JUDGMENT S.S. Ahmad, J. - The petitioner, who is being prosecuted for an offence under Section 307, I.P.C. in Sessions Trial No. 317 of 1983, has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for reliefs, inter alia, that the order 23rd August, 1985 passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Faizabad may be quashed and the petitioner may be allowed to remain on bail and that too, on the bonds already furnished by him. 2. It appears that after the conclusion of the prosecution evidence on 9th August, 1985, the trial was adjourned to 14th August, 1985 for recording the statement of the petitioner. The statement was recorded and the trial was adjourned to 23rd August, 1985 for recording the statements of defence witnesses. 3. The defence examined Kedar Nath (D.W. 1) as a witness an 23rd August, 1985 and filed two documents, which were taken on record. An application (23-B) was also filed by the defence for summoning the record of Criminal Revision No. 187 of 1984 (Radhey Shyam v. Raja Ram and others) pending in the court of District and Sessions Judge, Faizabad, along with the lower court record. This application was allowed. Another application (25-B) was filed for summoning Dr. R.C. Dhawan as a defence witness to prove the injury report of the petitioner. This application was rejected by the following order:- "25-B. Application on behalf of the defence to summon Dr. R.C. Dhawan as Defence witness to prove the injury report of accused Vinai Mohan, Address of Dr. Dhawan has not been disclosed in the application. Moreover there is no reason why this application was not moved before hand to give sufficient time to summon the doctor. This is also a tactic to delay the trial of the case. Ground not sufficient. Rejected." 4. The case was fixed for 24th August, 1985 for arguments. A request was made that Sri Wasi Ahmad Siddioui, who was counsel for the petitioner, would not be able to argue the case before 28th August, 1985, and therefore, another date, and, not 24th August, 1985 may be fixed for arguments. This prompted the Presiding Officer to pass the following orders:- "After the date 24th August, 1985 was fixed for argument Sri S.D. Yadav Advocate the junior of Sri Wasi Ahmad Siddiqi disclosed that Sri Wasi Ahmad Siddiqi would not be able to argue the case before 28th August, 1985. This prompted the Presiding Officer to pass the following orders:- "After the date 24th August, 1985 was fixed for argument Sri S.D. Yadav Advocate the junior of Sri Wasi Ahmad Siddiqi disclosed that Sri Wasi Ahmad Siddiqi would not be able to argue the case before 28th August, 1985. It has not been disclosed as to whether or not the defence has been closed. Probably it appears that the defence has not still been closed. It is dilating tactic because the defence had ample time to adduce all the Defence. The application for summoning the file too has been made today showing that purposely the delay is being caused. Take the accused in custody as there is likelihood that the accused would abscond because delay in the trial of the case is intended on behalf of the accused." 5. It is this order which has been challenged in the present petition which was filed on 2nd September, 1985 and was directed to come up on 6th September, 1985 to enable the State counsel to obtain instructions. On 6th September, 1985 it was directed to come up on 10th September, 1985 and then it was adjourned to 17th September, 1985. 6. The bail according to the papers produced before us by the learned Assistant Government Advocate, was granted to the petitioner by the II Additional Sessions Judge on 17th May, 1985. The impugned order by which the petitioner has been directed to be taken into custody appears to have been passed under Section 439 (2), Cr. P.C. which provides that the High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter, be arrested and committed to custody. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The Assistant Government Advocate has contended that the order, by which the petitioner has been taken into custody, was passed by the court below in exercise of the power under Section 439 (2) and, therefore, the custody of the petitioner cannot be said to be illegal. 8. Apart from the relief that the petitioner may be set at liberty by issuing a writ in the nature of habeas corpus, which in our opinion, cannot be granted, the petitioner has also claimed a relief that a writ of certiorari may be issued and the order dated 23rd August, 1985 may be quashed. 9. 8. Apart from the relief that the petitioner may be set at liberty by issuing a writ in the nature of habeas corpus, which in our opinion, cannot be granted, the petitioner has also claimed a relief that a writ of certiorari may be issued and the order dated 23rd August, 1985 may be quashed. 9. The impugned order, in my opinion, cannot be sustained. 10. The petitioner has given the details of the dates on which the case was listed for the prosecution evidence. These details have not been disputed on behalf of the State. It appears that the case was committed to the Court of Session on 24th October, 1983. The case was listed for prosecution evidence on 4th September, 1984, 17th September, 1984, 29th September, 1984, 30th October, 1984, 26th November, 1984, 15th December, 1984 and 24th January, 1985 but the prosecution evidence was not recorded as the witnesses were not produced. The first prosecution witness was produced on 14th March, 1985. He was cross-examined on 10th April, 1985 but the cross-examination could not be concluded. The case was adjourned for 3rd May, 1985 and on that date the cross-examination of P.W. 1 was completed. The case was adjourned for 15th May, 1985 and on that date it wag adjourned on the application of the prosecution to 20th May, 1985 when two more witnesses were examined. The case was again adjourned to 4th June, 1985 and 26th June, 1985 and then it was adjourned to 16th July, 1985 when another prosecution witness was examined. The prosecution sought another adjournment on 21st July, 1985 and then the case was taken up on 9th August, 1985 when two eye witnesses for the prosecution were examined and the prosecution evidence was closed. The prosecution thus did not, produce any witness throughout the year in 1984 and took five months beginning from 14th March, 1985 to 9th August, 1985 to conclude its evidence. It did not during this period occur to the learned Judge that the trial was being unnecessarily delayed of that the petitioner was likely to abscond. This feeling was developed by the learned Judge on 23rd September, 1985 when the defence filed two applications, and for summoning the record of a case pending in the Court of Sessions Judge, Faizabad. which was allowed and the other for summoning Dr. R.C. Dhawan to prove petitioner's injury report. This feeling was developed by the learned Judge on 23rd September, 1985 when the defence filed two applications, and for summoning the record of a case pending in the Court of Sessions Judge, Faizabad. which was allowed and the other for summoning Dr. R.C. Dhawan to prove petitioner's injury report. The defence also produced one witness whose statement was recorded. The impression that the petitioner was likely to abscond was developed by the learned Judge on account of the fact that the application for summoning the record as also a witness had not filed earlier and were filed on the day on which the case was listed for hearing and that a request was made on behalf of the counsel for the petitioner that a date may be fixed for arguments not before 28th August, 1985. These circumstances, in our opinion, were not before 28th August, 1985. These circumstances, in our opinion, were not sufficient for creating an impression that the petitioner was likely to abscond. As observed earlier, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions on 26th October 1983 and had been pending for the last two years. The prosecution had taken adjournment on a good number of occasions but the petitioner during this period had not absconded. The defence, in our opinion, was justified in moving the application for summoning of the record and for summoning of a witness and making a request that the case may not be taken up the next day and a date may be fixed not before 28th August, 1985. From these circumstances no inference could be drawn that the petitioner had adopted dilatory tractic or that he was likely to abscond. 11. We may go to the extent of saying that even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that the petitioner had adopted dilatory tractics, the inference could not be drawn that he was likely to abscond. 12. Once a person is released on bail, he is entitled to remain on bail till the conclusion of the trial, unless the bail is cancelled either under Section 437 (5) or under the Section 439 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Cancellation of bail cannot be ordered as a matter of course. 12. Once a person is released on bail, he is entitled to remain on bail till the conclusion of the trial, unless the bail is cancelled either under Section 437 (5) or under the Section 439 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Cancellation of bail cannot be ordered as a matter of course. The discretion has to be exercised by the court on sound judicial principles which have already been laid down by this Court as also by the Supreme Court in several decisions. The bail cannot be cancelled arbitrarily. We do not intend to say that the prosecution should have filed an application for cancellation of bail or that the bail could not be cancelled unless there was an application filed either by the State or by the complainant, but we do say that the Court, which can proceed to cancel the bail on its own, can do so by exercising the powers judicially and not arbitrarily. 13. The impugned order, in our opinion, was passed in an hasty manner as not even the petitioner or his counsel was given to understand that the bail was to be cancelled on account of the Court's impression that the petitioner was likely to abscond. The impugned order, as pointed out earlier, cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. 14. We accordingly allow the writ petition and quash the order dated 23rd August, 1985 in so far as it purports to cancel the petitioners bail. We further direct that the petitioner shall be released on bail and shall be allowed to remain on bail till the conclusion of the trial on the bonds already furnished by him. There will be no order as to costs. A copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel for the petitioner by tomorrow.