JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a second appeal. 2. The facts giving rise to the present second appeal are as under : 3. A suit No. 52 of 1971 was filed by the appellant Shivraj Singh Sharma against Devji Mai Asha Ram Paliwal Educational Association and others for a declaration that the resolution dated 24th October, 1971, passed by the Managing Committee of the College accepting the resignation of the plaintiff appellant is void and ineffective and that the plaintiff appellant continues in service as Science teacher in the institution. The allegation was that, in fact, he did not submit any resignation out of his own volition on 16th October, 1971 but that the resignation had been obtained by undue influence. 4. The suit was contested by the defendant respondents inter alia, on the ground that no undue influence was exercised on the plaintiff appellant when he gave the resignation and that the resignation was given by him voluntarily. It was further alleged that the resolution of the Managing Committee dated 24th October, 1971, was perfectly valid and a beading resolution. It was specifically alleged that on the post of the plaintiff appellant, a teacher had already been appointed and that the approval of the District Inspector of Schools h ad also been obtained. He is working from 4th December, 1971. As such the plaintiff appellant is not entitled to any relief in the suit. It was further alleged that the plaintiff appellant can not seek a declaration of continuous service in the suit and as such, the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground also. 5. The trial court by its judgment dated 18th May, 1974, decreed the suit holding that the resolution of the Managing Committee dated 24th October, 1981 was illegal and ineffective and further the respondents were restrained from interfering with the plaintiff appellants discharge of his duties as a science teacher on the basis of the resolution dated 24th October, 1971. 6. Aggrieved by this decision of the trial court dated 18th May, 1974, an appeal was filed by the defendant respondents. The appeal was partly allowed by the 4th Additional District Judge Bulandshahr, by his judgment dated 31st March, 1978. Only a decree for recovery of Rs. 382,10 p. towards salary, dearness allowance and increment upto 24th October, 1971, was passed. The rest of the suit was dismissed. The appeal was partly allowed by the 4th Additional District Judge Bulandshahr, by his judgment dated 31st March, 1978. Only a decree for recovery of Rs. 382,10 p. towards salary, dearness allowance and increment upto 24th October, 1971, was passed. The rest of the suit was dismissed. The lower appellate court recorded a categorical finding that the services of the plaintiff appellant were rightly terminated with effect from 24th October, 1971. The appellate Court further held that in view of the decision in the case of Muslim Association v. Hamid Hussain and others, 1972 Bar CLJ Vol. I, Page 1, the plaintiff appellant had no enforceable right in a Court of law against the order of termination and as such, no relief could be granted to hi in. 7. Aggrieved by the decision dated 31st March, 1978, the present second appeal has been filed in this Honble Court. 8. This Second Appeal came up for hearing before me earlier on 30th September, 1980. By an order of the same date, had referred three questions for decisions by a larger Bench, which were as follows "1. Whether acceptance by the Managing Committee is necessary before the resignation become effective in law under Regulations 29 and 30 of the Regulations framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 ? 2. Whether even if no acceptance is required under the Regulations mentioned above, what would be the date on which resignation would become effective when a notice of resignation is given under Regulation 29 ? 3. Whether the teacher has right to with drawl the resignation before the effective date ?" 9. The reference made by me came up for hearing before Honble the then Chief Justice Satish Chandra and Hon'ble Mr. Justice A. N. Verma. On an examination of the facts of the case, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the resignation letter dated 16th October, 1971, was void ab initio and it could not rupture the relationship between the parties and as such the resolution passed on 24th October, 1971, by the Managing Committee lost its utility and could have no legal effect. The reference was returned unanswered with the direction that the papers be laid before me for disposal of the appeal in accordance with law. 10. After the result of the reference, 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties again. The reference was returned unanswered with the direction that the papers be laid before me for disposal of the appeal in accordance with law. 10. After the result of the reference, 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties again. The learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant has urged that since the resignation letter dated i6th October, 1971, has been held to be void ab initio, the plaintiffs suit is liable to be decreed. 11. Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, Senior Advocate along with Sri K. R. Sirohi, has appeared for the respondent and has urged that even if the resignation letter dated 16th October, 1971 is void ab initio, no relief for a declaration of continuous service can be granted to the plaintiff appellant and, as such, the ultimate decision given by the lower appellate court is correct and needs no interference by this court. In my opinion, the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent is well founded. The lower appellate court has also held that no relief can be granted to the appellant in view of the decision of this Court in Muslim Association v. Hamid Hussain and others (supra). In Smt. J. Tiwari v. Smt. Jawala Devi Vidya Mandir and others, AIR 1981 SC 122 , the Honble Supreme Court relying upon an earlier decision in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain, AIR 1976 SC 888 has held that a declaration for continuous service cannot be granted even if the order of termination was wrongful. The only remedy available to a person aggrieved is a decree for damages. In the instant case, the plaintiff appellant has only sought for a decree for reinstatement. In the circumstances, the suit cannot possibly be decreed. The ultimate view taken by the lower appellate court, consequently, is correct. 12. It is relevant to mention here that in the written statement, it has been categorically stated on behalf of the defendant respondents that on the post in question on which the plaintiff appellant was working another teacher has been appointed and the said teacher has been working since 4th December, 1971. 13. In the result, be second appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. But, in the ' starts of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.