JUDGMENT - C.S. DHARMADHIKARI, J.:---In this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the orders passed by the Metropolitan Megistrate, 25th Court, Mazgoan, Bombay, dated 20th December, 1983, dimissing the applications filed by him raising certain preliminary objections. 2. It appears from the record that criminal proceedings are instituted against the petitioner after obtaining senction from the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (A), Enforcement, Bombay City Division, under sanctions 63(2)(1), 63(4) and 63(8)(i) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 as amended by the Maharashtra Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1981. It appears to be an admitted position that a show cause notice dated 6th May, 1982 was issued to the petitioner, calling upon him to show cause as to why a penalty should not be imposed under section 36 of the Act. Prior to this a complaint was made to the police on 23rd April, 1982 about the offences committed by the petitioner. 3. According to Shri Kothari, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, in substance, criminal prosecution was launched against the petitioner when offences complained against him were explained to him on 26th April, 1983. Prior to this, though criminal proceedings were started, in law no charges were levelled against the petitioner. Prior to 26th April, 1983 itself, on 6th May, 1982 a show cause notice to show cause as to why penalty should not be imposed on the petitioner, was issued. In view of this, the present prosecution is wholly barred under section 63(14) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act. He also contented that since the sanaction accorded by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax resulted in penal and serious consequences viz. a criminal prosecution which could result in the sentence of fine or jail, it was obligatory on the part of the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax to give an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner before the sanction was accorded. Therefore, the sanction granted is contrary to th principles of natural justice and on that count also the criminal proceedings instituted against the petitioner are not maintainable. Therefore, the sanction granted is contrary to th principles of natural justice and on that count also the criminal proceedings instituted against the petitioner are not maintainable. In support of his contentions, Shri Kothari has placed strong reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in (M/s. Erusian Equipment and Chemicals v. State of West Bengal and others)1, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 266; (State of Punjab v. K.R. Erry and another)2, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 834 and (Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India)3, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 818. 4. On the other hand, it is contended by Shri Vaidya, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondants, that the grant of a sanction for prosecution is wholly an administrative act which does not result in any civil or penal consequences. After sanction is granted, a person is prosecuted in a Court of law wherein he is given an opportunity to defend himself. In these circumstances, it is not necessary that before according sanction, the sanctioning authority should hear the accused or the person against whom prosecution is to be launched. In support of this contention, he has placed strong reliance upon the decision of this Court in (Parasnath Pande and another v. The State)4, A.I.R. 1962 Bom. 205. He then contended that the present prosecution is not barred by section 63(14) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act as admittedly in the present case, no penalty has been imposed upon the petitioner, either before the prosecution was launched or even thereafter. He also made a statement on behalf of the Department that the Department is not interested in proceeding further with the penalty proceedings since it has already launched a criminal prosecution. 5. For properly appreciating the controversy raised before us, it will be worthwhile to make a reference to the relevant provisions of the Act. Chapter Vlll of the Bombay Sales Tax Act deals with offences and penalties. Section 63 specifically lays down as to what will be the nature of the offences and penalties. 5. For properly appreciating the controversy raised before us, it will be worthwhile to make a reference to the relevant provisions of the Act. Chapter Vlll of the Bombay Sales Tax Act deals with offences and penalties. Section 63 specifically lays down as to what will be the nature of the offences and penalties. Section 63(14) reads as under : "(14) No prosecution for an offence against this Act shall be instituted in respect of same facts on which a penalty has been imposed by the Commissioner under any provisions of this Act." From the bare reading of this section, it is clear that prosecution is barred in those cases where a penalty has been imposed by the Commissioner under the provisions of the Bombay Sales Tax Act. Such a prosecution is barred if it is in respect of the same facts on which penalty has been imposed. In the present case, admittedly no penalty has been imposed upon the petitioner. Further, complaint to the police was filed on 23-4-1982 and therefore a show cause notice was issued on 6-5-1982. Thereafter, even prior to the issuance of the show cause notice for imposing penalty, criminal proceedings were already instituted. It is also an admitted position that but for issuing the show cause notice on 6-5-1982, no further proceedings were taken in that behalf and now a statement is made before us that the Department is not interested in proceeding with the penalty proceedings. Therefore, in these circumstance, it can safely be said that the bar contemplated by sub-section (14) of section 63 is not attracted in the present case. Therefore, it is not necessary to deal with the contention raised by Shri Kothari based on section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Article 20 of the Constitution of India since the said provisions are not relevant to the controversy raised before us. 6. So far as the contention raised by Shri Kothari is concerned, viz. that it was obligatory on the part of the Deputy commissioner of sales Tax to give an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner before the sanction was accorded, in our view, there is no substance in the said contention also. Granting of a sanction is an Administrative Act. that it was obligatory on the part of the Deputy commissioner of sales Tax to give an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner before the sanction was accorded, in our view, there is no substance in the said contention also. Granting of a sanction is an Administrative Act. While construing a somewhat similar provision in (R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay)5, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 684, the Supreme Court has observed that the object behind creating a bar to the Court from taking congnizance of offences is to save the party from the harassment of frivolous or unsubstantiated allegations. The policy under lying such provisions is that there should not be unnecessary harassment, and this is the reason why in section 67 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act it is laid down that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under sections 63, 64 or 65 or any made under that Act except with the previous sanction of the Commissioner. After sanction is accorded, a Court can take cognizance of the offence and then starts the regular trial. Wherein accused is given full opportunity to defend and put forward his case. Therefore, it is not possible for us to import even by implication the principles of natural justice in this administrative action of granting or refusing sanction. However, it was contended by Shri Kothari that granting of sanction is a judicial or quasi judicial Act. We find it difficult to subscribe to this contention, since while granting or refusing sanction, the competent authority does not deal with the lie between the parties, nor the rights of the parties are decided. In (Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari)6, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 44, the Supreme Court observed: "Whether sanction is to be accorded or not is a matter for the Government to consider. The absolute power to accorded or withhold sanction conferred on the Government is irrelevant and foreign to the duty cast on the Court which is the ascertainment of the true nature, of the Act." This clearly shows that the said function is neither judicial nor quasi judicial. Similar view is taken by this Court in Parasnath v. State, A.I.R. 1962 Bom. 205 wherein it was held that 'grant of section is not a judicial act'. The Division Bench also quoted with approval, the observation of Madras High Court in (Kalagava Bapiahs Case)7, I.L.R. 27 Madras 54. Similar view is taken by this Court in Parasnath v. State, A.I.R. 1962 Bom. 205 wherein it was held that 'grant of section is not a judicial act'. The Division Bench also quoted with approval, the observation of Madras High Court in (Kalagava Bapiahs Case)7, I.L.R. 27 Madras 54. The Madras High Court has also held in the said decision that the sanction accorded by the Government under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not null and void for the reason that was given to the accused to show cause why it should not be given. It is a matter left to the discretion of the Government whether such an opportunity should be given to the person concerned before sanctioning the prosecution. The decisions on which reliance is placed by Shri Kothari are not only distinguishable, but are also irrelevant. It is no doubt true that the principles of natural justice apply even to administrative decisions if they involve and penal consequences, of grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, and the administrative order finally decides the rights. But in this case the accused has a reasonable opportunity of being heard and put forward his case at the trial. In this view of the matter, it is not possible for us to accept this contention of Shri Kothari. 7. However, it was contended by Shri Kothari that in similar cases before according sanction, show cause notice is normally issued by the Department and in his case only such practice was not followed. Therefore, in substance, it is contended by Shri Kothari that it amounts to discrimination and, therefore, the sanction is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is not possible for us to accept this contention also in view of the affidavit filed by the Sales Tax Officer, Enforcement Branch. Apart from the fact that general allegations made in this behalf are denied by the Department, the officer has explained as to why having regard to the facts and circumstance of those, cases, the Commissioner thought in fit to issue show cause notices. According to respondents the said show cause notices were issued for different purpose and not under section 67 of the Act, nor for considering the question of granting sanction for prosecution. According to respondents the said show cause notices were issued for different purpose and not under section 67 of the Act, nor for considering the question of granting sanction for prosecution. They were issued by virtue of the powers vested in the Commissioner under section 69 of the Act. which are discretionary. It is further contended by the Department that the case of the petitioner is not similar or identical to those cases. The Department decided to launch prosecution against the petitioner since there are serious allegations against and the Department thought that this was a fit case wherein criminal prosecution should be launched against the petitioner. We find much substance in these contentions. Even otherwise under section 69 of the Act the Commissioner is authorised to compound the offences. This compounding could be either before or after the institution of the proceedings and in the case of minor offence if the Commissioner thinks it fit to issue cause notice so as to consider as to whether the offence is a fit one which could be compounded, obviously if the accused is ready to do so, it cannot be said that there is anything illegal in the said procedure. It cannot universally apply to all cases. Further it was also open to the petitioner to approach the Commissioner, if he was ready and willing to compound the offence. Compounding of offences must ultimately depend upon the facts and circumstance of each case and no general rule can be laid down in that behalf. 8. In the view we have taken, therefore, we do not find any substance in this writ petition. The Rule is discharged. -----