ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - Shorn of unnecessary details brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the appellate authority decided the dispute against the petitioner ex parte on 13-12-1974. Against the aforesaid order revision petitions were filed and they were dismissed by the revisional court through its order dated 8-10-1976 as is evident from Annexure `A' attached with the writ petition. During the pendency of the revision petitions it appears that the petitioner had moved an application for setting aside the ex parte appellate order dated 13-12-1974 on 20-2-1976. De-notification of the village under S. 52, U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, took place on 12-2-1975. The appellate authority dismissed the application for setting aside the ex parte order dated 13-12-1974 through its order dated 7-12-1976. Against this order the petitioner preferred revision petitions which have been dismissed through the order dated 23-9-1977. Aggrieved by the orders of the appellate authority and the revisional court the petitioner had approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The writ petition was allowed by me on 3-8-1983, but that order was recalled because there was no proper service upon the contesting opposite party in the writ petition. Now the counsel for the parties have been heard. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner, adopted the reasonings in my judgment dated 3-8-1983 and has contended that the impugned judgments of the appellate authority and the revisional court deserve to be quashed. 3. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that when the order dated 3-8-1983 has been recalled, it should not be looked into and the case should be decided ignoring the reasonings in that judgment. According to the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party the writ petition is not maintainable. He has stressed that by the impugned judgment of the revisional court a number of revision petitions were dealt with and all the parties, who were before the revisional court, have not been impleaded in the present writ petition; therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. Second submission made on behalf of the contesting opposite party is to the effect that the appellate order dated 13-12-74 had merged in the order dated 8-10-1976 passed by the revisional court; therefore, the impugned judgments do not suffer from patent errors of law and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. Second submission made on behalf of the contesting opposite party is to the effect that the appellate order dated 13-12-74 had merged in the order dated 8-10-1976 passed by the revisional court; therefore, the impugned judgments do not suffer from patent errors of law and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. Third submission on behalf of the contesting opposite party is to the effect that the writ petition is not maintainable because the provisions of paras 128 and 131, U.P. Gaon Sabha and Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti Manual, had not been complied with nor the counsel for the petitioner were duly authorised by the Land Management Committee, therefore, the writ petition should be dismissed. 4. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. I am unable to accept the contentions of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that the writ petition is not maintainable for non-compliance of the provisions of paras 128 and 131, U.P. Gaon Sabha and Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti Manual. 5. A learned single Judge of this Court in 1965 Rev Dec 349 : 1965 All LJ 858 Land Management Committee Nainu Patti v. Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad had indicated that: "Para 131, Gaon Samaj Manual is only a direction given by the State Government to the land Management Committee and had not the force of Statutory law. Non-compliance of it cannot be considered to be fatal to the presentation of the writ petition or the appointment of a private Counsel for the Land Management Committee. The High Court will not go into the question when there is no legal prohibition in the Act or the Rules made in this respect for engaging a private counsel for the conduct of litigation on behalf of the Gaon Samaj so far as the High Court is concerned." Therefore, I think that the contention of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has no force as regards non-maintainability of the writ petition due to non-compliance of para 131. Gaon Samaj Manual. 6. So far as the non-compliance of para 128, Gaon Samaj Manual, is concerned I think that the petitioner is sponsoring the cause of general public and there is a resolution authorising Sri Sagar Ram Pradhan to do pairvi in the writ petition, 44 of 1978 (see Annexure `2' attached with the rejoinder affidavit). Gaon Samaj Manual. 6. So far as the non-compliance of para 128, Gaon Samaj Manual, is concerned I think that the petitioner is sponsoring the cause of general public and there is a resolution authorising Sri Sagar Ram Pradhan to do pairvi in the writ petition, 44 of 1978 (see Annexure `2' attached with the rejoinder affidavit). The writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground that the provisions of para 128, Gaon Samaj Manual, had not been complied with. To my mind substantial complinace has been made and the writ petition does not deserve to be thrown out on that ground. 7. In 1981 Rev Dec 1 : 1980 UPLT NOC 160 Gaon Sabha v. Ram Karan Singh, a learned single Judge of this Court at page 7, column 1, para 1 has observed that:- "The discussion made above would show that neither was a resolution of the Gaon Sabha required for filing the appeal nor was any written authority needed to do so. From the language employed in para 128, Gaon Samaj Manual, it appears to me that it would not otherwise apply to an appeal which is filed on behalf of the Gaon Sabha in this Court." 8. To my mind the above observation applies with greater force in the case of the writ petition before this Court. Hence I repel the contention of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that the writ petition should be dismissed for non-compliance of paras 128 and 131, Gaon Samaj Manual. 9. The first submission of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the circumstances that the petitioner has not impleaded the other persons who were before the revisional court in different revision petitions. I think that this contention has also no force in the circumstances of the present case. The subject matter of the dispute in the present writ petition is between the petitioner and the contesting opposite party Ganesh. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has emphasised that the claim of the parties can be decided by the revisional court even if the other parties in the different revision petitions are not before the revisional court. The subject matter of the dispute in the present writ petition is between the petitioner and the contesting opposite party Ganesh. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has emphasised that the claim of the parties can be decided by the revisional court even if the other parties in the different revision petitions are not before the revisional court. Since the cases before the revisional court were separate revision petitions, I am not, prima facie, satisfied with the submission of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that the present writ petition is defective and cannot proceed in the absence of other persons in different revision petitions before the revisional court. However, the revisional court would be at liberty to deal with the claim of the contesting opposite party Ganesh on this score when it is called upon to determine the claims of the parties in the present writ petition. If the equities between the parties in revision petitions 606 and 209 of Gaon Sabha v. Ganesh, cannot be determined in the absence of the other parties in different revision petitions the revisional court may not grant relief to the petitioner Gaon Sabha, but it would not be proper to dismiss the present writ petition for non-impleadnient of persons in different revision petitions specially when the case giving rise to the present writ petition is separate one before the revisional court. In view of the aforesaid discussions the first contention raised on behalf of the contesting opposite party fails. 11. Now as regards the second contention the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has placed reliance upon a large number of rulings such as AIR 1915 All 2, Mathura Prasad v. Ram Charan Lal, AIR 1934 All 134, Gauri Shankar Bhargava v. Jagat Narain Shahgal, AIR 1921 Oudh 141, Mahabali Parshad v. Balbhaddar Singh AIR 1929 Oudh 35 Girdhari Lal v. Dy. Comntr., Gonda; AIR 1954 Madhya Bharat 4, Balbhim Rao v. Alakh Murari Lal; AIR 1967 Bom 310 , Kantilal Khobabhan Patel v. Chiba Bava Bhandari. Comntr., Gonda; AIR 1954 Madhya Bharat 4, Balbhim Rao v. Alakh Murari Lal; AIR 1967 Bom 310 , Kantilal Khobabhan Patel v. Chiba Bava Bhandari. On this count the main grievance of the learned counsel for the opposite party is that the order of the appellate authority dated 31-12-1974 has been confirmed by the revisional court through its order dated 8-10-1976 on the ground that the revision petition was not maintainable, therefore, the order of the appellate authority dated 31-12-1974 had merged in the order of the revisional court dated 8-10-1976. It has been contended that the appellate authority and the revisional court were fully justified in dismissing the restoration application because the revision against the ex parte order had already been dismissed. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party emphasised the theory of merger and pointed out that the impugned orders do not suffer from any error of law, therefore, the writ petition should be dismissed. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to the rulings reported in AIR 1924 Cal 830 Kalimuddin Ahamad v. Esabakuddin, AIR 1945 All 352 Ram Rakhan v. Govind Das, AIR 1977 Cal 372 Mira Rani Dey v. Namita Goswami; 1979 All CJ 212 Dr. Charan Singh v. District Judge, Bareilly and has contended that the theory of merger of the appellate order in the order of the revisional court dated 8-10-1976 would not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 13. I have gone through the rulings cited by the counsel for the parties. It is not necessary to deal with them. In the present case the order of the revisional court dated 8-10-1976 is to the effect that the revision petition was not maintainable due to the circumstance that de-notification of the village under S. 52 of U.P.C.H. Act had taken place; therefore, there is no decision of the revisional court on merit of the claim put forward before it. Since there is no adjudication of the claims of the parties by the revisional court, no question of merger of the appellate order in the order of the revisional court arises in the circumstances of this case. The revisional court in its order dated 23-9-1977 has patently erred in holding that the order dated 8-10-1976 would be final between the parties. The revisional court in its order dated 23-9-1977 has patently erred in holding that the order dated 8-10-1976 would be final between the parties. It has failed to appreciate that the scope of the revision decided on 8-10- 76 was quite different from the scope of the revision being dealt within the impugned order. The revisional court has not indicated in the impugned order as to whether the petitioner was entitled to condonation of delay in preferring the restoration application. Since the revisional court has not dealt with the merits of the restoration application I think its order suffers from patent error of law and deserves to be quashed. 14. It is also noteworthy that the order dated 8-10-76 is not in consonance with the decision of this Court reported in AIR 1973 All 411 Dilawar Singh v. Gram Samaj and AIR 1973 All 414 Ram Bahadur v. Dy. Director of Consolidation. However, that order has not been challenged by the petitioner within reasonable time, therefore, it would not be proper to quash that order in the present writ petition. Even erroneous decision would be final between the parties, but in the present case the order dated 8-10-1976 would be construed as no revision lay against the order of the appellate authority dated 31-12-1974. The question involved in that revision petition was about the merits of the ex parte order but in the revision petition giving rise to the present writ petition the controversy centres round whether there exists sufficient cause for the absence of the petitioner on 31-12-1974 and whether the petitioner is entitled to condonation of delay in preferring the restoration application. Therefore, the scope of the revision petition giving rise to the present writ petition is different from the scope of the revision petition dealt with by the revisional court through its order dated 8-10-1976. In my opinion the order dated 8-10-1976 cannot work as an impediment in the way of the revisional court to decide the claims of the petitioner regarding the application for setting aside the ex parte order dated 31-12-1974. 15. In the result the writ petition succeeds in part and the impugned judgment of the revisional court dated 23-9-1977 is hereby quashed and the revisional court is directed to re-examine the claims of the petitioner regarding setting aside the ex parte order dated 31-12-1974 in the light of the observations made above. 15. In the result the writ petition succeeds in part and the impugned judgment of the revisional court dated 23-9-1977 is hereby quashed and the revisional court is directed to re-examine the claims of the petitioner regarding setting aside the ex parte order dated 31-12-1974 in the light of the observations made above. The observations made in the ruling reported in 1981 Rev Dec 307 : 1981 UPLT NOC 207 Shyam Narain Rai v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Ballia would also be taken note of. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.