JUDGMENT K.N. Goyal, J. - This is a landlord's writ petition arising out of his application under Section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for release of a residential building. The petitioner is a retired government officer who had purchased the building shortly before the coming into force of the said Act. The building purchased by him, according to the petitioner, consists of a ground floor and the first floor. Both were in the occupation of tenants. He has already got the ground floor accommodation vacated through similar proceedings, and thereafter he filed this petition against the opposite party who was tenant of the first floor. The date on which the petitioner obtained possession of the ground floor was 1474 while the date of this application in 5474 The petitioner has lost in both the courts. The Prescribed Authority held against the petitioner, both on the question of bona fide need and on the balance of hardship.* The District Judge, in appeal, however,, held that the need of the petitioner was bona fide but on the balance of hardship he found in favour of the opposite party. 2. During the pendency of this petition some applications have been given by both the parties for bringing on record the change in circumstances of the respective parties. 3 It has been argued, inter alia, that the learned District Judge was not justified in going into the question whether the ground floor accommodation was sufficient for the needs of the petitioner or into the question whether the hardship to the petitioner would be greater than to the opposite party. The contention of the petitioner is that under Explanation (iv) to Section 21 (1), the petitioner being in occupation of the ground floor portion, this fact should have been treated as conclusive to prove that the building is bona fide required by the landlord. Reliance has also been placed on Smt. Bimla Devi Vs. 1st Addl. District Judge ( AIR 1984 SC 1376 ) in which it has been held that the deletion of the said Explanation (iv) by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 was not retrospective but prospective. It was further held that the said explanation created a substantive right in favour of the landlord and the provision was not merely procedural. 4. District Judge ( AIR 1984 SC 1376 ) in which it has been held that the deletion of the said Explanation (iv) by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 was not retrospective but prospective. It was further held that the said explanation created a substantive right in favour of the landlord and the provision was not merely procedural. 4. Learned counsel for the opposite party has, however, contended that the very fact that the petitioner had taken possession only four days before making this application should negative the contention that he was in occupation of a part of the building. Secondly, it has been contended that there were six different flats owned by Smt. Krishna Kumari Agarwal, the original landlady who had sold four of them to different persons while she retained two with herself. Out of the said four flats two had been sold to the petitioner. On the other hand the contention of the petitioner is that there were actually three separate buildings each building consists of a ground floor portion and a first floor portion. The middle building out of these three, had been sold to the petitioner and after the petitioner came into occupation of the ground floor portion the first floor portion would be covered by the said proviso. 5. So far as the fact that the petitioner had come into possession of the ground floor only on 1474 is concerned, it cannot be said on that basis that the petitioner was not in occupation in the legal sense, of the ground floor. It is true that a mere transient or temporary possession which is expected to last only for few days may not be juridical possession. In the instant case, however, although the petitioner had come to occupy the ground floor only four days earlier, the possession of the petitioner so started cannot be said to be transient or fleeting or intended to remain in existence for a few days only. Although the petitioner was able to obtain possession of the ground floor only four days earlier he got the possession with the intention of remaining there forever and it in not disputed that he continues even till date to be in possession thereof. Although the petitioner was able to obtain possession of the ground floor only four days earlier he got the possession with the intention of remaining there forever and it in not disputed that he continues even till date to be in possession thereof. It cannot, therefore, be accepted that the possession of the petitioner over the ground floor was not, in the eye of law, his 'occupation' within the meaning of said explanation (iv). 6. On the second question, unfortunately, although there are clear pleadings in that behalf, particularly in the paras 14 and 16 of the written statement, Annexure 3, and paras 14 and 16 of the replication, annexure 2 to the writ petition, neither the Prescribed Authority nor the District Judge has cared to record a finding on the question. It would not be appropriate for this Court in writ proceedings to examine this issue of fact for the first time without the benefit of its first being examined by the courts below. As this is a most material issue, there is no option but to remand the case to the Prescribed Authority for the purpose. 7. As the matter is to go back to the Prescribed Authority, any changes in circumstances of the parties that may have taken place in the meantime may also be looked into by that authority and the parties shall be free to adduce evidence in that behalf before the Prescribed Authority. It will also 6e appropriate for the Prescribed Authority to make a local inspection of the premises in order to be able to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties. 8. In the circumstances, the writ petition is allowed and the orders of the Prescribed Authority and of the District Judge, Annexures 23 and 24, are hereby quashed. The Prescribed Authority shall readmit the case at its original number and decide it afresh in accordance with law in the light of the directions given above. As the case is very old, the parties are directed to appear before the Prescribed Authority on 4th February, 1985 for taking further orders from that court. The Prescribed Authority is expected to decide the case expeditiously. No order is made as to costs. 9. The parties shall be at liberty to apply for return of the plans that they have filed in this Court in order to have the same filed before the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority is expected to decide the case expeditiously. No order is made as to costs. 9. The parties shall be at liberty to apply for return of the plans that they have filed in this Court in order to have the same filed before the Prescribed Authority. (Petition allowed)