JUDGMENT V.K. Mehtrotra, J. - Nehtaur in District Bijnor, has a Municipal Board which was superseded by the State of U.P. in the year 1976. That supersession still continues. District Magistrate, Bijnor was appointed Administrator of the Board under the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act. The Nehtaur Municipal Board was charging toll tax. In the year 1980, it was proposed that the toll tax be abolished and be replaced by Octori duty. The proposal, along with the draft bye laws, was published in a daily newspaper `Rashtra Vedana' on January 11, 1980, Vyapar Mandal society Nehtaur. which claims to be looking after the interest of all the traders of Nehtaur town, filed an objection on January 21, 1980 to the proposal. On March 10, notice was issued to it by the Executive Officer of the Municipal Board saying that the objection would be heard on March 12, 1980. According to the society, which has approached this court as petitioner in the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the objection was not considered and without regard to the provisions of sections 131 to 133 of the Act proposed rules were published in the U. P. Gazette on June 18, 1983. This became known to the Society on July 16, 1983, which again filed an objection on July 30, 1983. Even these objections could not be considered and without following strictly the procedure contemplated by the provisions of Section 134 a final notification imposing octroi duty was published in the U.P. Gazette on October 8, 1983. Aggrieved, the petitioner came to this Court and filed the petition on October 22, 1983 challenging the levy. Accompanying the petition was an application for interim protection. This application was directed to come up for orders on November 21, 1983 because the Municipal Board, which the petitioner was required to serve, put in appearance and filed a counter affidavit in pursuance of the notice served upon it. The prayer for stay was considered on November 23, 1983. This Court directed that the impugned notification published in the U. P. Gazette dated October 8, 1983 shall not be given effect to. It. however, left it to the Municipal Board to impose octroi duty afresh in accordance with law. Parties exchanged further affidavit thereafter. 2. The petitioner says that the interim order of this Court was disregarded. This Court directed that the impugned notification published in the U. P. Gazette dated October 8, 1983 shall not be given effect to. It. however, left it to the Municipal Board to impose octroi duty afresh in accordance with law. Parties exchanged further affidavit thereafter. 2. The petitioner says that the interim order of this Court was disregarded. It, therefore, moved on application for punishing the respondents for committing breach of the interim order. That application is Contempt Case No. 167 of 1984. Another application of the petitioner with the same prayer is Contempt Case No. 193 of 1984. According to the petitioner, the breach of the order of this court by the respondents was deliberate and they deserved to be punished for having committed contempt of this Court. The petitioner says that the respondent board is not entitled to be heard in defence of the levy of octroi in the present petition as it has not purged itself of that contempt. The respondents say that they have not committed any contempt and had made realisation of octroi only during the period when no interim order was in operation. They say that the objection that they should not be heard is not sustainable. We shall advert to this a little later. 3. From the affidavit exchanged between the parties and the documents filed therewith it appears that on January 5, 1982 the district Magistrate, Bijnor made an inspection of the Municipal Board. He felt that the imposition of octroi did not follow the pattern of model bye laws made by the State Government. He therefore, directed that fresh proposals be prepared in accordance with the model bye laws. On March 26, 1982 fresh proposals were prepared and submitted to the Officer-In- charge/Administrator of the Board. The Officer-In-charge signed it on March 27 and thereafter on March 31, 1982, the Administrator accepted the proposal under a special resolution. All this is contained in annexure S. A 5 to the supplementary affidavit sworn by Sri Nasim lqbal, executive officer of the Board, on December 1. 1983. This was followed by publication of the proposals in the daily newspaper `Rashtra Vedana' of July 29, 1982. The publication so made is annexure SA I to the same affidavit. All this is contained in annexure S. A 5 to the supplementary affidavit sworn by Sri Nasim lqbal, executive officer of the Board, on December 1. 1983. This was followed by publication of the proposals in the daily newspaper `Rashtra Vedana' of July 29, 1982. The publication so made is annexure SA I to the same affidavit. It recites that the earlier proposals framed on January 11, 1980 were turned down by the Administrator as they were inconsistent with the model bye laws and fresh proposals that were prepared were being published inviting objections within 15 days of the date of publication. No objections were filed within this period. 4. On August 31, 1982 a special resolution under section 132(1) of the Act adopted in respect of these proposals was submitted to the Prescribed Authority namely, the Divisional Commissioner Muradabad Division for directing its publication under section 133 121 of the Act. Annexure S. A6 to the same affidavit is that communication. 5. From annexure 7 to the writ petition it appears that the State Government had directed, on September 9, 1982 the Municipal Boards that proposals for imposition of a new tax or increase in the rates of an existing tax should not be undertaken in view of the elections to Local Bodies which were likely to be held soon. The direction was operative till March 20,1983. On March 21, 1983 relaxation was made by the State Government in view of poor financial condition of Local Bodies. This appears from annexure' CA II to the Counter Affidavit sworn on November 20, 1983 by Hare Krishan Paliwal. On May 31. 1983 the Administrator of Nehtaur Municipal Board wrote to the Commissioner through Annexure SA IV to the counter affidavit of Naseem Igbal requesting him to direct publication of the proposal submitted to him earlier. On June 18, 1983, the proposal was published by the Commissioner in the U.P. Gazette inviting objection within a month. A copy of the publication in annexure `4' to the writ petition. On July 29, the Administrator passed a special resolution under section 134(2) of the Act saying that the octroi duty will be imposed with effect from the date of its publication in the official Gazette. A copy of this resolution is annexure `1' to the second supplementary counter affidavit sworn by Wasiddin on behalf of the Board. On July 29, the Administrator passed a special resolution under section 134(2) of the Act saying that the octroi duty will be imposed with effect from the date of its publication in the official Gazette. A copy of this resolution is annexure `1' to the second supplementary counter affidavit sworn by Wasiddin on behalf of the Board. On August 17, 1983 this resolution of July 29 was forwarded to the Commissioner for publication and, as noticed earlier, the proposal was finally published in the Official Gazette on October 8, 1983. We have heard Sri Rishi Ram for the petitioner and Sri S.C. Budhwar for the Municipal Board at some length in this case. Before noticing the submissions made by them on the merits of the petition we would first deal with the plea that the respondent board was not entitled to be heard by us for so long as it did not purge itself of contempt. 6. Sri Rishiram has put his objection thus. On November 23, 1983 this Court, after considering the detailed facts stated in the affidavit exchanged between the parties till then and hearing counsel for both the parties, passed an interim order saying that though it will be open to the respondents to impose octroi duty fresh in accordance with law, they shall not give effect to the notification levying octroi published in the U.P. Gazette dated October 8, 1983. On December 2, 1983 an application was made by the Municipal Board to recall this order. On January 18, 1984 Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.N. Sapru, who had passed the earlier interim order, said that the petition itself may be heard finally on merits. He did not vacate or modify the interim order. On March, 30, 1984 the petition was dismissed for want of prosecution but this Court did not say anything specifically about the continuance or otherwise of the interim order. The petitioner made an application on April 3, 1984 for recalling the order of dismissal and on April 19, 1984 the application was allowed. The writ petition was restored to its original number. On May 1 and 2, 1984 the petitioners' representatives met the Prabhari Adhikari and the Executive Officer of the Board asking them not to charge octroi duty as there was an interim order operating in the case. Yet, octroi duty was realised by the Board between May, 6 and 16, 1984. The writ petition was restored to its original number. On May 1 and 2, 1984 the petitioners' representatives met the Prabhari Adhikari and the Executive Officer of the Board asking them not to charge octroi duty as there was an interim order operating in the case. Yet, octroi duty was realised by the Board between May, 6 and 16, 1984. The application registered as contempt case No. 167 of 1984 was then filed by the petitioner for punishing H.K. Paliwal, the Officer-In-charge and the Executive Officer and on May 31, 1984 another application was made for taking action for contempt as the respondent was persisting in its action. This was registered as contempt case No. 193 of 1984. Charge was framed by this Court against the Officer-In-charge on August 14, 1984 and on August 30, 1984 notice was also issued to the Board to show cause why it should not be punished for committing contempt of this Court. On October 10, 1984, three weeks' time, as prayed by the counsel for the respondents was allowed to them for filing counter affidavit. No counter affidavit was filed in contempt case No. 193 though it was filed in Case No. 167 of 1984 earlier on May 1, 1985 after the petitioner had made an application in the present writ petition on April 25, 1985 that the respondents should not be heard by this Court in the writ petition as they were in contempt. A reply was filed to this application on May 7, 1985 in paragraph 12 whereof it was incorrectly alleged that the counter-affidavit had been filed in contempt case No. 193 of 1984 which was referred to in paragraph 2 of the affidavit of the petitioner filed in support of its application. The counsel for the Board, however, clarified that the reference to the counter-affidavit in paragraph 12 of the reply was to the counter-affidavit filed in contempt case No. 167 of 1984. 7. The counsel for the Board, however, clarified that the reference to the counter-affidavit in paragraph 12 of the reply was to the counter-affidavit filed in contempt case No. 167 of 1984. 7. The plea made by Sri Rishi Ram is that, inasmuch as, the facts stated in the affidavit filed in contempt case No. 193 of 1984, in which alone notice had been issued to the Municipal Board, have remained uncontroverted as the Board had not filed any counter-affidavit therein, this Court should take the view that the respondents were in contempt and should not hear them on the merits of the petition until they purge themselves of contempt. It is urged that the injunction of this Court contained in its order of November 23, 1983 was in the nature of mandamus saying that the respondents will not give effect to the notification published on October 8, 1983. This direction could not be ignored by the respondents during the period that the order dated March 30, 1984, dismissing the petition for want of prosecution was in operation even though on April 19, 1984 when the writ petition was restored to its original number no specific order restoring the interim order dated November 23, 1983 was passed. 8. In M. G. Gupta v. Agra University, AIR 1974 All 39 petitioner Madan Gopal had filed an application in a writ petition filed in this Court by him challenging some resolutions of the Executive Council of the Agra University seeking the striking out of the defence of the University. This was on the ground that the University was persisting in placing reliance upon its resolutions dated October 1, 1971 in respect whereof notice had been issued to some members of the Executive Committee for having committed, contempt of this Court. Those members had submitted unqualified apology on the basis whereof the notices issued to them were discharged by this Court. The argument on behalf of the petitioner-Gupta, was that the respondent University was not entitled to be heard on account of its persistent reliance upon that resolution. Those members had submitted unqualified apology on the basis whereof the notices issued to them were discharged by this Court. The argument on behalf of the petitioner-Gupta, was that the respondent University was not entitled to be heard on account of its persistent reliance upon that resolution. This Court, after considering a large number of authorities, including the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Hadkinson v. Hadkinson, (1952) 2 All ER 567, came to the conclusion, while rejecting the application of Gupta, that "denial of hearing to a party in contempt is an extreme penalty which is enforced only in those cases where an act of a party in contempt impedes the course of justice or that justice in the cause cannot be done without compliance of the Court's order" and further that where the party in contempt purges its contempt by obeying the orders of the Court or by undergoing the penalty imposed by the Court, the party should not be denied hearing. This Court noticed the fact that no order of conviction had been passed against the alleged contemners nor did they persist with the contemptuous act. 9. Without going into the question whether the interim order dated November 23, 1983 of this Court automatically revived after the dismissal of the writ petition had been set aside and it was restored to its original number on April 19, 1984 in respect whereof reliance has been placed by Sri Rishi Ram on a Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of N.R. Reddy v. N.P. Reddy, AIR 1978 Andh Pra 30 and Sri Budhwar on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Abdul Hamid v. Karim Bux, AIR 1973 All 67 and Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow v. Ved Prakash, AIR 1976 All 264 , we may observe that, admittedly, no order has yet been passed by this Court holding the contesting respondents in the present writ petition to be guilty of having committed contempt of this Court. Besides, it has been asserted in the counter affidavit, sworn by Mohammad Tayyab on behalf of Nagar Palika, Nehtaur in the application filed by the petitioner with the prayer that the Nagar Palika should not be heard in this case until it is purged of the contempt, that it copy of the stay order was served on the Nagar Palika on November 24/25, 1983 whereafter the recovery of Octroi Duty was stayed. The writ petition was dismissed on March 30, 1984 and a copy of the order restoring it to its original number was served by the petitioner along with a letter on May 2, 1984. This letter was placed before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in the evening that day and immediate orders were passed by him for staying the recovery of the Octroi Duty. On May 3, 1984 recovery of Octroi Duty was stayed. A special messenger was sent by the Nagar Palika to its counsel Sri now Mr. Justice) B. L. Yadav who was then the Chief Standing Counsel for the State of U.P. in this Court to elicit his opinion in the matter. On May 5, 1984. the opinion of Sri Yadav to the effect that the restoration of the writ petition did not have the effect of automatically reviving the stay order was sent to the Board relying upon which recovery of Octroi Duty was re-started. On May 16, 1984 a questionnaire whether the stay order dated November 23, 1983 was still in force with the reply in the affirmative obtained from this Court was filed. Recovery of octroi duty was stopped from that date. These assertions, prima facie, establish that there was no wilful disobedience on the part of the Nagar Palika of the interim order of this Court. We are lot examining the matter any further for we feel that in these circumstances it is difficult to hold that the Nagar Palika has disentitled itself to a hearing by us in this case on account of the alleged contempt committed by it. 10. It is common ground that the District Magistrate, Bijnor was the Administrator of the Board. after the supersession of Nehtaur Nagar Palika, under the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act. 10. It is common ground that the District Magistrate, Bijnor was the Administrator of the Board. after the supersession of Nehtaur Nagar Palika, under the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act. The petitioner says that to the initial publication of proposals dated January 11, 1980, which had been published in "Rashtra Vedna" by the Prahhari Adhikari who was not the Administrator, an objection was filed on January 21, 1980. These objections were never considered which was a breach of the mandatory provisions of law. But what was worse was that the proposals, which are claimed by the Nagar Palika to be fresh proposals, were never framed by the Administrator who alone was competent to do so being the Board on account of the supersession of the Board. The publication made in Rashtra Vedna on that date was by the Prabhari Adhikari. However, when we look at the publication dated July 29, 1982 (Annexure `S.A.I.' to the supplementary affidavit of Naseem Iqbal sworn on December 1, 1983) we find in the recital that the earlier proposals of January 11, 1980 were turned down by the Administrator as they were inconsistent with the model bye laws. Annexure `S. A. 5' to the same supplementary affidavit discloses that fresh proposals prepared on March 22, 1982 had been accepted by the Administrator on March 31, 1982 under a special resolution. This amounted to framing of fresh proposals by the Board through a special resolution. We find it difficult to accept the submission that apart from what was stated in Annexure 'S.A.S' any further evidence should have been produced by the Nagar Palika to establish that the initial proposal of January 11, 1980 had been dropped by the Board under the orders of the Administrator in the form of a copy of the specific order to that effect or an affidavit of the Administrator himself in these proceedings. After all, authenticity of the records of a public body, which is produced from proper custody, is not to be easily doubted. We find in S. 330 of the U. P. Municipalities Act a provision to that effect when it says that a copy of an order etc. duly certified by the Record Keeper is to be received as a prima facie evidence of its existence and shall be admitted as evidence in the matter and transactions therein recorded. We find in S. 330 of the U. P. Municipalities Act a provision to that effect when it says that a copy of an order etc. duly certified by the Record Keeper is to be received as a prima facie evidence of its existence and shall be admitted as evidence in the matter and transactions therein recorded. In the present case, copies of the proceedings have been filed on affidavit. The bald allegation that these proceedings should be treated to be prepared for the purposes of this case is sought to be established by only referring to the circumstance that they were not filed with the counter-affidavit initially filed by the Nagar Palika and that these documents have been filed with a supplementary affidavit. We would need some stronger reason to discard the documents filed by the Nagar Palika as fabricated for the purposes of the case or to accede to the submission that the circumstances of this case justify an enquiry into the genuineness of these documents and examination in Court, in that context, of the then District Magistrate Administrator of the Nagar Palika and its Prabhari Adhikari. We find no reason to take the view that documents were subsequently prepared to defeat the petitioner's case. 11. Naseem Iqbal, with whose supplementary affidavit these documents have been filed, is a responsible officer being the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika. Annexure `S. A. 4' to his affidavit is a copy of the letter sent by the District Magistrate, Bijnor (Administrator of Nehtaur Nagar Palika) and bears his signatures as do annexure `S.A. 5' and annexure `S.A. 6'. The Prabhari Adhikari of the Nagar Palika, whose signatures are also found on Annexures `S.A. 5' and `S.A. 6' is also a Sub Divisional Officer. The suggestion that these responsible officers would be a party to any subsequent preparation of documents for purposes of a particular case, in the absence of any cogent evidence on record, is only to be rejected as fanciful. We have no doubt that the subsequent proposal, which was published on July 29, 1982, was framed afresh under a special resolution by the District Magistrate, that is, the Administrator of the Board. In respect of these proposals under S. 131 of the Act a grievance is made that they were not published in accordance with law. We have no doubt that the subsequent proposal, which was published on July 29, 1982, was framed afresh under a special resolution by the District Magistrate, that is, the Administrator of the Board. In respect of these proposals under S. 131 of the Act a grievance is made that they were not published in accordance with law. It is said that S. 94 of the Act, read with Schedule III, contemplated that it should be published in the prescribed form contained in the Schedule not only in a Hindi News Paper having circulation in the area but also on the Notice Board of Nagar Palika, Nehtaur and of Collectorate, Bijnor. This is stated in paragraph 8 of the writ petition. Paragaph 6 of the c punter-affidavit sworn by the Prabhari Adhikari of the Nagar Palika, Sri H. K. Paliwal, specifically mentions that the proposals and rules etc. were published in the newspaper dated July 29, 1982 in pursuance of the provisions of S. 131 etc. and the rules were also placed on the Notice Board for information to the public at large. The Executive Officer (Sri Naseem Iqbal) of the Nagar Palika has also stated in paragraph 4 of the supplementary affidavit dated December 1, 1983 that after cancellation of the initial proposals another publication was made in the newspaper Rashtra Vedana dated July 29, 1982 and in paragraph 6 that the proposals were all published and placed on the Notice Board of the Nagar Palika. Also, that S. 131(3) read with S. 94 had not been violated. The rejoinder affidavit sworn on November 22, 1983 only re-states in paragraph 6 what had been stated in the writ petition, on the basis of record, like the statement in paragraph 8 of the writ petition. The statement in the counter- affidavit and the supplementary affidavit sworn by Sri Paliwal and Naseem Iqbal respectively is also based upon perusal of records. It is obvious that in this state of evidence it is not possible to accept the fact that publication had not been made in accordance with S. 94 read with Schedule III of the Act. 12. Even otherwise, the fact that publication of the fresh proposals was made is not in doubt. It is obvious that in this state of evidence it is not possible to accept the fact that publication had not been made in accordance with S. 94 read with Schedule III of the Act. 12. Even otherwise, the fact that publication of the fresh proposals was made is not in doubt. The copy of the publication in the Hindi newspaper is Annexure `S. A. 1.' The publication of the proposals is to be made in the manner prescribed in S. 94 by virtue of S. 131(3). What is to be published is the proposals framed under sub-section (1) and the Draft Rules framed under sub-section (2) along with a notice in the form set forth in Schedule III. Annexure S. A I' shows that the proposals as well as the Draft Rules were published in vernacular in the form contemplated by Schedule III. The requirement of S. 94(3) is that the publication is to be made in Hindi in a paper approved by the State Government and where there is no such paper, the publication is to be made by pasting upon the Notice Board of the Municipal Board office and the Collectors' office. It has not been suggested that `Rashtra Vedana' is not a paper which answers the description of a newspaper envisaged by S. 94. There is, therefore, no failure in observance of the rule relating to publication of the proposal. 13. Before us it is common ground between the parties that an objection dated July 16, 1983 to the proposed levy of octroi duty was filed under the signatures of one Sri Pradeep Kumar Jain, Advocate on July 30, 1983. The stand of the respondents is that these objections were barred by time having not been filed within a month of the publication dated June 18, 1983 and were rejected as such by the Commissioner. `What has been urged by Sri Rishi Ram on behalf of the petitioner is that after the publication on July 29, 1983 an objection was admittedly filed on July 30,1983. It should have been considered on merits. Reliance has been placed by him in particular upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Tharoo Mal v. Puran Chand Pandey, AIR 1978 SC 306 : 1978 All LJ 25. In that case, the levy under challenge was of Theatre Tax by Municipal Board, Pilibhit. It should have been considered on merits. Reliance has been placed by him in particular upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Tharoo Mal v. Puran Chand Pandey, AIR 1978 SC 306 : 1978 All LJ 25. In that case, the levy under challenge was of Theatre Tax by Municipal Board, Pilibhit. Tharoo Mal, the appellant before the Supreme Court, was partner in a firm carrying on the business of running a cinema house called `Jai Talkies'. He had not filed any objection to the proposals initially made which were submitted to the Prescribed Authority, that is, Commissioner of Rohilkhand Division under S. 132(4). It was proposed to levy the tax at the rate of Rs. 25/- per show. The Commissioner felt that the rate was too high. He returned the proposals to the Board which then reduced the tax to Rs. 15/- per show. 14. A proviso was added to S. 132(2) by U.P. Act No. 27 of 1984. Under it the revised proposals are not to be published in case the rate of tax is reduced. The Board did not publish the proposal to reduce the rates. However, on September 16, after the reduction of the rates on August 28, 1972, owners of Bome cinema houses, including Tharoo Mal, sent objections to the imposition of any theatre tax at all. These proposals were not forwarded to the Prescribed Authority by the Board when it sent the revised proposals to the Prescribed Authority on September 18, 1972. The Prescribed Authority sanctioned the modified proposal on October 31. Ultimately after publication of the draft rules on November 18, 1972 inviting objections thereto within 30 days, the rules were sanctioned under S. 134 and tax was imposed with effect from April 16, 1973 after a Gazette notification made on April 14, 1972. The Prescribed Authority sanctioned the modified proposal on October 31. Ultimately after publication of the draft rules on November 18, 1972 inviting objections thereto within 30 days, the rules were sanctioned under S. 134 and tax was imposed with effect from April 16, 1973 after a Gazette notification made on April 14, 1972. The Supreme Court, in effect, negatived the submission that the objection dated September 16, 1972 should have been forwarded to the Prescribed Authority and should have been considered by it by holding that the failure on the part of the Board to sent the objection to the Prescribed Authority would not invalidate the imposition of reduced tax but it observed that on its wide language S. 132(4) would cover any objection whether made within a fortnight or beyond a fortnight, provided they are sent in before the matter is submitted before the Prescribed Authority and that there was no statutory bar against the Prescribed Authority itself considering the objections which may be filed before it if the interest of justice so requires. 15. In the present case, we find it stated in paragraphs 9, 10 and 12 of the writ petition that the objections filed by the petitioners on July 30, 1983 had not been considered. In the counter-affidavit sworn by Paliwal, however, it has been stated in paragraph 6 that the objection was time barred and was otherwise not tenable and. as such, it was dismissed by the Commissioner. Further, that the draft proposals had been approved after considering the time barred objections of the petitioner dated July 30, 1983 by the Commissioner. The so called discrepancy between this statement and the assertion contained in paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit sworn by Naseem Iqbal, where it has been stated, inter alia, that, " ...............time barred objections were filed in the office of the Commissioner which were dismissed as time barred .................." is of no real consequences because the clear stand of the respondents appears to be that the objections were time barred and they were dismissed on consideration by the Commissioner. We may also add that even assuming that these objections were not considered on merits on the ground that they had not been filed within time, such non- consideration will not vitiate the levy in view of what has been observed by the Supreme Court in Tharoo Mal's case (1978 All U 25). 16. We may also add that even assuming that these objections were not considered on merits on the ground that they had not been filed within time, such non- consideration will not vitiate the levy in view of what has been observed by the Supreme Court in Tharoo Mal's case (1978 All U 25). 16. Sri Rishi Ram pointed out that there was variance in rates of octroi duty chargeable on certain items as given out in the publication made in `Rashtra Vedana' of July 29, 1982 and the Gazette publication dated October 8, 1983. Our attention was invited in particular to the disparity evidenced by omission of any rates in the `Rashtra Vedana' in regard to item No. 15 at page 4 and items Nos. 2 and 5 at pages ,5 and 6 in respect whereof rates were published in the Gazette notification. Counsel for the respondent Board has pointed out that it was a printing error in 'Rashtra Vedana'. We have no reason to doubt this stand of the respondent Board. More so, because July 29 publication was the initial publication and sub-section (2) of S. 132 would not be attracted to it. The rates in respect of these items which are being enforced are admittedly those which were mentioned in the publication of June 18, 1983 and as stated in paragraph 6 of the counter- affidavit of Paliwal, the proposals as initially enforced were published on the Notice Board. We may observe that in annexure 3 to the writ petition, which is a copy of the objection filed on July 30. 1983 in respect of the publication dated June 18, 1983, there is no objection to the effect that proposed rates in respect of some items were not disclosed by the Board. 17. At item No. 11 of category V (that is, Matter in vernacular hence not printed (Ed.)) the rate is mentioned at Rs. 20/- per quintal. It has been stated by Sri S. C. Budhwar on behalf of the respondent Board that it is a misprint for Rs. 2/- per quintal which is the actual rate and which alone would be enforced under the impugned notification. In view of this statement we have no doubt that the Board would not charge octroi duty at a rate in excess of Rs. 2/- per quintal which is the actual rate and which alone would be enforced under the impugned notification. In view of this statement we have no doubt that the Board would not charge octroi duty at a rate in excess of Rs. 2/- per quintal in regard to this item for so long as the notification of October 8. 1983 is the basis for realisation of octroi duty thereon. In our opinion, the levy cannot be said to be vitiated on account of this printing error. 18. Counsel for the petitioner says that no resolution under S. 134(2) was passed by the Board and that in case the resolution dated July 29, 1983 (part of annexure `II' S. C. I to the second supplementary counter-affidavit sworn by Wasiuddin on behalf of the Board on December 19, 1984) is treated to be such a resolution, it was invalid because it did not mention a specific date with effect from which tax was being imposed. 19. Annexure `II S. C. I.' is a copy of the letter dated August 17, 1983 sent by the Officer- in-charge, Nagarpalika, Nehtaur to the Commissioner, Moradabad Division, Moradabad. It has been mentioned in it that no objection had been received to the publication made in the Gazette dated June 18, 1983. Since publication under S. 134(2) was to be made, necessary documents including six copies of the special resolution of the Board were being sent with the request that after his sanction the Prescribed Authority may get it published in the Gazette. The copy of the special resolution which forms part of this annexure, mentions that the date of publication of the rules etc. in the Gazette is fixed as the date with effect from which the duty was being levied. The argument is that the statement in this resolution that imposition shall be with effect from the date of publication is not sufficient compliance of the provisions of S. 134(2) of the Act. 20. Section 134 is in these terms : "134. Resolution of board directing imposition of tax.- (1) When the proposals have been sanctioned by the Prescribed Authority or the State Government, the State Government after taking into consideration the draft rules submitted by the board, shall proceed forthwith to make under S. 296 such rules in respect of the tax as for the time being it considers necessary. Resolution of board directing imposition of tax.- (1) When the proposals have been sanctioned by the Prescribed Authority or the State Government, the State Government after taking into consideration the draft rules submitted by the board, shall proceed forthwith to make under S. 296 such rules in respect of the tax as for the time being it considers necessary. (2) When the rules have been made, the order of sanction and a copy of the rules shall be sent to the board, and thereupon the board shall by special resolution direct the imposition of the tax with effect from a date to be specified in the resolution." 21. In Zila Parishad, Moradabad v. Kundan Sugar Mills, AIR 1968 SC 98 , the Supreme Court was called upon to examine the validity of the circumstances and property tax by the erstwhile District Board of Moradabad. S. 119 of the U. P. District Boards Act, 1922, which was akin to S. 134(2) of the U.P. Municipalities Act contemplated that "upon receipt of the copy of the rules sent under the preceding section, the board shall by special resolution direct the imposition of the tax with effect from a date (to be specified in the resolution) not less than six weeks from the date of such resolution." This Court had allowed the writ petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the Zila Parishad. It was found that no resolution under S. 119 had been passed. Yet, the levy of the tax was sought to be justified on the ground of procedure adopted being in accordance with law on account of sub-section (3) of S. 120 of the U. P. District Boards Act which was akin to S. 135(3) of the U. P. Municipalities Act and which made issuance of a notification under sub-section (2) to be conclusive proof of the fact that the tax had been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 22. The Supreme Court decision does not assist the petitioner in the present case where a special resolution under S. 134(2) is found to have been adopted. The object of such a resolution is only to make definite the date from which levy would stand imposed. 22. The Supreme Court decision does not assist the petitioner in the present case where a special resolution under S. 134(2) is found to have been adopted. The object of such a resolution is only to make definite the date from which levy would stand imposed. The fact that the duty would stand imposed with effect from the date that the draft rules are finally published in the Gazette which finds a mention in the special resolution adopted under S. 134(2), makes the imposition operative from a definite point of time. It cannot be said that without mention of a specific date the imposition cannot be made definite in regard to its commencement. No decision was brought to our notice in which it may have been held that non-mention of a specific date in the resolution under S. 134(2) would make the levy invalid even though the point of commencement of the levy can be definitely known having regard to the language used in the resolution. We are clearly of opinion that the language in which the resolution under S. 134(2) in the instant case is couched fulfils the object behind a resolution under S. 134(2) and the levy of octroi duty by the respondent Nagar Palika cannot be said to be contrary to law. 23. We have found that the necessary procedural steps which were imperative to be adopted were, in fact, followed by the Nehtaur Nagar Palika in the imposition of octroi duty and no legal infirmity attaches to that imposition. The petitioners have not made out a case for interference by this Court with it. 24. The writ petition fails and is dismissed but we leave the parties to bear their own costs. The interim order shall stand discharged.