JUDGMENT B.D. Agrawal, J. - The short question at this stage is whether prima facie the order of the State Government dated June 30, 1984 which is Annexure 8' to the Writ Petition is under the authority of law and, if not, its effect. The dispute pertains to the management of Sakaldiha L.T., Training College, which is admittedly privately owned and run. It is recognised by the State Government in the Education Department, but is unaided. Sakaldiha L.T. Training College (which is the petitioner No. 1) Samiti was, it appears, registered under the Societies Registration Act. The registration was got renewed for certain period. The Sakaldiha L.T. Training College Shiksha Samiti, Sakaldiha came in between and this was registered under the Societies Registration Act. Against this there was dispute raised by the Sakaldiha L.T. Training College Samiti which was referred by the Registrar to the Prescribed Authority, under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act. That is under challenge at the instance of petitioner No. 1 in another writ petition. According to petitioner No. 1, they are in effective control over the affairs of the management of the institution concerned. This is refuted for the respondents No. 5 to 12. On June 30, 1984 the State Government issued a letter addressed to the Director of Education, whereby approval was accorded to the appointment of respondents Nos. 5 to 12 as selected by the Sakaldiha L.T. Training College Samiti as teachers; it also provides that the construction of the Selection Committee be and the selection of teachers shall in future be made in accordance with the departmental rules. The validity of this direction of the State Government is under challenge in the present. 2. I have heard Sri S.P. Gupta assisted by Sri V.M. Sahai appearing for the petitioners and Sri R.N. Singh, who appeared for the respondents. 3. The contention for the petitioners primarily is that Article 162 of the Constitution does not, in the absence of any Act, Rules or Regulations, cover the directions contained in the impugned order which tend to operate to their prejudice. The submission on the other side is that the order falls within the executive powers of the State Government under Article 162. 4. The executive power connotes ordinarily, it has been said, the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away. The submission on the other side is that the order falls within the executive powers of the State Government under Article 162. 4. The executive power connotes ordinarily, it has been said, the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away. The executive may function despite there being no law already in existence. It would not be correct to say that the powers of the executive are limited merely to the carrying out of the laws. In a welfare State the function of executive are ever widening which cover within their ambit various aspects of social and economic activities. This however is equally settled that all executive action which operates to the prejudice of any person must have the authority of law to support it. If the executive action is such, in other words, that it encroaches upon private rights, the support of law is essential. Mere reference in that event to Article 162 of the Constitution does not help as Articles 73 and 162 are concerned primarily with the distribution of the executive power between the Union on the one hand and the States on the other rather than with the validity of the executive action vide Ram Jawaya Kanpur, and others v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 549. The executive action therein was found not to infringe any fundamental right of the petitioners and therefore it was upheld even though there was no law on the subject pre-existing. 5. The principle enunciated in the case of J. Cajee, (1961) 1 S.C.R. 750 also was that "where executive power infringes upon the rights of citizens it will have to be backed by an appropriate law". The right concerned need not necessarily be fundamental right; it may even be a common law right. This is made clearer still in State of M.P. and another v. Thakur Bharat Singh, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1170 at page 1174 it was observed: "Every act done by the Government or by its Officers must, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person, be supported by some legislative authority." 6. This is made clearer still in State of M.P. and another v. Thakur Bharat Singh, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1170 at page 1174 it was observed: "Every act done by the Government or by its Officers must, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person, be supported by some legislative authority." 6. In reference to Ram Jawaya Kapur (supra) it Was stated that the observations made therein do not support the contention that "the State or the Officers may in exercise of executive authority infringe the rights of the citizens merely because the legislative of the State has the power to legislate in regard to the subject on which the executive order is issued." (Para 6). 7. Seerval in Constitutional Law (Vol. II) (3rd ed.) p. 1703 comments that both Ram Jawava Kapur and Thakur Bharat Singh converge on the principle that "where the right of a citizen were prejudicially affected, executive action could be justified only if it was supported by the authority of law." 8. In Nariandas Indurkhya v. State of M.P. and others, 1974 4 S.C.C. 788. Ram Jawaya's case has been relied upon. It was found that one of the main conditions on which recognition is granted by the State Government is that the School authorities must use as text books only these which are prescribed or authorised by Government. Therefore, even though there is no law which confers power on the State Government to prescribe text books, the Government could by virtue of the need of the private schools for recognition prescribe text books and oblige them to use such text books. 9. There is no departure in principle from the above in Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan etc. v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 33 on which Sri R.N. Singh strongly relies. This as well reiterates that the State or its executive officers cannot interfere with the right of others unless they can point to some specific rule of law which authorises their acts. The teleprinter message impugned therein was not found to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act or the Control Orders issued thereunder which are statutory in character. Article 301 of the Constitution, it was held, is not violated because the executive instructions contained in the teleprinter were merely regulatory in nature. 10. In Dr. The teleprinter message impugned therein was not found to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act or the Control Orders issued thereunder which are statutory in character. Article 301 of the Constitution, it was held, is not violated because the executive instructions contained in the teleprinter were merely regulatory in nature. 10. In Dr. Ramji Dwivedi v. State of U.P. and others, 1982 U.P.L.B.E.C. 137 (D.B.) : 1983 3 S.C.C. 52 also cited for the respondents, likewise the radiogram was held to be covered within the power of the State Government under Section (4) of the Intermediate Education Act and further it was noticed that this did not run counter to the Act or the Regulations framed thereunder. The Supreme Court affirmed that Section 9(4) fully covered the radiogram vide Dr. Ramji Dwivedi v. State of U.P. and others, (1983) 3 SCC 52 . 11. The manner in which Government may in its executive capacity, despite there being no Act on the subject, control the functioning of recognised institutions in certain sphere may be found enunciated by their Lordships in Km. Ragina v. St. Alovsius H.E. School and others., A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1920 at 1924 in these words: "But it cannot also be gainsaid that as the Government has the power, to admit schools to recognition and grant-in-aid, it can, de hors the Act, lay down [conditions under which it would grant recognition and aid. To achieve uniformity and certainty in the exercise of such executive power and to avoid discrimination, the Government would have to frame rules which, however, would be in the form of administrative instructions to its officers dealing with the matters of recognition and aid. If such rules were to lay down conditions, the Government can insist that satisfaction of such conditions would be condition precedent to obtaining recognition and aid and that a breach or non-compliance of such conditions would entail other the denial or Withdrawal of recognition and aid. The management of a school, therefore, would commit a breach or non-compliance of the conditions laid down in the rules on pain of deprivation of recognition and aid. The rules thus govern the terms on which the Government would grant recognition and aid and the Government can enforce these rules upon the management." 12. The management of a school, therefore, would commit a breach or non-compliance of the conditions laid down in the rules on pain of deprivation of recognition and aid. The rules thus govern the terms on which the Government would grant recognition and aid and the Government can enforce these rules upon the management." 12. Learned counsel Sri R.N. Singh, urged that the directive contained in the State Government's letter does not infringe any rights. It is difficult to subscribe to this contention. The letter accords approval to a set of teachers proposed for appointment by the management of the rival society. This implies assumption of power in the executive to accord approval to certain teachers being appointed suggesting also there that there could be no such appointment made if the approval were not there. Secondly, it requires the management to ensure that the composition of the selection committee and the selection of teachers is made in accordance with prescribed departmental rules. I asked for specification as to what those rules are, but none could be pointed out. The direction governing constitution of the Selection Committee cannot in many cases be brushed aside lightly as being regulatory in nature. The instructions contained in the letter read as a whole appear clearly to infringe against private rights to manage and run a privately owned educational institutions. 13. Admittedly, there is no Act of the legislature nor statutory rules laying down norms for control or authority such as sought to be exercised in the present over the functioning of privately owned training College for teachers. The Court is not referred to the terms on which recognition was accorded to this particular institution by the State Government. Sri Singh invited a reference to Section 209 of the Education Code which only says that apart from training institutions maintained by Government, training colleges and Schools of different types are maintained by private managements subject to the recognition by the Department. It is no body's case that the College in question is maintained by Government. Sri Singh invited a reference to Section 209 of the Education Code which only says that apart from training institutions maintained by Government, training colleges and Schools of different types are maintained by private managements subject to the recognition by the Department. It is no body's case that the College in question is maintained by Government. The recognition of the Education Department to the College is no doubt there; but in the absence of any such condition shown to be incorporated in the terms of recognition or even in the executive instructions embodied in the Education Code, it may not be maintained that the Government is conferred the power to accord approval to appointment of teachers in the College or to direct the management under executive instructions to constitute a Selection Committee in a particular manner. There are no statutory norms existing on the subject and no assistance is derivable from what is contained in para 209 aforementioned. 14. It is argued also that assuming that the Government letter infringes private rights, there is none of the petitioners to entitle them to complain of the Sakaldiha L.T. College Shiksha Samiti which the petitioners represent is registered under the Societies Registration Act. It is a moot question not requiring decision in the present case whether the Prescribed Authority has jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act to adjudicate where the dispute is not between two rival committees of a society but between rival societies as such. The registration made of the Sakaldiha L.T. College Samiti which the respondents 5 to 12 represent is under challenge on this basis. There are allegations and counter-allegations in regard to the exercise of actual control over the management of the institution at the moment. There needs to be no probe directed into the same at this stage. Suffice it may to say that both sides rely upon certain evidence which may ultimately have to be weighed, it appears, by the civil Court, which may be competent to decide as to which is the society entitled to run the administration of the College. On account of the impugned Government Order there is evident prejudice caused to the right to manage the institution claimed on behalf of the petitioners. 15. On account of the impugned Government Order there is evident prejudice caused to the right to manage the institution claimed on behalf of the petitioners. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that in the absence of Sakildha L.T. Training College Samiti as a party, the petitioners may not get the relief which they seek in the present against the impugned Government Order. I am not impressed with this contention-the reason being that the petitioners have arrayed as parties the State Government and also the Director of Education and District Inspector of Schools Varanasi. These are the authorities who made, the impugned order and who are directed thereunder to implement the same. There is no counter-affidavit filed on their behalf in justification of the authority for making the order in question. It may not be regarded as necessary, therefore, for the petitioners to have impleaded the Samiti too as a co-respondent. 16. In Tikaram v. Mundikota Shikshan Prasarak Mandal and others, (1984) 4 S.C.C. 291 the appellant was reverted to the post of Assistant Teacher by an order passed by the management. The Deputy Director of Education allowed the appeal filed by the appellant, the appeal by the Management before the Director of Education against this order was dismissed. The Director allowed a review petition filed by the Management and set aside the order of the Deputy Director. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court to quash order made by the Director on the review petition on ground that he had no jurisdiction under the School Act to review his earlier order. The petition was dismissed by the High Court holding that teachers working in private Schools could not enforce their right under the School Act which were not statutory rules. The decision was set aside by the Supreme Court observing that since the writ petition was properly directed against the order passed in a quasi judicial proceeding by the Director, the appellant cannot be said to be seeking any relief directly against the Management on the basis of the provisions contained in the Schools Act. Since the Director was alleged to have assumed jurisdiction to review his own orders not conferred on him, the appellant was entitled to maintain the petition under Article 226. 17. For the reasons stated above, the interim order dated August 31, 1984, is confirmed.