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1985 DIGILAW 835 (ALL)

Brij Raj v. District Judge

1985-09-10

V.K.MEHROTRA

body1985
JUDGMENT : V.K. Mehrotra, J. In premises No. 77/8, Coolie Bazar, Kanpur, there is a one room accommodation. One Mithu Lal was its tenant. The owner of the premises is Sri Thakur Ji Maharaj Mandir Virajman, house No. 77/7 Coolie Bazar, Kanpur. Sri Mahesh Prasad is the Sarvarakar of the trust Ram Laxman Janki Temple which is the owner landlord of the premises. Mithu Lal is said to have intimated the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur that he was intending to vacate the room and that it be allotted to some one. 2. Anand Kumar, who is the second Respondent in this petition, claims that he was carrying on business in the disputed premises with Mithu Lal. He was advised to apply for allotment of the premises so that he made an. application for the purpose on December 14, 1979. On May 28, 1981, the Rent Control Inspector made a report to the effect that Mithu Lal, who was in occupation of the premises, was intending to vacate it so that a vacancy could be declared in respect thereof. In this report it is also mentioned that Anand Kumar was reported to be carrying on business with Mithu Lal in the premises in dispute. A copy of the report is annexure 4 to the petition. 3. On August 29, 1981 some applications were made for allotment in respect of the disputed premises. One such application was by Brij Raj, the Petitioner. An order of allotment was made in his favour on November 3, 1981. The case of Brij Raj is that he look possession of the accommodation in pursuance of the order of allotment. Anand Kumar, however, maintains that he continues to be in possession of the accommodation as before. 4. On coming to know about the order of allotment, two applications were made u/s 16(5) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. One was by Anand Kumar and the other by Mahesh Prasad. The grievance made in the applications was that there was in fact no vacancy or likely vacancy and that the order of allotment made without notice to them was invalid. 5. Before the aforesaid applications were heard or decided Anand Kumar and Mahesh Prasad filed two separate revisions against the order of allotment. These were Rent Revision No. 247 of 1981 and Renl Revision No. 2 of 1982. 5. Before the aforesaid applications were heard or decided Anand Kumar and Mahesh Prasad filed two separate revisions against the order of allotment. These were Rent Revision No. 247 of 1981 and Renl Revision No. 2 of 1982. These revisions were heard by the District Judge, Kanpur. They were allowed. The learned Judge was of the view that the declaration of vacancy and the order of allotment made thereafter without notice to Mahesh Prasad, who was the Sarvarakar of the Trust, was bud in law as it was in breach of Rule 8(2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules 1972. "No effort, worth the name, was made to" serve Mahesh Prasad with the notice of the proceedings and the order was passed by affixing notice on the temple premises which was improper. The learned Judge also felt that non-consideration of the application for allotment made by Anand Kumar on December 14, 1979, during the allotment proceedings, was in breach of the mandatory provision of Rule 9(3) so that the order of allotment made in favour of Brij Raj stood vitiated. Both the revisions were allowed and the matter remanded to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to re-determine the vacancy after giving opportunity to the landlord and in case the vacancy was found to exist, to reconsider the question of allotment where the applications of Anand Kumar and Brij Raj were to be taken into consideration. This order was passed on August 2, 1982. Brij Raj thereafter filed the present writ petition in this Court for relief. 6. Sri V.P. Misra has appeared for Petitioner Brit Raj. His submission is that the learned District Judge was in error in treating the application dated December 14, 1979 of Anand Kumar as a pending application of which consideration was necessary. According to his submission, the application was not got renewed by Anand Kumar in accordance with Rule 10(4). It ceased to be a pending application. 7. In regard to the case of the landlord, the submission of Sri Misra is that the learned District Judge was in error in holding that service by affixation was insufficient without going into the matter further and finding out whether the necessary conditions for affixation of the notice had been made out. It ceased to be a pending application. 7. In regard to the case of the landlord, the submission of Sri Misra is that the learned District Judge was in error in holding that service by affixation was insufficient without going into the matter further and finding out whether the necessary conditions for affixation of the notice had been made out. The argument also is that a power of attorney had been executed by Mahesh Prasad in favour of Dwarika Prasad Shastri who lived at the temple itself. When the notice remained unserved at the temple, affixation thereof was the proper mode of service and it was not necessary that the notice should have been sent to Mahesh Prasad at his residential address in Unnao as was considered necessary by the learned District Judge. 8. Sri P.K. Sinha, has appeared on behalf of Anand Kumar and Mahesh Prasad. He has urged that it was not necessary for Anand Kumar to get the application made by him renewed after the expiry of the year 1979 as action appears to have been taken thereon before the expiry of the year. Such an application did not require renewal under Rule 10(4). As far as the case of the landlord is concerned, the submission of Sri Sinha is that the service of notice by affixation is to be made as a matter of last resort as contemplated by Rule 28 and in absence of necessary finding having been recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer justifying the service by affixation, the view taken by the learned District Judge was unexceptional. 9. Counsel for both the parties have placed reliance on some decisions of this Court on the question whether the application for allotment made by Anand Kumar on December 14, 1979 could be treated to be a pending application without its renewal having been sought by him by January 15, 1980. It is, however, not necessary to notice these authorities for there is no doubt that where an application is such which has not been rejected as not maintainable, and in respect whereof some proceeding was taken before the expiry of the year in which it was made, no renewal was called for before treating it to be a subsisting application. It is, however, not necessary to notice these authorities for there is no doubt that where an application is such which has not been rejected as not maintainable, and in respect whereof some proceeding was taken before the expiry of the year in which it was made, no renewal was called for before treating it to be a subsisting application. What is in doubt, however, is the fact whether' the application of December 14, 1979 made by an and Kumar was an application in respect whereof no action has been taken by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer before the expiry of the year 1979. Sri V.P. Misra has urged, on the basis of the circumstances that the report of the Rent Control Inspector, annexure 4 to the writ petition, is of May 28, 1981, that no action on the application made by Anand Kumar was taken prior to that date. This circumstance by itself is, however, not conclusive of the fact that no action had been taken on the application of Anand Kumar prior to the expiry of the year 1979. May be, as urged by Sri Sinha, the report of the Inspector was made in pursuance of an order asking him to do so by the appropriate authority prior to December 31, 1979. Neither on the record of the writ petition nor in the orders passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the learned District Judge is there; any indication about the fact as to when was action commenced on the application of Anand Kumar. In the absence of any finding on this crucial fact, it would not be proper to take the view either that the application had ceased to be pending one on account of its non-renewal or that its renewal was not necessary as action had commenced on it. 10. Coming now to the case of the landlord, whose revision application was also allowed by the District Judge, it would be worth while reading Rule 28 of the Rules. That rule reads: 28. 10. Coming now to the case of the landlord, whose revision application was also allowed by the District Judge, it would be worth while reading Rule 28 of the Rules. That rule reads: 28. Service of Notice: (1) A notice issued by the District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or the appellate or revising authority under the provisions of the Act shall be served on the person concerned: (a) by giving or tendering it to such person, or his counsel, or (b) by giving or tendering it to any adult member of his family; or (c) if no such person is found, by leaving it at his last known place of abode or business or in the case of an appeal or revision at his address as given under Rule 6; or (d) if none of the means aforesaid available by affixing it on some conspicuous part of his last known place of abode or business or in the case of an appeal or revision at his address as given under Rule 6; (2) If party files a duly stamped and addressed envelope for service of any notice, then it shall be served by registered post. (3) In the case of an appeal or revision unless the Appellant has taken action under Sub-rule (2), the appellate or revising authority shall send the notices to the District Magistrate or the prescribed authority, as the case may be, for having service effected. 11. The rule permits service of notice by affixation only when a conclusion is arrived at that none of the other methods mentioned in Clauses (a) to (e) of Rule 28(1) was available for effecting service. The learned District Judge has only considered the fact that no effort appeared to have been made to affect service on the Sarvarakar Mahesh Prasad, the fact of whose residence at Unnao was known. There is nothing in the order of the District Judge to show that his attention was invited also to the fact that Dwarika Prasad who has a power of attorney in Ins favour, was available at the temple for service of notice or that affixation of notice was resorted to only when the methods provided for by Clauses (a) to (c) had not been found available to affect service on him. The fact that the service of notice was attempted to be affected at the temple (premises No. 77/7) seems to suggest that the authorities were of opinion that some one competent to receive the notice on behalf of the landlord was available at that address. 12. By his order, the District Judge has sent the matter back to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. If the application of Anand Kumar could not be treated to be pending in absence of its renewal, consideration of his application could not be directed. Likewise, if circumstances justifying service by affixation existed, the matter could not be directed to be re-heard at the instance of the landlord. Before the two revisions were finally disposed of by the learned District Judge, it was necessary for him to have gone into these aspects which lie has not done. It is, therefore necessary to require him to do so now on the basis of the material already on record of the case. 13. There is serious dispute between Anand Kumar and the Petitioner Brij Raj as to who is in actual possession over the disputed premises. Both of them are claiming to be in possession thereof. It seems desirable that when the matter is reconsidered by the learned District Judge, status quo in regard to possession over the disputed premises us obtaining today be maintained by the parties. I direct accordingly. 14. The petition is allowed the orders of the District Judge, Kanpur dated August 2, 1982 in Rent Revision No. 247 of 1981 and in Rent Revision No. 2 of 1982 are quashed. The learned District Judge is directed to restore the revisions to their original numbers and decide them afresh expeditiously in the light of the observations made above, if possible, within four months of a certified copy of this judgment being filed by either of the parties before him, after notice to them. 15. Parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.