JUDGMENT O.P. Saxena, J. - This appeal under O. 43 R. 1(R) C.P.C. has been filed against the order dated 17-8-85 passed by the II Civil Judge, Kanpur. 2. The plaintiff is a Government Company duly incorporated and registered under the Companies Act, 1956. Defendant No. 1 is the recognised trade union of workers of the plaintiff Company. Sri D.N. Pandey is the president and Sri R.C. Dwivedi is the secretary of defendant No. 1. There is a Constitution of defendant No. I and the elections of the Executive Committee are held according to the terms of the constitution. On 22nd July 1985, an announcement was made for the next elections. 1st Aug. to 3rd Aug. was fixed for filing nomination. 5th Aug. was fixed for scrutiny. 6th Aug was fixed for withdrawal. 8th Aug. was fixed for announcement of the final list of the candidates. 13th Aug. was fixed for the elections. 3. On 12-8-85, plaintiff filed a suit for a permanent injunction restraining defendants Nos. 4 to 10 from contesting the elections for the office bearers of defendant No.1 restraining defendants 1 to 3 from taking into account the votes of defendants Nos. 4 to 10 if polled at the elections to be held and further restraining defendants Nos. 1 to 3 from announcing the result of the elections on the basis of the votes cast by defendants 4 to 10. The main objection of the plaintiff was that according to Cl. (4) of the Constitution, only those persons who were actually employed in the plaintiff Company are entitled to participate in the elections. The plaintiffs case was that defendants 4 to 10 were dismissed by the plaintiff company during the period from 1981 to 1985. 4. On 13th Aug. the Court below passed the following order :- "The result of the defendants Nos. 4 to 10 he not declared on 14-8-85." 5. The application was contested by defendant No. 1 through its President Sri D.N. Pandey and also by the other defendants. It was said that only defendants 4 to 6 were dismissed in the year 1981 and defendants 7 to 10 were employees of the plaintiff Company on the date of the notification of the elections. When the dismissal order was received, the president informed the Election Officer. Defendants 4 to 10 have challenged their dismissal before the labour Court and the matter is sub judice. When the dismissal order was received, the president informed the Election Officer. Defendants 4 to 10 have challenged their dismissal before the labour Court and the matter is sub judice. It was said that under Cl. (4) of the Constitution of defendant No. 1. a dismissed employee would also be deemed to be a worker within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and he could participate in the elections. It was said that the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction in view of the U. P. Amendment to O. 39 R. 2 C.P.C. Another plea taken was that the plaintiff could file an objection before the Registrar of the Trade Unions under Regulation 17A of the U.P. Trade Unions Regulation. 1927. 6. On 17-8-85, the Court below dismissed the application for injunction and vacated the interim order passed on 13-8-85. 7. The present F.A.F.O. was filed on 19th Aug., 1985 and the following interim order was passed : "Meanwhile the operation of the declaration of the result of the election will remain suspended till 29th August 1985." 8. In the affidavit filed in support of the stay application, similar grounds have been raised as were raised before the Court below. In the counter-affidavit filed by respondents Nos. 4 to 10 also similar grounds were raised as were raised before the Court below. Clause 4 of the Constitution was quoted and it was pointed out that the English definition given in the affidavit in support of the stay application is incorrect. Cl. 4 does not use the words "actually employee" and even a dismissed employee would be deemed to be an ordinary member of defendant No. 1. It was also said that the result of 14 out of 31 candidates was declared on 19th Aug. 1985 and respondents 7 to9 were declared duly elected as members of the Executive Committee of respondent No. 1. Annexures CA. 6A, 6B and 6C were filed. In the counter-affidavit filed by respondent No. 1, however, a stand contrary to the one taken in the Court below was taken. An objection to the injunction application and the affidavit in support thereof has been filed by Sri D.N. Pandey, President of the respondent No. 1. A counter-affidavit before this Court has been filed by Sri R.C. Dwivedi, the Secretary of respondent No. 1 supporting the case of appellant. An objection to the injunction application and the affidavit in support thereof has been filed by Sri D.N. Pandey, President of the respondent No. 1. A counter-affidavit before this Court has been filed by Sri R.C. Dwivedi, the Secretary of respondent No. 1 supporting the case of appellant. Rejoinder-affidavit has also been filed. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the affidavits along with annexures exchanged between the parties. 10. The main point for determination in this appeal is as to whether it is legally permissible to give a temporary injunction of the nature sought for by the appellant in view of the provisions of O. 39 R. 2(2) Proviso (e) C.P.C. 11. The relevan f provision is that no injunction can be granted to restrain any election. 12. In view of the decisions in N. P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal, AIR 1952 SC 64 and A. Appalaraju v. P. Siva Kondarao, AIR 1982 Andh Pra 208, it can hardly be disputed that the word `election' indicates the entire process culminating in a candidate being declared elected. The process commences with the notification of election and ends with declaration of result. The filing of nomination papers, scrutiny, withdrawal and the polling are intervening steps. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Proviso (d) provides that no injunction shall be granted to effect the internal management of any educational institution, including a University or a Society. He submitted Proviso (d) may not apply in the present case strictly, but the provisions are similar to the provisions of proviso (e). He placed reliance on the case of Mahabir Singh v. I Addl. District Judge, Meerut, 1981 UPLBEC 463 : 1981 UPLT NOC 187, It was held on page 469 : "In the instant case no injunction has been sought against the whole committee of management on the ground that one of its members has become disqualified to hold office. The injunction has been sought only against that person who has ceased to be a member because he has incurred a disqualification and even on whose ceasing to hold office the management of the college can smoothly go on in view of those bye-laws of the Society which provide for such a contingency and on which reliance has been placed in the impugned order. For the reasons given above, I am of opinion that Cl. For the reasons given above, I am of opinion that Cl. (d) of the proviso to Sub-rule (2) R. 2 of O. XXXIX of the C.P.C. as inserted by U.P. Act 57 of 1976 will not be attracted to the facts of the instant case." 14. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondents Nos. 4 to 10 are not prima facie qualified to offer themselves for election to the membership of the Executive Committee of respondent No. 1 and in this view of the matter if an injunction is granted the question of any interference or restraint in the election does not arise. He contended that the respondents Nos. 4 to 10 are rank outsiders and not even ordinary members of respondent No. 1 and thus they could not participate in the elections. Reliance was placed on the English copy of the constitution submitted by respondent No. 1 to the office of the plaintiff- appellant. 15. The learned counsel for respondents Nos. 4 to 10 drew my attention to S. 6 sub-cl. (e) of the Trade Unions Act. It provides that a trade union shall not be entitled to registration under this Act unless the executive thereof is constituted in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules thereof provide for the following matter, viz.:- ".. .. .. .. .. (e) the admission of ordinary members who shall be persons actually employed or employed in an industry with which the trade union is connected, and also the admission of the member of honorary or temporary members as office bearers required under S. 22 to form the executive of the Trade Union." My attention was also drawn to S. 22 of the Trade Unions Act, which provides as below :- "22. Proportion of officers to be connected with the industry - Not less than one half of the total number of the office-bearers of every registered union shall be persons actually engaged or employed in an industry with which the Trade Union is connected : Provided that the appropriate Government may, by special or general order, declare that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any Trade Union or class of Trade Unions specified in the order. 16. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the constitution of the respondent No. 1 does not provide for outsider to become members of the Executive Committee. 16. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the constitution of the respondent No. 1 does not provide for outsider to become members of the Executive Committee. 17. As I am concerned with a limited question as to whether Proviso (e) referred to above applies to the present case, I do not find it necessary to go into other matters. The bar set out in Proviso (c) is absolute and it is not removed by the circumstances pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant. Whether respondents Nos. 4 to 10 are entitled to contest election or not is wholly irrelevant to the question as to whether the Court can grant an injunction restraining any election. The bar only puts an embargo on the powers of a Court to grant an injunction restraining any election. It does not come in the way of the parties in challenging the legality or validity of the elections in accordance with law. Simply because persons who are disqualified are participating in the election, the Court cannot have a right to interfere in the election. The policy of the legislature appears to be that the election should be held unhanipered by any interim orders of Courts of law and the validity of the election should be considered at a later stage in accordance with law. I am unable to accept that the provisions of Proviso (e) and Proviso (d) are analogous to each other. The case of Mahabir Singh v. The I Addl. District Judge, Meerut, 1981 UPLBEC 463 : 1981 UPLT NOC 187 (supra) provides no guideline on the point in issue. I hold that the Proviso (e) applies and no temporary injunction may be granted to restrain the election. The court below rightly rejected the application for temporary injunction. 18. The appeal is dismissed and the interim order dated 19th August 1985 is vacated. 19. The learned counsel for the appellant made an oral prayer for permission to file a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. I am not satisfied that this case raises any substantial question of law of general importance which needs decision by Supreme Court. The oral prayer is refused. 20. A copy of the order may be issued to the parties on payment of usual charges today.