ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This revision is directed against an order dated November 30, 1984, passed by the learned District Judge, Rampur, appointing one Sri Mukesh Kumar Jain as an interim receiver to discharge the functions of the Board of Trustees of a trust in regard to which a suit No. 42 of 1984 was filed by the opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 for the removal of the applicant who was arrayed as defendant No. 2 in the suit as well as Amrish Kumar, the opposite party No. 6 herein, (defendant No. 3 in the suit) and Ram Chandra, the opposite party No. 7 (defendant No. 4 in the suit) as trustees as well as for a direction that their vacancies be filled up either by election or by nomination, or, in any other manner, which the court might deem fit and proper. 2. During the pendency of the above suit an application was moved for appointment of a receiver, While this application was pending the parties are alleged to have entered into a compromise recorded by the Court below whereby this suit as well as two other suits were agreed to be disposed of in terms of the statement made by either the parties themselves or their counsel. One of the terms of the compromise reached between the parties was that till new trustees are elected the court may appoint a receiver to discharge the functions of the Board of Trustees which was to stand suspended from the date of appointment of the receiver. It is in pursuance of this alleged compromise that the impugned order has been passed by the court below appointing Sri Mukesh Kumar lain as an interim receiver. 3. It is significant that the order appointing interim receiver is being challenged only by Hari Shanker and by no other party to the suit or the other trustees who were arrayed therein as defendants. 4. Sri B. D. Mandhyan, learned counsel for the applicant, challenged the impugned order mainly on the ground that the compromise or agreement on the basis of which the court below has passed the impugned order was itself not validly recorded or concluded. The formalities contemplated under O. 23, R. 3 of the Civil P.C. were not complied with in the present case and consequently it was not binding on the applicant. The formalities contemplated under O. 23, R. 3 of the Civil P.C. were not complied with in the present case and consequently it was not binding on the applicant. It was urged that in order that a compromise may be binding on the parties it must be in writing and signed by them. In the present case, the applicant who was a party to the suit had admittedly not signed the agreement and consequently the agreement could not be held to be binding on the applicant. That being so, it was urged, the court below could not validly appoint a receiver in the purported implementation of the agreement said to have been reached between the parties. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find no substance in this revision. In the first place, the impugned order has been expressly passed not in the independent exercise of the Court's powers under O. XL, R. 1 of the Civil P.C. but in implementation of an agreement stated to have been reached between the parties earlier. This is clear from a bare perusal of the order, and, indeed, it was not seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the applicant. The order expressly states that it is being passed in view of the agreement arrived at between the parties. A certified copy of the agreement has been supplied to the Court by the applicant. The agreement is in the shape of what purports to be a record of the statements made before the court below as contemplated by the Explanation added by the Allahabad High Court to Order XXIII, Rule 3 which states that the expressions `agreement' and `compromise' include a joint statement of the parties concerned or their counsel recorded by the court and the expression `instrument' includes a statement of the plaintiff or his counsel recorded by the court. A perusal of the statement of the parties recorded by the court below leaves no room for doubt that it provided that the court shall itself appoint a receiver for the interim period till a Board of Trustees was elected in accordance with the terms of agreement reached by the parties. The agreement specifically empowered the court to appoint an interim receiver and by the impugned order the court has done neither less nor more than what it was expressly authorised by the parties to do. 6. The agreement specifically empowered the court to appoint an interim receiver and by the impugned order the court has done neither less nor more than what it was expressly authorised by the parties to do. 6. It is apparent that the interim receiver having been appointed specifically in terms of the statement recorded by the court below it cannot be challenged so long as the proceedings of the court whereby the statements of the parties disclosing that they have reached a settlement for the appointment of an interim receiver and disposal of the suit stand. The impugned order appointing interim receiver is simply a consequential order, the basic order being one which the court below passed in terms of Order XXIII, Rule 3 read with the Explanation added thereto by the Allahabad High Court. 7. Faced with the above difficulty, Sri Mandhyan, attempted to challenge the validity of the order passed by the court below recording the statements of the parties. It was urged that the said order cannot be sustained, firstly, because a compromise under Order XXIII, Rule 3 has to be in writing, and, secondly, because the order does not bear the signature of the applicant. 8. Having given the submission a careful consideration, I find it difficult to accept it. Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code no doubt provides that an agreement or compromise has to be in writing and signed by the parties. Where, therefore, the parties submit before the court an agreement or compromise for an order that the same be recorded and a decree be passed in terms thereof, it has certainly to be in writing and signed by the parties. But the Explanation added by the Allahabad High Court to O. XXIII. Rule 3 does away with this requirement by necessary implication. It provides : "Explanation - The expressions, `agreement and `compromise' include a joint statement of the parties concerned or their Counsel recorded by the Court, and the expression `instrument' includes a statement of the plaintiff or his counsel recorded by the Court." The explanation equates the agreement and compromise with a joint statement of the parties concerned or their counsel as recorded by the court and the expression `instrument', with a statement of the plaintiff or his counsel recorded by the Court. It is apparent that the provision in the Explanation substituting a joint statement of the parties for `agreement' and 'compromise' necessarily obviates the requirement under R. 3 of O. 23 of the agreement or compromise to be in writing signed by the parties. For, the joint statement is recorded by the Court and surely the Legislature would not and did not require that an order passed by a court should be signed also by the parties. Explanation to O.23, R. 3 added by the Allahabad High Court does not speak of the statement of the parties but a joint statement of the parties concerned `recorded by the court'. 9. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that reading O. 23, R. 3 together with the Explanation added by this Court it cannot be validly contended that just because the applicant chose not to sign beneath the order of the Court recording the joint statement of the parties and their counsel, the entire exercise was rendered invalid under O. 23, R. 3. 10. Further the court below in its order recording the statement has noted as follows :- "When the parties read over the statement and asked to sign the same and got busy signing the same, Sri Hari Shanker, defendant No. 2 in the meantime, went away from the court." Appended below the joint statement recorded by the court below are the signatures of all the parties to the suit or their counsel except that of the applicant Sri Hari Shanker. 11. Now, O. 23, R. 3 itself contains an inbuilt machinery for investigating a claim that an adjustment has taken place as alleged. It provides that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question unless the Court for reasons to be recorded thinks fit to grant such adjournment. 12. If, therefore, the applicant Sri Hari Shanker felt that the Court had not correctly recorded his statement or those of the other parties, he could have raised an objection then and there. He, however, did not choose to challenge the order passed by the court below recording the joint statement of the parties and preferred to walk away from proceedings. If, therefore, the applicant Sri Hari Shanker felt that the Court had not correctly recorded his statement or those of the other parties, he could have raised an objection then and there. He, however, did not choose to challenge the order passed by the court below recording the joint statement of the parties and preferred to walk away from proceedings. Further, not only did the applicant not challenge the correctness of the order passed by he court below recording the joint statement of the parties before the court below itself but even in this Court neither in the grounds of revision nor in the affidavit filed in support of the stay application has the applicant challenged the correctness or accuracy of the statement recorded by the court below. The objection raised in this connection by the applicant before this court is merely this that the agreement had not been signed by the applicant. 13. That being so, this Court is entitled to assume that the court below correctly recorded the statement of the parties including that of the applicant. Having agreed to the appointment of an interim receiver the applicant cannot be heard to contend in a civil revision that the order appointing the interim receiver by the court below should be set aside because the formalities contemplated under O. 23, R. 3 were according to the applicant, not strictly complied with by the court below. 14. Lastly Sri Mandhyan submitted that the agreement or compromise is not in accordance with the Scheme of Administration of the trust I am not inclined to entertain this submission at this stage. Such an objection ought appropriately to have been raised before the court below itself. If it is correct that the parties have reached a settlement for the disposal of the suit in a particular manner as recorded by the court below. I do not think it ought to be open to the applicant to raise an objection of this kind in a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. None of the parties to the suit or the trustees has questioned the validity of the compromise. All the parties to the suit are willing to abide by the agreement reached between them before the court below. I am hence not persuaded to disturb that arrangement at the instance of a lone individual. 15. None of the parties to the suit or the trustees has questioned the validity of the compromise. All the parties to the suit are willing to abide by the agreement reached between them before the court below. I am hence not persuaded to disturb that arrangement at the instance of a lone individual. 15. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed with costs.