Judgment 1. This second appeal is at the instance of the plaintiffs. It arises out of a suit for declaration that the sale deed dt. 21-9-1974 executed by plaintiff No.2 in favour of defendant No.2 is void and without consideration. 2. Plaintiffs Nos.1 and 2 are the sons of one Jhapsi Singh. Plaintiff No.3 is the wife of plaintiff No.2. According to the plaintiffs case, the father of plaintiff No.2, Jhapsi Singh, acquired a house bearing municipal holding No. IV, Ward No. 4, in Gaya town. After the death of Jhapsi Singh the aforesaid property devolved on the joint family consisting of plaintiffs Nos.1 and 2 and widow of Jhapsi. Plaintiff No.2 is said to have fallen in bad company and was addicted to ganja, bhang and alcohol drinks. It is said that he also suffered from insanity since the year 1972. There was a separation in the family and each one of the members of the family got 1/3rd share. It was further agreed that plaintiff No. 2 being insane shall have no right to alienate the property allotted to him and his wife (plaintiff No. 3) was only authorised to sell the property if necessity therefor arose with the consent and advice of plaintiff No.1. The terms were reduced into writing and came to be termed as a deed of agreement bearing the date 21-10-1973. It bore the signatures of all concerned. It is said that even though plaintiff No.2 was not permitted under the agreement to execute any sale deed, he did so during the period of insanity. Therefore, the sale deed in question is void and without consideration. The defendants case, on the other hand, is that plaintiff No. 2 was never insane. There was a regular partition between the parties on 21-10-73 with the help of Panches. The entire suit house was divided. Plaintiff No.2 got the eastern portion of the suit house over an area of 11/2 kathas with specified boundary. Plaintiff No. 1 got western portion of the suit house and Dulari Devi in the middle. Since the date of partition each party was in exclusive possession. Plaintiff No.2 sold his share of the suit house for a sum of Rs.5,500.00 by a sale deed dt.21-9-1974 and received the consideration amount. The document is genuine, valid and for a valuable consideration. Since the date of partition each party was in exclusive possession. Plaintiff No.2 sold his share of the suit house for a sum of Rs.5,500.00 by a sale deed dt.21-9-1974 and received the consideration amount. The document is genuine, valid and for a valuable consideration. The plaintiffs have no right, title or interest to challenge the said sale deed. 3. It appears that Jhapsi had two daughters. They filed an application for being impleaded as party defendants to the suit and the said prayer was allowed by the trial court. They also filed written statement and claimed that they have also share in the property. According to them, in the partition plaintiff No.2 could not have got 1/3rd share but only 1/5th share. According to them, Jhapsi died on 20-11-76. 4. The trial court decreed the suit. The decree which, however, was prepared, did not notice the intervenor-defendants, that is, their names were not mentioned in the decree. The appellants preferred appeal against the decree as it stood by impleading the plaintiffs only in the lower appellate court. The lower appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court on all counts. It, inter alia, found that plaintiff No. 2 was not insane and the sale deed (Exhibit A) was executed in sound mental state. It also held that there was a partition in the family prior to the execution of the sale deed. 5. At the time of the admission of the appeal the only substantial question of law framed is as hereunder : "Whether an appeal in the lower appellate court was maintainable on account of non-impleading of intervenor-defendants in whose favour the trial court had passed the decree?" 6. Mr.A.N. Chatterji appearing for the plaintiffs contended that the appeal before the lower appellate court was wholly incompetent because the intervenor-defendants also obtained a decree in their favour which the appellate court sought to reverse without giving them an opportunity to hail the decree. In support of his contention he relied upon the decision in Notified Area Committee V/s. Gobind Ram, AIR 1959 Punjab 277 (FB). Mr. Chatterji further contended that this case must be sent down to the lower appellate court and the appeal should be reheard after impleading the intervenor-defendants. He referred to the decision in Ramsunder Singh V/s. Most. Pana Kuer, AIR 1979 Pat 5 . 7. Mr. Mr. Chatterji further contended that this case must be sent down to the lower appellate court and the appeal should be reheard after impleading the intervenor-defendants. He referred to the decision in Ramsunder Singh V/s. Most. Pana Kuer, AIR 1979 Pat 5 . 7. Mr. Amla Kanta Choudhary appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that the intervenor-defendants also suffered a decree against themselves but they neither filed an appeal in the lower appellate court nor in this Court. According to them, they claimed 1/5th share which was not allowed by the trial court. It is not correct to say that the defendants supported the plaintiffs beyond stating that plaintiff No.2 had no right to convey 1/3rd share in the suit house. He also contended that the appeal was rightly instituted and was competent because an appeal, as required under S. 96 of the Civil P.C. is to be filed against a decree. The trial courts decree did not mention the intervenor-defendants nor the plaintiffs took any steps to get the trial courts decree corrected. According to learned counsel, the cases relied upon by the learned lawyer of the appellants have no application at all because those cases do not touch the point that falls for adjudication in this case. On the contrary, according to learned counsel for the respondents, the decision in the case of Firm Munna Lal Raunag Ram V/s. Firm of M/s. Lachhmandas Devraj, AIR 1959 Punj 49, a Division Bench decision of the Punjab High Court, wholly and fully covers the instant case. 8. Reliance on Ramsunder Singhs case ( AIR 1979 Pat 5 ) (supra) is wholly misconceived. That case only lays down that if there is a clerical error in the judgment and the said judgment is affirmed by the appellate court, the appellate court can correct the errors therein. It does not decide the point that even when the appeal has been preferred in consonance with the decree prepared, whether the said appeal could be held to be incompetent because the decree omitted therefrom the names of the intervenor-defendants. Similarly, the Notified Area Committees case (AIR 1955 Punj 277) (FB) (supra), which has been relied upon by Mr. Chatterji, has also no application and it was not called upon to decide the problem that arises in this case. Similarly, the Notified Area Committees case (AIR 1955 Punj 277) (FB) (supra), which has been relied upon by Mr. Chatterji, has also no application and it was not called upon to decide the problem that arises in this case. The said Full Bench case only decided that if a party to the original proceedings is not impleaded in appeal on account of a bona fide and honest mistake, the appellate court in exercise of its powers under O.41, R.20, Civil P.C. can add such a person as a party to the appeal. It was further laid down that the words "interested in the result of the appeal" as given in O.41, R.20 must be decided on the facts and circumstances of each particular case whether the person sought to be added in that case is one interested in the result of the appeal. According to their Lordships if there is any bona fide omission resulting from supplying of an erroneous copy of the decree or judgment, the Court has inherent power to implead such a person in exercise of the powers conferred under O.41, R.20, C.P.C. In this case the intervenor-defendants did not come forward, who are none else but sisters and mother of plaintiffs Nos.1 and 2. No decree has been passed against those intervenor-defendants. They do not fare in the decree. A situation of the same kind arose in the case of Firm Munna Lals case (AIR 1959 Punj 49) (supra) and a Division Bench of the said Court held that the appeal in the court below was neither defective nor incompetent. I.D. Dua, J., speaking for the Court, observed: "The decree of the trial court purports to be in favour of Dev Raj alone and Lachhman Das has not been shown as a decree-holder in the decree sheet. In the heading of the judgment also the name of Dev Raj alone occurs as the plaintiff. Under the law it is the decree that is appealable and the defendants merely wanted to get rid of the decree as framed or drawn up by the trial court; they were aggrieved by this decree and not by what the decree would have been if correctly framed - correctly according to the plaintiff. Under the law it is the decree that is appealable and the defendants merely wanted to get rid of the decree as framed or drawn up by the trial court; they were aggrieved by this decree and not by what the decree would have been if correctly framed - correctly according to the plaintiff. In order, therefore, to get rid of this decree the only necessary party as a respondent was Dev Raj." In the instant case it is the plaintiffs who obtained a decree which was sought to be avoided by the defendant appellants in the lower appellate court. They preferred the appeal to get rid of the decree as framed by the trial court. They were aggrieved by this decree. The impleaded defendants neither obtained a decree nor suffered anything under the decree. It was not a suit for partition where they could have claimed their 1/5th share in the suit property. Their remedy, if any, is elsewhere. I regret I cannot agree with the contention of Mr. Chatterji that the appeal in the lower appellate court was incompetent on account of non-impleading of the intervenor-defendants. No decree, according to me, was passed in their favour in the trial court. The case is completely covered by the Division Bench decision of the Punjab High Court with which view I fully agree. 9 In the result, the appeal is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.