JUDGMENT : M. P. Varma, J.-This Second appeal arises out of a decree of reversal. The plaintiff's suit was for eviction of the defendant from the suit property, founded upon two grounds, namely. (i) determination of lease by notice under section 111 (h) of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the T. P. Act') and (ii) determination, of the lease by efflux of time as envisaged under clause (a) of section 111 of the T. P. Act. 2. According to the plaintiff, the purpose of the lease was to carryon miscellaneous business (Vividh Vyawsaya). It was a lease for a fixed period of five years and the tenancy was made effective from 15th of November, 1973. The lease of the premise admittedly was created through two registered documents, one termed as 'Patta' signed by the plaintiff-the lessor alone, marked ext. 2 and the other namely 'Kabuliat' executed by the defendant alone, marked Ext. 4. According to both the documents, the tenancy was to be effective from 15.11.1973 and was to expire on 14.4.1973 (sic). It is thus, obvious that tenancy was intended to expire by efflux of time limited thereby in the two Deeds. It is also the admitted case of the parties that the lease was sought to be terminated by service of notice (marked exts. E. and E/1) which mentioned, though wrongly, the date of commencement of the lease as 9.11.1973, the date of the execution of the two documents. 3. The suit was contested on different grounds and one of the pleas was regarding the validity of the two notices by reference to the 'purpose of tenancy. i. e. whether the lease was for manufacturing purpose or other than that. 4. The trial court took the view that the tenancy being for a fixed term lease, is got determined under section 111 of the T.P. Act which is by efflux of time. The Court therefore, decreed the plaintiff's suit reading the two aforesaid exhibits-the Patta and the Kabuliat (Exts. 2 and 4 respectively) as substantially complying the requirements of law giving rise to a validly created lease. The trial court therefore, ignored the validity of the two notices determining the lease of the suit premises. The defendant was teated as trespasser from 15.11.1978 and granted the decree for eviction and also for damages. 5. 2 and 4 respectively) as substantially complying the requirements of law giving rise to a validly created lease. The trial court therefore, ignored the validity of the two notices determining the lease of the suit premises. The defendant was teated as trespasser from 15.11.1978 and granted the decree for eviction and also for damages. 5. The lower appellate court, however, construed the provisions regarding the making of lease as contained in paragraph 3 of Section 107 of the T. P. Act, held that the two documents being executed unilaterally, one by the lessor alone and the other by the lessee alone, could not conform to the requirements of the above law and hence, could not be accepted to be validly made. The decree therefore, was reversed against which the plaintiff has preferred this appeal. 6. In course of argument, the learned Counsel for the appellant has conceded that the findings of the lower appellate court regarding the invalidity of the lease document could not be challenged, as each One, has been made and executed unilaterally, but laid stress that even if the tenancy was for manufacturing purposes, as contended by the defendant, the two notices determining the lease gave enough of time, rather much more than required by law and hence, the notices (Exts. E and E/1) should be deemed to have been complied with the requirements of law as contained in section 111 (h)/section 106 of the T. P. Act. I am unable to accept the contention, because apparently, the two notices (Exts. E and E/1) are not in strict compliance with the mandatory provisions of section 106 of the T. P. Act, as it is no t that six months' or fifteen days' period should be given to the lessee, as the case may be for determination of the lease in accordance with the purpose of the tenancy; it is also necessary that the said period should expire with the end either of the year of the tenancy or with the end of the month of the tenancy, i. e. to say that at the expiry with the actual date when the tenancy is to expire. I may add here that the mistake in the said notices has been acknowledged by the appellant's counsel. I may add here that the mistake in the said notices has been acknowledged by the appellant's counsel. But he has tried to persuade this court to accept that the real purport emanating from the long period given in the two notices for determining the tenancy has been achieved and the same cannot be said to be defective. Noncompliance of the mandatory provisions, as laid down under section 106 of the T. P. Act makes the two notices invalid. I am therefore, afraid that the contention regarding the validity of the notices on the plea that the lessor gave much more time than required by law cannot validate the two notices, which are initially bad in law and the same therefore, cannot be accepted. 7. As regards the second question, i. e. the two documents (Exts. 2 and 3) conforming to the requirements of section 107 of the T. P. Act, though Counsels for both the sides have very clearly conceded that there are decisions, on which basis the two unilaterally executed documents of lease (Patta and Kabuliat) fall short of the requirements of law as laid down under paragraph 3 of section 107 of the T. P. Act. It has been contended that the law requires that the documents should be executed by both-the lessor and the lessee. True it is that the two documents have been executed unilaterally, that is to say not jointly by the lessor and the lessee, yet it appears to me that it may be deemed to comply substantially with the requirements of law, because though created separately, they, when read togather constitute as one made for the same purpose with regard to the same property, one being the document for transfer of the interest and the other acceptance thereof, for which the lease was created. In a document of lease, there should be a transfer of interest by the lessor under certain terms and the same should be accepted by the lessee as required by section 105 of the T. P. Act and putting the two documents together I feel like accepting that they together constitute as one document, though executed separately and the two documents therefore, appear to meet the requirements of law. Since the appellant's counsel has himself conceded and accepted the invalidity of these two documents, i. e. Patta and the Kabuliat, I do not feel and intend to give any definite finding on this question of law as the same having not been canvassed before me and I leave this question open for an authoritative decision by this Court in any case when it is raised. 8. In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed, but since the appeal has been argued only on the question of law, I do not propose to pass any ORDER :as to costs. Appeal dismissed.