R. A. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THESE two petitions involve common questions of law and fact and with the consent of the parties are heard together and disposed of by this common judgment. ( 2 ) THESE two petitioners were appointed as temporary constables in November 1983 and they were on probation. They underwent some depart mental training and had to appear at department examinations. They appeared at two of the examinations and on 25/02/1984 it alleged that they wore found including in unfair practice at the examination by copying from a chit which was recovered from them. during the examination in presence of another candidate and the Drill Inspector who was assisting the Supervisor PSI. They were not allowed to further appear in the examination and their services came to be terminated by the impugned orders 2nd. 2/03/1984. The order states that as the services of the petitioners were not required in the department and as that appointment was purely temporary they were being discharged from services by payment of notice pay of one week as per rule 33 of B. C. S. R Vol. I. ( 3 ) THESE orders are challenged on two around (i) that the termination is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution because persons similarly situated and junior to the petitioners were continued in service and the petitioners were arbitrarily singled out for discriminatory and hostile treatment; and (ii) that the impugned orders of termination were penal because the foundation for that action was the alleged mis-conduct of copying and unfair practice at the departmental examination and the petitioners had no opportunity to meet with that allegation and therefore the order is violative of principles of natural justice. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgment in the case of Manager Government Branch Press and another v. B. D. Belliappa AIR 1979 S. C. 499 and contended that it is the duly of the respondents to dispel the charge or discrimination by disclosing the reason or motive which impelled it to take the impugned action and the impugned order does not disclose any reason whatsoever and therefore. the happened order of termination is had as violative of Art. 16 of the Constitution. However the ratio of the judgment is not to that effect. the happened order of termination is had as violative of Art. 16 of the Constitution. However the ratio of the judgment is not to that effect. The Supreme Court has been that if services of a temporary government servant are terminated in accordance with conditions of his service on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct or his unsuitability for the job and/or for his work being unsatisfactory or for a like reason which marks him off a class apart from other temporary servants who have been retained in service there is no question of the applicability of Art. 16 hand the Supreme Court has also said in that case that the reason or the motive of the authority can be disclosed and shown in the court and the authority cannot with hold such information from the court. In that case the services of a temporary government servant were terminated without giving him any reason while some other employees junior to him were retained in service. The employee was earlier served with a show cause notice questioning his integrity and fidelity hut the government ultimately took a stand that there was no nexus between the show cause notice and the termination of services and the government with obdurate persistency stuck to the position that the respondents service had been terminated without giving any reason and the Supreme Court held that it amounted to the government admitting that the power had been exercised arbitrarily. The Supreme Court also observed therein that it was perhaps open to the government to say in view of the complaint alluded to in the show cause notice against the integrity and fidelity of the respondent that the employer had lost confidence in the employee and considered him unsuitable to be con tinued in the post Since the government had not taken up any such defence the Supreme Court held that merely because the authority had power to terminate the services of an employee. it did not absolve the authority from its obligation to satisfy the court about the reason or motive which impelled it to lake the action of termination In absence of reason the government cannot successfully meet the challenge of discrimination ( 5 ) RELYING on this judgment the petitioner has relied on the admission made in the affidavits in reply in both petitions wherein it is stated in para 9 that this termination of services has nothing to do with the act of copying at the examination in C Division held at P. T. S. Baroda on 20-2-84 and the petitioner has contended that if that factor has nothing to do with the termination of his services there is no other reason motive or circumstance distinguishing his case from the other employees who are retained in service But it is to be noticed that the above sentence which has been relied by the petitioner is not complete picture. The immediate sentence following that sentence reads as under"however it is slated that on going through the papers of enquiry received from the Principal P. T. S. Baroda it is noticed that he was outarred (sic) for the examination for the act of copying". In the next para it is averred that the petitioner was found copying from the chit which he had carried with him while entering the examination hall with an intention to copy out the answers of the questions and this chit was recovered from him it is further stated in the same para that his services were terminated after following the procedure prescribed in the rules. In para 4 of the reply it is stated that the petitioner was found copying at the time of examination and was caught red handed by the supervisor in presence of another candidate and Drill Instructor. It is also stated that since the services of the petitioner has been terminated as per rules the procedure for conducting the departmental inquiry did not arise as the petitioner was admittedly on probation. In para 5 of the reply it is also stated as under:". . . . . THIS type of gross misconduct cannot be tolerated in a disciplined forced like police. All the candidates were instructed and warned to refrain from mal-practices in the exam or else the defaulting ones would be sent back to their districts. In para 5 of the reply it is also stated as under:". . . . . THIS type of gross misconduct cannot be tolerated in a disciplined forced like police. All the candidates were instructed and warned to refrain from mal-practices in the exam or else the defaulting ones would be sent back to their districts. Still the defaulter included in copying for which the himself is to be blamed. His services have been merely terminated so that he may not be debarred from service in any other government department". ( 6 ) IN view of the entire affidavit in reply it is clear that when the deponent stated that this termination of service has nothing to do with the act of copying what was meant was that the act of copying was not the foundation of the order of termination That statement is clearly made under the apprehension or misapprehension that if termination and the act of copying were admitted to be connected the termination might be treated as attaching a stigma. The reading of the affidavit in reply as a whole makes it clear that the authorities were satisfied that the petitioner was unsuitable to be continued in service having regard to the facts against him The authorities have made it clear that the petitioner was class by himself in view of the allegations against him and he cannot be said to be similarly situated with other persons who are retained in service. At the same time the authorities have taken care to say that no stigma attaches to him by not making the act copying as the foundation of the order. The authorities have made it clear that the order of termination is discharge simpliciter which would not debar the petitioner from service in any other government department. ( 7 ) BOTH the learned counsels relied also upon a judgment in the case of State Uttar Pradesh v. Bhoop Singh Verma AIR 1979 S. C. 684. In that case the inquiry was instituted by superior authority into the misconduct alleged against the government servant and the High Court had held that the resulting termination of service was by way of punishment attaching a stigma to the government servant. In that case the inquiry was instituted by superior authority into the misconduct alleged against the government servant and the High Court had held that the resulting termination of service was by way of punishment attaching a stigma to the government servant. However in para 5 of the judgment the Supreme Court while reversing the High Court judgment held that considered as an order made without reference to the earlier proceeding against the respondent the impugned order cannot be regarded as one of punishment. In para 6 the Supreme Court observed that even assuming that the impugned order was made in the background of the allegations against the respondent concerning his behaviour with the woman there was no reason in law why a departmental inquiry should be necessary before the respondents services could be terminated. In that case the earlier order of discharging the employee from the police force was made on the ground that he had behaved in a reprehensible manner was not likely to make him useful police officer and was unfit for further retention in a disciplined force. The original earlier order plainly attached a stigma to the respondents record of service because specific grounds were set forth in the termination order and was therefore set aside by court. Thereafter a fresh order was passed of discharge simpliciter and it was sought to be justified on the ground that the government servant was not suitable for retention in service and after considering. several judgments the Supreme Court reversing High Court view came to the conclusion that it is apparent from the facts of this case that if the impugned order was to be considered as made in the light of allegations against the respondent concerning the woman the conduct of the respondent constituted a motive merely for making the order and was not the foundation of that order. The Supreme Court therefore upheld the order of termination of service passed without holding any inquiry or affording any opportunity of being heard. ( 8 ) IT is thus clear that merely because the government discloses the reason or motive behind the order of termination so as to meeting with the challenge of discrimination it cannot be said that the reason or motive was the foundation of the order of termination. ( 8 ) IT is thus clear that merely because the government discloses the reason or motive behind the order of termination so as to meeting with the challenge of discrimination it cannot be said that the reason or motive was the foundation of the order of termination. In respect of temporary or probationary employees the statute gives the power to terminate the services without assigning any reason. In such a case in order that that power is not misused it has to be reasonably exercised and taking care to see that under the colour of that power arbitrary actions are not taken. With that view the authority is required to satisfy the court as to why a particular employee has been singled out for termination and if the court is satisfied about that particular employee being in special situation and facts unlike rest of the employees the charge of discrimination would fail and the termination being not arbitrary or discriminatory would be within the power of the authority to terminate the temporary service and no question of holding an inquiry or giving an opportunity to the petitioner would arise. ( 9 ) BOTH of the above decisions of the Supreme Court were considered by this court in the case of Bums Habibbhai Taili v. State of Gujarat and anr. 1979 (2) G. L. R. 680. In that cacse the court upheld the charge of discrimination and set aside the order of termination because in that case the government had insisted and taken a stand that it had the power to terminate the services under rule 33 of B. C. S. R. without assigning any reason and no other ground was urged by the government. It was contended that the government had reasons for terminating the services belt they were not disclosed in the affidavit in reply. . In the affidavit in reply it was admitted that it is not the case of the government that the service record of the petitioner was not satisfactory and that his services were terminated on any ground concerning his work and conduct. In view of this clear admission and absence of any reason on record the High Court following the ratio in the case of Manager Govt. Branch press and another (supra) held that the termination was arbitrary. In view of this clear admission and absence of any reason on record the High Court following the ratio in the case of Manager Govt. Branch press and another (supra) held that the termination was arbitrary. In the present case the affidavit in reply has mentioned the special facts and circumstances of the petitioner which were quite different from those of the persons who were retained in service and therefore the charge of discrimination has been successfully met with by the government. ( 10 ) THE case of State of U. P. v. Bhoop Singh (supra) was also referred to wherein the Supreme Court held that the order of termination could not be said to have been made by way of punishment and must be held to be an order of termination simpliciter based on the examination of suitability of the petitioner for retention in service. In the present case also the special facts and circumstances of the case have not been directly relied on casting a stigma on the petitioner and to punish him for the act of copying at the examination. Those facts and circumstances have been taken into account to decide as to whether the petitioner was suitable for retention in the government service and such an order cannot be said to the penal or casting any stigma These facts have been disclosed by the government in the affidavit in reply to meet the charge of discrimination and it cannot be said that the order is penal in nature. ( 11 ) THE submission of the petitioner is two fold namely of discrimination or punishment so as to put the authority on the horns of dilemma. The petitioners contention would mean that. in any case the petitioner must succeed. Tails he succeeds heads the other side loses. The law is not such that a petitioner can succeed by creation of such a dilemma. The petitioner alleges that he has been singled out for arbitrary and hostile treatment. If the government does not disclose the facts and reasons for taking the decision the charge of discrimination would be proved and if the government discloses those facts the charge of punishment would be proved according to the contentions of the petitioner and the government would be defenseless in such a case. If the government does not disclose the facts and reasons for taking the decision the charge of discrimination would be proved and if the government discloses those facts the charge of punishment would be proved according to the contentions of the petitioner and the government would be defenseless in such a case. It W33 due to such apprehension and dilemma that in one sentence the government has stated in their affidavit in reply that the termination of services has nothing to do with the act of copying and in the succeeding paragraphs narrated the facts relating to the act of copying and ultimately it is averred that this type of conduct cannot be tolerated in a disciplined force like the police and the services of the petitioner were merely terminated so that he may not be debarred from service in future. The respondent has successfully shown that there is neither discrimination nor punishment. ( 12 ) IN view of the above discussion both the contentions of the petitioners fail. The impugned order of termination are neither discriminatory nor punitive. Hence both these petitions fail and are dismissed. Rule discharged with no order as to costs. Interim relief vacated. Petition dismissed. .