JUDGMENT : Satya Brata Sanyal, J. - The short point in this writ petition is whether it was open to the respondents to change or alter the date of birth of the petitioner, being 9.4.1930, once accepted by the respondents in the year 1964 at the time of appointment, to 24th May, 1922 without giving an opportunity to the petitioner. The impugned communications are Annexures 1 and 13 dated 26.4.80 and 27.5.80, respectively, which are sought to be quashed. The writ petition has been filed on 17.7.80. 2. The petitioner claims that her date of birth is 9.4.1930 and it was so recorded at the time of her appointment on the 25th of February, 1964. On 1st February, 1978, the Inspectress of Schools called for the Service Book of the petitioner (Annexure 8). On 14th March, 1978, the Inspectress of Schools enquired (Annexure 7) from the Principal as to why the date of birth of the petitioner had been changed from 9.4.1930 to 24.5.1922. The Principal replied on 1.9.1978 (Annexure 9) that no document was available to the change of age of the petitioner in service book. On 1.9.1978 the petitioner enquired from the Inspectress of Schools as to why her date of birth in the service record had been tempered. She further stated in her representation that she had not read in any school. At the time of her appointment she had produced the medical certificates of the Civil Surgeon and on that basis her age was recorded. Having not received any reply, the petitioner sent a reminder on 25.4.80 (Annexure 11). One day thereafter the Inspectress of Schools wrote to the Principal that the date of birth of the petitioner should be treated as 24.5.1922 (Annexure 1). The petitioner filed a representation against the said communication on 19.5.80 (Annexure 12) stating that she had been under previous employment and her age had been changed without any show cause and opportunity. It appears that the said representation was disposed of by the authorities by communication dated 27.5.80 by the principal to the petitioner (Annexure 13) that her date of birth would be treated as 24.5.1922 and, therefore, she had to retire on 31.5.1980. It appears that the said representation was disposed of by the authorities by communication dated 27.5.80 by the principal to the petitioner (Annexure 13) that her date of birth would be treated as 24.5.1922 and, therefore, she had to retire on 31.5.1980. The petitioner has annexed to this petition certificates of two Civil Surgeons of Purnia, one dated 26.4.58 (Annexure 2) and the other dated 9.4.64 (Annexure 3) by another Civil Surgeon, which support the age recorded in the service book. 3. From the writ petition it further appears that on 10.6.67 the then Principal of the School wrote to the Inspectress of Schools that the age of the petitioner had been recorded on the basis of the medical certificates of age and health but she had come to learn from one of the teachers that the age of the petitioner in the same school when she had studied was recorded as 24.5.1922. The Principal, therefore, suggested to the Inspectress of Schools that her date of birth should be altered. The Inspectress of Schools by her letter dated 21.6.1967 (Annexure 5) wrote to the Principal that the age of the petitioner should be treated as 24.5.1922. This was communicated to the petitioner by the Principal on 26.2.76 (Annexure 6). It appears that this communication led to the filing of some representation by the petitioner and, therefore, the service record was called for by the Inspectress of Schools on 14.3.1978 (Annexure 8) and the matter was finally disposed of vide Annexures ‘1’ and ‘13’ in the months of April and May, 1980. 4. The respondents have not filed counter-affidavit and, therefore, the facts stated in the writ petition are uncontroverted. 5. Admittedly the date of birth of the petitioner has been changed to her disadvantage without giving her any opportunity of hearing. She has asserted not only in her representation but also in this writ petition that she appeared as a private candidate and she did not read in any educational institution. Mr. Ghose, learned counsel, stated that there may be a person of the same name who had studied in the school. If the authorities would have cared they might have found that the entry did not relate to her. The Principal acted merely on hearsay. Mr. Ghose, learned counsel, stated that there may be a person of the same name who had studied in the school. If the authorities would have cared they might have found that the entry did not relate to her. The Principal acted merely on hearsay. He further submitted that there was a bad blood between the ex-Principal and the petitioner which would be evidence from Annexure 14, a letter of the year 1963 resisting the appointment of the petitioner to the school by the ex-Principal. 6. It is now firmly established in law, as held in the cases of State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and others (A.I.R. 1967 Supreme Court 1269), Jiwan Kishore v. Delhi Transport Corporation (A.I.R. 1980 Supreme Court 1251) and Sarjoo Prasad v. The General Manager and another (A.I.R. 1981 Supreme Court 1481), that the date of birth without notice and without giving opportunity to the person concerned cannot be altered to the disadvantage and prejudice of an employee because an administrative ORDER :which involves civil consequences must be made in conformity with the rule of natural justice which at its lowest minimum requires notice and opportunity to the person affected thereby. That having admittedly not been done in the instant case, this petition has to succeed and the ORDER :correcting the date of birth as well as the ORDER :of retirement have to be set aside. 7. The only argument of the learned counsel for the State is that this writ petition should not be entertained because of unusual delay in coming before this Court, the petitioner having come to learn about the alteration of the date of her birth in the service record as far back as on the 26th February, 1976 (Annexure 6). Learned counsel for the State has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Jagdish Narain Maltiar v. State of Bihar and others (A.I.R. 1977 Supreme Court 1343) as also in The Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and another v. Ramjee (A.I.R. 1977 Supreme Court 965). In Jagdish Narain Maltiar’s case (supra) the appellant even though came to know about his termination of service three years before kept on submitting one memorial after another which were in the nature of mercy petitions. In Jagdish Narain Maltiar’s case (supra) the appellant even though came to know about his termination of service three years before kept on submitting one memorial after another which were in the nature of mercy petitions. It was observed that the remedy not being appointed in law he was putting into peril a right of high value and significance, and the conduct disabled the High Court from exercising extraordinary powers in his favour. In the case of Board of Mining Examination (supra) the Court held that if fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamental of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. None of these cases have any bearing to the instant case inasmuch as the petitioner being informed about change recorded in the service record, on her representation the matter was entertained and taken up by the Inspectress of School, and the final decision was rendered on 26.4.80 or on 27.5.80 when she was intimated that her age would be treated as 24.5.1922 and that she had to retire on 31.5.80. Further in this case she was never called upon to justify the age recorded at the time of her appointment. It has been held in the case of State of Orissa v. Sri Pyarimohan Samantaray and others (A.I.R. 1976 Supreme Court 2617) that the making of repeated representations after the rejection of one representation cannot be said to be a satisfactory explanation of the delay. Even this case has no application. On the contrary, in the case of G. P. Doval and others v. Chief Secretary, Government of U. P. (1984 L.I.C. 1304 SC) where provisional seniority list of the year 1971 was challenged before the High Court in the year 1983, the Supreme Court refused to entertain the objection of delay on the ground that the list was not finalised for 12 years and the representation of the petitioner did not yield any response, reply or relief. “Coupled with this is the fact that the petitioners belong to lower echelons of service and is not difficult to visualise that they may find it extremely difficult to rush to Court.” The petitioner in the instant case had filed one representation which was entertained and responded by finally disposing it of by Annexure 13, within three months whereof this writ petition had been filed. This case is covered by the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of G. P. Doval (supra). 8. It is also a settled law, that illegality committed by any party should not be allowed to perpetrate and the relief should not be denied only on the ground that there is delay in filing the writ petition. If during the period of delay, if any interest accrues in fvour of 3rd party or if any 3rd party gets the vested right then the delay can not be condoned as it will adversely affect the party in whole favour the right is vested, or the delay in moving the Court has resulted in somebody changing his detriment (See 1968 S.L.R. 291 at 315 and A.I.R. 1984 Rajasthan 156). If any right has accrued in favour of any third party it has as accrued in the instant case when the petitioner was made to retire on 31.5.80, on the basis of the altered date of birth. No right accrued to any person prior to the illegal determination of her service. The petitioner has assailed the same in this Court on 17.7.80. In the case of Sikander Pal Jain v. State of Haryana (reported in 1984 L.I.C. 1457 S.C.) the Supreme Court observed that pursuing a remedy of review before the Review Board constituted by the Haryana Government Transport Department cannot be said to be resorted to a tenuous remedy for the vindication of one’s right. In the instant case the representation of the petitioner was entertained and considered by the Inspectress of Schools and the same was disposed of vide Annexure 1. Immediately thereafter the writ petition has been filed. It cannot be held to be a tenuous remedy pursued by the petitioner for the vindication of her right. 9. For the reasons aforesaid, I do not find that there has been any delay or laches in the instant case in the petitioner’s moving this Court for the reliefs sought for. 10. Immediately thereafter the writ petition has been filed. It cannot be held to be a tenuous remedy pursued by the petitioner for the vindication of her right. 9. For the reasons aforesaid, I do not find that there has been any delay or laches in the instant case in the petitioner’s moving this Court for the reliefs sought for. 10. The irresistible conclusion of quashing Annexures 1 and 13 would be the continuation of the petitioner in service and she will so continue till she retires according to the age entered in her service record i.e. 9.4.1930. It will, however, be open to the respondents, if they so desire and consider it necessary, to hold an enquiry about the correct birth date afresh after giving notice and opportunity of producing materials on either side in this case. 11. The petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein with costs. The hearing fee is quantified at Rs. 500/- to be paid by the respondent State to the petitioner.