Judgment :- 1. The tenant, against whom the authorities below have passed an order for eviction, on an application in that regard taken out by the respondents herein, who are the landlords, under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960, as amended by Act 23 of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), is the petitioner. 2. The building bearing door No. 11, Third Street, Gopalapuram, Madras-86, consisting of a ground-floor and a first-floor, belonged to one Seethalakshmi Ammal. By two registered sale deeds, dated 5th April, 1982, the respondents herein purchased the entire ground-floor from Seethalakshmi Ammal in distinct and separate portions. Even prior to the sale in favour of the respondents by Seethalakshmi Ammal, the petitioner herein was in occupation of a portion of the ground-floor comprised in both the portions purchased distinctly and separately by the respondents, under sale deeds referred to earlier. After the sale in favour of the respondents, Seethalakshmi Ammal intimated the petitioner about the sale and directed her to pay the rent to the respondents herein from the month of March, 1982 onwards. There is ho dispute now that the petitioners attorned to the respondents and had been paying the monthly rents also to them. On 6th June, 1982, the respondents wrote to the petitioner as well as two other tenants who were then in occupation that they required the portions in the occupation of the tenants for their own use and occupation and called upon them to quit and deliver vacant possession on 1st July, 1982. To this, the petitioner sent a reply on 12th June, 1982 stating that the demand for possession was not in order and that the respondents owned another house where they were living and, therefore, the portion in her occupation was not required for their use and that the attempt was only to evict her and let out for higher rent, which was refused to be paid by her. On 6th July, 1982, the respondents issued a notice to the petitioner stating that the ground-floor of door No. 11, Third Street, Gopalapuram, Madras-86, including the portion in the occupation of the petitioner were purchased by them for their own use and occupation, as they do not own any house of their own in the city of Madras and called upon the petitioner to vacate and surrender possession on or before 1st August, 1982. A copy was sent by the petitioner on 16th July, 1982 accepting the purchase of a house by the respondents and the attornment of the tenancy by her in their favour, but stating that the respondents owned a house where they were living and therefore, the requirement for the personal use and occupation was not genuine but was only the outcome of a desire to get a higher rent and offering the payment of Rs. 200 per month. This stand of the petitioner led to the filing of R.C.O.P. No. 3946 of 1982 by the respondents herein before the Rent Controller (XII Judge, Court of Small Causes), Madras under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act, praying for an order of eviction against the petitioner. 3. In her counter, the petitioner denied the claim of the respondents that the property was purchased for their own personal use and that the respondents did not own or possesss other property of their own within the city of Madras. An objection regarding the validity of the notice to quit was raised. The petitioner claimed to be a teacher in a Government Aided School and as such employed in essential service. Yet another objection was raised by the petitioner to the effect that the application for eviction had been filed against a dead person, but the summons had been served on her. Disputing the bona fides of the requirement of the respondents, the petitioner stated that the application was not maintainable in law, but had been filed with a view to get enhanced rent. On the aforesaid grounds, the petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the application for eviction. 4. Before the Rent Controller (XII Judge, Court of Small Causes,) Madras, the respondents were examined as P.Ws. 1 and 2 and Exs. P1 to P13 were marked on their behalf, while, the petitioner gave evidence as R.W. 1, besides, filing Exs. R1 to R13 in support of her case. 4. Before the Rent Controller (XII Judge, Court of Small Causes,) Madras, the respondents were examined as P.Ws. 1 and 2 and Exs. P1 to P13 were marked on their behalf, while, the petitioner gave evidence as R.W. 1, besides, filing Exs. R1 to R13 in support of her case. On a consideration of the oral as well as documentary evidence the learned Rent Controller found that the application for eviction had been correctly filed against the proper person, namely, the petitioner herein, that the claim of the petitioner that she is in essential service and, therefore, entitled to protection under S. 10(4) of the Act is not established and that the requirement of the respondents, who did not own any other building in the city of Madras, was genuine and bona fide . On these conclusions, an order for eviction was passed against the petitioner. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner preferred an appeal in R.C.A. No. 1165 of 1983 before the Appellate Authority (VI Judge, Court of Small Causes,) Madras. On a reconsideration of the evidence, the Appellate Authority concurred with the conclusions of the Rent Controller and upholding the order of eviction and dismissed the appeal. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this Civil Revision Petition. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner first contended that the application for eviction had been instituted by the respondents herein against a dead person, namely, Mr. N.S. Rao, and, therefore, it was incompetent. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the notices prior to the institutions of the application for eviction had been served only on the petitioner and the summons had also been served on the petitioner, that the original application for eviction also showed that the proceeding was initiated only against the petitioner and that the mention of the name of Mr. N.S. Rao in the copy of the application for eviction served on the petitioner was owing to typographical error only and, therefore, no exception could be taken to the validity of the application for eviction as filed. 6. It is seen from the sale deeds marked as Exs. N.S. Rao in the copy of the application for eviction served on the petitioner was owing to typographical error only and, therefore, no exception could be taken to the validity of the application for eviction as filed. 6. It is seen from the sale deeds marked as Exs. P9 and P10 that even at the time of the sale of the building forming the subject-matter of the application for eviction in favour of the respondents herein, the petitioner had been in occupation thereof as a tenant and not Mr. N.S. Rao. From the recitals in Exs. P9 and P10, it is seen that the respondents are given possession of the property purchased by them by directing the tenants to attorn the tenancy in their favour and one of the tenants is the petitioner. Subsequent to the purchase of the premises by the respondents herein under Exs. P9 and P10, the vendor thereunder had written a letter to the petitioner herein directing her to pay the rent to the respondents herein from March, 1982 onwards, and that is made out by Ex. P13 written by the petitioner to respondents herein. In that letter, the petitioner has attorned the tenancy also in favour of the respondents herein. Subsequently, under Ex. P3, dated 6th June, 1982, the respondents have addressed the petitioner ( sic ) to attorn the tenancy and that they required the premises in the occupation of the petitioner and other tenants for their own use and terminating the tenancy and requesting for delivery of vacant possession. Ex. P4 is the reply sent by the petitioner to the respondents for Ex. P3. The petitioner has accepted the purchase of the property by the respondent as well as the attornment of the tenancy in their favour, but has raised an objection that the notice of termination is bad and that the respondents were attempting only to evict her by a ruse so as to secure higher rents. The petitioner had also stated that she was ready and willing to pay Rs. 200 per month. Thereafter, under Ex. The petitioner had also stated that she was ready and willing to pay Rs. 200 per month. Thereafter, under Ex. P1, dated 6th July, 1982, the respondents had again issued a notice to the petitioner reiterating their requirement of the premises under the occupation of the petitioner for their own use and occupation and determining the tenancy in favour of the petitioner and calling upon the petitioner to surrender possession on or before 1st August, 1982. This notice had been addressed to the petitioner and also served on her as seen from Ex. P2. R.3 is the reply, dated 16th July, 1982 sent by the petitioner herein to the respondents in answer to Ex. P1. There again the petitioner has accepted the purchase of the building by the respondents and the attornment of the tenancy by her in their favour and stated that their requirement is not genuine or bona fide as they own other houses. It is thereafter the application for eviction had been filed by the respondents herein on 17th August, 1982. It is seen from the records that the original of the application for eviction describes the petitioner as Mrs. N.S. Rao. Notice of this application had been ordered and served on the petitioner and there also the petitioner had been described as Mrs. N.S. Rao at her address. However, Ex. R2, which is the copy of the application for eviction served upon the petitioner herein, shows the name of the respondent as N.S. Rao and the petitioner wants to take advantage of this to contend that the application for eviction had been filed against her late husband. 7. From the documents referred to earlier, it is clear that the communications had been addressed to the petitioner, who had accepted the tenancy of the premises in her occupation under the respondents and had also replied to the same. At no point of time the petitioner had raised any objection to her description as Mrs. N.S. Rao. It is obvious, therefore, that not only in the sale deeds in favour of the respondents the petitioner had been described as a tenant, but she had accepted her position as a tenant under the respondents and had also replied to the communications addressed to her in that capacity. The application for eviction had been filed only against the petitioner and she had been served with summons also. The application for eviction had been filed only against the petitioner and she had been served with summons also. In such a situation, the petitioner cannot be allowed to take advantage of what apparently is a typographical error in the copy of the application for eviction served on her under Ex. R2. A reference to the original application for eviction clearly establishes beyond doubt that the proceedings in eviction had been initiated only against the petitioner. There is, therefore, no substance in the first contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the application for eviction had been filed against a dead person, and, therefore, it should be treated as non est. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the respondents cannot be permitted to join together in filing the application for eviction against the petitioner, as, according to him, there was no relationship of tenant and landlords between the petitioner and the respondents with references to each of the respondents in relation to portion of the premises in the occupation of the petitioner. Meeting this objection, the learned counsel for the respondent pointed out on the strength of Exs. P. 9 to P11 and the evidence of P.W. 1 that though the premises had been purchased by the respondents in distinct and separate portions under Exs. P9 and P10, the petitioner was in occupation of portions of properties purchased by both the respondents and had also attorned the tenancy in their favour and as such, the application for eviction as laid was in order. 9. There is now no dispute that the respondents have purchased the entirety of the ground-floor No. 11, Third Street, Gopalapuram, Madras-86. A reference to the description of the property under Exs. P9 and P10 and the plan Ex. P11 shows that in the ground-floor a distinct and separate back portion had been sold in favour of the first respondent herein, while another distinct and separate front portion had been sold in favour of the second respondent herein. The sale deeds Exs. P9 and P10, while dealing with delivery of possession of the portions so purchased by the respondents, has directed the petitioner, who was then a tenant, and other tenants as well to attorn, to the respondents. Ex. The sale deeds Exs. P9 and P10, while dealing with delivery of possession of the portions so purchased by the respondents, has directed the petitioner, who was then a tenant, and other tenants as well to attorn, to the respondents. Ex. P13 is the letter, dated 13th April, 1982 written by the petitioner to the respondents whereunder she had not only attorned the tenancy in respect of the premises under her occupation to the respondents herein, but had also paid to them the rent for March, 1982. Even in Ex. R3 sent by the petitioner, the petitioner has clearly admitted that the respondents had purchased the property and that she had attorned the tenancy to them. Thus, from the very sale deeds Exs. P9 and P10 and the plan Ex. P11 and Ex. P13 and R. 3, it is clearly established that the petitioner is a tenant under both the respondents with reference to the portions in her occupation. Further, it is seen from the evidence of P.W. 1 that the portions in the occupation of the petitioner lie within the portions purchased by both the respondents. Even on the footing that the application for eviction against the petitioner could not have been competently laid by one or other of the respondents, herein, it is not established as to how the petitioner can claim to have been in any manner prejudiced by that. In view of the ownership of portions of the premises in the occupation of the petitioner by both the respondents and the attornment of the tenancy by the petitioner with reference to such portions as are in her occupation in favour of both the respondents as a single tenancy and the payment of rents by the petitioner to both of them in respect of such tenancy, the contention of the petitioner that the joint application for eviction filed at the instance of the respondents against the petitioner is not maintainable, cannot be countenanced. 10. Lastly the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that one of the portions in the ground-floor purchased by the respondents had fallen vacant and that was under the “occupation” of the respondents within the meaning of S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act and, therefore, the proper remedy of the respondents would only be to file an application for additional accommodation under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act. In answer to this, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the expression “occupation” occurring in S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act has a connotation which is different from “possession” as ordinarily understood, as “occupation” connotes the idea of either physical occupation or occupation by the exercise of overt acts and effectively retaining control over the premises by locking up articles and household effects with the intention of moving in to reside if the need or occasion should arise. Attention in this connection was drawn to many decisions to the effect that what is contemplated by the expression “occupation” occurring in S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act is either actual occupation or retention of control and possession over the premises by exercising overt acts in such a manner as to indicate that the premises had been kept ready for being occupied or used whenever desired. 11. In the course of the proceedings before the authorities below, the petitioner had not specifically raised this plea. Despite that, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that as a development which had taken place subsequent to the institution of the proceedings in eviction, it can be taken note of in considering the authorities below. It is true that such subsequent events can be noticed and appropriate relief granted. Even so, in this case, there is lack of evidence with reference to the so-ca lled subsequent “occupation”. The whole argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner on this aspect of the case centres round a statement made by P.W. 1 to the effect that he has the key of one portion which had fallen vacant. Merely having the key of a vacant premises would not, in my view, amount to the person so having the key occupying the premises. “Occupation” as ordinarily understood, particularly of a residential premises, could be only by physical occupation or at least by occupation whic h can be recognised by law as such, namely, retention of control over the premises by the exercise of overt acts by the employment of a person to look after the premises or leaving the household articles and utensils locked up therein, etc., coupled with an intention to reside or to use the premises. In this case, there is no evidence at all with reference to either actual occupation or even the exercise of overt act a by the respondents with the intention of occupying the portions stated to have fallen vacant. Recently, in Sundaram v. Jothi Bai 1 I had occasion to consider the question as to when a landlord can be stated to be occupying his premises and after taking note of the relevant decisions touching upon that aspect, it has been held that in order to constitute occupation for purposes of S. 10 (3)(a)(i) of the Act, it should be either physical occupation of the residence or at least a retention of control over the premises by the exercise of overt acts with an intention to use the premises or live there by keeping the household effects, personal things, etc., locked up therein. That test is not satisfied at all in this case, as there is total lack of evidence on that aspect. Even on the basis that the respondents have kept in their custody the key of the vacant premises which had since fallen vacant, and nothing more it cannot be said that the respondents are already in occupation of a residential building of their own for purposes of S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act with reference to that portion so as to disentitle them from maintaining an application under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act on the ground that the appropriate remedy in such a case would only be the filing of an application under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act. In view of this, the last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner also fails. No other point was urged. 12. The authorities below have concurrently found that the respondents do not own any other house for their residential use in the city of Madras. Indeed, it is seen from the evidence that the first respondent is living in a rented premises and the second respondent is now being accommodated by his uncle in a house, which is not his own. The record also clearly establishes that the respondents, who are bank employees, have borrowed moneys for the purchase of the property forming the subject-matter of the application for eviction and that they do not own any other residential building in the city. The record also clearly establishes that the respondents, who are bank employees, have borrowed moneys for the purchase of the property forming the subject-matter of the application for eviction and that they do not own any other residential building in the city. There is also no clinching evidence to establish that the respondents demanded enhanced rent from the petitioner and that only on account of the refusal of the petitioner to accede to that demand, the application for eviction had been filed mala fid . As a matter of fact, it is seen from Ex. R3 that the petitioner had expressed her readiness and willingness to pay Rs. 200 per month, besides Rs. 5 for water charges, as against the existing rent Rs. 185. That had not been however accepted by the respondents. There is also no material to show that the application for eviction had been otherwise motivated. Under these circumstances, the authorities below were quite right in concluding that the respondents have clearly made out their bona fide requirement of the premises in the occupation of the petitioner under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act for their own use and occupation. This concurrent conclusion of the authorities below, based on evidence and supported by it cannot be interfered with in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under S. 25 of the Act as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Sri Rajalakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy. 1 Consequently, the Civil Revision Petition is devoid of merits and it is dismissed with costs. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that in the event of the contentions of the petitioner not being accepted, the petitioner may be granted some time to vacate the premises in her occupation. The learned counsel for the respondents agreed to grant three months time to the petitioner to enable her to do so. Accordingly, the petitioner is granted three months time from this date to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the premises in her occupation to the respondents; but this will be subject to the further condition that the petitioner should file an unconditional affidavit of undertaking to that effect before this Court within one week from this day, failing which the order of eviction can be put into execution forthwith.