R. DAYAL. J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment dated 19th April. 1985 of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sikkim, convicting the appellant Jagar Singh Pradhan, under section 307 Indian Penal Code for attempting to cause the death of Meharman Subba and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for, 4 years. ( 2 ) THE accused Jagar Singh Pradhan and the victim Meharman Singh are both residents of village Kitam, Police Station Jorethang, District South and were having strained relations. The prosecution case, as disclosed at the trial, is that on 16th May, 1983 Meharman Subba (P. W. 10) had gone to Kitam Bazar for purchasing sugar and shroud for the dead body of the father of Birsika who had died the same day and when he was returning after making the purchases and reached near the house of B. M. Darnal (P. W. 5), be met the accused Jagar Singh on the road and seeing him the accused took out his Khukuri in order to hit him, whereupon he turned around to run away, but the accused managed to hit him with his Khukuri on the balk side of his bead. After receiving the blow, Meharman Subba dropped the articles which he was carrying and started to run away and after reaching a distance of about 100 ft. near the house of B. M. Darnal, he fell on the ground, but the accused who was chasing him from behind, reached the spot and started hitting him with his Khukuri. The victim Meharman Subba could catch hold of one lathi and began to defend himself from the assaults, but after sustaining two Khukuri blows, the lathi broke down into two pieces. Then the victim Meharman Subba caught bold of the hand of the accused in which he was holding the Khukuri and then both began to struggle for the Khukuri. In the meantime, the accused managed to give One Khukuri blow on the shoulder of Meharman Subba. During the scuffle, B. M. Darnal, (P. W. 5) and some other witnesses came to the spot. B. M. Darnal snatched the Khukuri which was being held by both the victim as well as the accused. This Khukuri was later handed over by B. M. Darnal and K. P. Subba, Panchayat Secretary to the Head Constable at Majitar O. P. , on that very date, that is, 16th May, 1983. B. M. Darnal snatched the Khukuri which was being held by both the victim as well as the accused. This Khukuri was later handed over by B. M. Darnal and K. P. Subba, Panchayat Secretary to the Head Constable at Majitar O. P. , on that very date, that is, 16th May, 1983. Meharman Subba was examined by Dr. Tapan Sarbajna (P. W. 2) District Medical Officer of Namchi Hospital who found the following injuries on the person of the victim Meharman Subba: 1. Cut injury (fresh), active bleeding present, 3 x 1/2 x bone=deep middle of the head, scalp. 2. Cut injury (fresh), active bleeding present, 3 x 1/2 x bone deep over the left upper part of shoulder region backside; ( 3 ) CUT injury (fresh) active bleeding present, 1/2 x x over the left hand dorsal part basic of the phalangeal metacarpus region fourth; ( 4 ) ABRASION with cut (fresh) 1/2 x 1/8 x over the right palm, base of the middle finger. ( 5 ) BRUISE (fresh) 1/2 circular over the interior part of right knee joint. ( 6 ) ABRASION 1/4 x over the left dorsal part of hand. 3. According to the evidence of Dr. Tapan Sarbajna (P. W. 2, injuries at serial Nos. 3 and 4 were sharp cu t and at 5 and 6 were blunt and all these injuries at serial Nos. 3 to 6 were simple. To determine the nature of injuries, at serial Nos. 1 and 2, the patient was referred to SNM Hospital for radiological examination and treatment. Dr. S. Dorjee (P. W. 3), Radiologist in SNM Hospital took X-Ray of left shoulder joint and skull of Meharman Subba. He did not find any gross bone lesion. A written report (Ext. P- 1) of the incident was made by Head Constable Man Bahadur Subba, the brother of the victim Meharman Subba on that very date, i. e. , 16. 5. 1983 to the effect that an attempt on the life of the victim was made by the accused at about 4. 30 p. m. , by means of a Khukuri. This report was sent to the Officer-in-Charge, Jorethang Police Station, South Sikkim. On the basis of this report, a formal F. I. R. (Ext. P-4) was registered at Jorethang Police Station giving the time of the report as 1735 hrs. 30 p. m. , by means of a Khukuri. This report was sent to the Officer-in-Charge, Jorethang Police Station, South Sikkim. On the basis of this report, a formal F. I. R. (Ext. P-4) was registered at Jorethang Police Station giving the time of the report as 1735 hrs. Sub-Inspector, A. P. Mothey (P. W. 9) of Namchi Police Station investigated into the case, arrested the accused and submitted charge-sheet against the accused. 4. At the trial, the accused did not choose to have any legal assistance from any lawyer. On 23rd July, 1984, he stated before the trial court that he did not want to engage any lawyer nor was he agreeable to have anyone from the Legal Aid and Advice Board and he him self wanted to conduct the case. He further, stated that he had no faith on any lawyer and felt that he was quite competent to take up his own case. In the circumstances, the trial court did not find any choice but to allow the accused to conduct his own case in the absence of any defence counsel. In his statement recorded under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (which code is still applicable in Sikkim), the accused did not deny the occurrence. He admitted that he met the victim, but stated that it was Meharman Subba who rolled up his sleeves to hit him with his own (accuseds) Khukuri. He also did not deny that B. M. Darnal (P. W. 5) came to the spot and snatched the Khukuri. At the trial, besides the evidence of Dr. Tapan Sarbajna (P. W. 2), Dr. S. Dorjee (P. W. 3), S. I. A. P. Mothey (P. W. 9), evidence of the victim Meharman Subba (P. W. JO), B. M. Darnal (P. W. 5), Man Bahadur Subba (P. W. 1), Krishna Bdr. Pradhan (P. W. 4), Nirmala Subba (P. W. 6) who is the wife of Meharman Subba, Indra Bdr. Manger (P. W. 7) and Dilli Bdr. Damala (P. W. 8) was recorded. The trial Court found the prosecution evidence to be trust-wrongly and held that the prosecution had been successful in bringing borne the charge against the accused under section 307 Indian Penal Code. 5. I have heard Shri N. B. Khatiwada, Advocate for the appellant and Shri V. J. Rao, learned Advocate General on behalf of the State. The trial Court found the prosecution evidence to be trust-wrongly and held that the prosecution had been successful in bringing borne the charge against the accused under section 307 Indian Penal Code. 5. I have heard Shri N. B. Khatiwada, Advocate for the appellant and Shri V. J. Rao, learned Advocate General on behalf of the State. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that it was the accused who was assaulted first by Meharman Subba and-tile accused only exercised his right of private defence in inflicting the injuries on the person of Meharman Subba. He has also contended that the evidence produced by the prosecution is contradictory and unreliable, and the investigation was not fair. His further contention is that the case could not be conducted properly on behalf of the accused for want of any defence lawyer and the prosecution was not conducted by the Public Prosecutor. 6. As regards the contention that the trial is vitiated for want of a defence lawyer, there is absolutely no merit in this contention in view of the fact that an adequate opportunity was provided to the accused either to engage his own counselor to have a counsel from the Legal Aid and Advice Board. But the accused did not choose any of these options and decided to conduct the case by himself, since he felt that he was quite competent to conduct his own case. Not only this, he said that he had no faith in any lawyer. When the accused expressed unequivocally his desire to conduct the case by himself without any lawyer, no lawyer could legally be forced upon the accused. Faced with this difficulty, the learned counsel contends that the offer about the lawyer was made before the charge was framed and not thereafter and if the offer had heart made after the framing of the charge, in all probability, the accused would have opted for a lawyer. This argument is also without any merit. An accused is not to be asked at every stage of the proceedings whether he wants to have a Lawyer. It is enough if the opportunity to have a lawyer is granted at the initial stage before the charge is framed. ( 7 ) REGARDING the plea of self-defence, no evidence has been produced by the accused in support thereof. An accused is not to be asked at every stage of the proceedings whether he wants to have a Lawyer. It is enough if the opportunity to have a lawyer is granted at the initial stage before the charge is framed. ( 7 ) REGARDING the plea of self-defence, no evidence has been produced by the accused in support thereof. But even in such a situation this plea is open to the accused if the same arises on the material on record. The burden of establishing that plea is on the accused, and the burden can be discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of the plea. It is therefore, to be seen whether such a plea is established from the evidence on record, or whether the prosecution have been able to prove its case under section 307 I. P. C. without the accused having been able to establish the plea of self defence. ( 8 ) THE victim Meharman Subba deposed as P. W. 10, that he had gone to Kitam Bazaar for purchasing sugar and shroud for the dead body of the father of Birsika who had died the same day, and when he was returning from the shop and reached near the house of B. M. Darnal (P. W. 5), he met the accused who was sanding on the road and when the accused saw him, he took out a Khukuri in order to hit him, whereupon he turned his back in order to run away, but the accused managed to hit him with the Khukuri on the back side of his head. After receiving the Khukuri blow, he says, he dropped the articles he was carrying and started to run away and after going a distance of 100 ft. , near the house of B. M. Darnal, he fell on the ground when the accused who was chasing him from behind, continuously hit him with his Khukuri. He further states that he could catch hold of one lathi with which he warded off the Khukuri blows, but after two assaults, the lathi broke down into two pieces and then, thinking that the accused was going to kill him, with all his strength he caught hold of his hand which was holding the Khukuri. He further states that in the meanwhile, the accused managed to give him one further Khukuri blow- on his left shoulder. He further states that in the meanwhile, the accused managed to give him one further Khukuri blow- on his left shoulder. He also states that when they were struggling for the Khukuri, B. M. Darnal (P. W. 5) came to the spot and snatched the Khukuri from the hand of the accused and then the accused ran away from the scene of occurrence. Further, he says that after sometime, Melli-Namchi bus came and he boarded the bus with some others and went to the Namchi Hospital for medical treatment where he remained for three days and thereafter, he was forwarded to SIN M Hospital where he was admitted for ten days. He identified the Khukuri (Ext. p. 1 ). There is nothing in his cross-examination to cast doubt on the veracity of his statement. The accused did not try to dispute that he was the first to assault with his own Khukuri. He also did not dispute that he chased the victim after the latter began to run and struck him twice. No suggestion was given to him that he had rolled up his sleeves to hit the accused. B. M. Darnal (P. W. 5) deposed that on the date of the incident at about 4 p. m. , he was repairing a goat-shed near his house where Krishan Bahadur Pradhan (P. W. 4) also came. After having a little talk, K. B. Pradhan went back. Thereafter, he heard the shouts of his daughter who, when asked, said that a fight was going on between the accused and the victim, Meharman Subba. He then went to the spot and saw the scuffle going on between them as they were trying to snatch the Khukuri. This witness has said that he saw bleeding injury on the head of Meharman Subba and also some injuries on the person of the accused and he snatched the Khukuri which both of them were holding. He further states that the wife of Meharman Subba and one Indra Bahadur Manger also came there and started separating them and then the accused ran away from the scene. This witness also testified that with the help of the villagers who had gathered there, Subba was taken to Namchi Hospital. Further, he stated that he and one K. P. Subba, Panchayat Secretary went to Majitar O. P. and made over the Khukuri (Ext. This witness also testified that with the help of the villagers who had gathered there, Subba was taken to Namchi Hospital. Further, he stated that he and one K. P. Subba, Panchayat Secretary went to Majitar O. P. and made over the Khukuri (Ext. P. 1) to the Head constable there. In the cross-examination a suggestion was given to him that toe had not seen the incident with his own eyes; but this suggestion has no value since the accused himself admitted in his statement under section 342 Cr. P. C. that B. M. Darnal came to the spot and took possession of the Khukuri. A suggestion was also given to him that he had once gone to the house of the accused to beat him with other villagers; but without giving any details as to when he had gone. The suggestion appears to be a desperate attempt to rob the testimony of its value. However, there is nothing in the cross-examination to throw any doubt on the truthfulness of this witness. Krishna Bahadur Pradhan (P. W. 4) has corroborated the testimony of B. M. Darnal by deposing that on the date of incident, at about 4 p. m. , he had gone to the house of B. M. Darnal, and when he came out from there, he saw the accused chasing the victim Subba with Khukuri in his hand and he saw the accused hitting Subba on his head with the Khukuri. There is a discrepancy in that whereas, according to the victim's version, he had received the head injury before he started running, according to this witness, Pradhan, the injury was received by him after the running had started. But this IS not a material contradiction so as to render the evidence unreliable. Such a discrepancy is likely to occur in the evidence of truthful witnesses. Another witness is Nirmala Subba (P. W. 6) the wife of the victim, Meharman Subba. She has deposed that she had been to the house of one Mangar, where one old person had died and her husband had gone to the bazaar to purchase shroud, and on being told by a child that the accused had attacked her husband with a Khukuri, she went to the place of incident and saw the victim lying with injuries on his head and shoulders. She further stated that the accused was also present and both were hold of each other and after sometime, with the help of the villagers, her husband was removed to Namchi hospital and from there, after two days, he was removed to Gangtok hospital. P. W. 1 is Man Bahadur Subba younger brother of the victim, Meharman Subba who has deposed that on the day of the incident at about 5 p. m. , when he was in his house at Kitam busty, he heard some villagers saying that the accused was assaulting his elder brother, whereupon, he went to the place of occurrence and found his brother lying with injures on his left arm and he took his brother to Namchi Hospital the same day and lodged a written complaint at Jorethang P. S. Indra Bahadur Mangar, P. W. 7 is also a resident of village Kitam. He deposed that his elder brother-in-law expired in the same village on the day of the incident and victim Meharman Slibba bad been sent to Kitam Bazaar to purchase shroud. He testified that on hearing the shouts of the villagers, he went to the spot and saw the victim Meharman Subba and the accused fighting with each other. He also saw the bleeding injuries on the head and shoulder of the victim Meharman Subba. Dilli Bahadur Damala (P. W. 8) who had also been to the house where the death of an old person had taken place, deposed that he also went to the scene on hearing shouts of the villagers and saw the accused and the victim, catching hold of each other and the wife of the victim trying to separate them. He also testified that he had seen blood injuries on the head and shoulder of the victim, Meharman Subba. ( 9 ) IT is thus established from the evidence of the victim, Meharman Subba, that it was the accused who attacked him with his Khukuri (Ext. P-I) and when he ran away to escape from further assaults, the accused chased him and again attacked him with the Khukuri. There is no reason to doubt his testimony that he warded on two Khukuri blows on one lathi which he could get hold of and which later on broke down. P-I) and when he ran away to escape from further assaults, the accused chased him and again attacked him with the Khukuri. There is no reason to doubt his testimony that he warded on two Khukuri blows on one lathi which he could get hold of and which later on broke down. This evidence is corroborated in material particulars by several other witnesses namely, B. M. Darnal (P. W. 5), Krishna Bahadur Pradhan (P. W. 4), Man Bahadur Subba (P. W. 1), Nirmala Subba (P. W. 6), India Bahadur Mangar (P. W. 7), and Dilli Bahadur Damala (P. W. 8 ). There is nothing in the cross-examination of any of these witnesses to give any counter version of the occurrence or to lay any basis for the plea of self defence. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses is convincing and truthful and proves beyond reasonable doubt that the accused bad attempted to commit the murder of the victim Meharman Subba. Medical evidence on record also shows that cut injuries at serial Nos. I and 2 of the medical report referred to earlier, were caused by a sharp moderately heavy weapon like Khukuri and thus corroborates the oral evidence. ( 10 ) LEARNED counsel for the accused attacked the medical evidence on three grounds. His first objection is with regard to 1 he statement of Dr. Tapan Sarbajna (P. W. 2) where he stated that injuries Nos. I and 2 had been caused by a sharp moderately heavy weapon like Khukuri (Ext. p j) The learned Counsel contends that the doctor could not have known that Khukuri had been used in the commission of the crime and the fact that the doctor used the expression Khukuri showed that he was not an independent witness. This argument overlooks the fact that it was necessary that medical evidence was specific as to whether the injuries in question could be inflicted by the weapon Ext. p. I. Another contention is that the description of the first two injuries as bone deep with a width of half and Inch could not be correct, since injuries of that width and of equal depth could not be caused by a weapon like Khukuri. This argument is not based on record. No such question was put in the cross-examination of the doctor. This argument is not based on record. No such question was put in the cross-examination of the doctor. The other argument is that the description of the first injury as on the middle of the head is contrary to oral evidence that the injury was caused on the backside of the head. But this contradiction is of a very minor nature, since whether the injury was on the middle of the head or on the back-side of the head is of little significance on the facts of the case. Then no attempt was made during cross-examination of prosecution witnesses to get a clarification about it. Thus attack against the medical evidence is unsubstantial. ( 11 ) ANOTHER contention of the learned counsel is that whereas Meharman Subba, (P. W. 10) deposed that he had gone to purchase sugar and shroud, the witness Indra Bahadur Mangar, (P. W. 7) and Nirmala Subba, (P. W. 6) deposed that he had gone to purchase shroud without referring to sugar and that this discrepancy showed that these witnesses were not truthful. He also contends that the salesman of the shop from where the purchases were made, has not been produced in evidence and, therefore, the prosecution evidence on the point that Meharman Subba had gone to make the purchases in doubtful. In this connection, he also referred to the charge-sheet where instead of shroud, the word coffin has been used and on this basis, the learned counsel contends that coffin is too heavy to be carried by one individual and, therefore, the prosecution case that Subba had gone to make the alleged purchases, is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. So far as the discrepancy between the chargesheet and the oral evidence is concerned, it was not disputed by the learned counsel at the time of arguments that the word coffin was med only in the charge- sheet and not by the witnesses. If the police wrongly used the word coffin for shroud, the prosecution case does not become doubtful only for that reason. The discrepancy that, whereas Subba had said that he had gone to purchase both sugar and shroud, and the other two witnesses said that he had gone to purchase shroud, without mentioning sugar, is of a trifling nature. Whether Subba went to purchase only sugar or both sugar and shroud, is not material for the purpose of this case. The discrepancy that, whereas Subba had said that he had gone to purchase both sugar and shroud, and the other two witnesses said that he had gone to purchase shroud, without mentioning sugar, is of a trifling nature. Whether Subba went to purchase only sugar or both sugar and shroud, is not material for the purpose of this case. It has to be remembered that there are discrepancies of truth as well as of falsehood and that too minute attention to immaterial discrepancies may lead to serious failure of justice. Minor discrepancies are bound to occur in human testimony and mathematical precision cannot be expected. The argument that the evidence is not credit-worth since the salesman of the shop was not produced for evidence, is not valid. That Subba had gone to make the purchases and had, in fact, made the purchases before the incident took place, is not very material to prove that the accused attempted the murder of the victim. This fact has been brought on record only to show how the victim happened to be there to provide an occasion to the accused to commit the crime. In this connection, following observations of Chandrachud, C. J. in State of U. P. Ram Sagar Yadav1 are pertinent: It is necessary in such cases to find out the central point of the case and to concentrate upon evidence which bears upon that point. Petty details which before the real issue and minor contradictions in the evidence which are inevitable when a story is narrated under the stress of a grave crime; ought not to be permitted to tilt the scales of justice. The more a Judge gets bogged down in superfluous details, the greater is the likelihood of his staying away from evidence which can clinch the issue. Since it is proved satisfactorily that the victim was near the house of B. M Darnal, when the accused spotted him, it is of little consequence whether the victim had purchased only sugar or both sugar and shroud or even whether he had purchased none. 11. A. In order to lay the foundation of another argument, the learned counsel referred to the statement of B. M. Darnal (P. W. 5) where he stated that he had seen some injuries on the person of the accused as well. 11. A. In order to lay the foundation of another argument, the learned counsel referred to the statement of B. M. Darnal (P. W. 5) where he stated that he had seen some injuries on the person of the accused as well. The contention is that it was the duty of the prosecution to prove the injuries on the person of the accused and to the explain the same. However, in the circumstances of the case the argument fails to make any dent on the prosecution case. It depended on the nature of the injuries whether the medical examination was to be conducted or not. There is nothing on record to show that any medical examination of the accused was made. If no medical examination was conducted, there could be no question of explaining any injuries on the person of the accused. ( 12 ) THE next contention of the learned counsel is that whereas the incident took place at Kitam village within the jurisdiction of Namchi P. S. , the FIR was lodged by the victims brother, who is a Head Constable, at Jorethang P. S. According to the learned counsel, Jorethang is far away from Namchi and there must have been some ulterior motive for this course having been adopted. For this argument, no foundation was laid in the cross-examination of any of the witnesses. Nor was this argument made before the learned trial court. So this argument is of no consequence. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel has also contended that, in fact, there were two Khukuries; but only one was produced by the prosecution. However, evidence on record negatives this contention. No witness has said that there were two Khukuries. B. M. Darnal, (P. W. 5) deposed that the Khukuri seized by him on the spot was handed over by him and one K. P. Subba, Panchayat Secretary to the Head Constable at Majitar A. P. S. L, A. P. Mothey (P. W. 9) also deposed that he seized the Khukuri from the In-charge, Majitar O. P. , vide recovery memo Ext. P. 7. He did not refer to any other Khukuri. It is, however, true that the seizure memo Ext. P. 7, instead of stating that the Khukuri was seized from In-charge Majitar O. P. , states that it was seized from the place of occurrence. P. 7. He did not refer to any other Khukuri. It is, however, true that the seizure memo Ext. P. 7, instead of stating that the Khukuri was seized from In-charge Majitar O. P. , states that it was seized from the place of occurrence. But merely because of this discrepancy, it does not follow that one Khukuri becomes two. No question was put to S. I. , A. P. Mathoy to seek an explanation about the discrepancy. However, there appears to be no doubt that the statement in the seizure memo that the recovery was made from the place of occurrence, was wrongly worded. The reason appears to be sheer negligence on the part of the 1. 0. The discrepancy is not substantial enough to make the prosecution case doubtful. ( 14 ) THE learned counsel has also contended t hat the charge-sheet mentioned the name of Head Constable P. T. Bhutia, In-charge Majitar A. P. , as one of the witnesses; but he was not produced; and therefore, a presumption should be drawn against the truthfulness of the prosecution case. But it is not the law that every person connected with the offence, even though very remotely, should be produced in evidence. It is not clear how Head Constable P. T. Bhutia was a material witness. It is satisfactorily proved on record that the Khukuri (Ext. P. 1) was handed over by Shri Darnal (P. W. 5) along with K. P. Subba, Panchayat Secretary, to the Head Constable at Majitar A. P. Therefore by the non-production of Head Constable, P. T. Bhutia, no adverse presumption arises against the prosecution case. The learned counsel also referred to the statement of Shri B M. Darnal, where he stated that his daughter had told him that a fight was going on between the accused and the victim, and it was thereafter, that Subba went to the scene of occurrence. Similarly, he submitted that Nirmala Subba (P. W. 6) was informed by a child that the accused had attacked her husband with a Khukuri. The contention is that both these witnesses were material witnesses and since they were not produced, adverse presumption arises against the prosecution. For the unfolding of the prosecution case, it was not necessary for the prosecution to produce these witnesses when Darnal, (P. W. 5) and Nirmala Subba, (P. W. 6) have been produced. The contention is that both these witnesses were material witnesses and since they were not produced, adverse presumption arises against the prosecution. For the unfolding of the prosecution case, it was not necessary for the prosecution to produce these witnesses when Darnal, (P. W. 5) and Nirmala Subba, (P. W. 6) have been produced. ( 15 ) ANOTHER contention of the learned counsel is that the lathi which was used by the victim for warding off the two Khukuri attack by the accused was not produced. It would have been better if the lathi had been produced and exhibited. However, it is quite possible that the Lathi might not have been traced by him. In the face If the substantial evidence on record to prove the prosecution case, the absence of lathi is not of any consequence. isa. The learned counsel also referred to the statement of M. B. Subba, (P. W. 1) where he slated that he had seen injuries on the left arm without referring to the injury on the head. According to the learned counsel, the failure of the witness to say that the injury was also there on the head of the victim, made the presence of the witness doubtful. There is no merit in this contention. The discrepancy is of a very minor nature and shows that the witness was not careful enough while making his statement in the court. At least, by the time of evidence, he must have known that the injury had been caused on the head also. The discrepancy shows that either he was negligent or too scrupulous to say only what he was able to notice on the scene of occurrence. ( 16 ) THE learned counsel also contends that no blood grouping was blood and it was not known whether the Khukuri had the blood of the victim or of the accused. On the facts of the case, the failure on the part of the prosecution in this regard is of no consequence. ( 17 ) NEXT contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the investigation was not conducted in a fair manner. The F. I. R. (Ext. P-4) was lodged on 16th May, 1983 at 1735 hrs. Shri A. P. Mathoy, Sun-Inspector, the Investigating Officer (P. W. 9) deposed that he visited the place of occurrence the next day which means 11th of May, 1983. The F. I. R. (Ext. P-4) was lodged on 16th May, 1983 at 1735 hrs. Shri A. P. Mathoy, Sun-Inspector, the Investigating Officer (P. W. 9) deposed that he visited the place of occurrence the next day which means 11th of May, 1983. The site plan of the spot (Ext. P. 5) bears the date 18th May, 1983, which means that he went to the spot on that day. The importance of the 1. 0. visiting the site at the earliest opportunity cannot be too over-emphasised. Delay in visiting the spot is likely, in most of the cases, to result in loss of some of the important clues and pieces of evidence which would otherwise be available on the spot, soon after the incident. It has already been commented upon that the 1. 0. was not careful even in preparation of the seizure memo (Ex. P. 7) where he wrongly mentioned that the Khukuri was seized from the scene of occurrence. The seizure memo bears the dated 16th May, 1983. It does not stand to reason why, if, the La. seized the Khukuri on 16th May, 1983, he did not visit the site on that very date itself. However, in view of the overwhelming evidence on record, these lapses on the part of the 1. 0. do not affect the merit of the case. The senior police officers should see that the I. Os. investigate the cases properly, proceed to the scene of occurrence immediately on receipt of information, and record the evidence of the witnesses with out delay, and further that they are careful in preparing documents like seizure memo with care. ( 18 ) NEXT contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the proceedings before the trial court from 29th August, 1984 till 19th April, 1985 were conducted on behalf of the State by the Court Inspector, in violation of section 270 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) 898, which provides that in every trial before a Court of Sessions, the prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor. The term Public Prosecutor has been defined in section 4 (1) (T) of the Code, according to which the term Public Prosecutor includes any person acting under the direction of a Public Prosecutor. The term Public Prosecutor has been defined in section 4 (1) (T) of the Code, according to which the term Public Prosecutor includes any person acting under the direction of a Public Prosecutor. On some dates the Public Prosecutor himself had conducted the proceedings and there is nothing on the record to show that the Court Inspector was not working under the directions of the Public Prosecutor. No objection was raised in this regard at the time when the Court Inspector was conducting the case. No objection was also raised at the time of arguments before the learned trial Court. For all these reasons, the contention is inconsequential. ( 19 ) REGARDING the plea of private defence, the appellant Jagar Singh Pradhan stated in his statement recorded under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that it was Meharman Subba who rolled up his sleeves to hit him and that Subba wanted to use his (accuseds) Khukuri on him. But no evidence has been produced by him in proof of this plea; nor is there anything in the cross-examination of any prosecution witness to support the plea. In fact, no foundation was laid in the cross-examination regarding the plea of self defence. On the other hand, a suggestion was given by the accused to Nirmala Subba (P. W. 6), the wife of Meharman Subba that Subba was having illicit relationship with the wife of the accused, which allegation was denied by the witness as baseless and false. This suggestion instead of lying the foundation of a plea of self defence, goes to show to some extent a justification, whether true or false, for the appellant having made an attempt on the life of Subba. It was held in Munshi Ram v. Delhi Adminisration, that the burden of establishing the plea of private defence is on the accused and that burden can be discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour at that plea on the basis of the material on record The learned counsel for the Appellant referred to Rajnikant v. State of Maharashtra, where it was observed that an accused person can without calling defence evidence in support of the plea of self-defence rely on the evidence led by the prosecution and the material on record for showing that be had acted in self-defence. In such cases the real question which the Court is called upon to decide is whether on proper appraisal of the evidence and the relevant material on the record it can be said that the accused has been proved to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt. For, the Court cannot justifiably ignore the material which establishes the right of self-defence merely because the accused has for some reason or the other omitted to take such plea. This authority does not in any way support the case of the Appellant. It does not lay down that merely because a plea of self- defence has been taken, that plea has to be accepted. Before a plea of self defence is accepted, it is necessary that there must be some evidence to support that plea. Since the evidence on record does not support the plea of self-defence and the prosecution evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant attempted to cause the murder of Meharman Subba without the appellant having a right of private defence, the plea of self-defence is negativated. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. --- *** ---