JUDGMENT A.N. Dikshita, J. - By means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has prayed to quash the order dated 28-9-1976 passed by the U. P. Public Service Tribunal (I), Lucknow, respondent No. 2 to the writ petition. 2. Respondent No. 1 was appointed as Assistant Teacher on 1-4-1959 in the C. T. grade in the scale of Rs. 120-250 in the Government Deaf and Dumb School, Agra. He was subsequently confirmed on the post. Thereafter vide order dated 27-11-1970 respondent No. 1 was promoted to the L. T. grade in the scale of Rs. 150-350. In the order it was made clear that the promotion was purely temporary and that respondent No. 1 was liable to be reverted at any time to his substantive post. Respondent No. 1 was transferred from Government Deaf and Dumb School, Agra, to join his new assignment at Farrukhabad and was accordingly relieved on 30-11-1970. Vide another order dated 22/23 December 1972 respondent No. 1 being the senior most teacher amongst the teachers of the said school in the L. T. grade was appointed as Principal of Government, Deaf and Dumb School, Farrukhabad by way of an ad hoc and purely temporary arrangement. It was made clear that by this appointment of respondent l he would have no right to hold the post and further that he would be liable to be reverted to his substantive post at any time. Subsequently by another Government Order dated 15-10-1973 the ad hoc and temporary appointment of respondent l as Principal of the said school was given effect to on 30-8-1972. Respondent l was subsequently reverted on 27-3-1975 to his substantive post in the C. T. grade. 3. Aggrieved by the order of the State Government reverting the respondent No. 1 to his substantive post in C. T. grade respondent No. 1 filed a Claim Petition under S. 4 of the U.P. Public Service Tribunal Act, 1976 before respondent No. 2. 4. The claim of the respondent No. 1 was contested on behalf of the petitioner. 5. After hearing both the parties, respondent 2 vide its order dated 23-9-1976 quashed the order of reversion dated 24-2-1975 passed by the State Government and the consequential order dated 5-4-1975 passed by the Director of Harijan and Social Welfare, U.P. Lucknow. 6. 4. The claim of the respondent No. 1 was contested on behalf of the petitioner. 5. After hearing both the parties, respondent 2 vide its order dated 23-9-1976 quashed the order of reversion dated 24-2-1975 passed by the State Government and the consequential order dated 5-4-1975 passed by the Director of Harijan and Social Welfare, U.P. Lucknow. 6. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner has preferred the instant writ petition for quashing the order dated 2-8-1976 passed by respondent 2. Respondent 1 has opposed the petition on various grounds. It is manifest from the record that one Sri Ram Chandra Sharma, Up Sachiv, Uttar Pradesh Shasan, wrote to the Director of Harijan and Social Welfare, U.P. Lucknow vide letter dated 22/23-12-1972 that Rajpal has been pleased to cancel the order of promotion of Sri Satish Chadra Saxena to the post of Principal and that respondent No. 1 has been promoted temporarily to the post of principal, Deaf and Dumb School, Farrukhabad in the scale of Rs. 250-550. This order was partially modified and respondent was appointed Principal of Government, Deaf and Dumb School, Farrukhabad with effect from 30th August 1972 on which date Sri Ram Nath Singh Principal of the said school had retired. This order appointing respondent 1 as Principal of the said school was subject to the approval by the U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad. Respondent No. 1 preferred several reminders for referring his case to the U. P. Public Service Commission for approval and confirmation but it was not done though respondent 1 continued to work and act as Principal. Sri D. P. Varan, the then Secretary, Harijan and Social Welfare, U. P. Lucknow passed an order reverting the respondent l to the post of teacher from the post of Principal, Deaf and Dumb School, Farrukhabad. Respondent 1 was subsequently asked to join and work in C. T. grade. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the appointment of respondent i to the post of principal, Government, Deaf and Dumb School was purely temporary and he was liable to be reverted to his post singularly on the premise that the arrangement was made on ad hoc basis. 8. We are unable to agree with such a submission. The impugned order of reversion from the post of Principal, Deaf and Dumb School and to his substantive post in C.T. grade is not an order of reversion simpliciter. 8. We are unable to agree with such a submission. The impugned order of reversion from the post of Principal, Deaf and Dumb School and to his substantive post in C.T. grade is not an order of reversion simpliciter. Indeed there are no words in the order nor does it even betray that it was punitive in character yet we are unable to agree that the impugned order casts no stigma on the respondent 1 as the surrounding circumstances conclusively indicate that the impugned order is punitive in character and is an outcome of misconduct alleged against the respondent 1 and in any case it cannot be urged that such an order was only the outcome of an administrative exigency- Respondent 1 was selected and promoted as Principal after superseding a few seniors and he discharged his duties as Principal with effect from 30th August 1972 for a period of three years. His suitability was proved. It has been submitted on behalf of the Standing Counsel that complaints were received against respondent 1 of having no sympathies with Harijans and was equally ill disposed towards members of the Scheduled Castes. 9. The reversion of the respondent 1 was based on such attributes. The matter was enquired by the Sub-Divisional Officer who himself was a Harijan. The Sub-Divisional Officer conducted the enquiry. Even ex parte hearings were conducted and allegations of misconduct were enquired. 10. Admittedly the respondent 1 was never given any opportunity to rebut the allegations nor was he ever associated with such enquiry into the complaints against him. Acting on the basis of such complaints emerging from such enquiry the Secretary, Harijan and Social Welfare reverted him to his substantive post. It is also stressed on behalf of the learned Standing Counsel that the enquiry was preliminary in character only to find facts. Such an argument is misconceived as the basis of the enquiry and the outcoming report even casts a stigma on the character and working of respondent l. 11. It is also stressed on behalf of the learned Standing Counsel that the enquiry was preliminary in character only to find facts. Such an argument is misconceived as the basis of the enquiry and the outcoming report even casts a stigma on the character and working of respondent l. 11. The impugned order of reversion passed by the Secretary, Harijan and Social Welfare basing the finding of guilt reached at an ex parte enquiry held by the Sub-Divisional Officer must, in the background of the aforesaid facts, be deemed to be violative of Article 311 of the Constitution as no opportunity whatsoever was ever afforded to respondent l to show cause against such complaints and then denying him opportunity of associating with the enquiry. Respondent 1 was robbed of his right to offer an explanation. Respondent l had he been permitted to show cause or allowed to join the enquiry, might have established his innocence. 12. It was next submitted on behalf of the learned Standing Counsel that respondent 1 was only a temporary employee. Such an assertion is again wholly misconceived as protection of Article 311 of the Constitution is equally available to temporary employees as well. 13. Learned Standing Counsel placed reliance on a decision of a learned single Judge reported in 1982 Vol. III U.P. Lawyers' Law Times (Service Cases) 39. We have examined that decision, but find that the same is of no assistance. In that case the position was that the preliminary enquiry was held with a view to judging only the suitability of the petitioner to continue in service while in the instant case the enquiry was in regard to an alleged act of misconduct on the part of the respondent. Further we do not agree that in order that Article 311 of the Constitution may be attracted a formal charge-sheet must precede an order of punishment. The view taken by the learned single Judge runs counter to several Supreme Court decisions (see AIR 1974 SC 2192 ). In this case His Lordship the Chief Justice observed:- ".... Further we do not agree that in order that Article 311 of the Constitution may be attracted a formal charge-sheet must precede an order of punishment. The view taken by the learned single Judge runs counter to several Supreme Court decisions (see AIR 1974 SC 2192 ). In this case His Lordship the Chief Justice observed:- ".... the form of the order is not decisive as to whether the order is by way of punishment and that even an innocuously worded order terminating the service may in the fact and circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry into allegation of serious and grave character of misconduct involving stigma has been made in infraction of the provision of Article 311 (2). It is therefore now well settled that where the form of the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the court before which the order is challenged to go behind the form and ascertain true character of the order. If the Court holds that the order though in the form is merely a determination of employment is in reality a cloak for an order of punishment the court would not be debarred, merely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to the rights conferred by law upon the employee." 14. The above principles have been reiterated in another pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1984 SC 636 , Anoop Jaiswal v. Govt. of India Venkataramiah, J. speaking for the court observed:- "...... Even though the order of discharge may be non-committal, it cannot stand alone. Though the noting in the file of the Government may be irrelevant, the cause for the order cannot be ignored. The recommendation of the Director which is the basis or foundation for the order should be read along with the order for the purpose of determining its true character. If on reading the two together the court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground as the appellant has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Art, 311 (2) of the Constitution." 15. The said decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was followed by Division Bench of this Court reported in 1984 UP LBEC 399 : 1984 Lab IC 1559, V.K. Singh v. Union of India. Justice A. N. Verma speaking for the Court observed: "When an order of discharge is based on an enquiry into specific allegations of misconduct, inefficiency or corruption and the like in contradistinction to a general enquiry which may be conducted by the authority with a view to satisfying himself whether on an account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other failing not involving moral turpitude the petitioner is unsuitable for the job, the order of discharge, though innocent on its face shall amount to an order of punishment so as to attract Article 311 (2)." 16. The above decisions completely cover the controversy in hand. The Tribunal was right in holding that no opportunity having been afforded to the respondent No. 1 before reverting him to the C. T. Grade, the impugned action taken against h m must be struck down as violating Article 311 of the Constitution. 17. In view of the discussion above, the petition has no force and is accordingly dismissed with costs.