JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - This is a plaintiffs appeal against the decree dated 22nd Dec. 1972 passed by the 1st temporary Civil and Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur whereby the appellant's suit for declaration that the order dated 7th July, 1961 passed by the Development Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh Lucknow terminating his services as Block Development Officer was void and illegal and for recovery of arrears of pay and travelling allowances (was dismissed). 2. The facts in a nutshell giving rise to the aforesaid suit are that the appellant was appointed as a temporary Block Development Officer on 15th Nov. 1956. It appears that some funds were placed at the disposal of the appellant in his capacity as Block Development Officer for meeting the expenditure connected with training of the members of the Block Development Committee in the month of March 1961. It further appears that every trainee of the Block Development Committee was to be paid a sum of Rs. 16/- and a complaint was made to the District Planning Officer that full payment had not been made to some of the trainees. The District Planning Officer made some preliminary enquiries and submitted a report to the District Magistrate stating that prima facie there appeared to be some substance in the complaint. On receipt of the report, the District Magistrate wrote a 10 letter dated 22nd May 1961 to the Development Commissioner, U.P. Lucknow, a copy where of was filed as Exhibit 13 in the suit, stating that from report of the District Planning Officer it appeared that the appellant had committed financial irregularities and the exact amount of misappropriated money by the appellant could be found only after all the trainees were examined which will take some time. A request was made that till enquiry was completed, the appellant may be suspended. The Development Commissioner, on receipt of that letter, passed an order dated 7th July 1961, a copy whereof was filed in the suit as Ex. 11. Relevant portion of the said order reads as under : - "OFFICE OF THE DEVELOPMENT COMMISSIONER, UTTAR PRADESH No. 4423/E-K1) Dated Lucknow July 7, 1961 ORDER The services of Sri Shyam Sunder temporary Block Development Officer, Bharat, district Gorakhpur are no longer required, by this department this services are, therefore, terminated with effect from the service of the order. Sri Shyam Sundar will get one month's pay in lieu of notice. Sri Shyam Sundar will get one month's pay in lieu of notice. Satish Chander Development Commissioner Uttar Pradesh." The appellant, on receipt of the order dated 7th July 1961, made a representation not to any higher authority but to the Development Commissioner himself on 8th Aug. 1961. A copy of this representation was filed in the suit as Ex. 21. The representation, however, does not appear to have found favour with the Development Commissioner. The appellant was also prosecuted for the financial irregularities mentioned above and was convicted by the Assistant Sessions Judge. On an appeal filed by him, he was, however, acquitted by giving benefit of doubt by the Sessions Judge on 18th Dec. 1969. On being acquitted notwithstanding the order dated 7th July 1961 whereby his services had been terminated, the appellant made a request for being permitted to report on duty. The request, however, was obviously not granted on the face of the order dated 7th July 1961. The appellant then served a notice dated 16th Nov. 1970 on the respondent under S. 80 of the C.P.C. The suit giving rise to this appeal was, however, filed on 10th Mar. 1973. 3. The suit was contested by the respondent and was dismissed by the trial Court as already pointed out above. A perusal of the judgment appealed against indicates that two points were pressed on behalf of the appellant in the trial Court : (1) even though the order dated 7th July 1961 purported to be an innocuous order of termination of service simpliciter, it really amounted to an order of punishment and since this order was passed without giving the appellant an opportunity of showing cause as contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution, it was void and (2) since one month's salary in lieu of notice had not been paid to the appellant, the order dated 7th July 1961 was bad in law. The case of the appellant on these two points was contested on behalf of the respondent. The plea that the suit was barred by time was raised in addition by the respondent. On the first plea raised on behalf of the appellant, the trial Court took the view that the order dated 7th July 1961 was a simple order of termination of service and it had not been passed by way of punishment. Consequently, Article 311(2) of the Constitution was not attracted. On the first plea raised on behalf of the appellant, the trial Court took the view that the order dated 7th July 1961 was a simple order of termination of service and it had not been passed by way of punishment. Consequently, Article 311(2) of the Constitution was not attracted. On the second plea raised on behalf of the appellant, the trial Court found in his favour and held that since one month's pay in lieu of notice had not been paid to the appellant, the order of termination dated 7th July 1961 was illegal. The suit was, however, dismissed on the finding, accepting the plea raised on behalf of the respondent, that it was barred by time. 4. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that in case the order dated 7th July 1961 is treated as an order of punishment, it would be void inasmuch as the same would be in contravention of the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution and no question of limitation would be involved in regard to the suit for declaration that the said order was Void and for recovery of the salary. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Syed Qamrali, 1967 Serv LR 228. Reliance was also placed on certain decisions of some High Courts including the decision in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jaideo Ram, (1985) 1 Serv LR 787 : (1984 Lab IC 1492) wherein relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Syed Qamrali (supra) it was held that an order of dismissal in breach of mandatory provisions of rules would be invalid having no legal existence. 5. In this view of the legal provision, the crucial question which falls for consideration and has been canvassed by the learned counsel for the parties is as to whether the order dated 7th July 1961 is an order of termination of service of the appellant simpliciter or amounts to an order of punishment. 6. Before adverting to this question, we would like to dispose of the other question, namely, as to whether the order dated 7th July 1961 was illegal for non-payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice. 6. Before adverting to this question, we would like to dispose of the other question, namely, as to whether the order dated 7th July 1961 was illegal for non-payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice. In our opinion, the view taken by the trial Court is erroneous in view of the decision of this Court in Director of Technical Education, U.P. Kanpur v. John Mohammad, 1975 All LJ 27 : (1975 Lab IC 685), wherein a Division Bench of this court relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Dinanath Rai (C.A.No. 1734 of 1968 decided on Oct. 11, 1968) : (reported in (1969) 2 SCWR 92), held that either the giving of notice or making payment of one month's pay in lieu thereof is not a condition precedent to the validity of an order terminating the services of a temporary employee. Keeping in view the plain language of the relevant rules issued vide notification dated 30th Jan. 1953 in this behalf, as quoted thereon. 7. In this connection, reference may also be made to another decision of the Supreme Court in Senior Superintendent, R.M.S., Cochin v. K.V. Gopinath, AIR 1972 SC 1487 : (1972 Lab IC 826). In that case the interpretation of R. 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules (1965) came up for consideration. An order of termination of service had been set aside by the High Court on the ground that salary in lieu of notice had not been paid. On behalf of the appellant, namely, Senior Superintendent R.M.S., Cochin, it was contested that for nonpayment of salary in lieu of notice, the order could not be held to be illegal.* In support of this submission, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dinanath Rai (1969-2 SCWR 92) (supra). This plea was repelled on the ground that the language of the U.P. Rule only meant that the pay for 30 days may be substituted for service for the period of notice. In other words, the rules only entitle the employee to pay for the period of the notice without laying down any condition as to when the payment is to be made. In other words, the rules only entitle the employee to pay for the period of the notice without laying down any condition as to when the payment is to be made. The order dated 7th July 1961, therefore, cannot be held to be illegal for non-payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice and the finding of the trial Court to the contrary cannot be sustained in law. 8. Coming to the main question as to whether the order dated 7th July 1961 was really an order of punishment in garb of an innocuous order for termination of service, the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a letter dated 21st May 1961 by the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur to Sri Satish Chandra, Development Commissioner, U.P., Lucknow, a copy whereof was filed in the suit as Annexure 13 as also an another letter dated 3rd May, 1961 by the District Planning Officer, Gorakhpur, a copy whereof has been filed as Annexure 14 in the suit. The District Magistrate in his letter dated 21st May, 1961 had written that from a report of the District Planning Officer against the appellant it appeared that the part of the funds placed at the disposal of the appellant as Block Development Officer for meeting the expenditure connected with the training of the member of the Block Development Committee was embezzelled by him and that he further appeared to have misappropriated a sum of Rs. 1000/- as cost of material supplied to the block. It was pointed out that the exact amount misappropriated could be found out only after all the Pradhans who had attended the training camp were examined. A suggestion was made that till further investigation is made, the appellant may be suspended. The Development Commissioner, however, in place of passing an order of suspension as suggested by the District Magistrate, passed the order dated 7th July 1961 terminating the service of the appellant. The other letter dated 3rd May 1961 by the District Planning Officer was addressed to the Assistant Development Commissioner pointing out that on preliminary enquiry being made, there appeared to be substance in the complaint about the financial irregularities said to have been committed by the appellant. The other letter dated 3rd May 1961 by the District Planning Officer was addressed to the Assistant Development Commissioner pointing out that on preliminary enquiry being made, there appeared to be substance in the complaint about the financial irregularities said to have been committed by the appellant. It was also stated in this letter that the District Magistrate had already moved the Development Commissioner for placing the appellant under suspension and that after receipt of the order of the Development Commissioner, disciplinary proceedings would be instituted against the appellant. On the face of these two letters and the order dated 7th July 1961, it is apparent that no disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the appellant. On receipt of the complaint about the financial irregularities, some preliminary enquiries were made and it appears that after the preliminary enquiry, the above correspondence took place between the officers concerned. The Development Commissioner, on receipt of the letter from the District Magistrate apparently appears to have taken the view that it was not a case where departmental proceedings may be initiated against the appellant and that since he was a temporary employee, it was a fit case for terminating his services under the relevant rules in this behalf framed by the State Government. 9. Here it may be pointed out that it is well known that on receipt of a complaint against a Government servant, generally disciplinary proceedings are not immediately initiated. Some sort of preliminary enquiry is first made to ascertain as to whether there is prima facie any substance in the complaint or it just deserves to be thrown into the waste paper basket. The preliminary enquiry is made only for this purpose and if prima facie it is found that a case for initiating disciplinary proceedings is made out, it is only then that the disciplinary proceedings are initiated; otherwise, the complaint is filed and no action is taken on that. 10. Even though, no authority is needed for this proposition reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in The Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijai Narayan Vajpayee, AIR 1980 SC 840 wherein it was held that a regular departmental enquiry commenced only after the charge-sheet is drawn up and served upon the delinquent and the latter's explanation is obtained. In the instant case, that stage had never reached. In the instant case, that stage had never reached. Even though, as a result of the preliminary enquiry, prima facie case appears to have been established, if the correspondence between the officers is taken into consideration reliance on which has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Development Commissioner on the facts of the present case, did not consider it expedient to initiate formal disciplinary proceedings and considered it proper to terminate the services of the appellant by passing an innocuous order in this behalf which did not contain any stigma. It is in this background that we have to consider the legal position in order to find out as to whether the order dated 7th July 1961 could be treated as an order of punishment so that it may be held to be void having been passed in breach of the requirement under Article 311(2) of the Constitution. At this place, we consider it expedient to refer tp certain decisions of the Supreme Court laying down, the principles in this behalf. 11. In Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 , a Bench of five Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court held as under : - "Shortly put, the principle is that when a servant has right to a post or to a rank either under the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, or under the rules governing the conditions of his service, the termination of the service of such a servant or his reduction to a lower post is by itself and prima facie a punishment for it operates as a forfeiture of his right to hold that post or that rank and to get the emoluments and other benefits attached thereto. But if the servant has no right to the post, as where he is appointed to a post, permanent or temporary either on probation or on an officiating basis and whose temporary service has not ripened into a quasi-permanent service as defined in the Temporary Service Rules, the termination of his employment does not deprive him of any right and cannot, therefore, by itself be a punishment. One test for determining whether the termination of the service of a Government servant is by way of punishment is to ascertain whether the servant, but for such termination, had the right to hold the post. One test for determining whether the termination of the service of a Government servant is by way of punishment is to ascertain whether the servant, but for such termination, had the right to hold the post. It he had a right to the post, the termination of his service will by itself be a punishment and he will be entitled to the protection of Article 311." 12. In Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 449 , a Bench again of five Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court held as under:- "It is obvious that temporary servants or probationers are generally discharged, because they are not found to be competent or suitable for the post they held. In other words, if a temporary servant or a probationer is found to be satisfactory in his work, efficient and otherwise eligible it is unlikely that his services would be terminated, and so, before discharging a temporary servant, the authority may have to examine the question about the suitability of the said servant to be continued and acting bona fide in that behalf, the authority may also give a chance to the servant to explain, if any complaints are made against him. or his competence or suitability is disputed on some grounds arising from the discharge of his work; but such an enquiry would be held only for the purpose of deciding whether the temporary servant should be continued or not. There is no element of punitive proceedings in such an enquiry; the idea in holding such an enquiry is not to punish the temporary servant but just to decide whether he deserves to be continued in service or not. If as a result of such an enquiry, the authority comes to the conclusion that the temporary servant is not suitable to be continued, it may pass a simple order of discharge by virtue of the powers conferred on it by the contract of the relevant rule; in such a case, it would not be open to the temporary servant to invoke the protection of Article 311 for the simple reason that the enquiry which ultimately led to his discharge was held only for the purpose of deciding whether the power under the contract or the relevant rule should be exercised and the temporary servant discharged. On the other hand, in some cases, the authority may choose to exercise its power to dismiss a temporary servant and that would, necessitate a formal departmental enquiry in that behalf. If such a formal enquiry is held, and an order terminating the services of a temporary servant is passed as a result of the finding recorded in the said enquiry, prima facie the termination would amount to the dismissal of the temporary servant. It is in this connection that it is necessary to remember cases in which the services of a temporary servant have been terminated directly as a result of the formal departmental enquiry, and cases in which such termination may not be the direct result of the enquiry; and this complication arises because it is now settled by decisions of this Court that the motive operating in the mind of the authority in terminating the services of a temporary servant does not alter the character of the termination and is not material in determining the said character, vide Parshottam Lal Dhingra 1958 SCR 828 : AIR 1958 SC 36 : (at 862 of SCR); (at p. 49 of AIR). Take a case where the authority initiates a formal departmental enquiry against a temporary servant, but whilst the enquiry is pending, it takes the view that it may not be necessary or expedient to terminate the services of the temporary servant by issuing an order of dismissal against him, in order to avoid imposing any stigma which an order of dismissal necessarily implies, the enquiry is stopped and an order of discharge simpliciter is served on the servant. On the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of Parshottam Lal Dhingra, 1958 SCR 828 : AIR 1958 SC 36 it must be held that the termination of services of the temporary servant which in form and in substance is no more than his discharge effected under the terms of contract or the relevant rule, cannot in law, be regarded as his dismissal, because the appointing authority was actuated by the motive that the said servant did not deserve to be continued for some alleged misconduct. That is why in dealing with temporary servants against whom formal departmental enquiries may have been commenced but were not pursued to the end, the principle that the motive operating in the mind of the authority is immaterial, has to be borne in mind. But since considerations of motive operating in mind of the authority have to be eliminated in determining the character of the termination of services of temporary servant, it must be emphasised that the form in which the order terminating his services is expressed will not be decisive. If a formal departmental enquiry has been held in which findings have been recorded against the temporary servant and as a result of the said findings, his services are terminated, the fact that the order by which his services are terminated, ostensibly purports, to be a mere order of discharge would not disguise the fact that in substance and in law the discharge in question amounts to the dismissal of the temporary servant. That is why the form of the order is inconclusive; it is the substance of the matter which determines the character of the termination of services. In dealing with this aspect of the matter, we must bear in mind that the real character of the termination of services must be determined by reference to the material facts that existed prior to that order ''(Emphasis supplied) In Samsher Singh v. State' of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192 : (1974 Lab IC 1380)a Bench of seven (7) Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court while considering a similar question with regard to a probationer, held as under : - "Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any Rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved, in this. The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry. No punishment is involved, in this. The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry. But in these cases the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a chance td make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probation. If, on the other hand, the probationer is faced with an enquiry on charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption, and if his services are terminated without following the provisions of Article 311(2) he can claim protection. In State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore Prasad, AIR 1960 SC 689 it was said that if the Government proceeded against the probationer in the direct way without casting any aspersion on his honesty or competence, his discharge would not have the effect of removal by way of punishment. Instead of taking the easy course, the Government chose the more difficult one of starting proceedings against him and branding him as a dishonest and incompetent officer. The fact of holding an inquiry is not always conclusive. What is decisive is whether the order is really by way of punishment .....................In R.C. Lacy v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No. 590 of 1962 decided on 23-10-1963 (SC) it was held that an order of reversion passed following an enquiry into the /conduct of the probationer in the circumstances of that case in the nature of preliminary inquiry to enable the Government to decide whether disciplinary action should be taken. A probationer whose terms of service provided that it could be terminated without any notice and without any cause being assigned could not claim the protection of Article 311(2). [See B.C. Banerjee v. Union of India (1964) 2 SCR 135 : AIR 1963 SC 1552 An order terminating the services of a temporary servant or probationer under the Rules of Employment and without anything more will not attract Article 311. Where a departmental enquiry is contemplated and if an enquiry is not in fact proceeded with Article 311 will not be attracted unless it can be shown that the order though unexceptionable in form is made following a report based on misconduct. Where a departmental enquiry is contemplated and if an enquiry is not in fact proceeded with Article 311 will not be attracted unless it can be shown that the order though unexceptionable in form is made following a report based on misconduct. [See State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk (1971) 2 SCR 191 : AIR 1971 SC 1011 : (1971 Lab 1C 724" (Emphasis supplied) 13. In State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi, AIR 1976 SC 2547 : (1976 Lab IC 1647), the facts in a nutshell as stated in para 2 of the report were that the respondent was appointed as temporary Clerk in Gur Sarai Canal Division, Jhansi, on May 16,1954. Seven years later, he was required to appear in a departmental examination which was held in July 1961. In the typewriting test held by the Department, the Executive Engineer, Investigation and planning Division, Jhansi detected Gopal Deo Santiya, a clerk of Bhander Canal Division, attempting to personate and appear for the respondent. He obtained the explanation of both the Clerks and reported the matter to the Superintending Engineer of his Division. Considering the explanation tendered by the clerks to be unsatisfactory, the Superintending Engineer brought the matter to the notice of the Chief Engineer, Irrigation Department, Lucknow. The Chief Engineer wrote back to the Superintending Engineer asking him to award suitable punishment to the aforesaid two clerks. The Superintending Engineer, however, thereafter issued orders terminating the services of both the clerks by passing a simple order of termination in this behalf. A suit was instituted for setting aside the order of termination of services of the respondent on the ground that even though the order was innocuous order of termination, it was order of punishment and was void inasmuch as it was passed in breach of Article 311 of the Constitution. The plea raised by the respondent did not find favour with the trial court as well as the first appellate Court. Aggrieved, the respondent filed a second appeal in the High Court. The plea raised by the respondent did not find favour with the trial court as well as the first appellate Court. Aggrieved, the respondent filed a second appeal in the High Court. The High Court, after going through the official correspondence preceding the passing of the impugned order, observed that a close scrutiny of the facts on record showed that the order was passed by way of punishment on the basis of the enquiry' proceedings and as a result of the recommendation made by the Executive Engineer followed by the direction issued by the Chief Engineer that the respondent should be suitably punished. The State of U. P. aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the High Court, went up in appeal before the Supreme Court. The appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree of the High Court were set aside. After referring to various decisions of the Supreme Court including that of Parshotam Lal Dhingra ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ) (supra), Samsher Singh (supra) and jagdish Mitter ( AIR 1964 SC 449 ) (supra), it was held as under : - "Thus on a conspectus of the decisions of this Court referred to above, it is obvious that there is no real conflict in their ratio decidendi and it is no longer open to anyone to urge with any show of force that the constitutional position emerging from the decisions of this Court in regard to cases of the present nature is not clear. It is also to be borne in mind that even in cases where a High Court finds any conflict between the views expressed by larger and smaller benches of this Court, it cannot disregard or skirt the views expressed by the larger benches. The proper course for a High Court in such a case, as observed by this Court in Union of India v. K. S. Subramanian (Civil Appeal No. 212 of 1975 decided on July 30, 1976, reported in 1976 U. J. (SC) 717 : (1976 Lab IC 1551)) to which one of us was a party, is to try to find out and follow the opinion expressed by larger benches of this Court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of the Court which practice, hardened as it has into a rule of law is followed by this Court itself. ....... ....... Keeping in view the principles extracted above, the respondent's suit could not be decreed in his favour. He was a temporary hand and had no right to the post. It is also not denied that both under the contract of service and the service rules governing the respondent, the State had a right to terminate his services by giving him one month's notice. The order to which exception is taken is ex facie an order of termination of service simpliciter. It does not cast any stigma on the respondent nor does it visit him with evil consequences, nor is it founded on misconduct. In the circumstances, the respondent could not invite the Court to go into the motive behind the order and claim the protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. We, therefore, agree with the submission made on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was in error in arriving at the finding that the impugned order was passed by way of punishment by probing into the departmental correspondence that passed between the superiors of the respondent overlooking the observations made by this Court in I.N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1967) 2 SCR 496 : AIR 1967 SC 1264 that when there are no express words in the impugned order itself which throw a stigma on the Government servant, the Court would not delve into Secretariat files to discover whether some kind of stigma could be inferred on such research." (Emphasis supplied) 14. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Dr. Md. S. Iskander Ali, AIR 1980 SC 1242 : (1980 Lab IC 698), the temporary services of the respondent had been terminated. Aggrieved by that order, he filed writ petition in the High Court on the ground that the order was invariably an order of punishment. The writ petition was allowed by the High Court. On an appeal preferred by the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, the order of the High Court was set aside and it was held that the order terminating the services of the respondent was valid in law. Reliance in that case was placed on the aforesaid decision in Ram Chandra Trivedi's case (1976 Lab IC 1647) (SC) (supra),. On an appeal preferred by the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, the order of the High Court was set aside and it was held that the order terminating the services of the respondent was valid in law. Reliance in that case was placed on the aforesaid decision in Ram Chandra Trivedi's case (1976 Lab IC 1647) (SC) (supra),. It was held as under : - "Applying the principles enunciated by this Court in various cases to the facts of the present case, the position is that the order impugned is prima facie an order of termination simpliciter without involving an stigma. The order does not in any way involve any evil consequences and is an order of discharge simpliciter of the respondent who was a probationer and had no right to the service. The respondent has not been able to make out any strong case for this Court to delve into the documents, materials in order to determine a case of victimisation or one of punishment." In arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, the Supreme Court further held agreeing with the statement made on behalf of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission that the High Court was in error in arriving at the finding that the impugned order was passed by way of punishment by probing into the departmental correspondence that passed between the superiors of the respondent overlooking the observations made in I. N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1967) 2 SCR 496 : AIR 1967 SC 1264 . 15. In Union of India v. P. S. Bhatt, AIR 1981 SC 957 : (1981 Lab IC 504) a probationer was reverted to his original post by an order which on the face of it did not cast any stigma. The order was challenged by the respondent of that case in the High Court. Reliance was placed before the High Court on behalf of the respondent on the following facts as stated in paragraph 9 of the report : - "1. Sri Bhatt and Shri Prasad had indulged in loose talk and used filthy language against the Station Director and other officers of All India Radio, Vijayawada, while in office. 2. This finding has been recorded by the learned single Judge. 3. The tape recording of the conversation of Shri Bhatt and Prasad had been forwarded to the Station Director. 4. Sri Bhatt and Shri Prasad had indulged in loose talk and used filthy language against the Station Director and other officers of All India Radio, Vijayawada, while in office. 2. This finding has been recorded by the learned single Judge. 3. The tape recording of the conversation of Shri Bhatt and Prasad had been forwarded to the Station Director. 4. The Station Director by his memo dated 1-12 1976 which we have earlier noted, had warned Mr. Bhatt. 5. The Station Director had further reported the matter to the Director General, All India Radio for appropriate action; 6. The impugned order terminating the period of probation of Sri Bhatt as Producer and reverting him to his post of Announcer .had thereafter been passed". While allowing the writ petition of the respondent, the High Court had taken the view that even though the order was a simple order of reversion it amounted to punishment in view of the aforesaid facts. The Supreme Court allowing the appeal filed by the Union of India, held that on proper consideration of the facts stated above, it cannot be said that the impugned order was passed by way of punishment and the High Court was in error in arriving at the finding that the said order was by way of punishment. It was also held that even if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the authority to terminate the service of the employee on probation, such termination cannot be termed as penalty or punishment. 16. Keeping in view the broad principles formulated and laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to above, we find it difficult to take the view that the order dated 7th July 1961 in the instant case was passed by way of punishment. The said order, as already quoted above, on its plain language is an innocuous order of termination of services simpliciter. It does not cast any stigma. No departmental enquiry was ever initiated against the appellant. On receipt of the complaint made against him in regard to financial irregularties, only a preliminary enquiry was made to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out to initiate formal disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. It does not cast any stigma. No departmental enquiry was ever initiated against the appellant. On receipt of the complaint made against him in regard to financial irregularties, only a preliminary enquiry was made to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out to initiate formal disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. The District Magistrate wrote a letter to the Development Commissioner pointing out that from the report of the District Planning Officer, a prima facie case appeared to have been made out but no final opinion could be expressed on this point unless all the Pradhans, who attended the training were examined. He requested that till the preliminary enquiry is completed the appellant may be placed under suspension. It was as such a case where a final opinion with regard to financial irregularties had not been formed even in the preliminary enquiry which had not been completed. It is at this stage that the order dated 7th July 1961 was passed. Apparently, the Development Commissioner, seems to have taken the view that the appellant should not be required to face any departmental enquiry because in that eventuality, there was possibility of his dismissal from service casting stigma, and that it was expedient that his services may be terminated by a simple order on the basis of contract of service and relevant rules applicable in this behalf. It is for these reasons that it is not possible to take the view that the order dated 7th July 1961 is void or in any way violates the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The order is a simple order of termination of services and the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution are not at all attracted. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the case of Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, AIR 1984 SC 636 : (1984 Lab IC 343) wherein it was held that where the form of the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct, and reasonable opportunity to defend is not given, the order is liable to be struck down. In that case it was held that the recommendation of the Director was the basis or foundation for the order of termination and if the order of termination was read along with the aforesaid recommendation, it was apparent that the alleged act of misconduct on June 22, 1981 of the appellant, who was discharged from service, was the real foundation of action taken against him. If misconduct is the basis of the order and not the motive, the order would certainly amount to punishment. In the instant case, however, this is not the position as already pointed out above. This case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. 18. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on another decision of the Supreme Court in Nepal Singh v. State of U. P., AIR 1985 SC 84 : (1985 Lab IC 587). A perusal of that case indicates that the order of termination of service passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police was based on the report of the Superintendent of Police quoted in para 4 of the report, which is as follows :- "A corrupt Officer, who is not straightforward, married two wives against Government Servants' Conduct Rules. Does not do his duty sincerely. Wherever he goes creates problems". The Supreme Court apparently was of the view that even though the order purported to be a simple order of termination, it was really based on the report of the Superintendent of Police which was in the nature of a finding by him in regard to the conduct of the appellant. Since misconduct constituted the basis of the . order of termination, it was held to be an order of punishment. This decision is also, in our opinion, distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In our opinion, neither in the case of Anoop Jaiswal (1984 Lab IC 343) (SC) (supra) nor in the case of Nepal Singh (supra) view contrary to the view taken in the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Parsottam Lal Dhingra ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ), Samsher Singh (1974 Lab IC 1380) and Jagdish Mitter ( AIR 1964 SC 449 ) (supra) has been taken. If the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, it will amount to saying that a view contrary to the view .taken by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases has been taken in the cases of Nepal Singh (1985 Lab IC 587) and Anup Jaiswal (1984 Lab IC 343) (supra). In that contingency also the view taken by the larger benches of the Supreme Court will have to be followed by this Court as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chandra Trivedi (1976 Lab IC 1647) (supra). 19. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no merit in this appeal 'which is accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.