JUDGMENT 1. - This is a tenant's second appeal in a suit for ejectment based on the grounds of default as well as personal bonafide necessity of the plaintiff in respect of a shop. 2. In view of the order, I am going to pass I need not state the facts of the case at length. Suffice it to say that in the written statement, the defendant while denying the plaintiff's ground of ejectment also denied his title and claimed title in himself. 3. Six issues were framed they related to the questions (i) whether the defendant was the plaintiff's tenant; (ii) what is the rent payable; (iii) whether the plaintiff required the shop reasonably and bonafide for his personal use; (iv) whether the plaintiff was entitled to eject the defendant; (v) whether the defendant has been in possession of the suit shop for the last 80 years as owners; and (vi) relief. After taking the evidence of the parties, the trial Court decreed the plaintiff's suit holding that it was proved that the defendant was the tenant of the plaintiff, that the amount of rent was Rs. 130/- p.a., that the plaintiff had reasonable and bonafide necessity of the shop, that plaintiff was entitled to get the shop vacated and that in view of the decision on issue No. 1, issue No. 5 should be decided against the defendant. Aggrieved of this, the defendant went up in appeal and before the learned appellate Court the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants urged that in this case the defendant had denied the title of the plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiffs can get a decree in their favour only if they prove their title, that the defendant is the tenant and that the tenancy has validly been terminated. So far as the bonafide necessity of the plaintiff was concerned, it was not disputed before the learned District Judge and, the learned District Judge further found that it was also proved that the defendant had made defaults in making payment. The learned District Judge held that in this suit, the plaintiffs are not required to establish their title, that it was proved that the defendant was the plaintiffs' tenant and that the tenancy had validly been terminated. He, accordingly, dismissed the defendant's appeal by his judgment and decree dated 2.4.1974. Hence this second appeal. 4. The learned District Judge held that in this suit, the plaintiffs are not required to establish their title, that it was proved that the defendant was the plaintiffs' tenant and that the tenancy had validly been terminated. He, accordingly, dismissed the defendant's appeal by his judgment and decree dated 2.4.1974. Hence this second appeal. 4. Pending this appeal, an application has been made under Section 13A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (hereinafter called 'the Act') as amended by the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Ordinance No. 26 of 1975 on 29.1.1975 and a statement of the arrears of rent etc. was also submitted on 13.2.1976. However, that application has not yet been disposed of. 5. The plaintiffs-respondents have also filed an application under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. praying that as the defendant has denied the plaintiffs' title, the defendant is liable to be ejected on this ground under Section 13(1)(f) of the Act and, therefore, this ground may either be taken into account as such or the plaintiffs may be allowed to amend the plaint to incorporate this plea. The plaintiffs' application has been objected to by the learned counsel for the appellant. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 7. I shall first take up the application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. The learned counsel for the respondents urged that since the defendant has denied the plaintiffs' title not only in the written statement but has made this denial the main ground before the first appellate Court, this Court in this appeal can take note of this denial and on the basis of the admission of the defendant to the effect that he has denied the title of the plaintiffs, the decree of ejectment may be maintained on this additional ground under Section 13(1)(f) of the Act. No doubt it does appear that in the written statement as also before the first appellate Court, the defendant appears to have denied the plaintiffs' title and has also asserted his own but the question is whether at this stage, this ground of ejectment can be taken into consideration without any pleading or any further proof. I am clearly of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case, this cannot be done in view of the requirements of Section 13(1)(f). I am clearly of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case, this cannot be done in view of the requirements of Section 13(1)(f). Section 13(1)(f) of the Act lays down that a decree for ejectment can be passed against a tenant if the Court is satisfied that the tenant has renounced the character of the landlord as such or denied the title of the landlord and the latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant. Now even if it is held that the tenant has, in the written statement as well as before the first appellate Court renounced his character as such or has denied the title of the landlord which by itself may furnish a ground for the landlord to file a suit for ejectment against the tenant and in that suit, it will also have to be established to the satisfaction of the Court that the landlord has not waived his right of ejectment on this ground nor has he condoned the conduct of the tenant in renouncing the title of the landlord. Now in the present suit, the landlord has claimed ejectment only on the grounds of default and his personal bonafide necessity but now on account of the denial of his title in the written statement by the tenant if he wants to take advantage of this additional ground, he can do so only if he can plead it by way of amendment and not by merely relying on the so called denial of his title in the written statement. The plaintiff has also to plead and prove that he has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant on account of this ground of ejectment. Therefore, unless this ground is pleaded and the defendant has the reasonable opportunity of rebutting it, it would not be proper for this Court to base the decree for ejectment on this ground. 8. The learned counsel for the respondents brought to my notice a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Firm Srinivas Ram v. Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1951 Supreme Court 177 and urged that the plaintiff can be granted a decree on a ground not pleaded by him but which is apparent from the admission of the defendant either in his written statement or in his evidence. The proposition, of course, does not admit of doubt but that can be done, as has been pointed out by their Lordships themselves in very special circumstances. In that case, although the plaintiff had not pleaded an advance to the defendant as a loan but the defendant had admitted the loan and had not in any way shown his non-liability to that loan. Therefore, the Court thought it proper to pass a decree in respect of that ground even though it was not pleaded but in the present case, the position is not similar to that case because the denial of the landlord's title by itself would not entitle the plaintiff to a decree for ejectment unless it is further proved to the satisfaction of the Court that this ground has not been waived or the conduct of the tenant has not been condoned by the plaintiff. This further pleading and proof would still be acquired before a decree on this ground can be passed and when such a pleading is raised, the defendants also will have a right to file a written statement in respect of this ground either denying or explain his conduct in denying the title of the landlord. 9. It was further urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that the denial of the plaintiffs' title is an event subsequent to the filing of the plaint and the Court can take into consideration a subsequent event. In this respect, he placed reliance upon P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1409. It would be difficult to call it a subsequent event in the true sense of term. As a matter of fact, as already stated above, the plaintiffs had based their suit for ejectment on the grounds of default and personal necessity and while denying these grounds, the defendants had taken a further plea that the plaintiff was not his landlord. This plea cannot be said to be subsequently event although such a plea may given rise to a further cause of action to the plaintiff for filing a suit for ejectment against the defendant or adding one more ground of ejectment in this very suit. Therefore, this authority is also of avail to the plaintiffs in this case. 10. This plea cannot be said to be subsequently event although such a plea may given rise to a further cause of action to the plaintiff for filing a suit for ejectment against the defendant or adding one more ground of ejectment in this very suit. Therefore, this authority is also of avail to the plaintiffs in this case. 10. Then the further question which arises is whether in the circumstances of the cases, the amendment of the plaint in order to incorporate this plea should be allowed and looking to all the facts and circumstances of the case. I am inclined to allow it although the learned counsel for the appellant has objected to this also. It may be pointed out that although the application for amendment is belated as even though the plaintiff's title had been denied in the very written statement filed by the defendant in the trial Court, this plea was not sought to be raised by way of amendment either in the trial Court or before the first appellate Court and the application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. has been filed only before this Court, the conduct of the defendant is also such that the plaintiff should not be driven to a separate suit and should be allowed to add this ground of ejectment in this suit itself. The defendant not only denied the plaintiff's title in the written statement but forcefully reiterated it as the main ground of his appeal before the first appellate Court and has still made it a ground before this Court. As has rightly been held by the learned first appellate Court in a suit for ejectment, the question of title of the plaintiff need not be gone into but the Courts below have found that the defendant is a tenant of the plaintiff, it is proper that the plaintiff should be given an opportunity of basing his suit for ejectment under Section 13(1)(f) also. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the application under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. should be allowed and that the amendment proposed in para No. 4 of the application be permitted. 11. This brings me to the second application filed by the learned counsel for the appellant. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the application under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. should be allowed and that the amendment proposed in para No. 4 of the application be permitted. 11. This brings me to the second application filed by the learned counsel for the appellant. This application is under Section 13A of the Act as was inserted by Rajasthan Ordinance No. 26 of 1975 w.e.f. 29.9.1975 and which was later on replaced by Rajasthan Act No. 14 of 1976. According to this section, in a suit for ejectment pending at the time of coming into force of this provision, no Court shall pass any decree in favour of landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, if the tenant applies under clause (b) and pays to the landlord, or deposits in Court; within such time such aggregate of the amount or rent in arrears, interest thereon and full costs of the suit as may be directed by the Court under and in accordance with that clause;Section 13-A(b) reads as under:- "(b) in every such proceeding, the Court shall, on the application of the tenant made within thirty days from the date of commencement of the amending ordinance notwithstanding any order to the contrary, determine the amount of rent in arrears upto the date of the order as also the amount of interest, thereon at 6% per annum and costs of the unit allowable to the landlord; and direct the tenant to pay the amount so determined within such time, not exceeding ninety days, as may be fixed by the Court; and no such payment being made within the time fixed as aforesaid; the proceeding shall be disposed of as if tenant had not committed any default;" Section 13-A(c) reads as under:- "the provisions of clauses (a) and (b) shall mutatis mutandis apply to the appeals; or applications for revisions, preferred or made, after the commencement of the amending ordinance against decrees for eviction passed before such commencement with the variation that in clause (b), for the expression "from the date of the commencement of the amending ordinance", the expression "from the date of the presentation of the memorandum of appeal or application for revisions" shall be substituted;" 12. The application under Section 13A has been made before this Court on 29.10.1975 i.e. within the time prescribed under clause (b) of Section 13A and, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Section 13A, the Court will have to determine the amount. Since this application has not yet been disposed of and in view of the amendment of the plaint as allowed by me above, matter will have to be sent back to the trial Court, the trial Court will determine the amount in accordance with the provisions of Section 13A of the Act. Both the learned counsel have no objection to this. 13. In view of the further amended provisions then we have to take into account the further application under 14. The suit has also been decreed on the ground of personal bonafide necessity. Section 14 as it stands after the amendment in 1975 lays down as under:- "(1) No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be passed unless the Court is satisfied, after taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration, that it is reasonable to allow such eviction. (2) No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be passed if the Court is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. Where the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only." 14. Where the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only." 14. In the present case, the two Courts below have concurrently found that the plaintiff requires the shop in dispute for his reasonable bonafide necessity but now according to the provisions of Section 14, it is further required to be examined whether having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it and further the Court is to be satisfied whether no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, and if the Court is so satisfied, it may pass a decree in respect of such part only. As these provisions were not in existence at the time the suit was filed or was decreed by the two Courts below, no such enquiry has been made but in view of the provisions of Section 14(1), such an enquiry will have to be made before any such decree can be passed. As in view of the amendment allowed by this Court, the matter will go back to the trial Court, the trial Court will take necessary steps in this direction in accordance with Section 14 also. 15. In view of what has been stated above, this appeal is partly allowed, the decrees of the two Courts below are set aside and the suit is remanded to the Civil Judge, Ratangarh, with a direction that the plaintiff will be allowed to file the amended plaint as permitted by this Court above within 15 days of the appearance of the parties before the trial Court where after the defendant shall be given an opportunity to file his written statement to the amended plaint. An issue, if necessary, shall be framed on the basis of the amendment and then the Court will proceed to take evidence in respect of that issue as well as in respect of the provisions of Section 14 of the Act. An issue, if necessary, shall be framed on the basis of the amendment and then the Court will proceed to take evidence in respect of that issue as well as in respect of the provisions of Section 14 of the Act. The Court will also dispose of the application under Section 13A as indicated above and thereafter dispose of the suit in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible say within a year. The parties are left to bear own costs of this appeal. The parties shall appear before the learned Civil Judge on 20.1.1986. The record may be set back immediately. The application under Section 13A by the appellant as also the application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. by the respondents filed in this Court should also be sent back to the trial Court along with the record.Appeal partly allowed. *******