ORDER S.D. Agarwala, J. - These are three applications. One application has been moved under S. 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in making the application under O. 22 R. 9 of the C.P.C. The second application is an application for setting aside the order dated 21st Mar 1980 dismissing the second appeal as having been abated, and the third application is an application under 0. 22 R. 3 of the Civil P.C. to delete the name of the sole appellant Natha Ram from the array of the parties and to substitute the names of the applicants in his place. 2. The present appeal was filed by Natha Ram against the widow Smt. Draupati Devi and her minor son and daughter. 3. Suit No. 992 of 1965 had been filed by Natha Ram against the respondents for ejectment of the respondents from the premises in suit and for recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits. Another suit No. 1016 of 1967 was filed by the minor son Hukam Chandra and minor daughter Km. Meena through their next friend against Natha Ram for redemption of mortgage on the basis of transaction in suit. Both the suits came up for hearing before the trial court. Suit No. 992 of 1965 was decreed for ejectment of the respondents while suit No. 1016 of 1967 filed for redemption was dismissed. This judgment was delivered on 22-12-1969. Aggrieved against the said judgment two appeals were filed before the lower appellate court. The lower appellate court by judgment dated 19-11-70 allowed the appeal filed by the respondents and decreed the suit No. 1016 of 1967 for redemption of the mortgage. The respondents were liable to pay a sum of Rs. 200/- as mortgage money. It was further directed that in case the respondents failed to deposit a sum of Rs. 200/- then the suit shall stand dismissed. So far as the suit No. 992 of 1965 is concerned, the decree for ejectment was passed in case the mortgage money was not deposited as directed by the court. If the mortgage money is deposited the ejectment was not to be given effect to. 4. Against this judgment dated 19-11-1970 a second appeal was filed in this court in the year 1971. During the pendency of the second appeal in this Court Natha Ram died on 6th Nov. 1973. If the mortgage money is deposited the ejectment was not to be given effect to. 4. Against this judgment dated 19-11-1970 a second appeal was filed in this court in the year 1971. During the pendency of the second appeal in this Court Natha Ram died on 6th Nov. 1973. No application for substitution was made in place of Natha Ram. Natha Ram being the sole appellant, the appeal was abated by an order dated 21-3-80. The death took place as stated above in 1973 but till 1980 no substitution application was filed. 5. After the appeal was abated, all the three applications have been filed in this court on 28th Sept. 1981. 6. The main ground which has been taken in the application for condonation of delay is that the applicants were not aware of the proceedings in the case and of the second appeal having been filed in the High Court at Allahabad. Counter affidavit has been filed contesting the question of delay in filing these applications. There is no dispute so far as the date of death is concerned or in regard to the heirs who have moved these applications. A supplementary counter affidavit of Hukam Chandra has been filed to contest the applications. In pars 4 of this supplementary counter affidavit, it has been categorically stated that after the death of Natha Ram, the applicants who have moved the present applications in this court had also moved an application on 24th May, 1973 in the court below for execution of the decree passed in suit No. 992 of 1965 together with an application for substitution of their names in place of Natha Ram deceased and also filed an affidavit in support of the application for substitution. A true copy of the execution application filed by the applicants who are the heirs of Natha Ram and the affidavit of Ramesh Chandra who is also one of the applicants have been filed as annexures-1 and 2 to this affidavit. The execution application was filed for the reasons that according to the applicants the respondents had not deposited the amount of mortgage money and consequently according to them the decree became an executable decree. In reply to this supplementary affidavit a supplementary, rejoinder affidavit has been filed. The contents of paragraph 4 of the supplementary counter affidavit have not been denied. In reply to this supplementary affidavit a supplementary, rejoinder affidavit has been filed. The contents of paragraph 4 of the supplementary counter affidavit have not been denied. It is consequently admitted that the applicants in this court did move an application for execution after the death of Natha Ram as far back as 24th May, 1973, immediately after the death of Natha Ram which had taken place on 6th Feb. 1973. This conclusively establishes that the applicants had full knowledge of the pending suits and the litigation pending in regard to the said two suits. 7. Learned counsel for the applicants, has, however, urged that though they may be having knowledge of the pendency of the suit but they did not have knowledge of the pendency of the second appeal filed in this court. After going through various affidavits, I am not inclined to accept this argument. It cannot possibly be believed that the applicant did not have knowledge of the pendency of the second appeal in this court. The applicants were so vigilant that only after two months of the death of Natha Ram they filed an execution application against the respondent. This application was filed through Shri Rajendra Singh, Advocate. In para 4 of the supplementary rejoinder affidavit it has been further admitted that the second appeal had been filed on the advice of Shri Rajendra Singh, Advocate. The counsel who moved the execution application was the counsel who was responsible for filing the second appeal and as such it cannot be believed that the said counsellor his clerk would not have informed the applicants of the pendency of the second appeal. In my opinion the ground taken for condonation of delay is concocted one only with a view to move the application for substitution after a lapse of almost eight years. In the circumstances in my opinion sufficient cause has not been made out for condonation of delay in moving the application under O. 22 R. 9 as also for the delay in moving the substitution application after the disposal of the appeal by this court on 21-3-1980. 7A. Learned counsel for the applicant has cited two cases in support of his submissions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The first case relied upon by the learned counsel is Sital Prasad Saxena v. Union of India AIR 1985 SC 1 . 7A. Learned counsel for the applicant has cited two cases in support of his submissions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The first case relied upon by the learned counsel is Sital Prasad Saxena v. Union of India AIR 1985 SC 1 . Learned counsel for the applicants has relied upon the following observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court:- "The second error was that once an appeal is pending in the High Court, the heirs are not expected to keep a constant watch on the continued existence of parties to the appeal before the High Court which has a seat far away from where parties in rural areas may be residing. And in a traditional rural family the father may not have informed his son about the litigation in which he was involved and was a party. Let it be recalled what has been said umpteen times that rules of procedure are designed to advance justice and should be so interpreted and not to make them penal statutes for punishing erring parties." 8. In my opinion, this observation does not help the applicants. Here the question of watching the proceeding before the High Court did not arise. The applicants moved an application for substitution after the death of their father on 24-5-1973. They were fully aware of the proceedings. They were so vigilant that they proceeded to execute the decree and moved an application for substitution in the court below on 24th May, 1973 but they completely neglected to take any step for moving any substitution application in the High Court. These applicants are clever litigants. They knew that substitution application had to be filed and it was, therefore, that immediately after the death of the applicants' father they moved the substitution application in the court below. They were wholly negligent in not taking steps in the High Court. It appears that they did not move the application in the High Court for the reasons that they thought that they will get the decree executed in the court below and will get the possession of the property. 9. The second case relied upon by the learned counsel is Smt. Lachi Tewari v. Director of Land Records Ally 1984 SC 41. 9. The second case relied upon by the learned counsel is Smt. Lachi Tewari v. Director of Land Records Ally 1984 SC 41. In this case also reliance has been placed on certain observation made by the Honb'le Supreme Court that as the appeal in the High Court was suddenly listed before the court and the counsel had been engaged to appear but they did not appear for no fault of the appellant. 10. In the instant case, the observation made in Lachi Tewari's case (supra) does not apply because here there was no fault on the part of the counsel. The substitution application had to be filed by the applicants themselves and they had to take steps for filing the substitution application. It is then that the appeal has been abated for their default and not due to the default of their counsel. 11. I must emphasise, that in the instant case after going through the records, I find that the litigation started merely because a paltry sum of Rs. 200/- were alleged to have been paid which was taken on loan from the applicants' father Natha Ram, creating a mortgage on the property of the respondents. The respondents are a minor son and a minor daughter along with widowed mother. The court below had directed the payment of this amount to the applicants' father Natha Ram. There is no other right of the applicants in the property in dispute. The entire litigation appears to be a method to harass the, respondent who is a poor widow along with her children and to take possession of the house in dispute. In this view of the matter, I do not find any equity in favour of the applicants. The money which they had given and mortgaged the property had already been given back by the respondents as stated by the learned counsel for the respondents. 12. In the result, all the three applications mentioned above are hereby dismissed. The parties are, however, directed to bear their own costs.