JUDGMENT Om Prakash, J. - This is a second appeal by the plaintiff-appellants against the judgment and decree dated 7th November, 1974 passed by learned Addl. District Judge I Bareilly (hereinafter to be referred as the A.D.J.) affirming the judgment and decree of the lower court. Whereby the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed. 2. The plaintiff's filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their (plaintiffs) peaceful possession over the suit land that was marked by letters A.B.G.H. in the plaint map and from taking possession over the same. The case of the plaintiffs was that the suit land in the past belonged to two real brothers, namely Babu Ram and Moll Chand, who sold away the same to Mirza Najir Beg, who was the predecessor in title of the grandfather of the plaintiff no. 1. It was stated that the plaintiffs remained in possession right from the time of their grand-father and prior to that the predecessor in title of the grand-father of the plaintiff no. 1 remained in peaceful possession over the suit land. The plaintiffs in the alternative claimed their ownership by adverse possession. 3. The defendant no. 1 contested the suit. The defendants denied the case of the plaintiffs altogether. The case of the defendant no. 1 was that the suit land belonged to the defendant no. 2 and that he transferred the same on 1-2-1966 in favour of the defendant no. 1 for Rs. 700/-. 4. The lower court framed as many as six issues and observed that the plaintiffs later rested their case on the plea of adverse possession and that was the only material plea to be considered. On the plea of adverse possession, the lower court took the view that the plaintiffs failed to establish their adverse possession. The lower court also observed that the suit land could be approached by the plaintiffs only from the western and southern sides, but there was no opening on either side, nor was one shown in the plaint map. The commissioner who was appointed at the instance of the plaintiffs to prepare the plaint map, did show the opening in the southern wall but the lower court took the view that the same had been opened by the plaintiffs after the suit was filed. Learned A.D.J. also gave the same reasoning to reject the plaint case. 5. The commissioner who was appointed at the instance of the plaintiffs to prepare the plaint map, did show the opening in the southern wall but the lower court took the view that the same had been opened by the plaintiffs after the suit was filed. Learned A.D.J. also gave the same reasoning to reject the plaint case. 5. I have heard Sri R.K. Agrawal, learned counsel for the plaintiffs only as none appeared for and on behalf of the defendants-respondents even after the list was revised. The lower court has clearly observed that the defendant no. 1 though cross-examined the witnesses of the plaintiffs but he absented on the date fixed for his evidence and thus the case was decided ex-parte against him. So, no evidence was led by the defendant no. 1. Neither the lower court, nor the appellate court has discussed and evidence of the defendant no. 2 that might go adverse to the plaintiffs. On these facts, the question is; was the appellate court right in dismissing the plaintiffs case? Learned A.D.J. has stressed the point that the land in suit could be used only through the western and southern sides by the plaintiffs, but there was no opening and that no such opening was even shown in the plaint map and, therefore, there was no chance for the plaintiffs to use the suit land. The Commissioner, who was appointed to prepare the plaint map, clearly showed a door in the southern wall and the plaintiffs urged that they had been using the suit land through that door. Both the courts below consistently held that the door in the southern wall was newly opened. The question is whether this inference was rightly drawn?. The Commissioner was not examined by the defendants to depose the point of time of construction of the door in the southern wall. The inference that the door was newly opened was drawn, because the Commissioner observed in his report that some wet-earth was found at the place where the door is located and that the plaster also appeared to be newly done. Simply because the plaster was new learned A.D.J. was not right in holding that the door in the southern wall was new. It is to be noted that the door is in the southern wall which is not new. Simply because the plaster was new learned A.D.J. was not right in holding that the door in the southern wall was new. It is to be noted that the door is in the southern wall which is not new. For constructing the door, no diging or foundation is required and, therefore, from the Commissioner's observation that some new wet, earth was there on the sport, no inference of newly constructed door can be drawn. Even from the fact that plaster was new on the wall which is admittedly old, no inference can be drawn that new door was constructed. The Commissioner does not say that the door is new, nor have the defendants proved that the door was constructed during the pendency of the suit. The plaintiff's clearly suggested that the omission in the plaint map to snow the door in the southern wall, was merely accidental or clerical. There is no material on record to rebut this case of the plaintiffs. In absence of any evidence on behalf on the defendants in rebuttal, it is difficult to sustain the orders of the courts below. The plaintiffs having raised the plea of adverse possession and they having adduced evidence in support there of and the defendants having failed absolutely to rebut the case of the plaintiffs, in my opinion, the courts below should have accepted the case of the plaintiffs. No doubt the onus is on the plaintiffs to prove their case but the point of onus has to be seen in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case and the important fact is that the case of the plaintiffs has not at all been rebutted by the defendants and thus it cannot be said that onus has not been discharged by the plaintiffs. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court are set aside and the suit of the plaintiffs for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land is decreed with costs throughout.