JUDGMENT S.K. Dhaon, J. - This petition has been referred by an employer. In it an award given by the Labour Court, Ghaziabad in an adjudication case is being impugned. 2. In the purported exercise of powers under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the State Government made a reference of an industrial dispute. The English rendering of the terms of the reference was somewhat like this : "Was the termination of the services of the workman Sri M. S. Gautam by the employer on 29th August, 1977, lawful. If not, to what relief was the workman entitled." According to the employer, Sri M. S. Gautam, the respondent No. 3 (hereinafter referred to as the workman) was appointed on 5th May, 1973, as an Account Assistant on the basis of letter of appointment issued by it. Paragraph 9 of the said letter of appointment ran s "It is under stood that though you have been appointed at the Guldhar Office at Ghaziabad, you may be transferred to any other place any where in India or to any allied concern should the exigencies of service so require of which the management shall be the sole judge." Thereafter, the workman was promoted as a store-keeper. On 7th June, 1977, the employer sent a communication to the workman in which it was, inter alia, stated that his services were required at the Head Office and he should report at the Head Office as soon as possible. This communication was followed by another communication dated 15th June, 1977 and in that communication it was made clear to the workman that the failure to comply with the order of 7th June would entail disciplinary action. Some more correspondence ensued between the employer and the workman and eventually the workman did not report himself at the Head Office and the order of transfer was observed in its breach. On 29th August, 1977, an order terminating the services of the workman was passed. The operative portion of this order ran as under t ". . . . As you have failed to join your duties at Head Office and you have not applied for any leave, it is clear that you are not interested in continuing your services in our Company and have abandoned your services. The operative portion of this order ran as under t ". . . . As you have failed to join your duties at Head Office and you have not applied for any leave, it is clear that you are not interested in continuing your services in our Company and have abandoned your services. Therefore your services are treated as terminated and you may collect your dues from the registered office of the company on any working day of the Company against proper receipt for the amount." 3. In the purported exercise of powers under clauses (b), (o) and (g) of Section 3 of the Act the Governor made the Uttar Pradesh (Industrial Employment) Standing Order, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Standing Order) and this was duly enforced by a notification in the Gazette. Before the Labour Court the employer placed reliance upon the Standing Order 15(9) which run 1 "A workman remaining absent without leave for a period exceeding fifteen days at a stretch shall be deemed to have abandoned the employment." The workman produced a certificate of the doctor of the Employees State Insurance according to which he (the workman) was ill between 4th June and 5th July, 1977, both days inclusive. The workman in turn contended that though the order dated 29th August, passed by the employer was couched in the language so as to enable it to be treated as containing as order of termination, the employer had in fact dismissed him on the ground on misconduct and imposed him the punishment of dismissal from service. This action was illegal as admittedly the procedure as prescribed in Standing Order 26 had not been followed. 4. The Labour Court recorded a finding that the employer had no power to pass the order transferring the workman from Ghaziabad to the Head Office. Since the terms of the Standing Order do not permit an employer to transfer its employees, the terms of paragraph 9 of the order of appointment could not be enforced as against the workman. In other words, the Court recorded a finding that the said term became inoperative after the enforcement of the Standing Order. The Court accepted the plea of the workman that he remained on leave between 4th June and 5th July, 1977. It negatived the plea of the employer that the workman had abandoned his employment. In other words, the Court recorded a finding that the said term became inoperative after the enforcement of the Standing Order. The Court accepted the plea of the workman that he remained on leave between 4th June and 5th July, 1977. It negatived the plea of the employer that the workman had abandoned his employment. It also came to the conclusion that the order of the termination of the services was illegal as the same had been passed in violation of the Standing Order. The Court accepted the plea of the Standing Order 26. It accordingly declared the termination of the services of the workman as illegal and granted him the relief of the payment of the back wages and also the relief of reinstatement in service. 5. A great deal of argument has been advanced on the question as to whether in the absence of any provision in the Standing Order and even otherwise in the general law, the employer had no jurisdiction or power to transfer the workman from Ghaziabad to the Head Office at Delhi. It is not necessary for me to adjudicate upon the question finally in view of my decision which follows shortly. For the purposes of this petition am proceeding on the assumption that the employer had the jurisdiction to transfer the workman from Ghaziabad to Delhi and the workman disobeyed the order of transfer. 6. The question still is : Whether the employer can save its it order dated 29th August, 1977, by relying upon the Standing Order 15 (9) afore quoted the argument advanced on behalf of the workman is that assuming the workman remained absent without leave for the requisite number of days and assuming the Standing Order 15(9) applied, then too the order terminating the services of the workman was an illegal one. The sheet-anchor of the submission 's Section 6-N of the Act. 7. Section 6-N provides that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until : (a) the workman has been given one months notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of notice. (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) ............................ Retrenchment has been defined in Section 2(s) to mean : "the termination by the employer to the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include. - (Emphasis supplied) (i) voluntary retirement of the workman ; (ii) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf." 8. Let us first examine whether employer purported to terminate the service of the workman as measure of punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. The letter dated 29th August, 1977 terminating the services of the petitioner clearly indicates that the employer had no intention of taking any disciplinary action against the workman. In the letter it is recited that the workman failed to carry out the order of transfer, absented himself from duty without any leave and, therefore, he (the workman) abandoned the employment. Clearly the employer, in the letter, rested its orders on the terms contained in Standing order 15(9) This intention of the employer is corroborated by the fact that it did not initiate any proceedings against the workman in pursuance of the Standing Order 15 (9) which lays down a procedure for taking a disciplinary action Therefore, there can be no difficulty in proceeding on the assumption that the employer neither intended to take any disciplinary action against the workman nor, in fact, it did so. 9. Having found that no disciplinary action has been taken against the workman, we have now to see whether the other exception as envisaged in Section 2(s) of the Act were in existence. It was nobodys case, nor is it now, that the workman took a voluntary retirement or he attained the age of superannuation. That being so, the case of the employer does not fall in any of the exceptions as laid down in the aforementioned provision. Nonetheless, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the exceptions laid down in Section 2(s) of the Act are merely illustrative and not exhaustive. That being so, the case of the employer does not fall in any of the exceptions as laid down in the aforementioned provision. Nonetheless, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the exceptions laid down in Section 2(s) of the Act are merely illustrative and not exhaustive. According to him, the question of the employee being retrenched does not arise when he himself abandoned his job in accordance with the Standing Order. The submission no doubt appears to be attractive, but in my opinion the controversy stands concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money (1976) 32 FLR 197 . In this case the terms of appointment were these : (l) The appointment is purely a temporary one for a period of 9 days but may be terminated earlier, without assigning any reason there for at the banks discretion : (2) The employment unless terminated earlier will automatically cease at the expiry of the period i.e. 18-11-1972. In the case it was admitted that 9 days employment tacked on and ripened into a continuous service of not less than 240 days in one year. On these facts the Supreme Court was called upon to give Us verdict on the application of Sections 2 (oo) and 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The provisions thereof are in part materia with Sections 2 (s) and 6-N of the Act. The precise argument before the Supreme Court, on behalf of the employer was that, in view of paragraph aforementioned where the employment was to automatically cease on the expiry of a period, the provisions are contained in Section 2 (oo) will not be attracted despite the words "for any reason whatsoever." The Supreme Court answered this question in paragraph 9 by saying that whatever the reason, every termination spells retrenchment. The substance is decisive. A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master or the running out of the stipulated term. To protect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated germination embraces not merely the act of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced. 10. Applying this ratio, there can be no other answer to the problem before us than this. To protect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated germination embraces not merely the act of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced. 10. Applying this ratio, there can be no other answer to the problem before us than this. Despite the operation of Standing Order 15 (9) the provision as contained in Section 6-N of the Act will apply and the order of termination as contained in the letter dated 29th August, 1977 stands vitiated on account of the non-observance of the conditions laid down in Section 6-N. 11. Reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel on two decisions of this Court. The first is M/s. Symonds and Co. v. Shri Maharanidin and others, (1978) 37 FLR 234 . In this case an automatic termination of service on account of a provision in the Standing Order took place. A Division Bench of this Court took the view that the termination of service was not a punishment or discharge from service within the meaning of Section 6-E (2) of the Act. There, it is apparent, Section 6-N was not considered at all. This case, therefore, is not apposite. In Writ Petition No. 4691 of 1977, decided on 16th September, 1982, too Section 6-N of the Act was not considered This care, therefore, also does not advance the case of the employer. 12 An order passed or direction given under Section 3 of the Act is an exercise of an administrative or executive power. See Basti Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1978) 37 FLR 265 and State of U. P. v. Basti Sugar Mills Co. Ltd., (1961) 2 FLR 101 . If there be any real conflict between the terms of the Standing Order 15(9) and the provisions contained in Section 6-N, obviously the letter provisions will prevail. Section 6-N contains the legislative mandate and its efficacy can be destroyed only by the Legislature. However, 1 do not find any conflict between the Standing Order and the statutory provisions. Even when the employer terminates the services of a workman on the ground of the abandonment of his job by the workman. Section 6-N will have its lull play. Standing Order 15(9) is absolutely silent about the observance of relevant provisions of the Act by the employer. Even when the employer terminates the services of a workman on the ground of the abandonment of his job by the workman. Section 6-N will have its lull play. Standing Order 15(9) is absolutely silent about the observance of relevant provisions of the Act by the employer. On the contrary, the fulfilment of the conditions enumerated in sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 6-N are mandatory. That apart, the proviso to Section 3 takes the matter beyond the pale of any controversy. The proviso lays down that no order made under clause (b) Section 3 shall require an employer to observe the terms and conditions of the employment less favourable to workmen than those which were applicable to them at any time within the three months preceding the date of the order. Now it is well settled that the terms and conditions of employment can have their genesis either in a contract express or implied or in a provision having a statutory force. It cannot be said that the provisions as contained in Section 6-N do not fetter the right or the discretion of the employer to terminate the service of its employees. Correspondingly, the said provisions secure the right of an employee to be free from the caprice or of an employer. For, the provisions of Section 6-N considerably dilute the hardship inherent in the right of an employer to hire and fire an employee. There can be, therefore, no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the provisions as contained in Section 6-N provide, for the terms and conditions of service of workmen. Section 6-N in the present from was brought in the statute book by U. P. Act No. 1 of 1957. Whereas the Standing Orders were enforced some time in 1972. Therefore, the provisions as contained in the proviso to Section 3 are squarely attracted. 13. The net result is that the services of the workman were wrongfully terminated on 29th August, 1977, and the award given by the Labour Court calls for no interference. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs.