JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - By this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, Prof, K A. Nizami, who was the Head of the Department of History in Aligarh Muslim University, has challenged the order of the Vice Chancellor contained in the office memo dated 13th June, 1984. The office memo was issued by the Registrar of the University intimating to the petitioner that as he had completed more than five years as Head Chairman of his department before 14-6-1984, he ceased to be the Chairman of the department. The office memo further stated that the aforesaid direction of cessation of the petitioner as Head of the Department had been issued in pursuance of clause (4) of Chapter II of the Ordinances (Academic) promulgated on behalf of the Executive Council by the Vice Chancellor on June 13, 1984. 2. The office memo contained the names of Sixteen other Heads/Chair - men, who had completed more than five years, ceased to be the Heads/Chairmen of their respective departments. One of the professors of that list was Prof. A Jamil Qadri he was Head of the Department of Psychology. He has filed the connected writ petition. 3. In this petition and in the connected writ petition, the same arguments were advanced by the petitioners of the two cases. The first argument was that by virtue of Sub-section (3) of Section 22 of the Aligarh Muslim University (Amendment) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act of 1981), petitioner, Prof. K.A. Nizami would be entitled to continue till he completed his full terms of sixty years. The second Submission was that the impugned clause 4 of Chapter II could not be framed by the Executive Council giving it retrospective effect. Hence, the petitioner, who had been appointed as Head of the Department before the Amending Act was entitled to continue to function as such irrespective of the amendments made in Statute 8 and the Ordinances framed thereafter in pursuance of the same. 4. We may make a brief reference of the provisions of the Aligarh Muslim University Act and the relevant Statute for the purpose of appreciating the controversy involved. The Aligarh Muslim University Act was passed to establish and incorporate a teaching and residential Muslim University at Aligarh is 1920. The Act since then has undergone various changes and amendments. 4. We may make a brief reference of the provisions of the Aligarh Muslim University Act and the relevant Statute for the purpose of appreciating the controversy involved. The Aligarh Muslim University Act was passed to establish and incorporate a teaching and residential Muslim University at Aligarh is 1920. The Act since then has undergone various changes and amendments. The Act provided for constitution of the Executive Council with which to consist of the academicians, representatives of the teachers, members of the Legislative Assembly and Members of the Parliament etc. The Executive Council is in fact the principal executive body of the University. The Executive Council had been conferred the power to make, amend or repeal and Statute. This power was, however, subject to the limitation incorporated in the provisions of Sections 2 to 28. As we are not concerned with the limitations of the powers of the executive Council, we do not consider it necessary to mention the same. Section 27 reads: "Subject to the provisions of this Act, the statutes may provide for the following matters, namely : (g) the conditions of service of employees including the provision for pension, insurance and provident fund, the manner of termination of service and disciplinary action ; (k) the establishment and recognition of Student, Union or associations of teachers, academic staff or other employees of the University." 5. Power to make ordinances subject to the provisions of the Act and the Statutes also was conferred on the Executive Council. Amongst others, this power could provide for : (k) the emoluments and the terms and conditions of service of the academic and other staff of the University ; (p) such other terms and conditions of teachers as are not prescribed by the Statutes. 6. In pursuance of sub section (1) of Section 28 of the Aligarh Muslim University Act, the Statues were framed. Statute 8 provided for : "Each Department Shall have a Head who shall be a Professor and whose duties and f unctions and terms and conditions of appointment Shall be prescribed by the Ordinances..................." 7. Pursuant to Statute 8 which empowered the framing of the Ordinance providing for terms and conditions of appointment of a Head of the Department, sub-clause (4) of Chapter II of the Ordinances (Academic) was made. The relevant portion of the Ordinance is quoted below "4. Pursuant to Statute 8 which empowered the framing of the Ordinance providing for terms and conditions of appointment of a Head of the Department, sub-clause (4) of Chapter II of the Ordinances (Academic) was made. The relevant portion of the Ordinance is quoted below "4. Subject to the provisions made in Statute 8 (1) of the Statutes, if there are More Professors than one, or in the absence of a Professor, more Readers than one in a Department, senior-most Professor or Reader, as the case may be, shall be the Head of that Department." 8. In the year 1981, the Parliament brought the Aligarh Muslim University (Amendment) Bill, 1981. T he bill was passed by the two Houses and thereafter become the Act. It made certain important changes in the constitution of the various authorities provided for by the Act. We are concerned in this case with the changes which were made by Section 21 of the Amending Act. The relevant portion of this Section is as follows:- "21. Notwithstanding anything contained in the principal Act, the Statutes of the University shall be amended as follows :- (i) throughout the Statutes, for the words "Head of Department", wherever they occur, the words "Chairman of Department" shall be substituted, and Such consequential amendments as the rules of grammar may require shall also be made." 9. As a result of Section 29, the provision that every Department Shall have a Head was done away with, instead the result was that each Department would have a chairman who must be a Professor. In other respects Statute 8 remained the same as a result whereof the duties, functions and terms and conditions of appointment were, as before, to be prescribed by the Ordinances. Clause 4 of Chapter II of the Ordinances (Academic) was consequently amended. It made substantial changes providing for the term of five years for a Chairman and also laying down the cycle of rotation. By the cycle of rotation all those Heads/Chairmen who had completed five years on 13th June, 1984 ceased to be the Chairman. In their places new appointments were made by the Vice-Chancellor. 10. Since the petitioner. Prof. K.A. Nizami, had completed more than five years, he also ceased to be the Chairman of the Department of History and in his place another Professor of the University was appointed as Head. 11. In their places new appointments were made by the Vice-Chancellor. 10. Since the petitioner. Prof. K.A. Nizami, had completed more than five years, he also ceased to be the Chairman of the Department of History and in his place another Professor of the University was appointed as Head. 11. It was by the change brought about as a result of the promulgation of clause 4 of Chapter II that the petitioner felt aggrieved. The learned counsel, Sri S.S. Bhatnagar. appearing for him contended that only the nomenclature of the Head was changed to Chairman. Due to this change in the nomenclature brought about by the Amending Act, the Legislature in order to obviate the difficulty and to clear confusion provided by making Sub-section (3) of Section 22 that all those Heads working on the date of the commencement of the Amending Act would continue to work as Chairmen. The petitioner's interpretation of the Sub-section (3) was that he was entitled to continue till completion of his full tenure. 12. We do not find any merit in this submission of the petitioner's learned counsel. Section 22 has been given the heading of "transitional provision". A reading of the three Sub-sections of Section 22 would indicate that this was enacted to meet the situation which had to crop up immediately on commencement of the Amending Act. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 22 specifically provided that until the Court or the Executive Council, as amended by the Amending Act, was not constituted, the old Board and the Executive Committee in existence at the time of the commencement of the Amending Act would continue to function Similar provision was made with regard to Chancellor and the Pro - Chancellor inasmuch as the changes in the method and manner of their appointments had also been brought by the Amending Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 22 directed that the person holding any Such office immediately before such commencement Shall continue to hold that office until his successor enters upon his office. Sub-section (2) of Section 22 directed that the person holding any Such office immediately before such commencement Shall continue to hold that office until his successor enters upon his office. 13 Sub-section (3) of Section 22, if it is read in the context of what was said in Sub-section (2), no doubt would be left in its interpretation which was necessarily to be that the Heads of the Departments holding office immediately before commencement of this Act were permitted t. continue as Chairman by the same term and upon the same terms and conditions as they held it immediately before such Commencement. This provision was enacted to meet the vacuum which had come into existence due to the abolition of the Heads of the Departments and creation of the new office by the name of Chairman. In Clause 4 of the Chapter II of the Ordinances till the date of Commencement of the Act, the terms and conditions were only in respect of the Heads of the Departments. The question could also arise about the terms and conditions of the Chairmen who were allowed to work for a short period till new arrangements were not made. It was with that view that Sub-section (3) of Section 22 provided Heads to hold the respective offices by the same tenure and upon the same terms and conditions as they held it immediately before such commencement. 14. Much emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the use of term 'tenure'. He urged that his tenner since as Head of the Department was 60 years, he was entitled to continue upto the age of sixty years as Chairman. This does not appear to us to be correct. The expression "tenure" following the word 'same' means that the tenure would remain uncharged in character. Earlier the tenure was upto the age of sixty years. The object of saying the same tenure was that it could not extend beyond Sixty years. It did not mean that irrespective of the changes brought about by the Executive Council by framing new Ordinances that such a Head who had become a Chairman would be entitled to continue till he attained the age of superannuation. If the word "tenure" is understood by taking into account the context as well, no doubt would be left about its interpretation. 15. If the word "tenure" is understood by taking into account the context as well, no doubt would be left about its interpretation. 15. In Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U. S. 1 at page 232 remarked dealing with a similar argument that one half the doubts in life arise from the defect of the language. To the similar effect is the observation made in Margan v. Johns, (1973) Lofft 160. Mensfield C.J. observed : "Most of the disputes in the world arise Iron words." 16. The petitioner is straining the language beyond its scope by submitting that a Head on becoming a Chairman on the the Amending Act would continue until the age of superannuation. Literalness may strangle meaning. Doubtless; said Cave, J, "no form of words has ever yet been formed by human ingenuity with regard to which some ingenious counsel could not suggest a difficulty. 17. In connection with the interpretation of Sub-section (3) of Section 22, reference may be made again to its marginal or head note, K.P. Varghesa v. I.T. Officer, AIR 1981 SC page 1922 the Supreme Court has dealt with the utility of referring the marginal note by saying that it can certainly be relied upon as indicating drift of the section. It Bushell v. Hammod, (1904) 2 KB 563, Collins M.R. has said that a marginal head-note shows us that question it is dealing with. 18. A transitional provision is made or enacted with a view to meet certain contingency Situations which are to be attended to by the Parliament so that difficulties do not crop up in the implementation of the amendments or the changes. Transitional provision has a short life. It is meant to provide for passing phenomenon. If this is kept in view the only interpretation possible in which we have given above. To accept the argument of the petitioner's learned counsel would mean that Section 22, instead of being a transitional provision will acquire status of a substantive section creating right in favour of the Heads who had eased to function on account of the new office being created. 19. To accept the argument of the petitioner's learned counsel would mean that Section 22, instead of being a transitional provision will acquire status of a substantive section creating right in favour of the Heads who had eased to function on account of the new office being created. 19. To support his argument further about interpretation of Sub-section (3) of Section 22, the learned counsel pointed out that since there is no provision dealing with cessation of the Heads of the Departments, the right of a Head of to continue as Chairman on the commencement of the new Act till he attained the age of superannuation must be conceded to. We are unable to accept this submission. It may be true that the word "cease" has not been used in Sub-section (3) but seeing the provision as a whole and taking into account the context, one has to find that cessation took place automatically on the commencement of the Amending Act. The office of the Head of the Department was extinguished. As a result of extinction, the person, holding the office of the Head, ceased to occupy the same. The absence of the word "cease" will not change the interpretation of the Sub-section (J) of Section 22. The interpretation of the petitioner's learned counsel would paralyse the purpose of the Amending Section 21 and would further result in taking away the power of the Executive Council to lay down terms and conditions of service by framing ordinances. 20. Learned Counsel next urged that if the petitioner is not permitted to hold the office of the Chairman till he attains the age of superannuation, it would result in his removal. We find it difficult to accept this submission. The counsel had in that connection referred to clause 4 of Chapter II of the Ordinances and urged that as the petitioner was directed to cease as Chairman, the same resulted in removing him. This takes us to consider the question about the power of the Executive Council to change the Ordinances in respect of the terms and conditions of the teachers. Statute 8 had authorised the Executive Council to lay down or prescribe the terms and conditions. This takes us to consider the question about the power of the Executive Council to change the Ordinances in respect of the terms and conditions of the teachers. Statute 8 had authorised the Executive Council to lay down or prescribe the terms and conditions. In exercise of this power that clause 4 was framed by means of resolution passed on 31st March, 1984 and was given effect to from the 13th June The powers of the Executive Council to lay down terms and conditions are very vide. The ordinances making power is legislative in character. The Ordinances should not be either in conflict with the Statute or the provisions of the Act. In Gyanendra Kumar v. University of Allahabad, AIR 1963 All 596 , a learned Single Judge of this Court observed : "The function of the Executive Council under Sub-section (1) of Section 33 is Legislative in character." 21. The word condition has three meanings. The first is the proper meaning. The first meaning given in the Oxford English Dictionary is "something demanded or required as a prerequisite to the granting or performance of something else". The second meaning is a provision or stipulation - it simply means the terms of the contract. And the third meaning is given by lawyers as a terms of art. A "condition" in this sense is a stipulation for a contract which carries with it this consequence, 22. In exercise of the said power, the Executive Council amended clause 4 of Chapter II. Being fully in accordance with Statute 8 and the provisions of the Amending Act, we are unable to find that it is ultra vires of either of the two. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that Clause 4 of Chapter II if is given the meaning assigned by the respondents would amount to conferring power upon the Executive Council to frame Ordinance which may have retrospective effect. He contended that such a power has - not since been given under the Aligara Muslim University Act or the Statutes, the Ordinances could not be applied to a person like the petitioner. It will apply to Chairmen who are appointed after the enforcement of Clause 4 of Chapter II. The submission is not correct. 24. In Craise on Statute Law page 387, 1971 Edn. It will apply to Chairmen who are appointed after the enforcement of Clause 4 of Chapter II. The submission is not correct. 24. In Craise on Statute Law page 387, 1971 Edn. dealing with retrospective enactments, it has been said : "The Statute is to be deemed to be retrospective, which takes away or impairs in vested right acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past. But a Statute is not properly called a retrospective statute becomes a part of requisites for its action is done from some antecedent to its passing." 25. With regard to the admissibility or desirability of construing marginal note, Cross in his book on Statutory Interpretation, 1976 Edn. observed :- "No Judge can be expected to treat something which is before his eyes as though it was not there. In the words of UPJOHN, L.J." While the marginal note to a section cannot control the language used in the section, it is at least permissible to approach a consideration of its general purpose and the mischief at which it is aimed with the note in mind. Finally Lord Reid's remarks in Chandler v. Director of Public Prosecutions must be read in the light of his subsequent remarks in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Schildkamp, (1971) A.C.1). 26. In Special Appeal No 176 of 1975, Dr. Anandjee v. Dr. K.L. Shri Mali and others, a Division Bench of this Court was called upon to consider a similar argument raised with regard to retrospectivity of Statute 25 (4) by which the period of Headship of Benaras Hindu University was reduced. The Division Bench in its decision on 22-4-1976 observed : "We are also not satisfied that Statute 25 (4) has been applied retrospectively in the case of the appellant. None of his rights prior to the coming into force of Statute 25 (4) has been affected by the said statute. There is a marked distinction between an "existing Right" and a "Vested right '. The appellant at best on tho date when Statute 25 (a) came into force bad an existing right to continue as Head of Department till that appointment was terminated according to law. There is a marked distinction between an "existing Right" and a "Vested right '. The appellant at best on tho date when Statute 25 (a) came into force bad an existing right to continue as Head of Department till that appointment was terminated according to law. Where t e Statute operates in future it cannot be said to be retrospective merely because within the sweep of its operation all existing rights are included. (See Trimbak v. Assaram, AIR 1966 SC 1758 para 9). The second Submission also, therefore, fails." 27. In Trimbak Damodhar Rajpurkar v. Assaram Hiraram Patil and others, AIR 1966 SC 1758 , the Supreme Court held : "In this connection it is relevant to distinguish between an existing right and a vested right Where a Statute operates in future it cannot be said to be retrospective merely because within the sweep of its operation all existing right are included. As observed by Buckley, L.J. in West v. Gwynne, 1911-2 Ch. 1 at pp. 11, 12 retrospective operation is one matter and interference with existing rights is another." 28. As a matter of fact the system of rotation of the Headship existed in the Aligarh Muslim University from 1951 to 1965 At present also, this system exists in some other Universities including Jawahar Lal Nehru University, Delhi University and Allahabad University The suggestion of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that new system brought about would result in vide spread frustration This, according to the learned counsel was also not going to serve any purpose Often, the Courts have no Satisfactory and effective means to decide which alternative, either of the computing ones, is the best in the circumstances of the given case. We do not moan to suggest that every question of policy is outside the scope of the Judicial review. But in the instant case, we could not be shown anything which could lend us to hold that it was either arbitrary or mala fide invented with a view to benefit so no person and to harm others. 29. Wo have already dealt with the clause 4 of Chapter II of tho Ordinances (Academic). These Ordinances were framed by the Executive Council in exercise of the power conferred of clauses (k) and (p) of Section 29 of the Aligarh Muslim University Act. 29. Wo have already dealt with the clause 4 of Chapter II of tho Ordinances (Academic). These Ordinances were framed by the Executive Council in exercise of the power conferred of clauses (k) and (p) of Section 29 of the Aligarh Muslim University Act. These provisions enabled the Executive Council to frame Ordinances laying down the terms and conditions of service. The provision relating to rotation is covered by the Ordinances making power. It is a matter dealing with the terms and conditions. This argument can also be supplied in support of the conclusion that Section 22 (3) had a limited scope meant for the short period till new Ordinances were not framed. Terms and Conditions, the Parliament did not want to lay down and the same had been left to the Ordinances framing power of the Executive Council. For the short period that was likely to be taken in framing the Statutes that Sub-section (3) of Section 22 had been enacted. It was for this reason that the Parliament did not take upon itself, which it could, the job of laying down the terms and conditions and providing for rotation etc. This was left for the Executive Council. 30. Since the petitioner's terms and conditions of service were liable to be changed or modified he did not have any vested right. Consequently, the submission of the petitioner's learned counsel that Ordinance No. 4 cannot affect the same is untenable. A Statute is said to be retrospective, which takes away or impairs any vested right under the existing law In this case, we have shown above, that the petitioner did not have and Such right. His entitlement to continue as a Head of the Department was subject to codification and changes which could be made by the Ordinances. It is settled that existing rights can be taken away and to do so would not bring in the rule of retrospectivity. 31. For what we have said above, we do not find any merit in these writ petitions and dismiss the same. The stay orders in both the cases are hereby discharged. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own Costs.