Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1985 DIGILAW 773 (ALL)

Jayanti Devi v. District Judge

1985-08-22

V.K.MEHROTRA

body1985
JUDGMENT : V.K. MEHROHTRA, J. 1. Smt. Jayanti Devi, Petitioner, is a tenant in an accommodation of which the second Respondent Har Pyari Devi is the landlord, within the meaning of that term in U.P. Act 13 of 1972. On March 12, 1976, an application was made u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act by her for release of the portion in the tenancy of the Petitioner. It was founded on the basis that the accommodation in the possession of the landlady was inadequate for her needs and having regard to the number of members in her family, further accommodation was needed by her. She prayed that the accommodation in the possession of the Petitioner be released in her favour. The Petitioner resisted the claim by pleading, principally, that the accommodation in possession of the landlady was sufficient and that her need was not bona fide. 2. The case set up by the landlady was that apart from herself, after the death of her husband, her son Arjun Kumar who was married with one Suneeta and an unmarried daughter Km. Kamlesh, were living with her. The Petitioner set up the case that it was only the landlady and her unmarried daughter who were residing at Moradabad and that Arjun Kumar was living at Bareilly and carrying on business there. 3. The Prescribed Authority went into the evidence adduced by the parties in the case. He concluded that the total number of persons who were living at Moradabad was two which included the landlady and her unmarried daughter Km. Kamlesh. On the finding, he concluded that the accommodation in possession of the landlady was sufficient for her needs and with this finding the prayer for release was rejected. 4. In appeal, the learned District Judge appreciated the evidence afresh and came to the conclusion that number of persons living at Moradabad was four as pleaded by the landlady. He also concluded that the accommodation at the disposal of the landlady was not sufficient for the newly married son Arjun Kumar. Reversing the conclusion of the Prescribed Authority, the learned District Judge allowed the application for release and granted a month's time to the tenant to vacate the accommodation. 5. It has been urged on behalf of the tenant-Petitioner that the learned District Judge was in error in concluding-that the number of members of the family of the landlady living at Moradabad was four. 5. It has been urged on behalf of the tenant-Petitioner that the learned District Judge was in error in concluding-that the number of members of the family of the landlady living at Moradabad was four. The argument, firstly, is that the documents which had been considered by the Prescribed Authority had not been adverted to by the learned District Judge. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner had failed to point out anything in the order of the Prescribed Authority from which it may appear that any document filed on behalf of the Petitioner was relied upon by the Prescribed Authority. He referred to an affidavit of the Landlady (paper No. A/6/5) in paragraph 17 whereof, according to the Petitioner, there is an admission of the landlady. The learned District Judge has referred to this affidavit but has drawn a conclusion different from the one drawn by Prescribed Authority. It cannot be said that the learned District Judge has not considered the document which was relied upon by the Prescribed Authority in favour of the Petitioner while disposing of the appeal. 6. The second argument of the Learned Counsel is that the Prescribed Authority having come to a conclusion in favour of the tenant on appreciation of evidence, it is not open to the District Judge in appeal to reverse the same without meeting the reasons contained In the order of the Prescribed Authority. This argument is not sustainable. The powers of the appellate authority are co-extensive with that of the Prescribed Authority and where the appellate authority, on consideration of the material on record, comes to a different conclusion form the one arrived at by the Prescribed Authority, it cannot be said that the order suffers from manifest error of law. If, as here, (be conclusion of the Prescribed Authority Is found to be based upon relevant material on record, tee mere fact that each and every reason given by the Prescribed Authority is not met by the Appellate Authority in its order, cannot render it legally infirm. The order of the Appellate Authority need not, as it were, come in close quarters with that of the Prescribed Authority. In Ram Raj Ahir v. Hirdaya Narain Bai 1982 ALJ 1435 this principle has been accepted in the case of an appeal u/s 100 CPC. The order of the Appellate Authority need not, as it were, come in close quarters with that of the Prescribed Authority. In Ram Raj Ahir v. Hirdaya Narain Bai 1982 ALJ 1435 this principle has been accepted in the case of an appeal u/s 100 CPC. It applies with greater vigour when this Court is examining an order in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. The only submission made by the Learned Counsel is unacceptable for vitiating the order passed by the Appellate Authority. The writ petition is dismissed but I leave the parties to bear their own costs.