M.C. JAIN, J. - This is an appeal under Sec. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short the Ordinance) against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated November 8, 1985 affirming the order dated December 8, 1976 passed by the District Judge, Pratabgarh. 2. The matter arises out of the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrators filed their Award against which objections were filed before the learned District Judge, Pratabgarh by his order dated December 8, 1976 rejected the objections and made the Award rule of the Court against which an appeal was preferred by the objector Shri Chhabildas. That appeal was dismissed, 3. Mr. D.S. Shishodia appearing for respondent No. 1 as Caveator raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He submitted that the appeal is barred under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 39 bars the second appeal from an order passed in appeal under sec. 39 and the only saving that is provided is with regard to the appeal to the Supreme Court. In view of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 39, this special appeal under Sec. 18 of the Ordinance is not competent. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India vs. Mohindra Supply Company(l) and the decision of this Court in Sardarlal vs. Umraolal Gupta (2). "39. Appealable orders-(l) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the court passing the orders:- An order:- (i) superseding an arbitration; (ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case; (iii) modifying or correcting an award; (iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement; (v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement; (vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award; Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court. (2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court. (a) Substituted for "His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950". 4. Sec. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:- "18. (2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under the section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court. (a) Substituted for "His Majesty in Council by A.L.D. 1950". 4. Sec. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:- "18. Appeal to the High Court from Judges of the Court:- (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being and order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Sec. 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court. (2) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal." 5. How the words "second appeal" occurring in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 39, are to be construed came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (supra). Their Lordships clearly observed that "in that premise the conclusion is inevitable that the expression "second appeal" used in s. 39 (2) of the Arbitration Act means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under sec. 39(1) and not in appeal under sec. 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas (3) by Savdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga vs. Kissan Dass Girdhardass (4) by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective "imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal." 6. 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships expressed agreement with the view taken in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas (3) by Savdekar, J. and Mulchand Kewalchand Daga vs. Kissan Dass Girdhardass (4) by Rajamannar, C.J. expressed that we agree with the learned Judges that the adjective "imports a further appeal, that is, numerically second appeal." 6. Their Lordships further considered the question in the light of the provision of the Letters Patent and the subsequent change brought about in law and the legislative history of the provisions of appeal under the Civil Procedure Code, and with regard to the Arbitration Act, their Lordships observed as under- "The Arbitration Act, which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered. In our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of the Act X of 1940 by codifying the law relating to appeals in S. 39." 7. Mr L R. Mehta. learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in Union of Indias case (supra), the Letters Patent was an old one and the Arbitration Act came into force in the year 1940. As the change of law was brought about subsequently, so, in that light, their Lordships considered the question. In the instant case, Sec. 18 of the Ordinance is a later law and it deals with the appeals when they arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. But this later law, which is a special law for the appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has an over-riding effect over the old law contained in Sec. 39 (2) of the Arbitration Act. Under Sec. 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. Under Sec. 18 of the Ordinance, an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is competent before the Division Bench of this Court. The general provision contained in S. 18 of the Ordinance should be taken to be a special provision for appeals arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction and there are no restrictions under Sec. 18 of the Ordinance, so a wide interpretation should be taken. The language of Sec. 18 of the Ordinance does not admit of any narrow interpretation. 8. It may be stated that for the matters arising out of Arbitration, Sec. 39 specifically deals with the appealable orders. If any order has been passed under Sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act, then Sec. 39 itself deals with the provision of appeals under sub-s. (2). Sec. 39, therefore, is an express provision debarring the second appeal against an order passed in appeal under Sec. 39. As already held by the Supreme Court that the second appeal is numerically second appeal. From that point of view, no appeal lies against the order passed in appeal under Sec. 39 save an appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislative intention appears to be that numerically no second appeal shall be lie. It is with this legislative intent that a debarring provision has been introduced in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act. Their appears to be an object behind it. The matters arising from arbitration should be settled early. Except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, any other appeal, in our opinion, is expressly barred under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act. 9. The matter otherwise can also be judged. If the legislature intended to do away with the provision containing in sub-sec. (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication Sec. 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that notwithstanding anything contained in Sec. 39(2), an appeal would be competent, under Sec. 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. (2), it could have done so by bringing about the change in law in express terms or by necessary implication Sec. 18 of the Ordinance does expressly provide that notwithstanding anything contained in Sec. 39(2), an appeal would be competent, under Sec. 18 of the Ordinance. Such an intention does not appear even by necessary implication. When by express words or by necessary implications, such a meaning can not be given to Sec. 18, then, in our opinion, the provision of Sec. 39 (2) would remain unaffected It may also be stated that the words "Supreme Court" were substituted in Sec. 39 (2) in the year 1950 whereas the High Court Ordinance came into force in the year 1949. Although, for the words "His Majesty in Council" and the words "Supreme Court" were substituted but that at the time of substituting the words Supreme Court in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 39 in the year 1950, the intention appears to be that no appeal should lie except an appeal to the Supreme Court, so, the intra Code appeals, Letters Patent or Special Appeals were intended to be barred by Sec. 39. 10. The matter can be viewed in the light of this rule of interpretation enunciated by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes:- "One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any substantial alteration in the law beyond what it explicitly declares, in other words, beyond the immediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matters outside those limits the law remains undisturbed. It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringes rights or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness......" 11. Considering the nature of the amendment brought in the Companies Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M. K. Ranganathan v. Government of Madras(5) applied the said rule of interpretation. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Sec. 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Sec. 18. 12. It would appear from the above rule of interpretation, that if a change was to be brought regarding the law relating to second appeals arising out of the orders passed under Sec. 39, a change should be brought about by irresistible clearness. As already stated, it does not appear that any change was brought about by enacting Sec. 18. 12. The other authority Sardar Lal v. Umrao Lal Gupta (supra) cited by Shri D.S. Shishodia deals with the question in the light of the provision of sec. 22 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Sec. 22 also bars the second appeal and this Court has taken the view in that case that no special appeal can be entertained under Sec. 18 of the Ordinance. In the light of the above discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal is barred under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act as such, it is not maintainable. 13. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily as not maintainable.