits of the two appeals. 11. I shall first take up First Appeal No. 59 of 1972 filed by the aforesaid Trust, and the deity through its managing trustee and Mahasay Ram Chandra another trustee, who are, arrayed in the suit amongst the defendants third set. 10. Having set out the issues, I proceed to consider the merits of the two appeals. 11. I shall first take up First Appeal No. 59 of 1972 filed by the aforesaid Trust, and the deity through its managing trustee and Mahasay Ram Chandra another trustee, who are, arrayed in the suit amongst the defendants third set. Sri G. P. Bhargava arguing for the appellants confined his submissions to that part of the property of Schedule-B to the plaint in regard to which Smt. Naraini Devi had created a waqf and for which the court below has granted a decree for possession to the plaintiff-respondents. This property has been indicated by letters AHCKLZMVTURPB in the plaint, map No. 1. The conclusions on the various issues relevant to this appeal as reached by the court below are as follows : Radha Ballabh did execute the will dated 21-9-63 relied on by the plaintiffs and the allegations to the contrary made by the appellants are wrong and have remained unsubstantiated. The suit is not barred by estoppel or acquiescence. The plaintiffs did not do any act or omission which might attract the bar of estoppel or acquiescence. This property marked by letters AHCKLZMVTURPB in the plaint, map No. 1 belonged exclusively and absolutely to Radha Ballabh and the transactions respecting thereto standing in the name of Smt. Naraini Devi were Benami in character, the real owner being her husband namely, Radha Ballabh. The rest of the property of Schedule `B' marked by letters R.S.T.U., though not relevant for this appeal, has been held to belong to Smt. Naraini Devi. 12. Sri G. P. Bhargava, learned counsel for the appellants, did not challenge any of the aforesaid conclusions of fact reached by the court below against the appellants in regard to this trust property. Indeed, he addressed no arguments thereon. He, however, made two fresh submissions, which shall be dealt with below. 13. The first and, indeed, the main argument of Sri G. P. Bhargava was that in virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) Smt. Naraini Devi became absolute owner of all the properties bequeathed to her by Radha Ballabh under the aforesaid will notwithstanding the restrictions placed by the testator providing that she will have only a life interest in the properties and that she shall not have any right of alienation thereof. In support of this contention counsel placed reliance on the following decisions; 1. AIR 1977 SC 19 , Vaddeboyina Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, 2 AIR 1979 SC 993 , Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chela Bhai. 14. Elaborating his arguments Sri Bhargava submitted that as a Hindu widow Smt. Naraini Devi had a pre-existing right of maintenance in regard to the property in question and consequently in terms of Section 14(l) of the Hindu Succession Act she became absolute owner thereof notwithstanding the fetters placed on her right of enjoyment by Radha Ballabh in the will. It was urged that in the aforesaid decisions the Supreme Court has ruled that if a Hindu widow has a pre-existing right of maintenance and, if in recognition thereof, certain properties are allotted to her, any condition placed in a Will, Decree, or other instrument purporting to restrict her rights shall have no effect on the applicability of Section 14(1) of the aforesaid Act. 15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, and having given the matter a careful consideration, I am unable to agree. The argument though simple and attractive on its face does not bear a closer scrutiny. It proceeds on many factual assumptions which are non- existent in the present case. 16. At the outset it must be mentioned that the plea raised by Sri Bhargava was not canvassed in any form whatever before the court below. There the plain and simple issue raised was whether the property was acquired by Smt. Naraini Devi from her own funds or she was only a Benamidar for Radha Ballabh. The plea that she had acquired the property in lieu of maintenance was not even remotely hinted at before the court below. And as I shall presently demonstrate, the issue raised by Sri Bhargava is not an unmixed question of fact. The submission proceeds on a wide assumption that this particular property was given to Smt. Naraini Devi by Radha Ballabh in lieu of maintenance. However even on merit's the argument cannot be accepted. 17. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned Counsel it will be convenient to have a look at Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The submission proceeds on a wide assumption that this particular property was given to Smt. Naraini Devi by Radha Ballabh in lieu of maintenance. However even on merit's the argument cannot be accepted. 17. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned Counsel it will be convenient to have a look at Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. It provides : 14.(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation - In this sub-section, "property" includes both moveable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any persons, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act." (2) Nothing contained in subsection (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will, or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property." This section has been subject of an exhaustive consideration by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in two decisions cited by Sri Bharagava. In both these decisions, the question raised was whether a provision in a compromise decree purporting to restrict the right of enjoyment of certain properties given to a Hindu widow in lieu of her maintenance would attract sub-section (2) of Section 14 so as to prevent the property from vesting in the widow absolutely in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 14. After a survey of the entire law on the subject, both textual as well as judicial precedents, their Lordships ruled that there the decree or instrument restricting the right of enjoyment by Hindu widow of the properties given to her in lieu of maintenance merely recognizes a pre-existing right vesting in the widow, sub-section (2) of Section 14 shall have no application and that the appropriate provision applying to such cases would be section 14(1). It is noteworthy that in both these cases specific immovable properties had been allotted to a Hindu widow in the lieu of maintenance under a compromise decree which contained restrictive clause conferring only a life estate on the widow. Their Lordships observed that under the Shastric Hindu law, the widow had an undoubted right of maintenance for the satisfaction of which the properties in question were liable and if in satisfaction of her claim for maintenance she was allotted those properties, sub-section (2) of Section 14 could not validly rob her of the full estate which was conferred on her by Statute. 18. In order to elucidate the point it seems necessary to have a closer look at the precise nature of this right, namely, the claim of a Hindu widow for maintenance and its enforceability against joint Hindu family properties or the properties of her husband. In the case reported in AIR 1977 SC 19 44, His Lordship Bhagawati J. observed after an extensive analysis of the tests and authorities on the subject that a Hindu widow can for the purpose of maintenance follow the joint Hindu family property into the hands of any one who takes it but his Lordship hastened to add that this right of maintenance is not a right to a property but it is a right against the property of her husband, because the widow has a legal right to be maintained out of the properties of her husband. His Lordship stated the law thus at pages 1950 to 1951 : "It is, therefore, clear that under the sastric Hindu Law a widow has a right to be maintained out of joint family property and this right would ripen into a charge if the widow takes the necessary steps for having her maintenance ascertained and specifically charged in the joint family property and even if no specific charge is created, this right would be enforceable against joint family property in the hands of a volunteer or a purchaser taking it with notice of her claim. The right of the widow to be maintained is of course not a jus in rem, since it does not give her any interest in the joint family property but it is certainly jus ad rem, i.e., a right against the family property. Therefore, when specific property is allotted to the widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance, the allotment would be in satisfaction of her jus ad rem, namely, the right to be maintained out of the joint family property. It would not be a grant, for the-first time without any pre-existing right in the widow. The widow would be getting the property in virtue of her pre-existing right, the instrument giving the property being merely a document effectuating such pre-existing right and not making a grant of the property to her for the first time without any antecedent right or title." 19. After making the aforesaid observations His Lordship held that when specific property is allotted to the widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance, the allotment would be in satisfaction of her right to be maintained out of the Joint Hindu Family properties. It would not be a grant for the first time, without any pre-existing right in the widow. 20. Having stated the law thus and taking note of the fact that the property in question had been specifically allotted to the widow in satisfaction of her claim for maintenance. His Lordship ruled that the compromise decree under which she was allotted that property conferred no fresh rights on the widow. Consequently, it must follow that the decree purporting to restrict her right consistently with the Sastric law could not validly attract sub-section (2) of Section 14 Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 14 undoubtedly covered such upon its plain terms. 21. Consequently, it must follow that the decree purporting to restrict her right consistently with the Sastric law could not validly attract sub-section (2) of Section 14 Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 14 undoubtedly covered such upon its plain terms. 21. The same view was reiterated in the other case viz AIR 1979 SC 993 , Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai There also the position was that under a compromise decree specific properties were allotted to a Hindu widow in satisfaction of her claim for maintenance. The decree, however, provided that the widow shall have a only life estate in the properties. The Supreme Court held that sub-section (2) of Section 14 was not attracted as the decree merely recognised a pre-existing right of Hindu widow. Explanation to section 14(1) was applicable in terms to such a case. The property had not been conferred for the first time on the widow under the decree. It was in this factual background that their Lordships, negatived the claim of the plaintiffs founded on sub-section (2) of Section 14. 22. The right to maintenance of a Hindu widow examined by the Supreme Court in the two decisions cited above was in the context of the Shastric law. However, kunder the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act also the position is substantially the same. Indeed, it seems statutory recognition has been given to the existing law as regards the claim for maintenance of Hindu widows and their dependants of a Hindu. Thus Section 19 provides that a Hindu wife shall be entitled to be maintained after the death of her husband by her father-in-law from the estate of her husband. Section 21 defines the term `dependants' of a deceased Hindu. It includes his widow. Then follows Section 22 which provides that the heirs of a deceased Hindu are bound to maintain the dependents of the deceased out of the estate inherited by them from the deceased. Section 22(2) however provides : "Where a dependent has not obtained. by testamentary or intestate succession, any share in the estate of a Hindu dying after the commencement of this Act, the dependent shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of this Act, to maintenance from those who take the estate." 23. This provision is significant in the context of the present case. by testamentary or intestate succession, any share in the estate of a Hindu dying after the commencement of this Act, the dependent shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of this Act, to maintenance from those who take the estate." 23. This provision is significant in the context of the present case. Section 27 states : "A dependant's claim for maintenance under this Act shall not be a charge on the estate of the deceased or any portion thereof, unless one had been created by the will of the deceased by a decree of court, by agreement between the dependant and the owner of the estate or portion, or otherwise." 24. The section reiterates the rule established by a long line of decisions under the Shastric law as previously applied, which was that a claim of a Hindu widow for maintenance is not a charge on the estate of her deceased husband until it is fixed and charged upon the estate. The claim is of an indefinite character and unless made a charge upon the property, is enforceable only like any other liability in respect of which no charge exists. 25. It would thus seem that in the final analysis the vital question relevant for the application of Section 14 would be whether the Will or Instrument or a Decree which prescribes a restricted estate in such property merely recognises a pre-existing right of a Hindu widow. If the answer is in the negative sub-s. (2) of S. 14 would be attracted in terms and deprive the widow of the benefit contemplated under S. 14(1) of the Act, if, however, the answer is in the affirmative sub- section (]) rather than sub-section 42) will apply. 26. Turning to the facts of the present case, I find that it has not been proved that the open piece of land transferred to the Trust was given to Smt. Naraini Devi for her maintenance. Under the Will Radha Ballabh had bequeathed considerable properties to Smt. Naraini Devi. The properties included residential buildings as well as shops and open pieces of land. In one of the residential buildings Radha Ballabh was residing with Smt. Naraini Devi. The entire immovable properties were valued by the plaintiffs at Rs. 44,000/- out of which the valuation of the disputed property was shown in the plaint as Rs. 3,000/-. The properties included residential buildings as well as shops and open pieces of land. In one of the residential buildings Radha Ballabh was residing with Smt. Naraini Devi. The entire immovable properties were valued by the plaintiffs at Rs. 44,000/- out of which the valuation of the disputed property was shown in the plaint as Rs. 3,000/-. Sri G. P. Bhargava did not question the correctness of the valuation of the properties given by the plaintiffs in the suit. 27. Besides immoveable properties Smt. Naraini Devi was bequeathed moveable assets as well. The evidence indicates that Sri Radha Ballabh was a person of substantial means. So it may be safely assumed that Smt. Naraini Devi had been amply provided by Radha Ballabh in the shape of both immoveable properties as well as moveable assets, even without the aid of this piece of land which Smt. Naraini Devi chose to transfer to the defendant-appellant under the Waqf-deed. Not only that, Radha Ballabh had specifically enjoined the other legatees to pay certain sums of money every month to Smt. Naraini Devi for her maintenance. Further admittedly Smt. Naraini Devi had sold a part of the properties obtained by her under the will which further goes to prove that smt. Naraini Devi had no problem of maintenance. 28. Intrinsically also, there is nothing in the Will of Radha Ballabh which might suggest that the disputed property which Smt. Naraini Devi had transferred to the defendant- respondent trust was given to her in lieu of maintenance. 29. There is no presumption that every single property obtained by a Hindu widow by testamentary or intestate succession from her husband must be deemed to have been acquired by her for her maintenance. As has been laid down in the decisions cited above, as well as the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act she had at best a right to proceed against the properties left by Radha Ballabh in satisfaction of her claim for maintenance, if she was unable to maintain herself from other properties and assets. But from the mere circumstance that she could legally proceed against this property in satisfaction of her claim, it does not follow that the property must be deemed to have been acquired by her in lieu of maintenance within the meaning of explanation to S. 14(1). As observed by his Lordship Mr. But from the mere circumstance that she could legally proceed against this property in satisfaction of her claim, it does not follow that the property must be deemed to have been acquired by her in lieu of maintenance within the meaning of explanation to S. 14(1). As observed by his Lordship Mr. Justice Bhagawati in the decision reported in AIR 1977 SC 19 44, the claim for maintenance is not jus in rem, but in only a jus ad rem, i.e., a right against the property. 30. My conclusion, therefore, is that the property in dispute cannot be said to have been acquired by Smt. Naraini Devi in lieu of her maintenance. The two Supreme Court decisions cited by Sri G. P. Bhargava are hence distinguishable for the simple reason that in both these cases specific immoveable properties had been allotted to the widow expressly in satisfaction of her claim for maintenance. That being so section 14(2) clearly applies and the clause contained in the Will prescribing a restricted estate in the property bequeathed to Smt. Naraini Devi must be held to be fully operative in the case. 31. The second submission of the learned counsel for the appellants in this appeal was that even if Smt. Naraini Devi had a limited right in the property inasmuch as the alienation made by her in favour of the trust was for the spiritual benefit of her deceased husband. it must be upheld as sanctioned by various texts and authorities. In support learned counsel placed reliance on two decisions, namely, AIR 1922 PC 261 and AIR 1957 SC 434 , in which it has been ruled that a Hindu widow is entitled to make an alienation of a reasonable portion of the estate of her deceased husband for pious purposes or for objects which conduce to the bliss of the deceased husband's soul. It was urged that the transfer was made consistently with the wishes of Sri Radha Ballabh himself. That being so, the transfer must he upheld, even if legally Smt. Naraini Devi was not a full owner of the estate of her deceased hushand. 32. This point again was not canvassed in any form before the court below. It is obvious that it is not a pure question of law. That being so, the transfer must he upheld, even if legally Smt. Naraini Devi was not a full owner of the estate of her deceased hushand. 32. This point again was not canvassed in any form before the court below. It is obvious that it is not a pure question of law. The argument of the learned counsel is based on an unsubstantiated assumption that the alienation was made for the spiritual benefit of her deceased husband, or in fulfilment of his wishes. If the appellant had raised this issue before the court below, the other side would have had the benefit of establishing whether or not the transfer made by Smt. Naraini Devi was for the spiritual benefit of Sri Radha Ballabh or her own. Learned counsel, however, placed reliance on the recitals contained in the sale deed dated 2-3-1965 (Paper No. 198 Ka) by Smt. Naraini Devi in which it is mentioned that her husband wanted to construct a Dharmshala. From this recital Sri Bhargava wanted this court to conclude that the transfer in favour of the Trust must be deemed to have been made for the spiritual benefit of Sri Radha Ballabh. 33. I am unable to agree. It will be unjust to the respondent to give a finding on this issue of fact on the mere recitals of the aforesaid sale deed executed in favour of some third party in the absence of an issue on the point. Further, it may be mentioned that if this had been the wish of Radha Ballabh, there was nothing to prevent him from making a provision for it is the Will executed by him only a year or so before. I am, therefore, not inclined to entertain this argument at this stage. 34. Further it is also doubtful whether a Hindu widow who possesses only a life estate still enjoys the aforesaid right formerly recognised in the tests and judicial pronouncements. For under the Hindu Succession Act radical changes have been introduced conferring on Hindu females absolute right as well as right of inheritance equal in extent to that of a son. 34. Further it is also doubtful whether a Hindu widow who possesses only a life estate still enjoys the aforesaid right formerly recognised in the tests and judicial pronouncements. For under the Hindu Succession Act radical changes have been introduced conferring on Hindu females absolute right as well as right of inheritance equal in extent to that of a son. Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act provides that any text, rule of interpretation of Hindu Law enforced immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act or which is inconsistent with any provisions contained in this Act. A claim of the nature canvassed by Sri Bhargava prima facie seems inconsistent with sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act. However, I am expressing no concluded opinion on this point as the plea of Sri Bhargava is liable to be negatived on the first ground alone. 35. Lastly, I may add that although Sri Bhargava did not challenge the findings of the court below on any of the issues answered against the defendant appellants, I went through the evidence to satisfy myself as to whether the conclusions reached by the court below such as Radha Ballabh had duly executed the Will dated 21-9-1963 and that the suit was not barred by estoppel and acquiescence or Section 41 of the Transfer of Properties Act were correct or not, and, on a careful considerations of the same, I find myself in agreement with the court below on all those findings. 36. The result of the foregoing discussion, therefore, is that First Appeal No. 59 of 1972 has no merit and is liable to be dismissed. 37. 1 turn now to First Appeal No. 64 of 1982. Sri K. N. Tripathi learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the court below committed an error in not holding that the entire properties detailed in schedules A, B and C of the plaint were purchased by Radha Ballabh Benami in the name of Smt. Naraini Devi. It was urged that on a proper appreciation of the evidence on record, it was established beyond doubt that every single property purchased by Smt. Naraini Dexi really belonged to Radha Ballabh and that Smt. Naraini Devi was the mere Benamidar of Radha Ballabh. I am unable to agree. It was urged that on a proper appreciation of the evidence on record, it was established beyond doubt that every single property purchased by Smt. Naraini Dexi really belonged to Radha Ballabh and that Smt. Naraini Devi was the mere Benamidar of Radha Ballabh. I am unable to agree. In my opinion the finding of the court below in regard to portions of the properties mentioned in different schedules of the plaint for which the suit of the plaintiff appellants has been dismissed is correct. 38. For convenience sake, I shall take up the properties of different schedules-separately and consider whether the properties purchased in the name of Smt. Naraini Devi in regard to which the suit has been dismissed were benami, the real owner being Radha Ballabh. 39. The property of schedule A situate in Rafatganj admittedly belonged originally to one, Lalit Narain Dubey from whom Radha Ballabh purchased the same under a sale deed dated 24-4-1953. The same day Radha Ballabh and one Basir Uddin and Siraj Uddin executed a deed of exchange under which the property of schedule A was given to Basir Uddin and Siraj Uddin in exchange and lieu of some portion of the property comprising part of the property of schedule B. On 31-7-1954 Basir Uddin and Siraj Uddin transferred the property which they had got in exchange from Radha Ballabh by means of a sale deed dated 31-7-1954 to one Jagarnath Prasad with a stipulation therein for repurchase of the same by the vendors. Thereafter, Jagarnath Prasad sold this property in the name of Smt. Naraini Devi through a sale deed dated 25-5-1956, subject to the right of repurchase vesting in Basir Uddin and Siraj Uddin. Meanwhile, before transferring the property to Jagarnath, Basir Uddin and Siraj Uddin had partitioned the property half and half, the northern half going to Siraj Uddin and southern half to Basir Uddin. Subsequently both Basir Uddin and Siraj Uddin entered into a separate transaction firstly with Radha Ballabh alone and thereafter with both Radha Ballabh and Smt. Naraini Devi in respect of their respective portions. Thus on 29-5-1958 Suraj Uddin executed a deed of transfer (Ex. 23) in favour of Radha Ballabh in respect of his northern half portion, while the same day Basir Uddin exercising his right of repurchase obtained a sale deed in respect of his southern portion. Thus on 29-5-1958 Suraj Uddin executed a deed of transfer (Ex. 23) in favour of Radha Ballabh in respect of his northern half portion, while the same day Basir Uddin exercising his right of repurchase obtained a sale deed in respect of his southern portion. Both these transactions were, however, superseded by something which is of some significance for the disposal of this issue. On 25-9-1958 both Radha Ballabh and Smt. Naraini Devi jointly executed a fresh sale deed (Ext. 24) in favour of Basir Uddin in respect of his southern half portion of this property. Siraj Uddin similarly executed a fresh deed of surrender (Ex. A. 121) significantly in favour of both Radha Ballabh and Naraini Devi in respect of his northern portion. There was no transaction thereafter with respect to the northern portion of the property. However, Basir Uddin transferred his southern half portion to one Kishan Lal by a sale deed dated 23-10-1959 under a similar right of repurchase. Subsequently on 6-9-1960 he obtained a re-transfer of the said portion from Kishan Lal. Finally by a sale deed dated 2-8-1961 (Ex. A. 119) Basir Uddin sold this southern portion to Smt. Naraini Devi. 40. From a resume of facts set out above, it is clear that the ownership of both the northern and southern portions of the property of Schedule A finally came to be vested in Smt. Naraini Devi, though initially the property lead been purchased by Radha Ballabh. The title in the northern portion came to vest in Smt. Naraini Devi under the sale deed dated 25-5-56 (Ex. A. 118) executed by Jagannath (Jagarnath?) Prasad and in the southern portion on 2-8-61 under the sale deed (Ex. A. 119) executed in her favour by Basir Uddin. 41. It is indisputable that the onus of proof that these properties though standing in the name of Smt. Naraini Devi under formal deeds of title really belonged to Radha Ballabh and that Smt. Naraini Devi was only a Benamidar for the former. The law on the subject has been put beyond any controversy by several pronouncements of the Supreme Court and of the Privy Council but it would be sufficient to refer only to one decision reported in AIR 1965 SC 271 . The law on the subject has been put beyond any controversy by several pronouncements of the Supreme Court and of the Privy Council but it would be sufficient to refer only to one decision reported in AIR 1965 SC 271 . In this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court ruled that the onus of proof that a transaction is benami is on the party which sets up the case of benami character of the transaction. Another principle laid is that even if it is found that the consideration for a transaction of sale entered into by the husband in the name of his wife was provided by the former, the same is not conclusive to establish that the transaction was Benami. 42. In the present case, however, as I shall presently demonstrate, the plaintiffs have failed to prove by any cogent or convincing evidence that the consideration for the transactions of sale was provided by Radha Ballabh and not by Smt. Naraini Devi herself. In any case, the conduct of Sri Radha Ballabh as also the intervening transactions with regard to the property completely negative the possibility that the properties were intended to be Benami in the name of Smt. Naraini Devi. On the contrary the transactions indicated that Radha Ballabh himself intended that Smt. Naraini Devi should be the true owner of the property. 43. Taking up the question of the source of money first, I find that there is no independent or reliable evidence at all that the' money was provided by Radha Ballabh and not by Smt. Naraini Devi, herself. It is apparent that there is no presumption that the sale deed standing in the name of Smt. Naraini Devi, must have been obtained out of the funds provided by Radha Ballabh. On this part of the case, the only testimony is that of Ram Kishan (P.W. 3), one of the plaintiffs himself. Apart from his own highly interested testimony, there is no other evidence worthy of reliance which might affirmatively prove that the consideration was provided by Radha Ballabh. Ram Kishan (P. W. 3) in his statement said that Radha Ballabh had told him in the presence of some others, like Matroo Mal and the scribe of the sale deeds that the name of Smt. Naraini Devi was being mentioned in the sale deeds only for her consolation (Diljoi). Ram Kishan (P. W. 3) in his statement said that Radha Ballabh had told him in the presence of some others, like Matroo Mal and the scribe of the sale deeds that the name of Smt. Naraini Devi was being mentioned in the sale deeds only for her consolation (Diljoi). Significantly, however, none of the persons in whose presence Radha Ballabh is alleged to have stated this was produced on behalf of the plaintiffs. P.W. 1. Shiv Narain no doubt generally stated that Radha Ballabh was a man of some means but he was wholly unable to say anything about the financial resources of Smt. Naraini Devi. P W. 2 Damodar Das was also unable to say anything about the income or the financial position of Smt. Naraini. He candidly admitted that he was wholly unable to say whether Smt. Naraini Devi was earning money by stitching wedding garments. He was also unable to say whether Smt. Naraini Devi purchased any property from the custodian. He frankly admitted that he knew nothing about the financial status of Smt. Naraini Devi. Likewise the other witnesses of the plaintiffs were also entirely unable to support the plaintiffs' claim that the consideration was provided by Radha Ballabh. 44. Learned counsel, however, took me through the statements of defendants' witnesses and submitted that they have completely failed to; prove that Smt. Naraini Devi had any substantial or independent source of income so as to enable her to purchase the properties. In this connection, it is sufficient to say that assuming that the defendants' witnesses have not been able to prove that Smt. Naraini Devi had any regular source of income, that would not be of any assistance to the plaintiffs as the onus that the transaction was Benami lies on the plaintiffs and they cannot claim a decree on the basis of any alleged weakness in the case of the defendant. 45. From a consideration of the evidence on record, I have no hesitation in holding, in agreement with the court below, that the plaintiffs have miserably failed to prove that the consideration for the transactions in question was provided by Radha Ballabh and that Smt. Naraini Devi was not possessed of sufficient means to enable her to purchase the properties from her own independent funds. I may add here that the transaction of sale of 1956 in favour of Smt. Naraini Devi was only for Rs. 700/-. The sale consideration for the purchase of the property from Basir Uddin was also.of the same order. These amounts were by no means very substantial or such which a lady of the status of Smt. Naraini Devi could not have possibly paid from out of her own personal savings or resources. 46. The intervening events also negative the theory that the transactions of sale in favour of Smt. Naraini Devi evidenced by the sale deed dated 25-5-56 (Ex. A 118) and dated 2-8-61 (Ex. A 119) were Benami. Firstly, there was no reason why the property which was originally purchased in the name of Radha Ballabh should be allowed to be subsequently purchased in the name of Snit. Naraini Devi. No satisfactory reason has been offered why the property could not be purchased from Jagannath (Jagarnath) in Radha Ballabh's own name. Further after the sale deed and the deed of surrender dated 25-5-58 (Exs. 23 and 27) which initially stood solely in the name of Radha Ballabh, these documents were rewritten on 25-9-58 (Ex. 24 and Ex. A 121) in the names of both Radha Ballabh and Smt. Naraini Devi. If Radha Ballabh was the real owner of these properties, fresh deeds of sale and surrender executed in the name of both himself and Smt. Naraini Devi seemed superfluous. To my mind these transactions clearly indicate, that even Basir Uddin and Siraj Uddin recognised of surrender (Ex. A 121) recites that it was executed at the instance of Smt. Naraini Devi which shows that she was asserting ownership rights. 47. Thus the intervening transactions clearly suggest that Radha Ballabh as well as Basir Uddin and Siraj Uddin all treated Smt. Naraini Devi as the real owner of the property. There is no other explanation for various intervening exercise of deeds of surrender and sale in which the name of Smt. Naraini Devi figured. 48. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs tried to seek some support from the description of the northern boundary in the sale deed dated 29-5-58 (Ex. 26) which records that the property to the north of the building being so belonged to Radha Ballabh. 48. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs tried to seek some support from the description of the northern boundary in the sale deed dated 29-5-58 (Ex. 26) which records that the property to the north of the building being so belonged to Radha Ballabh. Learned counsel contended that this was an admission by Smt. Naraini Devi that Radha Ballabh was the owner of the northern portion of the property. I am unable to agree. The court below has rightly said that Radha Ballabh was taking active part in various transactions and it is possible that in the sale deed (Ex. 26) the northern boundary was wrongly mentioned as belonging to Radha Ballabh and this error went undetected by Smt. Naraini Devi. In any case the so-called admission is not sufficient to nullify the rest of the volume on the record which fully supports the case that Smt. Naraini Devi was not the Benamidar of Radha Ballabh. 49. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs also laid strels on the circumstances that Smt. Naraini Devi though arrayed as a defendant did not file any written statement and deny the assertions made in the plaint as well as the statements made under Order 10. In my opinion not much weight can be attached to the omission of Smt. Naraini Devi to file a written statement. Her omission cannot be used as an admission against the contesting defendants. 50. On a consideration of the entire evidence on record, therefore, I find myself in complete agreement with the court below that the plaintiffs have failed to prove their case that the properties of Schedule-A really belonged to Radha Ballabh and Smt. Naraini Devi was a mere Benamidar for him. 51. This brings me to the property of Schedule B marked by letters R.S.T.U. in regard to which the plaintiffs suit had been dismissed by the court below. Here also the position is that under a sale deed dated 28-9-1958 one Usman sold this property for Rs. 1,900/- to Smt. Naraini Devi. There is no other transaction in regard to this property which might support the plaintiffs' case that Smt. Naraini Devi was a Benamidar for Radha Ballabh. The evidence on record does not indicate that Radha Ballabh was present at the time of the execution of the sale deed. 1,900/- to Smt. Naraini Devi. There is no other transaction in regard to this property which might support the plaintiffs' case that Smt. Naraini Devi was a Benamidar for Radha Ballabh. The evidence on record does not indicate that Radha Ballabh was present at the time of the execution of the sale deed. The evidence led by the plaintiffs with regard to the source from which the consideration for this transaction came is of the same variety as that discussed by me while dealing with the property of Schedule A. Here also I find that there is no independent and reliable evidence which might support the claim of the plaintiffs that the real owner was Radha Ballabh and that Smt. Naraini Devi was a mere Benamidar. 52. So far as the property mentioned at item No. 2 of Schedule C is concerned, the position is that the house was purchased from Damodar Das through sale deed dated 7-4-48 for Rs. 6,000/- jointly in the name of Sri Radha Ballabh and Smt. Naraini Devi. The court below has discussed the evidence in regard to this property at length and has come to the conclusion that this property belonged both to Radha Ballabh and Smt. Naraini Devi in equal shares. I entirely agree with the comments made by the court below. I have gone through the statements of P.W. 1 Shiv Narain and P.W. 2 Damodar Das to which my attention was invited by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, but I am unable to place much reliance on their testimony. P.W. 1 Shiv Narain simply says that Radha Ballabh was employed in the concern called 'New Popular Cycle Mart, Agra' and that he had Rs. 15,000/- deposited to his credit in the book of that firm. He further says that Radha Ballabh had withdrawn Rs. 5,000/- out of that amount. However, there are no proper accounts forth- coming in support of this allegation. Secondly the plaintiffs are also the employees of this concern and consequently the testimony of P.W. 1 cannot be said to be entirely unbiased or independent. Further there is no reliable evidence to establish that the sum of Rs. 5,000/- alleged to have been withdrawn by Radha Ballabh was invested in the purchase of this house. 53. Secondly the plaintiffs are also the employees of this concern and consequently the testimony of P.W. 1 cannot be said to be entirely unbiased or independent. Further there is no reliable evidence to establish that the sum of Rs. 5,000/- alleged to have been withdrawn by Radha Ballabh was invested in the purchase of this house. 53. P.W. 2 Damodar Das also does not inspire much confidence and he seems to have appeared as a witness only to oblige the plaintiffs. He simply says that Radha Ballabh had told him that the name of Smt. Naraini Devi was being included in the sale deed only for her consolation. There was, however, no occasion for Radha Ballabh to tell this fact to Damodar Dass. The court below was hence right in not placing reliance on the plaintiffs' witnesses in regard to the property of Schedule C also. According to the recitals in the sale deed Radha Ballabh and Smt. Naraini Devi both were to be the owners of this property in equal shares. The plaintiffs' case of benami character of the transaction was hence rightly rejected in regard to this item of the property also. 54. In the result both the appeals fail and are dismissed. There will, however, be no orders as to costs in either of these two appeals.