JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - These seven writ petitions and others raise the question of validity of enhancement of fee under Rule 13 (sic) of the U.P. Cinematograph Rules, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as `the Rules'). 2. The main contention of the petitioners in all of these cases was that as no service was being rendered to them by the State of U.P., not only the enhancement of fee made by the State Government in 1981 raising it from Rs. 1200/- to Rs. 3600/- on cinemas like that of the petitioners, but also the intitial imposition of fee was invalid. The case of the petitioners was that even if the element of quid pro quo was not necessary to be established with arithmetical exactitude, but even broadly and reasonably, no co-relationship between the fee and the services rendered to the cinema owners could be established and, as such, the enhancement of fee from Rs. 1200/- to Rs. 3600/- was illegal. 3. Apart from the aforesaid point, some other minor points have also been raised which we will deal with seriatim. 4. For resolving the controversy, brief reference to the relevant statutes may be made. In 1955, the State of U. P. passed an Act known as the U.P. Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955 (U.P. Act No. 3 of 1956), (hereinafter referred to as the 1955 Act), for regulating exhibitions by means of cinematographs in the State of U. P. Before the 1955 Act, the State of U.P. had framed Cinematograph Rules, 1951. These Rules were framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 9 of the Cinematograph Act, 1918, and by the deeming fiction enacted in Section 12 of the 1955 Act, they remain in force. 5. Section 3 provides that "save as otherwise provided in this Act" no person shall give an exhibition by means of a cinematograph elsewhere than in a place licensed under this Act or otherwise than in compliance with conditions and restrictions imposed by such licence. Section 4 constitutes District Magistrate to be the licensing authority. Section 5 lays down that the licensing authority shall not grant a licence under this Act unless the conditions mentioned in this provision were satisfied. It is for this reason that this section has been headed as "Restrictions on the powers of licensing authority". Section 4 constitutes District Magistrate to be the licensing authority. Section 5 lays down that the licensing authority shall not grant a licence under this Act unless the conditions mentioned in this provision were satisfied. It is for this reason that this section has been headed as "Restrictions on the powers of licensing authority". Section 7 provides that where a licence has been granted under Section 5 it could be cancelled or revoked in public interest. One of the grounds for revocation mentioned in Clause (c) of Sub Section II-A), read as follows:- "the licensee has been guilty of breach of the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder or of any conditions or restrictions contained in the licence, or of any direction issued under Sub-section (4) of Section 5." 6. There are many other clauses in this sub-section of Section 7. However, the details of the same are not necessary to be stated, hence we omit to do so. Section 8 deals with penalities for contravention of the provisions of the Act. By Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, the Cinematograph Act, 1918, in so far it relates to the matters other than the sanctioning of cinematograph films for exhibition, was repealed in its application by the State of U. P. However, as already stated Sub-section (2) of Section 12 preserved the Rules made under the Cinematograph Act, 1918, before the commencement of the 1955 Act, and provided that they would continue in force and be deemed to be the Rules made under this Act. This Subsection (2) was brought about by Section 4 of U.P. Act No. 27 of 1974 with retrospective effect. Section 13 confers power on the State Government to make Rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Amongst others, one of the provisions contained in Section 13 is Clause (b) of Sub-section (2). This sub-section (2) permits the State Government to frame Rules with regard to levy of fees for grant and renewal of licences for places and cinematograph exhibition. The Cinematograph Rules, 1951, contain provisions dealing with sanitation, ventilation, seating accommodation, exits, fire precautions, fire extinguishing appliances, prohibition of use of building for purposes other than of a cinema, prohibition about entry into projection room or winding room, prohibition on naked lights and smoking in projection and winding rooms, combustible material etc. The Cinematograph Rules, 1951, contain provisions dealing with sanitation, ventilation, seating accommodation, exits, fire precautions, fire extinguishing appliances, prohibition of use of building for purposes other than of a cinema, prohibition about entry into projection room or winding room, prohibition on naked lights and smoking in projection and winding rooms, combustible material etc. There are provisions which take care of the interest of cinema goers as well as the licensees. 7. Rule 37 provides that in addition to the initial inspection for getting a certificate, every permanent building with electrical installation shall be inspected by the Electrical Inspector. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 37 deals with inspection by the Licensing Authority. It provides : "....the Licensing Authority shall inspect or cause to he inspected any cinema within his jurisdiction at such intervals as may deem necessary.." An inspection book is also required to be maintained by the licensee in which all such inspection notes shall be recorded. 8. If at any time during the currency of licence, the licensing authority finds breach of any of the provisions of the Act and the Rules, it can call upon the licensee to remove the defects within a prescribed period. Rule 39 deals with fees for cinematograph licence. It lays down the amounts which are payable for the grant or renewal of a licence. 9. Counsel appearing for the petitioners urged that two elements are essential in order that a payment be recorded as a fee. The first is that payments primarily as fees are in public interest and, secondly, for some special service rendered. According to the petitioners, it must he levied in consideration of certain services rendered to the individuals. The petitioner's learned counsel cited a number of authorities in support of their submissions. One of them is Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1008 , In this case the Supreme Court laid down the tests for determining whether imposition was a fee or a tax. The controversy before the Supreme Court in this case arose out of a number of petitions challenging the imposition of market fees in the States of Punjab and Haryana. Mr. Justice Untwalia laid down the tests which are necessary to be established before justifying the levy of tax. The controversy before the Supreme Court in this case arose out of a number of petitions challenging the imposition of market fees in the States of Punjab and Haryana. Mr. Justice Untwalia laid down the tests which are necessary to be established before justifying the levy of tax. The Hon'ble Judge observed : "The element of quid pro quo may not he possible or even necessary, to be established with arithmetical exactitude but even broadly and reasonably it must be established by the authorities who charge the fees that the amount is being spent for rendering services to those on whom falls the burden of the fee. At least a good and substantial portion of the amount collected on account of fees, may be in the neighbourhood of two-thirds or three-fourths, must be shown with reasonable certainty as being spent for rendering services of the kind mentioned above." 10. Apart from the aforesaid decision, learned counsel referred to several other decisions, viz., 1. Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa, AIR 1954 SC 400 , 2. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388 3. Hingir Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa AIR 1961 SC 459 4. Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty. Cinema AIR 1965 SC 1107 ; 5. Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi v. Durga Das Bhattacharya AIR 1968 SC 1119 ; 6. Indian Mica and Micanite Industries Ltd. v. State of Bihar AIR 1971 SC 1182 ; 7. Secy. Govt. of Madras, Home Dept. v. Zenith Lamps and Electrical Ltd. AIR 1973 SC 724 ; 8. State of Maharashtra v. Salvation Army, Western India Territory, AIR 1975 SC 846 ; 9. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd., AIR 1975 SC 2037 ; 10. Chief Commr., Delhi v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1978 SC 1181 . 11. Counsel for the petitioners urged that between a tax and a fee there is no generic difference. Both are compulsory extractions of money for public authorities. But whereas a tax is imposed for public purposes, and is not and need not be supported by any consideration of service rendered in return, a fee is levied essentially for services rendered, and, as such, there is an element of quid pro quo between the person who pays the fee and the public authority which imposes it. But whereas a tax is imposed for public purposes, and is not and need not be supported by any consideration of service rendered in return, a fee is levied essentially for services rendered, and, as such, there is an element of quid pro quo between the person who pays the fee and the public authority which imposes it. The services which are to be rendered should be direct, and not remote or indirect. 12. Before we deal with this argument and discuss the authorities cited on behalf of the respondents, we think it necessary to dispose of two minor controversies. 13. One of them was the argument of Sri S. P. Agrawal that as the fee imposed is uniform and does not take into account the size of the cinema halls and their situation in small towns or big towns, the imposition is arbitrary and hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. According to him, the rate of fee should have been fixed keeping in view the aforesaid two considerations. We do not find any merit in this submission. One of the characteristics of fee, as laid down in the various authorities of the Supreme Court, is that fees are uniform and no account is taken of the varying abilities or capabilities of different recipients to pay. In Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals v. State of Kerala AIR 1981 SC 1863 , the Supreme Court observed: "It is equally true that normally a fee is uniform and no account is taken of the paying capacity of the recipients of the service, but absence of uniformity will not make it a tax if co-relationship is established." 14. In S.T. Swamiar v. Commr. for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, AIR 1963 SC 966 the Supreme Court held that ordinarily a fee is uniform and no account is taken of the varying abilities, but absence of uniformity is not a criterion on which alone it can be said that it is of the nature of tax. 15. We are, therefore, unable to hold that fee imposed by the impugned order of the State Government is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground stated above. 16. 15. We are, therefore, unable to hold that fee imposed by the impugned order of the State Government is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground stated above. 16. One of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that Rule 39 of the Cinematograph Rules, 1961, by which fee has been imposed is ultra vires the Act inasmuch as neither the Cinematograph Act, 1918, nor the 1955 Act authorises the making of such a rule. We find no merit in this submission. 17. The U.P. Cinematograph Rules, 1951, were framed under Section 9 of the Cinematograph Act, 1918. By Section 2 of the Cinematograph Amended Provisions (Amendment) Act, 1942, the following amendment in the Cinematograph Act, 1918, was made. "In Clause (a), Sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Cinematograph Act, 1918, after the word "safety" following words shall be added, namely, "and the fees to be levied for licensing buildings for cinematograph exhibitions and for inspection of electric installations in each buildings." 18. Rule 39, therefore, as it stood in 1951 can be justified on the basis of the aforesaid) amendment. However, it appears to us that since Section 13(2)(b) of the 1955 Act empowers the State Government to make rules for the fees to be levied for grant and renewal of licences irrespective of the controversy whether Rule 39 could be framed by the State Government under the U. P. Cinematograph Rules, 1951, the present notification issued under Rule 39 of the Rules would be valid having drawn its existence from the 1955 Act. Rule 39 was substituted in 1975 by Notification No. 20-M(3)/75-GAD-I, dated 31st July, 1975. By this notification, the licence fee was raised to Rs. 1200/-. It was in the year 1981 that the licence fee was raised to Rs. 3600/- by means of the amendment by the State Government in that year. Consequently, the present Rule 39, which is the subject matter of challenge in these writ petitions, is valid because of the provisions of Section 13(2)(b). In our opinion, it was valid initially as well. 19. 3600/- by means of the amendment by the State Government in that year. Consequently, the present Rule 39, which is the subject matter of challenge in these writ petitions, is valid because of the provisions of Section 13(2)(b). In our opinion, it was valid initially as well. 19. Coming to the question of service to be rendered to the cinema owners or others who pay licence fee, the submission was that the requirement of service, as was previously laid down by the Supreme Court, has undergone a change and now in accordance with the latest pronouncement, the element of quid pro quo is not a sine qua non of a fee. For this purpose, reliance was placed on Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals v. State of Kerala, AIR 1981 SC 1863 (supra), Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Mohd. Yasin, AIR 1983 SC 617 , Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1246 , Amarnath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 218 and City Corpn. of Calicut v. T. Sadasivan, AIR 1985 SC 756 , 20. The Supreme Court in City Corpn. of Calicut v. T. Sadasivan (supra) has laid down that though fee must have relation with the services rendered, but the services could be remote or indirect. To us it appears that to enable a fee to be levied, an immediate advantage measurable in terms of money conferred on the payer is no longer a requirement for the purposes of upholding it. That would be too narrow a view of the concept of fee. It may be true that fee must have relation with the services rendered, but it could be indirect. These authorities are, in fact, based on the decision of the Supreme Court given in Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals v. State of Kerala, AIR 1981 SC 1863 (supra) where the Supreme Court through Hon'ble A. P. Sen, J., observed : "It is also increasingly realised that the element of quid pro quo stricto sensu is not always a sine qua non of a fee. It is needless to stress that the element of quid pro quo is not necessarily absent in every tax. We may, in this connection, refer with profit to the observations of Seervai in his Constitutional Law........." 21. It is needless to stress that the element of quid pro quo is not necessarily absent in every tax. We may, in this connection, refer with profit to the observations of Seervai in his Constitutional Law........." 21. Counsel for the petitioners urged that the view taken in the aforesaid decision by the Supreme Court and in Srrenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1246 (supra) is in conflict with the Constitutional Bench judgment in Kewal Krishan Punri's case AIR 1980 SC 1008 (supra), hence the decision given in these two cases, which had formed the basis for the subsequent decisions in City Corpn. of Calicut v. T. Sadasivan, AIR 1985 SC 756 (supra), Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Mohd. Yasin, AIR 1983 SC 617 (supra) and Amarnath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 218 , (supra) have to be held not binding on this Court. 22. We are unable to accept the submission of the petitioner's learned counsel, Kewal Krishan Puri s case (supra) was interpreted by the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions. After interpreting the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court stated in City Corporation of Calicut v. T. Sadasivan (supra) as follows:- "It is thus well settled by numerous recent decisions of this Court that the traditional concept in a fee of quid pro quo is undergoing a transformation and that though the fee must have relation to the services rendered or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. It is not necessary to establish that those who pay the fee must receive direct benefit of the services rendered for which the fee is being paid. If one who is liable to pay receives general benefit from the authority levying the fee, the element of service required for collecting fee is satisfied. It is not necessary that the person liable to pay must receive some special benefit or advantage for payment of the fee." 23. In Gasket Radiators Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees State Insurance Corpn. AIR 1985 SC 790 the Supreme Court approved its decision in Amarnath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 218 (supra). 24. On the controversy whether the benefit of services rendered could be direct or it could be indirect as well, the Supreme Court relied on Municipal Corpn. In Gasket Radiators Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees State Insurance Corpn. AIR 1985 SC 790 the Supreme Court approved its decision in Amarnath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 218 (supra). 24. On the controversy whether the benefit of services rendered could be direct or it could be indirect as well, the Supreme Court relied on Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Mohammad Yasin, AIR 1983 SC 617 (supra). In this case, the observations made were : "For a fee must have relation to the services rendered or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct. A mere casual may be enough." 25. Learned counsel for the petitioners laid emphasis turn by turn on the proposition of law laid down in Kewal Krishan Puri 's case ( AIR 1980 SC 1008 ) and urged that since the said judgment was a Constitutional Bench judgment, it was binding-on the Supreme Court and, as such, the later decisions dissenting from Kewal Krishan Puri's case were not binding on this Court. This submission does not appeal to us. In later decision in Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1246 (supra), Hon'ble A.P. Sen, J., held that: "It would appear that there are certain observations to be found in the judgment in Kewal Krishan Puri's case AIR 1980 SC 1008 (supra), which were really not necessary for the purposes of the decision and go beyond the occasion and, therefore, they have no binding authority, though they may have merely pursuasive value." 26. With the above view, Hon'ble O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. expressed agreement by deciding M/s Amarnath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 218 , (supra). In the opinion of Hon'ble A. P. Sen, J., the observations made in Kewal Krishan Puri's case that substantial portion of the amount collected as fee in the neighbourhood of two- thirds or three-fourths must be spent for rendering services in the market to the payer of fee, were an obiter. 27. In M/s. Amarnath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab (supra), the Supreme Court, after referring to H.H. Suchindra Thirtha Swamiar v. Comrur. AIR 1963 SC 966 , Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa. AIR 1961 SC 459 , and H. H. Shri Swamiji v. Commr. 27. In M/s. Amarnath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab (supra), the Supreme Court, after referring to H.H. Suchindra Thirtha Swamiar v. Comrur. AIR 1963 SC 966 , Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa. AIR 1961 SC 459 , and H. H. Shri Swamiji v. Commr. Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Dept., AIR (1980) SC 1, agreed with Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1246 , (supra) and made the following observations: "The traditional view that there must be actual quid pro quo for a fee has undergone a sea change in the subsequent decisions. The distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as part of a common burden, while a fee is for payment of a specific benefit or privilege although the special advantage is secondary to the primary motive of regulation in public interest." 28. The Supreme Court in this case also approved Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), where it was held that co-relationship between the levy and the services rendered expected is one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude. To the same effect, the Supreme Court has taken the view in H.H. Shri Swamiji v. Commr. Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Dept. (supra). In this case, Chandrachud C.J. said: "What has to be seen is whether there is a fair correspondence between the fee charged and cost of services rendered to the fee payers as a class." 29. In fact, earlier to these recent decisions also the Supreme Court had found that for a fee to be valid it was not necessary that direct benefit should be conferred to the payers. In the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Chief Commr. of Delhi, AIR 1971 SC 344 the Supreme Court observed : "A levy in the nature of a fee does not cease to be of that character merely because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it nor is it a postulate of a fee that it must have direct relation to the actual services rendered by the authority to each individual who obtains the benefit of service." 30. In H.H. Sachindra Thirtha Swamiar v. Commr, AIR 1963 SC 966 (Supra), the Supreme Court had said : "The expenses for maintaining the service are met out of the amounts collected there being a reasonable relation between the levy and the expenses incurred for rendering the service........." 31. From what we have said above, it follows that the relationship between the services rendered and the payment need not be direct. It could be indirect or casual. The requirement of direct relationship has now undergone a change and even if services rendered are one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude, the fee would be valid in case reasonable relationship between the levy of fee and the services rendered is established. This is the purport of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in recent-decisions after Kewal Krishan Puri's case. With regard to Kewal Krishan Puri's case, the Supreme Court has found in Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1246 (supra), Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Mohammad Yasin, AIR 1983 SC 617 (supra). Amarnath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 218 (supra), and City Corpn. of Calicut v. T. Sadasivan, AIR 1985 SC 756 , (supra) that the observations in Kewal Krishan Puri's case have not to he followed being obiter in nature. We are bound by these pronouncements of the Supreme Court. 32. Counsel relied upon a decision, of Division Bench of this Court in Shree Mahalaxmi Vypar Kendra v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Powayan, 1984 All WC 282 : 1984 All LJ 1221 for submitting that Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1246 (supra) was not in conflict with Kewal Krishan Puri 's case. In two other decisions of our Court in Shyam Behari Mathur v. Zilla Parishad Mainpuri, (1984) 10 All LR 552 : 1984 All LJ 660, Anil Rice Mill, Jasrana v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti (1984) 10 All LR 708 : 1984 All LJ 869, the decision in the case of Sreenivasa General Traders was followed. In two other decisions of our Court in Shyam Behari Mathur v. Zilla Parishad Mainpuri, (1984) 10 All LR 552 : 1984 All LJ 660, Anil Rice Mill, Jasrana v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti (1984) 10 All LR 708 : 1984 All LJ 869, the decision in the case of Sreenivasa General Traders was followed. In the earlier decision, the Division Bench observed : "In the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1246 , their Lordships reviewed the entire law on the subject and observed that the traditional view that there must be actual quid pro quo for a fee has undergone a sea change subsequent to the decision in Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1008 ." 33. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in Shyam Behari Mathur v. Zila Parishad, Mainpuri, (supra) and Anil Rice Mill, Jasrana v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti (supra). Kewal Krishan Puri's case had been considered, discussed and it was found by the Supreme Court in Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra) that it had incorrectly found that substantial portion of the fee collected was required to he spent for justifying the levy. A casual or reasonable relationship between the levy of the fee and the services rendered would satisfy the requirement. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the law laid down to that effect would amount to upholding of a levy of fee even where no services are being rendered. A fee in that event would become a tax. although it was never levied as such by the authority imposing the same. With this submission we are unable to agree. Neither did the Supreme Court nor have we said that even where no services are rendered at all, fee would continue to have that character. Services have to be rendered. But, now the concept of percentage etc. for justifying the rendering of service has undergone a change. According to the view taken by the Supreme Court, even a casual relationship between the two would he sufficient. 34. Services have to be rendered. But, now the concept of percentage etc. for justifying the rendering of service has undergone a change. According to the view taken by the Supreme Court, even a casual relationship between the two would he sufficient. 34. In the case of M/s. Janta Rice and General Mills v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Sainiti, Haldwani (decided on 28-1-1983) the learned Judges found that the amount which had been spent over constructions falling outside the market yard had to he ignored and could not he pleaded. In justification of a market levy, this case was distinguished in Anil Rice Mill. Moreover, while deciding Janta Rice and General Mills, the Court had no benefit of the Supreme Court decisions which are Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1246 , Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Mohammad Yasin, AIR 1983 SC 617 , Amarnath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 218 and City Corpn. of Calicut v. T. Sadasivan, AIR 1985 SC 736 (supra). 35. Strong reliance was placed by the petitioners on Oriental Glass Works v. Municipal Board, Firozabad, 1980 UPLBEC 369 : 1980 All LJ NOC 21 and Capson Poultry Farm, Indira Colony v. Municipal Board, Kashipur, 1983 UP STC 283 in support of their submission. Both of these cases are distinguishable on facts. Moreover, for what we have said above, no further discussion dealing individually with these cases is required. What is now required to justify a levy of fee is only a casual relationship between the benefit and the amount paid. 36. The interpretation of the decision in Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1008 (supra) made by the Supreme Court in the four decisions, referred to above, is the law declared within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. The law declared is binding. We cannot hold that Kewal Krishan Puri's decision still occupies the field and is binding in all respects irrespective of the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. What has been laid down in Kewal Krishan Puri's case has been whittled down. We are hound by the interpretation made by the Supreme Court of that decision and to follow the law declared in subsequent pronouncements. What has been laid down in Kewal Krishan Puri's case has been whittled down. We are hound by the interpretation made by the Supreme Court of that decision and to follow the law declared in subsequent pronouncements. The law laid down is that the traditional concept in a fee of quid pro quo has undergone a transformation and that though the fee must have relation to the services rendered or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. It is not necessary to establish that those who pay the fee must receive direct benefit of the services rendered. Even general benefit to a person who pays the fee would justify the levy. 37. Some of the petitioners' counsel also urged that as required by the Act, the Rules should have been placed before the two Houses of the State and as this was not done, the Rules relied upon are invalid. This submission cannot be accepted in view of the averment made in the counter-affidavit. The counter-affidavit has stated that the amended Schedule was going to he placed before the two Houses. Nothing has been shown to us to come to the conclusion against the State on this point. Moreover, placing of a Rule before the two Houses is only directory. 38. Much was said by referring to Rule 39 of the Rules that as the amount will go in deposit in the State Revenue, the amount charged by way of licence fee under Rule 39 is not fee. According to the counsel for the petitioners, the money collected must be deposited in a separate account and as it is not being done, the same is a tax and not fee. In Municipal Corpn. Delhi v. Mohd. Yasin, AIR 1983 SC 617 (supra), the Supreme Court held- "The money collected does not go into a separate fund but goes into the consolidated fund does not also necessarily make it levy it tax." 39. The above decision disposes of this argument of the learned counsel. 40. By taking us through the various provisions of the Rules, counsel urged that the benefits, if any, are being conferred to the cinemagoers and, as such, those benefits would detract the levy from the character of fee. No merit can he attached to this submission. The Supreme Court repelled a similar argument in the City Corpn. 40. By taking us through the various provisions of the Rules, counsel urged that the benefits, if any, are being conferred to the cinemagoers and, as such, those benefits would detract the levy from the character of fee. No merit can he attached to this submission. The Supreme Court repelled a similar argument in the City Corpn. of Calicut v. T. Sadasivan, AIR 1955 SC 756 (supra) when it observed : "That others besides those paying the fees are also benefited does not detract from the character of the fee". 41. Two counter-affidavits have been filed by the State of U.P. One counter-affidavit was by the Finance (Entertainment Tax) Section of the U.P. Civil Secretariat. In this affidavit it was alleged that services were being rendered to the cinema owners in lieu of fee which was being realised from them as such. By referring to Section 7, it was alleged that the Entertainment Tax Department looks after the amenities which have to he provided for. Along with the counter-affidavit, it Chart described as CA-I was filed. This Chart has been clarified by filing a supplementary counter-affidavit on behalf of the State. From the Chart given along with the supplementary counter-affidavit, it appears, that the estimated receipt by way of licence fee at the rate of Rs. 3000/- per licence in the year 1981-82 was Rs. 21.34 lass, whereas the total expenditure towards the Entertainment Tax Department was Rs. 41.73 lacs. 42. Sri Sidheshwari Prasad, learner counsel for the petitioners in some of these cases urged that whereas the Chart gives the expenditure to he incurred on the Entertainment Tax Department, it does not give the figure of money which is received as entertainment tax, and, therefore, this Chart is useless and does not help the Court in deciding the controversy. He also urged, as was submitted by other counsel as well, that the maintenance of the Entertainment Tax Department by the Government was fur the purposes of collecting entertainment tax and, therefore, the amount spent on the Entertainment Tax Department could not be taken into consideration while finding out the relationship between the licence fee realised and the benefits conferred. Learned counsel urged that the Entertainment Tax Department, Sanitary Department, Medical Department, etc. Learned counsel urged that the Entertainment Tax Department, Sanitary Department, Medical Department, etc. are not meant exclusively for the cinemas, hence any service rendered by them could not be taken into consideration while finding the benefits which are conferred on the cinema owners. 43. It may be true that the aforesaid Departments are not exclusively engaged in the looking after the interests of the cinema owners and are also doing other duties, but that would not justify this Court to reject the expenses incurred on them. An officer of one Department may discharge several duties. For example, the District Magistrate and the U.P. Entertainment Tax Commissioner both are the licensing authority under the Act. A District Magistrate is appointed under the Code of Criminal Procedure whereas the Entertainment Tax Commissioner is appointed under the U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, but the expenses incurred on these authorities proportionately to the services rendered to the cinemas can be looked into. It may be difficult to find out the exact proportionate amount, but the same cannot be overlooked. Apart from these two officers, there is a full machinery engaged in the successful implementation of the various provisions of the Rules which are meant for the benefit of the cinemagoers and also for the owners of the cinemas. We have already referred to some of the rules in the beginning of the judgment. Those rules would indicate that the various requirements laid down by rules 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 25 directly benefit the cinema owners. 44. Rule 37 provides that in addition to the initial inspection, every electric installation shall be inspected by the Electrical Inspector or his representative once every year and if at any such inspection any defects are noticed, they are intimated to the management for removal. Under Rule 38, the licensing authority gives notice to the licensee requiring him to remove the defects. All these and many other provisions beginning from Rules 6 to 37 are meant for conferring the benefit to the licensees as well. Under Rule 38, the licensing authority gives notice to the licensee requiring him to remove the defects. All these and many other provisions beginning from Rules 6 to 37 are meant for conferring the benefit to the licensees as well. It may be true that some of the officers, Inspectors and clerks do the job of checking entertainment tax as well, but that would not justify the submission that the expenditure incurred on them should be totally ignored, particularly when they are meant for the proper compliance of the rules which, as said above, are for the benefit of the licensees as well. 45. In paragraph 7 of the supplementary counter-affidavit it is stated that under a District Entertainment Tax Officer there are five to six Entertainment Tax Inspectors who are required to inspect the cinema houses of their jurisdiction. In case there is any defect, the Entertainment Tax Inspectors report the matter to the Licensing Authority. Under Rules 6, 12, and 13, the Medical Health Department of the District is required to see that compliance of the Rules are made. Similar is the duty fastened on the Fire Officer to see the compliance of Rules, 6, 16 and 17. 46. Taking all these facts into consideration, we find that the element of rendering services is fully proved. In terms of money it may not be possible to find out the exact figure, but taking the overall view of the picture, one would find irresistibly that licensees receive the benefit out of the money paid by them as licence fee. Further, as the licensees, who are liable to pay, receive much more than the general benefits from the authorities levying the fee, the element of service required for collecting the fee is satisfied. We have already held above that it was not necessary that the person liable to pay must receive some special benefit or advantage for payment of the same. It may be noted here that the primary purpose of levying the fee under the Cinematograph Rules 1951 is the regulation in public interest. 47. The validity of levy as a fee under the Delhi Factories Rules came up for consideration by Supreme Court. It may be noted here that the primary purpose of levying the fee under the Cinematograph Rules 1951 is the regulation in public interest. 47. The validity of levy as a fee under the Delhi Factories Rules came up for consideration by Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that in each case when the question arises whether the levy was in the nature of a fee, the entire scheme of the statutory provisions, the duties and obligations imposed on the inspecting staff and the nature of the work done by them, were required to be examined for determining the rendering of services which would make the levy a fee. After examining the various provisions of the Factories Act, 1948, and the Rules framed, the Supreme Court held that a large number of provisions of the Act, particularly in the Chapters dealing with safety involved a good deal of technical knowledge and in the course of their discharge of duties and obligations the Inspectors were expected to give proper advice and guidance so that due compliance of the provisions of the Act could be made. The Supreme Court held that on certain occasions the factory owners were bound to receive a good deal of benefit by being saved from the consequences of the working of dangerous machines or implements of such processes as involved danger to human lives by being warned at the proper time as to the defective nature of the machinery or taking of the precautions which are enjoined under the Act. 48. In our case also we have referred to a number of provisions and have shown that such expert opinion is available to the licensees on account of their obtaining licenses and due to the fact that licence fees are paid. Such opinion, the licensees could not get otherwise without spending huge money. The licensees have been saved from spending the same. They can also call the technical staff for assistance as and when any necessity to do so arises due to some defeat in the machinery. In Indian Mica and Micanite Industries Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1971 SC 1182 (supra), the Supreme Court had agreed with the view taken in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Limited v. Chief Commr. of Delhi, AIR 1971 SC 344 (supra). 49. In Indian Mica and Micanite Industries Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1971 SC 1182 (supra), the Supreme Court had agreed with the view taken in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Limited v. Chief Commr. of Delhi, AIR 1971 SC 344 (supra). 49. Our attention was drawn to sub-rule (2) of Rule 37 for arguing that for taking assistance of Electrical Inspector special fee is payable, hence the expenditure incurred on Electrical Inspector could not be counted for justifying the levy of fee. What we have found after review of the rules is that only for initial inspection by the Electrical Inspector that fee is chargeable and not for subsequent inspections. But even if this question is answered in favour of the petitioners, that would not make any difference in the result of the writ petitions. The correlationship between the levy of fee and the benefits conferred has been satisfied more than necessary. It may be that the percentage of benefit conferred and the amount to be spent on the licensees cannot be found, but that would not affect our finding that correlation ship between the two has been established. 50. We have already pointed out above that the granting and renewal of a cinema licence is a regulatory measure. With respect to the regulatory measure, the element of quid pro quo is not satisfied in the same manner as it is done in the case of market fee etc. In Kewal Krishan Puri's case, AIR 1980 SC 1008 , the Supreme Court itself has noticed this fact and made observations to the following effect : "..........But, then, as pointed out in some of the cases noticed earlier the registration fee has been taken to stand on a different footing altogether. In the case of such a fee, the element of quid pro quo has not to be satisfied with such direct, close or proximate cor-relationship as in the case of many other kinds of fees. By and large registration fee is charged as a regulatory measure." 51. In our opinion, the taking of licence fee for starting a business and getting its renewal is a regulatory measure. The power to regulate means controlling or state of being reduced to order. If this meaning is taken into consideration, we find that close or proximate correlation ship as in the case of many other kinds of fees is not required. The power to regulate means controlling or state of being reduced to order. If this meaning is taken into consideration, we find that close or proximate correlation ship as in the case of many other kinds of fees is not required. In our view, the fee charged and the services rendered in this case satisfied the requirement of quid pro quo. 52. For what we have said above, all the writ petitions are dismissed with costs. The stay orders in all the petitions are discharged. Two months' time is given to each one of the petitioners for payment of the licence fee.