JUDGMENT V.N. Khare, J. - Notices of these writ petitions were accepted by the respondents and they also filed counter affidavits. Learned counsel for parties jointly stated that these writ petitions be decided at the admission stage. We therefore, propose to finally decide these writ petitions. 2. This bunch of writ petitions at the instance of the petitioners, who are employees in U.P. Co-operative Cane Development Union Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Union) and U.P. Co-operative Cane Union Federation Limited (hereinafter referred to as Federation) is directed against the orders passed by the Secretary, Rajya Ganna Sewa Pradhikaran, LJ. P., Lucknow reverting them from the posts of accountants or cashiers to the posts of clerks, typists or on other lower posts. 3. These writ petitions can be divided, for the sake of convenience, in two groups. The first group of writ petitions relates to the petitioners, who were promoted after April 1, 1963 and the second group of writ petitions relates to those employees who were appointed after October 18, 1975. The number of writ petitions which fell in the first group are writ petitions No. 9652, 10109, 10110, 10112, 10208, 10303, 10356, 10358, 10363, 10365, 10366. 10367, 10604, 10719, 10720, 10721, 10725, 10726, 10998, 12112, 12113, 13430, 13431, 13429, 13957 and 13959 all of 1983. 4. Since identical questions of facts and law are involved in these petitions, learned counsel for the parties referred to facts of writ petition No. 10109 of 1983, Hari Datt Sharma v. State and Writ Petition No. 10110 of 1983, Surendra Kumar v. State and Writ Petition No. 9652 of 1983, Ram Deo Singh v. Rajya Ganna Sewa Prcdhikaran, U.P., Lucknow and others. We, therefore, shall set out the facts of the aforesaid three cases only. 5. The case of the petitioners in the first group of writ petitions is that they were promoted under U.P. Co-operative Service Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Service Rules) on the posts of accountants or cashiers and thus they have acquired liens on the said posts under (he rules and they cannot be reverted to the lower posts. It is also their case that U.P. Cane Co-operative Service Regulations, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as Regulations) is not applicable to them and their reversion sought to be on the basis of the Gradation List prepared under the Regulations is illegal. It is also their case that U.P. Cane Co-operative Service Regulations, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as Regulations) is not applicable to them and their reversion sought to be on the basis of the Gradation List prepared under the Regulations is illegal. The further case of the petitioners in both the groups of writ petitions is that they having been allowed to continue on higher posts, their promotion cannot be termed as officiating or on ad hoc basis and they cannot be legally reverted from higher posts. 6. The stand of the respondents is that the appointments of the petitioners on higher posts were made on ad hoc basis and Such appointments do not confer any right on them with respect to the posts in which they were promoted. Their further case is that none of the petitioners as promoted in accordance with the rules applicable to them and they were liable to be reverted to lower posts. It is stated in the counter - affidavits that after the seniority list was published after inviting objections, steps were taken for m liking regular promotions to the posts of accountants and cashiers strictly in accordance with the criteria laid down under the Rules, namely, seniority subject to rejection of the unfit. The Federation after having considered the cases of 241 employees mentioned in the Gradation List, 96 employees have been promoted as regular cashiers or accountants and as a result of which 96 ad hoc employees (including the petitioners) were asked to go back to the posts where they were working prior to their promotion in ad hoc or officiating capacity. 7. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioners in the first group of writ petitions is that the petitioners having been promoted to the higher posts under the Service Rules, they shall be deemed to be ? automatically confirmed in those posts. In support of this argument learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon Note VI of Rule I and clause V of Rule 2 of Chapter IV of the Service Rules and also a decision of the Supreme Court given in the case of State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh reported in A.I.R. 1968, S.C. page 1210. We shall consider this case slightly later. 8. We shall consider this case slightly later. 8. At the time of argument there was a controversy as to whether the Service Rules were applicable to the petitioners or the Regulation framed in the year, 1975. We need not go into this controversy and for the purpose of deciding this question we shall assume that the Service Rules were applicable to the petitioners at the relevant period, i.e. when they were promoted and were allowed to continue beyond Six months from the date of their promotion. 9. On the argument of learned counsel for the parties the question that arises for consideration is as to whether the petitioners who were promoted either on ad hoc basis or in officiating capacity had acquired status of permanent employees under the rules. Admittedly, the petitioners in the first group of writ petitions were promoted either on ad hoc. basis or in officiating capacity but were allowed to continue in the posts beyond the period of six months from the date of their appointment. We shall now examine the relevant rules in order to find out as to whether petitioners stood automatically confirmed on higher posts to which they were promoted in ad hoc or officiating capacity after a period of 6 months. 10. In the case of Kedar Nath Bahai v. The State of Punjab reported in 1970 Services Law Reporter page 320 (S.C), it was held that there would be automatic confirmation of an employee in a post if rules clearly indicate that confirmation would automatically follow at the end of the specified period. 11. Note VI of Table I of Rule 1 and Clause V of Rule 2 of Chapter IV of the Service Rules are extracted below :- Note VI of Table of Rule 1. Officiating arrangement, in short term vacancies in the Cane Unions, occurring due to leave, transfer, etc. may be made by the Recruiting Authority for a period not exceeding three months on the basis of the seniority of the local employees available. This will, however, nor create claim or right for promotion to a higher post nor will it affect the inter se seniority of the employees. Clause V of Rule 2. - Temporary vacancies extending upto 3 months may be filled by the Recruiting Authority without following the procedure of recruitment prescribed, if there is no candidate available on the approved list for immediate appointment. Clause V of Rule 2. - Temporary vacancies extending upto 3 months may be filled by the Recruiting Authority without following the procedure of recruitment prescribed, if there is no candidate available on the approved list for immediate appointment. In no case, can an extension be given to and Such candidate beyond Six months. He shall have no preferential claim in future vacancies on the basis of such stop-gap temporary arrangement. Note VI of Rule 1 and Clause V of Rule 2 occur in Chapter IV of the Service Rules. Rules contained in Chapter VI of the Service Rules deal with appointment, confirmation and promotion in the service. Note VI of Rule 1 provides for officiating arrangement in short term vacancies in the Cane Unions occurring due to leave, transfer, etc. for a period not exceeding 3 months which shall not create any claim or right for promotion to the higher post. Similarly Clause V of Rule 2 of the Service Rules provides for appointments against temporary vacancies extending upto 3 months which in no case be extended beyond 6 months. Rules contained in Chapter VI of the Service Rules further provide that appointment by promotion shall be made on basis of approved list prepared in order of seniority subject to rejection of unfit. If an employee is promoted on basis of approved list, he is to be given appointment on probation for a period of two years which may be extended from time to time by the Recruiting Authority. It is noteworthy that the Rules do not provide for an outer limit beyond which probationary period cannot be extended Our attention has not been invited to any Rule under which petitioners can be considered as having been appointed either permanently or deemed to have been automatically confirmed after the expiry of the period of 6 months from the date of their promotion. Under Note VI of Rale 1 and Clause V of Rule 2 of Service Rules officiating appointments cannot be extended beyond 6 months against short term vacancies or temporary vacancies. The Rules do not provide that such an employee who has worked beyond period of six months either on ad hos basis or in an officiating capacity shall be deemed to have been automatically confirmed in the post against they were appointed. The Rules do not provide that such an employee who has worked beyond period of six months either on ad hos basis or in an officiating capacity shall be deemed to have been automatically confirmed in the post against they were appointed. From the continuance of petitioners on higher posts without and Specific order by the department the only inference that can be drawn is that the department allowed the petitioners to work in the same capacity in which they were appointed. As noticed earlier, the Rules do not provide that the employees who have worked for snore than 6 months in officiating capacity shall be deemed to be confirmed in the post and in absence of such a rule the status of the petitioners remained that of officiating accountants/cashiers. 12. The sheet - anchor of the case of the petitioners is the decision given in the case of State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh (supra). Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the following passage of the said decision :- "The initial period of probation of the respondents ended on October 1, 1958. By allowing the respondents to continue in their posts thereafter without any express order of confirmation, the competent authority must be taken to have extended the period of probation upto October 1, 1960 by implication. But under the proviso to Rule 6 (3), the probationary period could not extend beyond October 1, 1960. In view of the proviso to Rule 6 (3), it is not possible to presume that the competent authority extended the probationary period after October 1, 1960, or that thereafter the respondents continued to hold their posts as probationers." 13. This decision does not help the case of the petitioners. In this case the Supreme Court was considering the case of a probationer in reference to sub - rules (2) and (3) of Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised Cadre) Class III Rule, 1961. Hon'ble Supreme Court while interpreting the rules held that the 'petitioner must be deemed to have been confirmed if allowed to continue beyond 3 years in absence of an order of confirmation as the Rules do not provide for further extension of probationary period beyond 3 years. The rule which is applicable in the case of the petitioners is not akin to the rules interpreted by the Supreme Court and this case, therefore, is distinguishable. 14. The rule which is applicable in the case of the petitioners is not akin to the rules interpreted by the Supreme Court and this case, therefore, is distinguishable. 14. The next argument of learned counsel for the petitioners in both the groups of writ petitions is that the promotions of the petitioners were against clear vacancies and they had been working on higher posts for a considerable period of time and as such their appointments and their continuance in the posts cannot be termed as stop - gap arrangement or in officiating capacity and further they cannot be reverted from those posts. In support of their argument learned counsel referred to Rules of Chapter IV of the Service Rules and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of D.R. Nim v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1967 S.C. 1301 . 15. Hari Dutt Sharma Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 10109 of 1983 was temporarily promoted as accountant by an order dated 7-12-1964 in clear vacancy. This order indicated that his promotion as accountant in the scale of Rs. 75-95-EB. - 120/ - with usual dearness allowance is purely provisional and on ad hoc basis. On 3-9-1966 Hari Dutt' Sharma was again promoted temporarily as accountant in the same scale purely as stop - gap arrangement. The said order indicated that Sri Sharma may be reverted at any time without any prior notice. 16. Again by an order dated 16-4-968 Sri Sharma was promoted to the post of accountant in temporary and officiating capacity. Lastly, in the year, 1971 an order was passed allowing tho petitioner to continue as accountant as stop - gap arrangement till some permanent arrangement is made. In pursuance of these orders the petitioner Hari Dutt Sharma continued to work in the post of accountant. 17. Surendra Kumar in Writ Petition No. 10110 of 1983 was promoted on 22-10-1973 to the post of accountant in pay scale of Rs. 230 - 380/ - . The order of promotion indicated that Surendra Kumar is temporarily appointed as accountant in stop gap arrangement till permanent arrangement is made by the Federation. 18. Ram Deo Singh in Writ Petition No. 9652 of 1983 was originally appointed as seasonal cashier in the year 1952-53. Subsequently, he was promoted as cashier. 230 - 380/ - . The order of promotion indicated that Surendra Kumar is temporarily appointed as accountant in stop gap arrangement till permanent arrangement is made by the Federation. 18. Ram Deo Singh in Writ Petition No. 9652 of 1983 was originally appointed as seasonal cashier in the year 1952-53. Subsequently, he was promoted as cashier. On 23-11-1970 a letter was issued by the U.P. Cane Union Federation Lucknow in which it was pointed out that the appointment of petitioner was simply by way of stop - gap arrangement. 19. From the facts narrated above, it is clear that the petitioner, though appointed ad hoc or in officiating capacity, were allowed to continue to work on the posts of accountant or cashiers for over a decade. The question that arises for consideration is as to whether the continuous working of the petitioners in officiating or ad hoc capacity either on the posts of accountants or cashiers gives them permanent Status in those posts. 20. In the case of Director of Panchayat v. Bahu Singh Gaur reported in 1972 Services Law Reporter page 106 (S.C ) it was held that a temporary Government Servant does not become a permanent employee unless he is declared as a permanent Government Servant. 21. The facts of these writ petition Show that the substantive capacity was never conferred on the petitioners either when they were promoted to the higher post or while working in those posts. The fact the appointments of petitioners were made against clear vacancies and they were allowed to draw usual dearness allowance did not convert their appointments in the department either into permanent appointment or temporary appointment in substantive capacity in permanent posts. The terms of their appointments on higher posts also do not indicate that the petitioners, if allowed to continue for specified period, would automatically be confirmed on higher posts to which they were promoted. In the absence of such terms in the appointment it cannot be said that the petitioners became permanent accountants or cashiers only because they were allowed to continue to officiate on those posts for considerable period of time. 22. We may refer to the rules relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in order to find out whether the Rules provide that the officiating or ad hoc appointment would be treated as a permanent appointment. 22. We may refer to the rules relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in order to find out whether the Rules provide that the officiating or ad hoc appointment would be treated as a permanent appointment. Rules contained in Chapter IV relate to recruitment to each class of Cane Co-operative Service. This recruitment is by direct recruitment or by advancement. Table I of Rule I provides that 50 per cent posts of the accountant Shall be filled by direct recruitment for which minimum qualification will be Intermediate, preferably in commerce and 50 per cent by promotion out of the clerks and typists on the basis of seniority subject to the rejection of unfit. Similarly, in the case of cashier 50 per cent of vacancies shall be filled by promotion from amongst clerks and typists on the basis of seniority subject to the rejection of unfit. The remaining 50 per cent of the posts of cashier have to be filled up from out of seasonal qualified payment clerks having atleast an experience of 5 seasons credible work in "A" category for which an exemption in age is to be given, after a written test and interview. 23. A perusal of these rules show that it does not provide that if an employee is promoted on ad hoc basis he shall subsequently acquire the status of a permanent employee or his initial appointment would be treated as a permanent appointment. In the absence of such a rule and the fact that petitioners were never promoted in accordance with the Service Rules the promotion of petitioners and their continuance on the promoted posts were on ad hoc and officiating capacity. 24. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioners having never been declared or appointed by the Union or the Federation as permanent accountants or cashiers, their status remained that of employees promoted on ad hoc basis or officiating capacity. 25. The second limb of this argument is as to whether petitioners can be reverted from the posts they were promoted and allowed to continue to work for a considerable period of time. 25. The second limb of this argument is as to whether petitioners can be reverted from the posts they were promoted and allowed to continue to work for a considerable period of time. In the case of Purshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India reported in A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36 it was held that the appointment to officiate on permanent post is usually made when permanent post is vacant and no the Substantive appointment has been made to the post. Such an officiating comes to an end on the substantive appointment being made to that post. 26. In the case of State of Bombay v. F. A. Abraham reported in A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 794 it was held that a person officiating in a post has no right to hold it for all times. 27. In the case of State of Mysore v. M. K. Godgoli, reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1677 it was held that a person appointed in a officiating capacity has no right to hold the post for all time. 28. From the aforesaid decisions it is clear that a parson appointed either on ad hoc basis or in officiating capacity does not acquire any lien in the post and his services either can be terminated or he may be reverted from the pro noted post to the lower post. 29. Learned counsel relied upon the following passage of the case of D.R. Nim v. Union of India (supra) : "We agree with him that such a stop - gap arrangement cannot last for 8 years. It has been shown that the appellant was appointed temporarily in place of some persons as subsequently he has never been reverted. Further the fact that he was appointed to the post at the time when vacancies fell negatives that it was merely a temporary arrangement." 30. In this ease it was held that the date of classification of officers was arbitrary and contrary to Rule 3 of Rules and aforesaid observations were made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in respect of determination of seniority and the year of allotment in the service of an officer who was promoted to the Indian Police Service. This case does not lay down that if a person allowed to continue for over a decade shall be deemed to have been confirmed on the post and cannot be reverted. This case does not lay down that if a person allowed to continue for over a decade shall be deemed to have been confirmed on the post and cannot be reverted. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this case is distinguishable and is of no assistance to the case of the petitioners. 31. In the present case the petitioners' status was that of an officiating accountant/cashier and the orders r averting them from higher post to lower post cannot be termed as illegal. 32. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that petitioners had no right to hold the posts to which they were promoted and were liable to be reverted after the regular promotions were made in accordance with the rules. 33. Learned counsel for the respondents raised two other arguments, namely, that on the promulgation of the Regulations the Service Rules stood completely wiped out and petitioners cannot drive any benefit on the basis of the Service Rules and Secondly, that the writ petitions against the respondent Federation is not a State or "other authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution Since we have taken the view that the petitioners did not acquire any permanent Status on promoted posts and they were liable to be reverted, we are not inclined to consider the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents. 34. In the conclusion, we hold that the order passed by the Federation do not suffer from any legal infirmity ai d the writ petitions are liable to fail. 35. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs. 36. Before parting with the case, however, we feel impelled to observe that such unfortunate contingencies as have arisen in the instant case and which wittingly or unwittingly result in great hardship to the petitioners should not be allowed, as far as possible, to perpetuate their hardship. Legality apart, expediency and public interest also dictate that incumbents who have spent a long time serving on particular jobs should not have to face a situation when their employments are suddenly snapped, especially when such eventuality may have been brought about by the inaction of the powers that be. We have no reason to believe that the authorities concerned will not bear in mind these salient aspects before dealing with the matter in future.