JUDGMENT : A. BANERJI, J. 1. A learned Single Judge of this Court noticing some difference in opinions in two Division bench cares of this Court made a reference for the constitution of a Full Bench for consideration of the following two questions: Whether the decision in Balwant v. State 1980 AWC 234 DB or the decisions Uma Shanker v. State 1980 AWC 487 DB, Sukhbir v. Prescribed Authority 1978 AWC 838 DB and Kedar Singh v. First Additional District Judge 1979 AWC 692 DB lay down the correct law on the question of the true meaning and scope of Section 31(3) of the U.P. Imposition of Celling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1976 (U.P. Act No. XX of 1976) and Section 38-B of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 as amended upto-date? 2. What is the true meaning and scope of Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act (U.P. Act No. XX of 1976) with reference to the present case? 2. There was a suggestion in the referring order for the decision of the writ petition itself by the Full Bench. However, there is no order by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for doing so. But having heard the learned Counsel for the parties we think it proper to decide the writ petition as well. 3. In his referring order the learned single Judge has noticed the following facts. Proceedings under the provisions of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') were taken against Prakash Singh the Petitioner and his co-tenants Harpal Singh and Smt. Dalip Kaur. Objections were filed by the tenure holders. The Prescribed Authority by his order dated 31-12-74 held that the three tenure holders were entitled to hold 36.67 acres area and the remaining land was surplus land The appeals filed by the tenure holders were dismissed on 19th March, 1976. They filed a writ petition No. 5563 of 1975 in this Court which was also dismissed on 21-12-1977. An application for special leave to appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court also met with the same fate. 4. Meanwhile, the Prescribed authority issued a fresh notice on 16-6-76 u/s 10(2) of the Act to the Petitioner Prakash Singh and ten other persons. An application for special leave to appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court also met with the same fate. 4. Meanwhile, the Prescribed authority issued a fresh notice on 16-6-76 u/s 10(2) of the Act to the Petitioner Prakash Singh and ten other persons. The notice indicated that these ten persons were ostensible owners on behalf of the real tenure holder Prakash Singh. Objections filed by the tenant and these ten persons were decided by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 30th March, 1977. He held while deciding issue No. 1 relating to Karamjit Singh, Baljit Singh, Harender Singh and Smt. Pushpender Kaur that as their case was pending in a writ petition it did not require consideration at that stage. However, in regard to the remaining six persons the Prescribed Authority held in his finding on issue No. 2 that no part of the land in the heads of these persons was liable to be declared surplus. The Prescribed Authority also observed in his order that the necessary action in connection with the land of Karamjit Singh, Baljit Singh, Harender Singh and Smt. Pushpender Kaur who had acquired land after 24th January, 1971, shall be taken after the decision of the writ petition by this High Court. Although the number of the writ petition was not mentioned but in all probability it meant Writ Petition No. 5563 of 1975 which was pending even on 30-3-1977. 5. The Prescribed Authority issued a writ for taking possession over land in 1981, which had been declared surplus in his order dated 31-12-1974. The Petitioner Prakash Singh filed an objection contending that on the issuance of a fresh notice under the amended law the earlier proceedings had come to naught and stood abated. By the subsequent order of the Prescribed Authority dated 30-3-1977 in pursuance of a fresh notice u/s 10(2) of the Act, no land was declared surplus. It was also urged that several issues including the question whether land was or was not irrigated, were to be decided in proper legal proceedings and until these questions were decided and any land was declared surplus, proceedings for recovery of possession could not be taken. The Prescribed Authority rejected these contentions and observed that the High Court had upheld the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 31-12-1974 and consequently surplus land was being taken possession of from the Petitioner. The Prescribed Authority rejected these contentions and observed that the High Court had upheld the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 31-12-1974 and consequently surplus land was being taken possession of from the Petitioner. The objection of the Petitioner was rejected. It is against the above order that the present writ petition has been filed. 6. It appears from the referring order that the contention raised before the learned Single Judge was that after the issue of a fresh notice u/s 10(2) of the Act and in view of the provisions of Section 31(3) of the Amendment Act i.e. U.P. Act No. XX of 1976, the earlier determination of surplus land could not be enforced and the Impugned order of the Prescribed Authority to the contrary was wholly illegal. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the Division Bench case of Balwant v. State of U.P. 1980 AWC 254 and Dadhich Singh v. State of U.P. 1979 AWC 617 DB. The learned Single Judge observed that the decision in the case of Dadhich Singh (supra) was distinguishable because it proceeded on a consideration of Section 19(1) of another Amendment Act (U.P. Act No. 18 of 1973) which came into force with effect from 19th January, 1975. That Section contained a specific provision for abatement of appeal along with the proceedings. The learned Single Judge then noticed that a contrary view to that in the decision of Balwant v. State (supra) had been taken by a Division Bench in the case of Uma Shanker v. State of W.P. (supra). The learned Single Judge observed that according to the above decision a general review of the earlier orders was not intended by the aforesaid provisions permitting redetermination and only such cases were liable to be reopened which required redetermination in view of the amendments incorporated in the principal Act. Reference was made to Section 38-B of the Act, and Section 9 of U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975 and Section 31 of U.P. Act No. XX of 1976. This specifically provided that the findings or decisions given before October 10, 1975 shall not debar the retrial of the issues covered by the Act as amended. Reference was also made in this context to the cases of Kedar Singh v. First Additional District Judge 1979 AWC 692 DB and Sukhbir v. Prescribed Authority 1978 AWG 838 DB. We have heard Mr. Reference was also made in this context to the cases of Kedar Singh v. First Additional District Judge 1979 AWC 692 DB and Sukhbir v. Prescribed Authority 1978 AWG 838 DB. We have heard Mr. O.N. Varma, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Sri V. Upadbyaya, learned Standing Counsel. 7. The scheme of the Act stipulates that a notice u/s 10(2) has to be served by the Prescribed Authority on every tenure holder (who fails to submit a statement or submits an incomplete or incorrect statement, required to be submitted u/s 9 of the Act) together with a copy of the statement prepared u/s 10(1) calling upon him to show cause within a period stipulated, why the statement be not taken as correct. Section 11 of the Act empowers the Prescribed Authority to determine the surplus land where the statement submitted by a tenure holder u/s 9 is accepted by the Prescribed Authority or where the copy of the statement served on the tenure holder u/s 10(2) is not disputed by the tenure holder. Likewise Section 12 empowers the Prescribed Authority to determine the surplus land where an objection h filed by the tenure holder. The orders passed by the Prescribed Authority under Sections 11 and 12 are final subject to the order on appeal u/s 13 of the Act. Section 13-A provides for the re-determination of surplus land in certain eases. Sub-section (1) empowers the Prescribed Authority to rectify any mistake apparent on the face of the record within a period of two years from the date of notification under Sub-section (4) of Section 14 of the Act. Section 14 provides for acquisition of surplus land. It provides for acquisition after the order has become final u/s 11(1) and after the decision on an appeal, if any, u/s 13. Sub-section (4) provides for notifying. In the official Gazette every surplus land determined u/s 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1974 or u/s 31 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1976. 8. As seen above, possession can be taken u/s 14 of the Act provided the order of the Prescribed Authority has become final or where an appeal has been filed, after its disposal. 8. As seen above, possession can be taken u/s 14 of the Act provided the order of the Prescribed Authority has become final or where an appeal has been filed, after its disposal. The precise question which we have to consider in this case is whether the issuance of a fresh notice u/s 10(2) in pursuance of the Amendment Acts 1974 and 1976 would have the result of annulling the previous order of the Prescribed Authority declaring a certain area of land as surplus. In other words, whether the mere issuance of a notice u/s 10(2) of the Act after the coldly into force of the Amendment Acts of 1974 or 1976 the earlier decision declaring a certain area of land as surplus would be wiped out and become non est. In the case of Balwant v. State (supra) there are two observations of the Division Bench which seem to take the view that it would be so. The first observation reads as follows: It meant that the subsequent determination under Clause (3) of Section 31 of the Act XX of 1976 meant that the determination of surplus area prior to 10th October, 1975 was to be ignored where the area was to be re-determined under this provision. The practical effect of ignoring the earlier determination is only one that it would cease to have any existence. In the eye of law. Consequently the provisions of re-determination would, alone be binding and the earlier determination becomes non est in law. Such an order could not be enforced. The other observation is in paragraph 16 of the Report which reads as follows; After a careful consideration of the provisions and scheme of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Amendment Act 1976, we hold that as soon as another notice u/s 10(2) was issued by the Prescribed Authority purporting to act under Sub-section (3) of Section 31 of the aforesaid Act, the declaration of surplus land by the Prescribed Authority made prior to 10th of October, 1975 stood annulled, inspite of the fact whether an appeal was filed against the same and was pending or not. In such an eventuality the earlier order of the Prescribed Authority cannot be enforced and the only enforceable order is the final order passed in pursuance of the notice issued for re-determination under the aforesaid Sub-section (3) of Section 31. 9. In such an eventuality the earlier order of the Prescribed Authority cannot be enforced and the only enforceable order is the final order passed in pursuance of the notice issued for re-determination under the aforesaid Sub-section (3) of Section 31. 9. Learned Standing Counsel urged that these observations are not apt for in several other Division Bench decisions the question bad; been considered and a different view had been taken. In the case of Sukhbir v. Prescribed Authority (supra) the Court held that the earlier order of determination was made prior to the 10th day of October, 1975 and it was, therefore, competent for the Prescribed Authority to re-determine the surplus land in accordance with the amended provisions of the Act. "For that purpose the decision of the appeal against the earlier order of the Prescribed Authority is no bar. Obviously, the Prescribed Authority was not justified in passing an order of abatement of the earlier proceedings although it was open to him to proceed to re-determine the surplus area." It was also held that the power to re-determine the surplus land can be exercised notwithstanding the fact that an appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority was filed and whether it was pending or not. Reference was made to Sub-section (3) of Section 31 of the Amendment Act, 1975 and it was held that it did not provide for the abatement of the earlier proceedings. 10. In the case of Kedar Singh v. First Additional District Judge (Supra) another Division Bench observed that Section 38-B which had been introduced in Ceiling Act by the Amendment Act No. XX of 1976 and which came into force from the 10th day of October, 1975 applied only where retrial was necessitated by reason of the amendments introduced by the aforesaid Amending Act becoming applicable. It was further laid down: If in a case any provision Introduced by the aforesaid Amending Act is applicable, a previous decision or finding will not bar retrial of such an issue of proceeding. "The Division Bench further observed that since these Explanations become attracted the proceedings were validly re-opened by issuance of a fresh notice after the coming into force of the Amending Act No. XX of 1976. "The Division Bench further observed that since these Explanations become attracted the proceedings were validly re-opened by issuance of a fresh notice after the coming into force of the Amending Act No. XX of 1976. Consequently Section 38-B applied, and the findings given in the earlier ceiling proceedings would not operate as res-judicata, so as to bar retrial of the issue relating to the land covered by the gift deeds. It was then observed: "It is apparent that the previous decision of the ceiling authorities lost its binding character. The gift deeds were rightly ignored. 11. We may now refer to the provisions of Section 38-B of the Act which was brought in the principal Act by the Amendment Act No. XX of 1976. This Section reads as follows: 38-B. Bar against res-judicata.--No finding or decision given before the commencement of this section in any proceeding or on any issue (including any order, decree or judgment) by any court, tribunal or authority in respect of any matter governed by this Act, shall bar the retrial of such proceeding or issue under this Act, in accordance with the provisions of this Act as amended from time to time. 12. This provision came up for consideration before a Division Bench in Satya Pal Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1979 AWC 217. The Bench held: A finding or decision given, before Section 38-B came into force on October 10, 1973, are, for purposes of Ceiling Act, not final. They can be reopened and the question involved in it, retried. But, in a case where no retrial takes place, the finding or decision is binding. 13. The matter was considered in the case of Uma Shanker v. State of U.P. (Supra) by a Division Bench with the following observation: Hence Section 38-B does not obliterate all decisions or findings given by courts of law either under the general law or under the Consolidation Act from being given effect to in ceiling proceedings. Section 38-B makes the provisions of the Ceiling Act to have an overriding effect and so the finding which are in conflict or at variance with the provisions of the Ceiling Act will not bar retrial of the involved issues in proceedings under the Ceiling Act. But otherwise the decisions are to be recognised even in proceedings under the Celling Act. 14. But otherwise the decisions are to be recognised even in proceedings under the Celling Act. 14. Reference was made to the decision of Gopi Nath, J. in Ramlal v. State of U.P. 1978 AWC 713 with approval. In that case the question was whether after coming into force of the Amending Act No. 2 of 1975 and Act No. XX of 1976 a redetermination of ceiling area of a tenure-holder has to follow as a matter of course in respect of cases decided by the Ceiling Authorities or is it confined to cases affected by amendments incorporated in those Amending Acts. It was held by the learned Single Judge that a fresh notice for redetermination of surplus land was to issue not in all cases but only in such cases where they were likely to be affected by amendments. Section 9 of Act No. 2 of 1975 provided: Where an order determining the surplus land in relation to a tenure-holder has been made under the Principal Act, before the commencement of this Act, the Prescribed Authority may at any time within a period of two years from the commencement of this Act, redetermine the surplus land in accordance with the Principal Act as amended by this Act. A similar provision was there in Section 31 of the Amending Act No. XX of 1976. It read: Where an order determining surplus land in relation to a tenure-holder ms been made under the Principal Act before the tenth day of October, 1975, he Prescribed Authority (as defined In the Principal Act) way, at any time within a period of two years from the said date, redetermine the surplus land n accordance with the Principal Act as amended by this Act, whether or not any appeal was filed against such order and notwithstanding any appeal whether pending or decided) against the original order of determination of surplus land. 15. The learned Single Judge held that redetermination was required only when it was necessitated by the amendments made in the Principal Act, notwithstanding the existence of a decision determining the surplus land either by the Prescribed Authority or in appeal. It was further observed that the general review of the earlier orders was not intended by the aforesaid provisions permitting redetermination, and only such cases are liable to be reopened which required redetermination in view of the amendments incorporated in the Principal Act. It was further observed that the general review of the earlier orders was not intended by the aforesaid provisions permitting redetermination, and only such cases are liable to be reopened which required redetermination in view of the amendments incorporated in the Principal Act. The Division Bench in Uma Shankesr's case (Supra) held that Ramlal's case laid down the correct proposition. The Division Bench further observed: "...it is apparent that Section 38-B which removes the bar of retrial on any issue or proceeding would include findings or decisions given by the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate Authority under the Ceiling Act also. 16. It will be relevant to refer to the decision of Satya Pal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Supra) where the Division Bench of which the Hon'ble the Chief Justice was a member, observed: A finding or decision given before Section 38-B came into force on October 10,1975 (the date of enforcement of 8. P. Ordinance No. XXXI of 1975) are for purposes of Ceiling Act, not final. They can his reopened and the question involved in it, retried. But, in a case where no retrial takes place, the finding or decision is binding. Further, Section 38-B implies that findings or decisions given on any proceeding in any court, tribunal or authority will be binding upon the authorities under Ceiling Act, if they are given after October 10, 1975. 17. It will be noticed that in all these cases there is no observation that the findings given by the Prescribed Authority u/s 11 or 12 of the Act prior to tenth day of October, 1975 will be abated or stand annulled or become non-est upon the issuance of a fresh notice u/s 10(2) of the Act. It has been sufficiently emphasised in the aforementioned decisions of this Court that fresh notice u/s 10(2) will be issued provided it is required in view of the amendments to the Principal Act brought about by the Amendment Acts of 1974 or 1976. In that event the Proscribed Authority will have to determine the questions raised. That decision would thereupon prevail. 18. The provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 31 of the Amendment Act No. XX of 1976 does not any where lay down that the previous decision would come to an end or would stand abated. We have examined Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) of Section 31 as well. That decision would thereupon prevail. 18. The provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 31 of the Amendment Act No. XX of 1976 does not any where lay down that the previous decision would come to an end or would stand abated. We have examined Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) of Section 31 as well. These provide specific instances where the appeals abate. Sub-section (1) of Section 31 stipulates that all proceedings under Sub-sections (3) to (7) of Section 14 of the Principal Act, as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Ordinance, 1976, pending before any Court or authority immediately before the date of such commencement shall be deemed to have abated on such date. Sub-section (2) also has a provision "to have abated" in respect of every appeal u/s 13 of the Principal Act or other proceedings in relation to such appeal preferred against the order passed before the tenth day of October, 1975. u/s 9 of the Amending Act of 1974 the Prescribed Authority is required to redetermine the surplus land. Sub-section (3) of Section 31 covers a different field altogether. It relates to an order determining surplus land in relation to a tenure-holder made under the Principal Act before the tenth day of October, 1975. The Prescribed Authority has been empowered, within a period of two years of the aforementioned date to redetermine. The surplus land in accordance with the Principal Act as amended by the Amendment Act, 1976, whether or not any appeal was filed against the order and notwithstanding the pendency of any appeal. Sub-section (5) makes it clear that the provisions of Section 13-A of the Principal Act shall mutatis mutandis apply to every redetermination of surplus land under this section or u/s 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1974. It will be evident from the above that there is indeed no provision for abatement of any order passed previously in a proceeding upon the issue of a notice u/s 10(2) of the Act where a fresh notice under the same provisions is issued by the Prescribed Authority after the Amending Acts of 1974 and 1976. The reason is obvious. It will be evident from the above that there is indeed no provision for abatement of any order passed previously in a proceeding upon the issue of a notice u/s 10(2) of the Act where a fresh notice under the same provisions is issued by the Prescribed Authority after the Amending Acts of 1974 and 1976. The reason is obvious. It is not that the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 31 gives a cart blanche power to the Prescribed Authority to redetermine the surplus land whenever a fresh notice u/s 10(2) is issued. The notice will be valid only where it is necessary in view of the amendments brought about to the Principal Act by the aforesaid Amendment Acts. If the amendments in the Principal Act do not call for any change in the determination of surplus land, the fresh notice u/s 10(2) would not confer power on the Prescribed Authority to embark upon a re-assessment or redetermination of the surplus land. It is only in those cases where the amendments require the Prescribed Authority to redetermine surplus land that the notice u/s 10(2) be issued. It Is, therefore, obvious that there may be cases where the earlier decision as a whole may not require modification at all, or there may be cases where only partial modification may become necessary. For example, if the question is as to whether a particular plot of land is irrigated or not has been determined and does not call for any fresh decision. Since there is no amendment to the relevant provisions in this regard by the 1976 Amendment, there would be no necessity of the Prescribed Authority embarking on a fresh inquiry as to whether the said plots are irrigated or not. In such an event the previous order of the Prescribed Authority made before 10th October, 1975 will neither stand annulled nor be non-est. 19. Let us now consider one more decision of this Court in Hakim Khan Vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1981 All 426 . This decision although by a learned Single Judge touches the very question viz., redetermination of surplus land due to amendment in the Act and as to when earlier proceedings operate as res-judicata. 19. Let us now consider one more decision of this Court in Hakim Khan Vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1981 All 426 . This decision although by a learned Single Judge touches the very question viz., redetermination of surplus land due to amendment in the Act and as to when earlier proceedings operate as res-judicata. In this case too an argument was raised on behalf of the Petitioner that the view of the law laid down by the Division Bench in Balwant v. State (Supra) should prevail and not that of the earlier Division Bench decision in Uma Shanker v. State (Supra). The reason advanced was that the later decision should prevail in case of conflict. The learned Single Judge held that the Petitioner was not right in suggesting that there was a conflict between the aforesaid two Division Bench pronouncements. The learned Single Judge observed: Taking into consideration the legislative aim, the Division Bench laid down that if there had been no such amendment in the ceiling law as affected the findings in the earlier proceedings, then the proceedings would continue to remain effective and would operate as res-judicata in the subsequent ceiling proceedings also. The learned Single Judge after considering the facts in Balwant v. State (Supra) observed: The Bench held that in the facts of the said case the earlier ceiling proceedings stood annulled in view of the subsequent ceiling proceedings, and that the only enforceable order was the final order passed in the subsequent celling proceedings by the appellate court on 13-1-1977. The Court then considered whether there was conflict of opinion in these two Division Bench decisions. Learned Single Judge observed that in Uma Shanker v. State the Division Bench was concerned only with the controversy as to whether the findings recorded in the earlier ceiling proceedings would be res-judicata In the subsequent ceiling proceedings. In Balwant v. State the said controversy came up for consideration and it was held that the final order passed in the subsequent ceiling proceedings would be the only effective order and the order passed in the earlier ceiling proceedings stood annulled in the facts of the said case. In Balwant v. State the said controversy came up for consideration and it was held that the final order passed in the subsequent ceiling proceedings would be the only effective order and the order passed in the earlier ceiling proceedings stood annulled in the facts of the said case. The learned Single Judge concluded: It will thus be seen that the controversies as involved in the two Division Bench pronouncements differ from each other and, therefore, there is no question of making a reference to a larger Bench on the counsel's contention that the said two Division Bench pronouncements have laid down conflicting law. The learned single Judge then observed: In my view, the controversy as to whether in a given case the earlier ceiling proceedings would stand as annulled or not, will depend upon the form and the manner in which the orders are passed by the authorities in the subsequent ceiling proceedings. We are in agreement with the above view. 20. But here the question arises: What would be the effect of the previous decision if a fresh notice u/s 10(2) is issued? On the points which have already been decided, the earlier decision will operate as res-judicata. It would have no effect on the new grounds which are taken for reducing the surplus area further in pursuance of the Amending Act. The obvious reason is that fresh grounds would raise new controversies which have been not decided. That would have to be considered afresh on the evidence of the parties. 21. For the reasons indicated above, the two observations in Balwant v. State (Supra) quoted earlier in this judgment must be held as not laying down the law applicable to all cases where fresh notice u/s 10(2) of the Act is issued, but those observations were applicable to the facts of that particular case alone. With these observations, we answer point No. 1. Point No. 2. 22. The second point referred is: What is the true meaning and scope of Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act (U.P. Act No. XX of 1976) with reference to the present case? The question in short is whether there would be any abatement of the proceedings on the issuance of a notice u/s 10(2) afresh. The question in short is whether there would be any abatement of the proceedings on the issuance of a notice u/s 10(2) afresh. A perusal of Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Amendment Act, 1976 shows that it applies " every appeal u/s 13 of the Principal Act or other proceedings in relation to such appeal, preferred against the said order, and pending immediately before the 10th day of October, 1975, shall be deemed to have abated on the said date." 23. In the present case, the undisputed facts show that the original proceedings which culminated in the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 31st December, 1974 declared some surplus land. An appeal against the above order was dismissed on the 19th March, 1975. There is no provision for a second appeal and consequently no appeal was pending on the 10th day of October, 1975 and there was nothing to be abated. What was pending on the 16th September, 1975 was a writ petition (Writ Petition No. 5863 of 1975). The provisions of the Act would not apply to a writ petition. Consequently, the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Amendment Act, 1976 would have no application to the facts of the present case. 24. Point No. 2 is answered accordingly. On the Merits 25. The facts of the case have been sufficiently mentioned earlier. We have considered the matter. The original order declared certain area of land to be surplus pertaining to the Petitioner. Petitioner's effort to reverse that decision failed in appeal, in the writ petition and in the SLP before the Supreme Court. That order had become final. The Petitioner had obtained a stay order in Writ Petition No. 5563 of 1977 and on the basis of the said stay order no proceeding for taking possession was initiated for some 6 years. A fresh notice u/s 10(2) was issued for declaring some further land as surplus in the hand of the Petitioner. The objection to the above notice filed by the Petitioner was disposed of by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 30th March, 1977 wherein it was held that there was no additional land to be declared surplus. 26. A fresh notice u/s 10(2) was issued for declaring some further land as surplus in the hand of the Petitioner. The objection to the above notice filed by the Petitioner was disposed of by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 30th March, 1977 wherein it was held that there was no additional land to be declared surplus. 26. In regard to six remaining persons, the Prescribed Authority held that since the transfer in their favour was made after 24th January, 1971 and since a writ petition was pending before the High Court, further proceedings would be taken after the writ petition was decided. We are not concerned with this part of the order as to what proceedings were taken against these persons, but the fact remains that the Prescribed Authority held that the Petitioner Prakash Singh did not have any additional surplus land to be declared as such. This does not take away anything from the earlier decision which had become final declaring certain land as surplus land. The earlier decision is in no way abrogated or modified by the subsequent order. Consequently, the writ petition has no merits and must fail. We decide it accordingly. 27. In the result, therefore, the questions referred to are answered, and the writ petition itself is dismissed with costs.