JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - These two petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment as the issues raised therein are substantially identical. The petitioners have assailed the legality of orders passed by the Vice Chancellor of Allahabad University cancelling their admission to certain Post-Graduate Courses of Study. The orders passed by the Vice Chancellor have been communicated to the petitioners by the Registrar of the University on August 24, 1985. 2. The cancellation of both the petitioners' admissions is based on two grounds. First, that the petitioners have remained on the rolls of the University for more than eight years prior to their readmission which was granted to them contrary to an ordinance of the University which provides that the maximum number of years for which a student may remain on the rolls of the University as a regular student for courses other than Ph. D. Degree shall be eight years. Second, that admission was not granted to them by the Director of Admissions, who alone was competent to admit students to the Post Graduate Courses of Study. The contention of the petitioners is that neither of these two grounds is sustainable in law and in any case as no opportunity was afforded to the petitioners the principles of natural justice were clearly violated rendering the impugned orders completely void and ineffectual in law liable, to be quashed by this Court. 3. Learned counsel for the respondents put in appearance in these petitions when they were presented for admission on August 25, 1985. He has also filed counter-affidavits in both the petitions. Before we deal with the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties we will first briefly set out the relevant facts. 4. The petitioner Kamal Singh Yadav was first admitted to the respondent University in B.A. (Part 1) in the academic Session 1972-73. He continued thereafter to prosecute various courses of study from the session 1972-73 up to 1980-81 when he passed LL.B. (III year) Examination as an ex-student. On May 21, 1981 he was rusticated from the University for a period of two years by the order of the then Vice Chancellor on account of his alleged involvement in some occurrence which took place on February, 13, 1981 in the Department of Ancient History, Culture and Archeology. On May 21, 1981 he was rusticated from the University for a period of two years by the order of the then Vice Chancellor on account of his alleged involvement in some occurrence which took place on February, 13, 1981 in the Department of Ancient History, Culture and Archeology. For the year 1981-82, however the petitioner had taken admission for LL.M. (Part I) Course and had also deposited the annual fee and other annual dues but he did not continue his studies after his admission. After a gap of some years. Kamal Singh Yadav made an application on July 27, 1985 stating that he was admitted to the LL.M. (Part I) Course for the session 1981-82 but owing to some personal difficulty he neither appeared at the said examination nor could be complete his attendance. After stating these facts he requested that he be readmitted to the LL.M. (Part I) Course for the session 1983-84 so that he might attend classes and appear at the LL.M. (Part I) Examination as a regular student. Kamal Singh Yadav asserts that after making this application he approached the Chairman of the Admissions Committee Sri R.K. Sinha who told him that he had no authority to grant readmission and that the petitioner may approach the Head of the Department of Law who forwarded the petitioner's application to the Dean of the Faculty of Law who passed an order on July 27, 1985 directing the Head of the Department of Law to admit him. The same day the Head of the Department made an endorsement on the petitioner's application which reads as follows :- "Registrar The Dean has been pleased to admit Shri Kamal Singh Yadav, in LL.M. 1st Year 1983- 84 session. Kindly accept the dues for the year from him." 5. The Head of the Department also made the following endorsement to the Chairman of the Admission Committee as follows : "Sri R.K. Sinha As the Dean has admitted Sri Kamal Singh Yadav in LL.M. (Part I) 1983-84, session issue necessary card to him." 6. The petitioner thereafter stares that since his case was one of readmission the matter was referred to the Acting Vice- Chancellor Dr. T. Pati who passed the following order on August 6, 1985 : "The Agent. State Bank of India Allahabad University Branch, University of Allahabad/Chairman, Admission Committee for LL.M. University of Allahabad. The petitioner thereafter stares that since his case was one of readmission the matter was referred to the Acting Vice- Chancellor Dr. T. Pati who passed the following order on August 6, 1985 : "The Agent. State Bank of India Allahabad University Branch, University of Allahabad/Chairman, Admission Committee for LL.M. University of Allahabad. The admission fees of -Sri Kamal Singh Yadav for admission to the LL.M. (Part I) class may please be deposited in the Allahabad University Branch of the State Bank of India. The necessary certificate of admission may please be issued by the Chairman, Admission Committee for LL.M. University of Allahabad, as desired by the Finance Officer, University of Allahabad. Sd. T. Pati. Acting Vice-Chancellor University of Allahabad." 7. Thereafter it is alleged by the petitioner, the Chairman of the Admission Committee Sri R. K. Sinha calculated the annual dues and other fees of the University and issued the admit card to the petitioner. Thereupon the petitioner deposited the fees on 6-8-85. The petitioner further asserts that after readmission he received his identity card from the University and thus became a bona fide student of the same. At this point it is important to mention that Dr. T. Pati immediately after issuing the aforesaid letter/order dated August 6, 1985 withdrew his instructions to the State Bank by means of a letter dated August 6, 1985 asking it not to allow these two petitioners to deposit the fees as he had after issuing the aforesaid instructions been informed that these two persons might not be genuinely admitted students wide Annexure 6 to the counter affidavit). 8. Throughout his petition Kamal Singh Yadav has asserted that his case was one of readmission and not a fresh admission. The Head of the Department of Law was hence competent to readmit him. Thus in paragraph 10 of his petition it has been stated, "It is further submitted that the case of the petitioner is not of admission but it is a case of readmission and, therefore, it was recommended by the Dean, Faculty of Law, by the Head of the Department of Law and approved by the Chairman of the Admission Committee. Thus in paragraph 10 of his petition it has been stated, "It is further submitted that the case of the petitioner is not of admission but it is a case of readmission and, therefore, it was recommended by the Dean, Faculty of Law, by the Head of the Department of Law and approved by the Chairman of the Admission Committee. It is further submitted that since it is a case of readmission, therefore the matter was placed before the Vice-Chancellor (Acting Vice- Chancellor) who, after examining the case of the petitioner, directed the Chairman of the Admission Committee for LL.M., University of Allahabad, namely, Sri R.K. Sinha, to issue an admission card to the petitioner and upon issuance of admit card by the Chairman of the Admission Committee, the petitioner deposited the requisite fees and other dues calculated by the Chairman of the Admission Committee gamed above." The petitioner further asserts in the petition that as he was once duly admitted in LL.M. (Part I) for the 1981-82 session, he had a vested right to continue and complete his studies in LL.M. (Part I). Consequently, when he was readmitted to that class for the session 1983-84 his admission could not be cancelled by the Vice-Chancellor. 9. As regards the petitioner Bhola Nath Singh, the position is that he made an application on August 3, 1985 stating that he was admitted to the aforesaid class for the session 1981-82 and had also deposited the admission-fee, etc., but for certain reasons he could not get himself enrolled. After stating these facts he made a request that he be admitted to the said course so that he might appear at the M.A. (Previous) Examination in the subject of Hindi. This application was addressed to the Registrar/Head of the Department of Hindi. The latter made an endorsement the same day upon that application to the effect that if the petitioner could be admitted he had no objection. Thereupon the Registrar made a note, again on August 3, 1985 itself, for the consideration of the Director, Admission Committee, to the effect that appropriate orders may be passed on the aforesaid no-objection certificate of the Head of the Department. The Director of Admission Committee forwarded the application to the Vice-Chancellor for appropriate orders on the application presumably on the ground that it being a case of readmission he could not consider the same. The Director of Admission Committee forwarded the application to the Vice-Chancellor for appropriate orders on the application presumably on the ground that it being a case of readmission he could not consider the same. Before, however, the Vice-Chancellor could pass any orders on this application the petitioner made a second application on August 6, 1985 before the Acting Vice-Chancellor. Dr. T. Pati, who was officiating for the Vice-Chancellor, who happened to be on leave on that date, stating that the applicant Bhola Nath Singh had been admitted to the M.A. (Prey) Class but for some reasons he could not deposit his fees this year and requested the Acting Vice-Chancellor to permit him to deposit the fees. The petitioner was obviously referring to his admission in that class made in 1981-82. It is significant that the petitioner did not disclose in this application that he had already submitted his application for his readmission on August 3, 1985. The Acting Vice-Chancellor upon this application issued the following letter addressed to the State Bank of India/Chairman, Admission Committee, M.A. (Part I) Hindi which reads as follows :- "As desired by the Finance Officer, University of Allahabad, the Chairman, Admission Committee M.A. (Part I) (Hindi) may please issue a certificate of admission for enabling Shri Bhola Nath Singh to deposit his fees in the State Bank of India, Allahabad University and enrol himself at the University. Sd. T. Pati, Acting Vice-Chancellor, University of Allahabad 6-8-85." 10. This petitioner too has asserted in the petition that he had a right to be readmitted and having been duly admitted by the orders of the Acting Vice-Chancellor his admission could not be legally cancelled by the Vice-Chancellor. Here again it may be mentioned that Dr. T. Pati, the Acting Vice-Chancellor, had promptly withdrawn the instructions issued to the State Bank of India by means of his letter dated August 6, 1985 referred to above. The Acting Vice-Chancellor had in this letter categorically stated that the petitioners should not be allowed to deposit their fees as it has been brought to his notice that they might not be genuinely admitted candidates. However, instead of depositing the fees in the State Bank of India this petitioner deposited fees in the accounts office of the University on August 9, 1985 as, in the meantime, the strike in the accounts office had been called off on August 7 1985. 11. However, instead of depositing the fees in the State Bank of India this petitioner deposited fees in the accounts office of the University on August 9, 1985 as, in the meantime, the strike in the accounts office had been called off on August 7 1985. 11. In the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents it has been asserted that neither of the two petitioners had any right of readmission to the class in which they had sought readmission on the basis of their previous admission to those classes. The respondent University further contends that in any case as the petitioners were seeking admission to the Post Graduate Classes the same could not be granted by any authority other than the Director, Admissions Committee. It is also the case of the respondent University that both these petitioners had remained on the rolls of the University for more than eight years prior to their readmission and consequently under the Ordinance referred to above the Vice-Chancellor as the Chief Executive Officer of the University rightly, cancelled their admission. 12. Having set out the assertions and counter assertions of the parties we proceed to consider the legal submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. In our opinion, the first and the basic issue to be considered is whether the petitioners had at all any right to claim readmission on the basis of their previous admission to the classes in which they had once been admitted in the past. If this issue is answered against the petitioners we have no doubt that no relief can be granted to them as the right to readmission is the main foundation of the petitioner's claim. It is apparent that if there is no provision entitling the petitioners to claim readmission, their so-called admission cannot but held to be completely void and ineffectual in law, and this Court in its exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would not be justified in quashing an order the result of which would inevitably be restoration of orders which are non est in law. 13. We will, therefore first have a look at the relevant statutory provisions. The Allahabad University is governed by the U.P. State Universities Act. Admissions to the various courses of study are, therefore, regulated by the provisions of the Act. 13. We will, therefore first have a look at the relevant statutory provisions. The Allahabad University is governed by the U.P. State Universities Act. Admissions to the various courses of study are, therefore, regulated by the provisions of the Act. Section 28-of the Act provides that there shall be an admission committee of the University, the constitution of which shall be such as may be provided for in the Ordinance. "The Admission Committee is one of the authorities of the University (vide Section 19). Sub-section (3) of Section 28 provides that the Admission Committee shall lay down the principles or norms governing the policy of admissions to the various courses of study in the University and may also nominate a person or sub- committee as the admitting authority in respect of any course. 14. Under Section 28 of the aforesaid Act, the Admission Committee of the respondent University has been laying down various rules from time to time. On June 25, 1984 the Admission Committee made rules for readmission to classes. Rule 1 in so far as it is relevant for our purposes provides: "1. A student of any class who fails the Examination concerned or after fulfilling the condition of eligibility for appearing at the Examination concerned fails to appear at the same, shall not be eligible for readmission to the class concerned in any subsequent session, but may appear at the Examination in a subsequent session as an ex-student, subject to the Ordinances, regulations and rules governing the admission to Examinations of ex-student." To this rule there is a proviso which makes an exception in the case of students of various classes who may be readmitted to the class if they fail at the examination of various courses of study mentioned therein and the proviso indicates that in those cases the applications for readmission has to be submitted to the Head of the Department for consideration. However, the proviso deals with the subjects or courses of study or examinations other than those in which the petitioners sought readmission and hence the same are not being reproduced here. There is then Rule 2 which is the one which governs the cases of the petitioners. It provides : "2. However, the proviso deals with the subjects or courses of study or examinations other than those in which the petitioners sought readmission and hence the same are not being reproduced here. There is then Rule 2 which is the one which governs the cases of the petitioners. It provides : "2. A student of any Part I/Previous/First Year Class who discontinues his studies after admission or otherwise fails to fulfil the conditions of eligibility for appearing at the Examination concerned, shall not be eligible for readmission to the class in any subsequent session." The next relevant rule is Rule 3 which states- "3. A student of any Part I/Previous/First Year class governed by rules 1 and 2 and above, may apply for admission to the class concerned in a subsequent session as a fresh candidate, on the form prescribed and within the time period notified for such application for fresh candidates. His application for admission shall be considered along with the applications and in accordance with the rules governing the admission, of fresh candidates, and he shall not be entitled to any, special consideration on the ground that he had been admitted to the class concerned in any previous session." 15. It will thus be seen that under the aforesaid rules there is a complete bar to readmission of a student of any Part I/Previous/First Year Class who discontinues his, studies after admission. It very clearly provides that such a student shall not be eligible for readmission to the class in any subsequent session. It is indisputable that both the petitioners fall within the ambit of Rule 2. They were both students of Part I/Previous Classes the one in the subject of Hindi and the other in the LL.M. Both of them had discontinued their studies after admission. They were hence clearly ineligible for readmission to the class in the subsequent session. 16. The above position has been made more explicit by what is stated in Rule 3 quoted above. They were hence clearly ineligible for readmission to the class in the subsequent session. 16. The above position has been made more explicit by what is stated in Rule 3 quoted above. Thus while it permits such students to apply for admission to the aforesaid classes in a subsequent session as a fresh candidate on the prescribed form and within the time period notified for such other fresh candidates, it specifically mandates that their applications for admission shall be considered along with the applications and in accordance with the rules governing the admission of fresh candidates and that they shall not be entitled to any special consideration on the ground that they had been admitted to the class concerned in any previous session. 17. The position which thus emerges from the rules considered above is that the petitioners were not entitled or even eligible for readmission. Now, as noticed above, the clear case of the petitioners is that they had a vested right of readmission because they had already been previously admitted to the class concerned in the previous session, though for some reason they had discontinued their studies. Such a right is not only not countenanced by the rules but is specifically barred. 18. The petitioners have annexed to their petitions copies of their applications for readmission, the contents of which have already been set out hereinabove. They are simple applications for readmission not containing any particulars which are required to be disclosed for fresh admission and of course they are not in the prescribed form. The request for readmission made by the petitioners was made on the sole assertion that they had been admitted to the class concerned in the past in some previous session and on that basis were seeking readmission for which appropriate orders for depositing fees etc. might be issued. The petitioner's applications were neither considered nor processed as applications for fresh admission. 19. Fresh applications involve consideration of factors which are altogether different from a simple application for readmission to classes in which readmission is under the rules permissible. It implies, inter alia, as we shall presently demonstrate with reference to the rules for admission, a comparison of relative merits of all the candidates applying for admission. 20. 19. Fresh applications involve consideration of factors which are altogether different from a simple application for readmission to classes in which readmission is under the rules permissible. It implies, inter alia, as we shall presently demonstrate with reference to the rules for admission, a comparison of relative merits of all the candidates applying for admission. 20. Thus, the general rules laid down by the Admissions Committee in May, 1983, for admission of students to various classes provide that preference will be given to graduates of the current year over graduates of the previous year and that the latter may be considered for admission after discount of their marks in the qualifying examination by 5% of the aggregate secured. Rule 11(2) of these Rules provides that the relative merit of candidates for admission shall be determined in the manner laid down therein. The first divisioners of the Allahabad University and other Universities are given preference over the second divisioners and the second divisioners over the third divisioners and so on. In the case of the admission to LL.M. Classes also there is a similar rule, namely, Rule 19 which provides : "19. Relative merit of candidates for admission to LL.M. classes shall be determined in the following order of categories :- (a) Law graduates of Allahabad University with 60% marks or above at the LL.B. Examination; (b) Law graduates of other Universities with 60% marks or above at the LL.B. Examination. (c) Law graduates of Allahabad University with 55% marks or above at the LL.B. Examination." 21. Likewise, in the rules framed by the Admissions Committee on September 22, 1983, there are provisions which lay down that candidates shall be admitted to Previous/Part I class of the relevant subject strictly in order of merit as determined by the rules. The norms laid down are more or less the same as indicated in the previous rules mentioned above. Fresh graduates are given a preference over the graduates of previous years and in the case of the latter certain marks are deducted while computing their aggregate by way of discount. 22. It will thus be seen that fresh admissions imply altogether different considerations and criteria. The petitioner's applications could not hence be treated as applications for fresh admissions and it is for this reason that the Director of Admissions had expressly declined to consider the same. 23. 22. It will thus be seen that fresh admissions imply altogether different considerations and criteria. The petitioner's applications could not hence be treated as applications for fresh admissions and it is for this reason that the Director of Admissions had expressly declined to consider the same. 23. Sri R.R. Yadav, learned counsel for Sri Kamal Singh Yadav, however, placed reliance on Rule 22(b) of the aforesaid rules for admission framed by the Admissions Committee in May, 1983 and submitted that under that rule readmission to Part I/Previous classes of students who discontinued their studies in the middle of the session is permissible at the discretion of the Heads of the Department or the Deans concerned and inasmuch as Kamal Singh Yadav had been admitted by the Head of the Department of Law, his readmission could not be cancelled by the Vice Chancellor. 24. We are unable to agree. In the first place, Rule 22 shall have no application as these rules have been replaced by 1984 Rules framed by the Admissions Committee on June 25, 1984 mentioned above which deal comprehensively with the entire subject of readmission to classes. Secondly, Rule 22(b) does not countenance learned counsel's submission. Rule 22 in so far as it is relevant provides : "22. Readmission of students to classes shall be regulated by the following rules:- (a) Students who fail in any class or after completing their attendance, fail to appear at the examination due to illness or any other cause will not be readmitted. They can appear in the examination next year as ex-students or they may join some (or all subjects) as casual students, if the Heads of Departments concerned recommend and are willing to take them as casual students. Provided that this rule may be relaxed in specially deserving cases at the discretion of the Head of the Department or the Dean concerned, if there are any vacancies. Provided further that students so admitted shall renounce in writing their right to appear as ex-students and shall undertake to be governed by the Ordinances and rules relating to the attendance requirement governing regular students of the -University. Once readmitted as regular students, they will not be permitted in that session to opt again for appearing as ex-students. Provided further that students so admitted shall renounce in writing their right to appear as ex-students and shall undertake to be governed by the Ordinances and rules relating to the attendance requirement governing regular students of the -University. Once readmitted as regular students, they will not be permitted in that session to opt again for appearing as ex-students. (b) Students of Part I and Previous clause- when discontinue their studies in the middle of the session or students who were detained due to shortage of attendance, are not entitled to be readmitted. They will be treated as fresh applicants and can take their chance along with other applicants at the discretion of the Heads of the Departments or the Dean." 25. In our opinion, clause (b) of Rule 22 does not expressly or by necessary implication provide that the applications for readmission of students of Part I or Previous classes who discontinued their studies in the middle of the session may be considered and allowed as a matter of course without subjecting the same to the process involved in the disposal of applications for fresh admissions. The Rule merely provides that such students will be treated as fresh applicants and they may take their chance along with the other applicants only if the Head of the Department or the Dean of the Faculty concerned allows them to do so. The rule does not mean such students are entitled to any special considerations and that in their case the authority competent to deal with such applications would be Heads of the Department or the Deans concerned. 26. The fresh applications as well as the applications if students who were admitted in the past have all to be considered together by the same authority for it is impossible to conceive that framers of the Rules intended that the fresh applicants and the student of the above category would be dealt with in the matter of admission differently in one case by the' Director of the Admissions Committee, and, in the other, by the Head of the Department or the Dean. 27. In any case, the language of the 1984 Rules quoted above which alone, in our opinion, would govern the cases of the petitioners, is peremptory and unequivocal. It enjoins that such students shall not be eligible for readmission to the class in any subsequent session. 28. 27. In any case, the language of the 1984 Rules quoted above which alone, in our opinion, would govern the cases of the petitioners, is peremptory and unequivocal. It enjoins that such students shall not be eligible for readmission to the class in any subsequent session. 28. We, therefore, hold that neither of the two petitioners was eligible for readmission to the classes in which they sought admission. That being so, their admissions were completely void and ineffectual in law. The proposition that existence of a right is a condition precedent for invoking jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is far too well settled to require elaboration. Thus in D. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka reported in, (1977) 2 SCC 148 at page 152 : AIR 1977 SC 876 at P. 879 their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed- "It is well settled that though Article 226 of the Constitution in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder, the existence of the right is imlicit for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction by the High Court under the said Article." 29. The petitions are hence liable to be dismissed on this ground alone, namely, that the petitioners do not have any right of readmission which was the only right which was claimed by them before the respondent authorities. 30. It is equally well settled that this Court will not, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, issue a writ and quash an order, the result of which would be perpetuation of a gross and manifest illegality and restoration of an order or state of things which are clearly void and prohibited by statutory provisions. We will refer to just one case by way of illustration, namely, Major Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan, (1979) 1 SCC 321 : 1978 All LJ 1217. In this case the petitioner had obtained an administrative review of an order which was not statutorily authorised. The aggrieved party got the said order reviewed and cancelled against which the petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court allowed the writ petition on the ground that there was no provision for review of the order passed earlier. The aggrieved party got the said order reviewed and cancelled against which the petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court allowed the writ petition on the ground that there was no provision for review of the order passed earlier. Against this order an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court which was allowed and the order of the High Court, set aside. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the High Court was not justified in exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction ignoring the fact that the first order itself obtained by the petitioner was without jurisdiction because as there was no provision for review. The position here is exactly similar. The petitioners had no right of readmission but were wrongly and illegally readmitted. It is not difficult to see that the result of quashing of the impugned order passed by the Vice-Chancellor would be perpetuation of an illegality, namely, restoration of readmission of the petitioners which is expressly prohibited under the rules of admission. That being so, we are not persuaded that this is a fit case for interference even if the other contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners prevail. 31. Another ground on which the petition is liable to fail is that their admission was not granted by the Director of the Admissions Committee. In one case it was granted by the Head of the Department of Law and, in the other, by the Acting Vice-Chancellor. Of course the Acting Vice-Chancellor had immediately recalled his order as noticed above. In the petitions we do not find any specific challenge to the fact that the Director of Admissions Committee alone is the authority competent to grant admissions (as distinct from readmission). What has been contended by the petitioners in their petitions is that their was not a case of admission but of readmission which could be granted either by the Head of the Department or by the Acting Vice-Chancellor. The Vice-Chancellor has specifically asserted in his order that the authority competent to admit Post Graduate students was the Director of Admissions Committee. In paragraphs 53,54 and 61 of the counter affidavit filed in the case of Kamal Singh Yadav it has been specifically asserted that the petitioners had not been admitted by the authorities competent to admit them, namely, the Director of Admissions Committee. In paragraphs 53,54 and 61 of the counter affidavit filed in the case of Kamal Singh Yadav it has been specifically asserted that the petitioners had not been admitted by the authorities competent to admit them, namely, the Director of Admissions Committee. We have no reason to doubt the correctness of this assertion. The admissions of the petitioners were hence rightly cancelled by the Vice-Chancellor. As admittedly the petitioners were not admitted by the Director of Admissions we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order on the mere ground that before passing it the petitioners were not given any opportunity. 32. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, vehemently contended that non-observance of principles of natural justice per se renders the impugned orders liable to be quashed even if it is held that the petitioners had no right of readmission or that they had not been admitted by the Director of Admissions. In support, learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, reported in AIR 1981 SC 136 We, however, find that in this very decision their Lordships have observed : "Linked with this question is the question whether the failure to observe natural justice does at all matter if the observance of natural justice would have made no difference, the admitted or indisputable facts speaking for themselves. Where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it approves the non-observance of natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs. But, it will be a pernicious principle to apply in other situations where conclusions are controversial, however, slightly, and penalties are discretionary." 33. Applying the aforesaid dictum we find that in view of the clear legal position that the petitioners are not entitled to readmission and the further fact that the admissions have not been made by the competent authority it would be futile to issue a writ directing the Vice- Chancellor to comply with the principles of natural justice. No authority is competent to readmit the petitioners. Consequently we decline to interfere with the impugned orders in the exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 34. No authority is competent to readmit the petitioners. Consequently we decline to interfere with the impugned orders in the exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 34. Counsel for the petitioners also submitted that the validity of public orders has to be judged in the light of reasons disclosed therein and that we cannot sustain the impugned orders on a ground not disclosed by the Vice-Chancellor in his order, namely; that the petitioner's readmission was void ab initio as there was no provision for their readmission. 35. We are not impressed by the above submission. It is not that we were sustaining the impugned orders on a ground not disclosed therein. We are merely declining to exercise our discretion under Article 226 on a more fundamental ground, namely, that the petitioners did not have any right of readmission and the existence of a legal right being a pre-requisite for the exercise of discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is lacking in the present case, we are not persuaded to exercise our discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 36. Learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted that the Vice-Chancellor is the Chief Executive Officer of the University and if, in the exercise of those powers, the Acting Vice-Chancellor admitted the petitioners, the Vice-Chancellor could not sit in appeal over the order passed by the Acting Vice-Chancellor and nullify the action taken pursuant to the order passed by the Vice- Chancellor. 37. We cannot accept the argument. While it is true that the Vice-Chancellor is the principal executive and academic Officer of the University he cannot exercise powers in a manner which is contrary to the provisions of the Act, Statutes and Ordinances. Further he cannot exercise powers which are specifically vested in other authorities of the University. The power of admissions is vested under Section 28 in the Admissions Committee and the admissions have to be made in accordance with the rules framed by that authority. As the rules expressly prohibit readmission to classes in which the petitioners sought admission, the Acting Vice-Chancellor could not validly direct the readmission of the petitioners. 38. Reliance was placed by Sri R.R. Yadav, learned counsel for Kamal Singh Yadav on Section 66 of the Act. As the rules expressly prohibit readmission to classes in which the petitioners sought admission, the Acting Vice-Chancellor could not validly direct the readmission of the petitioners. 38. Reliance was placed by Sri R.R. Yadav, learned counsel for Kamal Singh Yadav on Section 66 of the Act. It was urged that even if there was any illegality in the readmission of the petitioners the same stood cured as a result of that provision. 39. We are unable to agree. Section 66 merely deals with certain specific situations or defects pertaining to procedure and not to the power of the authorities. Section 66 cannot, in our opinion, cure invalidity of acts arising from a total lack of power. 40. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that the petitioners having been once admitted and allowed to deposit their fees in pursuance of the order passed by the Acting Vice-Chancellor or the Dean or the Head of the Department, the respondent University is estopped from cancelling the same. 41. The contention is entirely devoid of any merit. There can be no estoppel against a statute. Further it has not been demonstrated that as a result of any act of any officer or authority of the University, the petitioner's position has, in any way, been altered in a manner and to the extent which may sustain a plea of estoppel. The readmission of the petitioners (sic) who were not competent to do so. In these circumstances, the plea of estoppel is wholly unsustainable and must be rejected. 42. Learned counsel also submitted that the Vice-Chancellor is guilty of meeting out discriminatory treatment to the petitioners as there were some others also who were similarly situated whose re-admissions have not been cancelled by the Vice-Chancellor. 43. We are unable to agree. The averments made by the petitioners in this connection are too vague and general to merit any serious consideration. Kamal Singh Yadav has alleged that three students mentioned by him have remained on the rolls of the University since 1969 and the Ordinance has not been applied to them by the Vice-Chancellor. He had not mentioned the details as regards for how many years these students have been on the rolls as regular students. Another allegation is that the cases of the petitioner and Sri Ashish Pandya are similar but the latter has been readmitted to M. Sc. (First Year) Maths. He had not mentioned the details as regards for how many years these students have been on the rolls as regular students. Another allegation is that the cases of the petitioner and Sri Ashish Pandya are similar but the latter has been readmitted to M. Sc. (First Year) Maths. These allegations have been denied in the counter affidavit in which it is asserted that their cases are not similar. It has not been stated by the petitioner as to who admitted Ashish Pandya and whether this fact has been brought to the notice of the Vice-Chancellor. In any case, the allegations are non-specific and cannot constitute a valid ground for inferring discrimination. 44. Finally, counsel submitted that as no date has been fixed under Section 52(5) of the Act by the Executive Council as to the date with effect from which the Ordinance shall have effect, the petitioner's admission could not be cancelled on the basis of the Ordinance. It was also urged that in any case the petitioners have not yet completed eight years on the rolls of the University as regular students. The vires of the Ordinance was also challenged. 45. Counsel for the respondent University, on the other hand, submitted that even if it be assumed that the Executive Council had not specifically fixed any date under Section 52(5) of the Act with effect from which the Ordinance shall have effect, the date on which the Executive Council passed the resolution should be taken as the date on which the Ordinance came into force. He also contended that both the petitioners had completed eight years in the, University as regular students and hence they could not be validly admitted. Counsel further maintained that the Ordinance does not violate any provision of the Constitution of India. 46. We are refraining from expressing any opinion on these submissions as, in our opinion, the impugned orders have been passed on the petitioner's applications for readmission. For the present the controversy was hence confined only to the question whether the petitioners had a right of readmission. The petitioners have not yet applied for fresh admission. The impugned orders must necessarily be deemed to relate only to the readmission of the petitioners. For the present the controversy was hence confined only to the question whether the petitioners had a right of readmission. The petitioners have not yet applied for fresh admission. The impugned orders must necessarily be deemed to relate only to the readmission of the petitioners. In this view, we consider it unnecessary to express any opinion whether the Ordinance has validly come into force or whether the petitioners have already completed eight years in the University. These are questions which will be gone into by the authority competent to consider cases of admissions to the classes concerned, if and when the petitioners choose to apply for fresh admissions. We however, make it clear that the competent authority shall consider the various pleas raised by the learned counsel on the applicability and validity of the Ordinance influenced by the observations made by the Vice-Chancellor in the impugned orders in regard to the petitioners. 47. In the result, both the petitions fail and are dismissed. But we make no order as to costs.