ORDER V.K. Mehrotra, J. - Swami Nagar is a mohalla in Dayalbagh which is a religious colony in district Agra. Dayalbagh is a Town area. Regulated Area Dayal Bagh was constituted for Dayalbagh under S. 3 of the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958 (for convenience, the Act) and a Master plan is said to have been proposed for the Regulated Area Dayalbagh. Swami Nagar Nagrik Parishad (briefly, the Parishad) is said to be a welfare- unit for looking after the welfare of the residents of Swami Nagar. There is a registered Society known as Allora Sahkari Avas Samiti Limited (hereafter, the Samiti) which is said to be a housing society. On Aug. 9, 1983 it submitted a plan for sanction to the Prescribed Authority, Dayalbagh Regulated Area with a view to develop certain plots as a Housing colony. 2. The Samiti submitted the layout plan, last amended on Oct. 6, 1982, under S. 7 of the Act to Prescribed Authority which did not pass any order under S. 7(3) granting permission or communicated any objection to the Samiti. On Jan. 12, 1983, a written notice was given by the Samiti to the Prescribed Authority under S. 7(4). The notice was served but the Prescribed Authority did not pass or communicate any order. Its sanction to the layout plan was, therefore, assumed to have been made by the Samiti. The Samiti says that it had informed the Prescribed Authority that it was going ahead with the layout plan through its letter of July 2, 1983 upon which by letter of July, 28, 1983, the Prescribed Authority informed it that it could continue with its development work on certain conditions specified in the letter. The Samiti further says that it entered into an agreement with the Prescribed Authority on Aug. 9, 1983. 3. The President and Secretary of the Parishad filed an appeal under.S. 15(2) of the Act before the Controlling Authority against the Permission said to have been accorded by the Prescribed Authority on Aug. 9, 1983 to the layout plan submitted by the Samiti. This was on Oct. 21, 1983. It has been asserted in .he memorandum of appeal that the order came to the knowledge of the appellant on Oct. 15, 1983. The appeal was allowed by the Controlling Authority on June 1, 1984 and the permission granted by the Prescribed Authority on Aug. This was on Oct. 21, 1983. It has been asserted in .he memorandum of appeal that the order came to the knowledge of the appellant on Oct. 15, 1983. The appeal was allowed by the Controlling Authority on June 1, 1984 and the permission granted by the Prescribed Authority on Aug. 9, 1983 was cancelled. The Samiti assailed the appellate order before this Court in Writ Petn. No. 7935 of 1984. The respondents in that writ petition, which included the President and Secretary of the Parishad, were given notice that the petition would be disposed of finally at the admission stage. Parties exchanged affidavits. On Aug. 23, 1984 the writ petition was dismissed on the ground that the Samiti had a clear efficacious alternative remedy by way of revision under S. 15-A of the Act to the State Government against the order of the Controlling Authority dated June 1, 1984 by which it had set aside the permission granted by the Prescribed Authority on Aug. 9, 1983. The judgment is reported in 1984 All LJ 1259. A revision was filed by the Samiti before the State Government against the order of the Controlling Authority under S. 15-A of the Act. The President and Secretary of the Parishad were made parties to it. The State Government heard the parties and by its order of June 15, 1985 allowed the revision. It held that the appeal filed by the President and Secretary of the Parishad before the Controlling Authority on Oct. 21, 1983 was barred by limitation. The Controlling Authority could not, therefore, interfere with the order passed by the Prescribed Authority on Aug. 9, 1983. The order of the Controlling Authority was set aside with the result that the order passed by the Prescribed Authority revived. The Parishad, as also its President and Secretary, then came to this Court for relief through the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Samiti is respondent No. 5 in the petition. It appeared, when the petition was presented through its counsel and later filed counter-affidavit. The petitioners filed their rejoinder affidavit and as jointly prayed, by the counsel for both the parties, the matter was heard at length at the admission stage and is being disposed of finally. 4. The order of the State Government dated June 15, 1985, is annexure 7 to the writ petition. The petitioners filed their rejoinder affidavit and as jointly prayed, by the counsel for both the parties, the matter was heard at length at the admission stage and is being disposed of finally. 4. The order of the State Government dated June 15, 1985, is annexure 7 to the writ petition. Prior to it, on May 17, 1985 the State Government passed an order disposing of a preliminary objection raised on behalf of the parishad to the maintainability of the revision. This order is annexure `6' to the petition. The State Government has taken the view that the order of Aug. 9, 1983 could be challenged in an appeal filed within thirty days thereof, and inasmuch as, the appeal was admittedly filed on Oct. 21, 1983 before the Controlling Authority, it was barred by limitation. The State Government held that the Controlling Authority was in error in condoning the delay in the presentation of the appeal under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, Section 5 was not available to Controlling Authority and that there was no prayer made on behalf of the appellant for condonation of delay. The Controlling Authority was not right in suo motu condoning the delay. As also, that the Controlling Authority had no power of condoning the delay in the presentation of the appeal, which was filed under S. 15(2) of the Act, which was a special Act under the Act itself. 5. At the outset an objection of Sri G. N. Verma, appearing for the Samiti, deserves notice. The objection is that the grant of sanction to the layout plan by the Prescribed Authority was in the nature of a deemed permission under S. 7(4) of the Act against which no appeal is provided under S. 15(2). Particular stress has been laid on sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 15 which read thus : "15. Orders granting or refusing permission to be final (1) Any order made under sub-sec. (2) of S. 7 refusing or granting any permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (2) be final and shall not be questioned in any court. Particular stress has been laid on sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 15 which read thus : "15. Orders granting or refusing permission to be final (1) Any order made under sub-sec. (2) of S. 7 refusing or granting any permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (2) be final and shall not be questioned in any court. (2) Any person aggrieved by an order under S. 7 refusing or granting permission or by an order under S. 7-A, cancelling a permission or by an order under S. 10 directing demolition of any construction or by the initiation of prosecution for any offence punishable under this Act may within thirty days from the date of such order prefer an appeal to the Controlling Authority and the order of the Controlling Authority shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court." 6. This objection is not open to the Samiti in the present writ petition. In the earlier writ petition. No. 7935 of 1984: reported in 1984 All LJ 1259 (Allora Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. v. Controlling Authority Agra the decision of this Court dated August 23, 1984 inter-parties is that the prescribed Authority had approved the layout plan submitted by the Samiti by order dated Aug. 9, 1983 against which an appeal taken to the Controlling Authority by the President and Secretary of the Parishad was allowed by an order of June 1, 1984 cancelling the permission granted by the Prescribed Authority. The Samiti was directed to challenge the appellate order of the Controlling Authority in a revision before the State Government. The judgment of this Court, which has admittedly become final contains the following observation :- "....... In the instant case from the facts on record, it is clear that the petitioner himself applied to the Prescribed authority for sanction of the plan which implied that he wanted permission for development of the site in the regulated area. It is this permission which was granted to the petitioner by an order dated 9th Aug. 1983 and the respondents filed an appeal under S. 15 of the Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appeal against the order dated 9th Aug. It is this permission which was granted to the petitioner by an order dated 9th Aug. 1983 and the respondents filed an appeal under S. 15 of the Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appeal against the order dated 9th Aug. 1983 was not maintainable before the Controlling Authority as the order sanctioning plan and granting permission to the petitioner was nothing else but an order passed under S. 7 of the Act." The finding aforesaid is binding between the parties and for the disposal of this writ petition, it will have to be accepted that there was an order passed under S. 7 on Aug. 9, 1983 against which an appeal was filed under S. 15(2) by the President and Secretary of the Parishad. 7. The objection that the President and Secretary of the Parishad were not aggrieved persons within the meaning of the Act and had no locus standi to file appeal before the Controlling Authority, was pressed with some emphasis by Sri G. N. Verma before me. This objection was raised in the earlier Writ Petn. No. 7935 of 1984 (reported in 1984 All LJ 1259) also but this Court did not go into the objection as it felt that the question could clearly be gone into by the State Government while dealing with the revision. The objection can be appreciated better (Sic) first some provisions. 8. The U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958 is "an Act to provide for the regulation of building operations in Uttar Pradesh" and in its preamble states that : "Whereas, it is expedient to provide for the regulation of building operations with a view to prevent haphazard development of urban and rural areas : It is hereby enacted in the Ninth Year of the Republic of India as follows." Under S. 3 the State Government is authorised to declare an area to be regulation area "if, in the opinion of the State Government any area within U.P. requires to be regulated.... with a view to the prevention of bad laying out of land, haphazard erection of buildings or growth of sub-standard colonies or with a view to the development and expansion of that area according to proper planning...... with a view to the prevention of bad laying out of land, haphazard erection of buildings or growth of sub-standard colonies or with a view to the development and expansion of that area according to proper planning...... `Development' has been defined in S. 2(e) to mean "the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land or the making of any material change in any building or land." S. 5 empowers the State Government, by notification in the Gazette, to issue such Regulations not inconsistent with the Act or with the Rules as it may consider necessary regarding the matters mentioned in the section in relation to the regulated area. Under S. 5- A, the State Government can cause a Master Plan to be prepared in case it is of opinion that any regulated area requires to be developed according to the Master Plan. Section 6 then says that "no person shall undertake or carry out the development of any site in regulated area or erect, re-erect or make any material change in any building... except in accordance with the regulations, if any, issued under the Act and with previous permission of the prescribed authority in writing. "Prescribed Authority" has been defined in S. 2(g) to mean `a person or body of persons appointed as such by the State Government in respect of a regulated area'. Section 7, in so far as it is material, reads thus :- "7. Application for permission. - (1) Every person desiring to obtain- the permission referred to in S. 6 shall make an application in writing to the prescribed authority in such form and containing such information as may be prescribed in respect of the development, building, excavation or means of access to which the application relates. (2) On receipt of such application the Prescribed Authority, after making such inquiry as it considers necessary, shall by order in writing either grant the permission subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order or refuse to grant such permission. (2) On receipt of such application the Prescribed Authority, after making such inquiry as it considers necessary, shall by order in writing either grant the permission subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order or refuse to grant such permission. (2A) The only grounds on which permission may be refused are the following, namely : - (a) That the work or the use of the site for the work or any of the particulars comprised in the site plan, ground plan, elevations, sections, or specifications, would contravene the provisions of any law or any order, rule or regulation made under this Act or any other law; (b) that the application for such permission does not contain the prescribed particulars or is not made or signed in the prescribed manner; (c) that any information or document required by the prescribed authority under the rules or regulations has not been duly furnished; (d) that the proposed building would be an encroachment upon any public premises as defined in the Uttar Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972; (e) that the site of such buildings does not about on a street, and there is no access to such building from any such street by a passage or pathway not less than twelve feet wide appertaining to such site; (f) that the site for the work forms part of the area, the layout plan of which has not been sanctioned; (g) that the use of the proposed building or the plan is not in conformity with the Master Plan. (3) Where permission is refused, the grounds of such refusal shall be communicated to the applicant in such manner as may be prescribed within ninety days of the receipt of such application. (4) Where no orders are communicated within the period mentioned in sub-s. (3) granting or refusing the permission, the applicant may by a written communication call the attention of the prescribed authority to the omission or neglect, and if such omission or neglect continues for a further period of thirty days the prescribed authority shall be deemed to have permitted the proposed work : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be construed to authorise any person to act in contravention of the Regulations issued under this Act." Section 7-A then provides that "7-A. Cancellation of permission obtained under fraud. - If at any time, after a permission has been granted under sub-sec. (2) of S. 7, the prescribed authority is satisfied that such permission was granted in consequence of any material misrepresentation made or any fraudulent statement or information furnished, the prescribed authority may cancel such permission for reasons to be recorded in writing and any work done thereunder shall be deemed to have been done without such permission." Section 9 provides for penalties for breach of the provisions of the Act and S. 10 enables the prescribed authority to direct demolition of a building in certain cases. Section 15, which has been read in its material part earlier, makes an order granting or refusing permission under S. 7 to be final subject to an order passed in an appeal under sub-sec. (2). S. 15-A enables the State Government to revise an order passed by the Controlling Authority. It reads thus :- "15-A. Revisional powers of State Government. - (1) The State Government may, at any time either of its own motion or on an application made to it in this behalf, call for the record of any case disposed of by the Controlling Authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed under this Act and may pass such orders in relation thereto as it may think fit : Provided that the State Government shall not pass an order prejudicial to any person without affording such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (2) The State Government may, by notification in the Gazette delegate the powers conferred upon it by sub-sec. (1) to any officer or authority who shall not be inferior to the Chairman of the Controlling Authority." 9. The provisions of the Act have been given overriding effect in S. 17. Section 19 empowers the State Government to frame rules and regulations to carry out the purpose of the Act. 10. The scheme of the Act is clear. Its object is to regulate and control development of building activities within a regulated area. Permission of the Prescribed Authority must be obtained by a person before undertaking or carrying on development of any site or erection etc. of any building in the regulated area. The permission is to be sought by making an application in the prescribed form. Its object is to regulate and control development of building activities within a regulated area. Permission of the Prescribed Authority must be obtained by a person before undertaking or carrying on development of any site or erection etc. of any building in the regulated area. The permission is to be sought by making an application in the prescribed form. Permission must be granted or refused by an order in writing and where it is refused, the grounds of refusal are to be communicated to the applicant in the prescribed manner within ninety days of the receipt of the application. Where orders are not communicated within ninety days, the applicant seeking permission may call the attention of the prescribed authority to its omission or neglect by a written communication and if the prescribed authority persists with its omission or neglect for a further period of thirty days, it is to be deemed to have permitted the proposed work. The Prescribed Authority may cancel the permission if it is satisfied that it was granted in consequence of any material misrepresentation or fraudulent statement or information furnished to it. The order granting or refusing permission under S. 7(2) can be challenged in appeal under S. 15 by any person aggrieved by it. Finality attaches to an order made under sub-sec. (2) of S. 7 granting or refusing permission subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of S. 15. This is provided in S. 15(2). 11. An applicant seeking permission of the prescribed authority under S. 7 may be aggrieved by its refusal. He would not be aggrieved by the grant of permission. Yet the grant of permission has been made subject to challenge in an appeal. Obviously a person other than the one applying for the permission may be aggrieved by an order granting permission. He can maintain an appeal under S. 15(2). In the absence of an appeal, the grant or refusal of permission by an order made under S. 7(2) would become final. But where there is an appeal, it is the order of the appellate authority i.e. the Controlling Authority which has been made final. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 15 gives a right of appeal to any person aggrieved by an order under S. 7 granting permission whether the grant is made under sub-sec. (2) of S. 7 or is deemed to have been made under sub-sec. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 15 gives a right of appeal to any person aggrieved by an order under S. 7 granting permission whether the grant is made under sub-sec. (2) of S. 7 or is deemed to have been made under sub-sec. (4) of S. 7. That is clear by the language of sub-sec. (2) which does not confine the order against which the appeal would lie only to an order made under sub-sec. (2) of S. 7 unlike S. 15(1) which specifically refers to S. 7(2). 12. Counsel for the Samiti urges that a person -may be aggrieved by the grant of permission whose personal rights may be pre-judicially affected by the grant. He can be a person whose property may be adversely affected by the proposed development in regard to which permission was sought and granted. He may be a person who may be claiming interest in the land in respect whereof permission has been granted. But some injury must be caused to his own rights before he can claim to be a person aggrieved by the grant of permission. Reliance has been placed, in support of this submission, upon a decision of Queen's Bench Division in Buxton v. Minister of Housing and Local Govt., (1960) 3 All ER 408, There, the owners and occupiers of certain land applied under S. 14 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947 to Saffron Walden Rural District Council, a local authority, for permission to develop their land by digging chalk. The permission was refused by the local authority. An appeal against this refusal was taken to the Minister of Housing and Local Government under S. 16 of the Act and an inquiry was got made by the Minister into the refusal. At this inquiry apart from the applicants, the local authority and four landholders whose land was adjacent to that of the applicants and was being used for agricultural and residential purposes were permitted to lead evidence and were heard. The Minister did not accept the report submitted by the Inspector who had made the inquiry and allowed the appeal. He gave reasons for his decision. The local authority did not challenge the decision of the Minister but the landowners whose land adjoined the land where the development was to be made, filed an appeal under S. 31 of the Town and Country Planning Act. He gave reasons for his decision. The local authority did not challenge the decision of the Minister but the landowners whose land adjoined the land where the development was to be made, filed an appeal under S. 31 of the Town and Country Planning Act. That section permitted a person aggrieved by any action on the part of the Minister to question the validity of his action on certain grounds. A preliminary objection was raised to the maintainability of the appeal filed by the landowners on the ground that they were not the persons aggrieved. Salmon, J., who wrote the judgment of the Queen's Bench, while upholding the preliminary objection, observed, inter alia, that : "Superficially there is much to be said for the view that the applicants (landowners of adjoining land) are aggrieved by the Minister's action.......... If I could approach this problem free from authority, without regard to the scheme of the town and country planning legislation and its historical background, the arguments in favour of the applicants on the preliminary point would be most persuasive, if not, compelling.....The scheme of the town and country planning legislation, in my judgment, is to restrict development for the benefit of the public, whether they live close to or far from the proposed development. The legislature made the local planning authority, under the general supervision of the Minister, custodians of the public rights. It is plain from S. 16 of the Act of 1947 that if the local planning authority grant permission for development, there can be no appeal to the Minister of any kind. It is only if the local planning authority refuses permission or grants it on unacceptable terms that the applicant for planning permission may appeal to the Minister. It would be strange indeed if the present applicants who would have had no right of appeal to the Minister from the local authority's grant of planning permission, nevertheless have the right to apply to the Courts from the Ministers grant of planning permission. I doubt whether the present applicants had any legal right to appear at the inquiry ........" "In my judgment, the Minister's action which these applicants seek to challenge infringed none of their common law rights. They have no rights as individuals under the Statutes. I doubt whether the present applicants had any legal right to appear at the inquiry ........" "In my judgment, the Minister's action which these applicants seek to challenge infringed none of their common law rights. They have no rights as individuals under the Statutes. Accordingly, in my judgment, none of their legal rights has been infringed, and in these circumstances it could not, in my view, have been the intention of the legislature to enable them to challenge the Minister's decision in the Courts............" "Apart from the authority and the scheme of the town and country planning legislation, there is, as I have already indicated, much to be said for the view that in ordinary parlance the applicants whose amenities may be spoilt and the value of whose land may be diminished by the proposed development are persons aggrieved by the Minister's decision. I, however, must apply the principle to which I have referred and I must have regard to the general scheme of the legislation. The relevant statutes, in my judgment, confer no right on the applicants as individuals. Accordingly, none of their legal rights has been infringed and no legal obligation has been imposed on them by the Minister's action." 13. The principle which has been accepted by the Queen's Bench in this decision is that before a person can be said to be `aggrieved person', there should be infringement of his own legal right. 14. The question was examined at great length by our-Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 , After noticing the view taken by English and American Courts in this respect, the Supreme Court chose to expand the ambit of persons who could be said to be having the right to assail an action of the State or a public authority. It laid down that apart from a person who complains of a specific legal injury suffered by him or a determinate class or group of persons, a member of public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty or from violation of some provisions of the Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and observance of such constitutional or legal provision. In other words, the Supreme Court recognised the fact that a public injury, distinct from a personal legal injury, can also enable a member of public having sufficient interest to seek redress before a Court of law. Dealing with the question of what would be sufficient interest to give standing to a member of the public, the Supreme Court observed (in para 19-A of the report) that : "....It is for this reason that in public interest litigation - litigation undertaken for the purpose of redressing public injury, enforcing public duty, protecting social, collective, `diffused' rights and interests or vindicating public interest, any citizen who is acting bona fide and who has sufficient interest has to be accorded standing. What is sufficient interest to give standing to a member of the public would have to be determined by the Court on each individual case. It is not possible for the Court to lay down any hard and fast rule or any strait-jacket formula for the purpose of defining or delimiting `sufficient interest'. It has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the Court." It, however, made it clear (in para 18 of the report) that : - The strict rule of standing which insists that only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury can maintain an action for judicial redress is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives standing to any member of the public who is not a mere busybody or a meddlesome interloper but who has sufficient interest in the proceeding." The rule that is laid down by the Supreme Court thus excludes a mere busybody or meddlesome interloper and enables the Court, having regard to the circumstances of a particular case, to find out whether the person complaining of a public injury has sufficient interest in the subject matter of dispute to give him standing to question the action of the State or a public authority. 15. The submission of Sri Verma that the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta's case, AIR 1982 SC 149 does not extend to a statutory appeal, like the one in the present case, is difficult to accept. As seen earlier, the U.P. (Regulation of Building. 15. The submission of Sri Verma that the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta's case, AIR 1982 SC 149 does not extend to a statutory appeal, like the one in the present case, is difficult to accept. As seen earlier, the U.P. (Regulation of Building. Operations) Act, 1958 itself enables a person) aggrieved by the grant of permission to file an appeal which would presuppose that in case permission is accorded by the prescribed authority, in spite of the presence of the grounds upon which it should refuse permission under S. 7(2A) or the permission enables the recipient thereof to act in contravention of the Regulations issued under the Act, a grievance can be made about it in an appeal by one who can reasonably be said to be aggrieved by the action of the prescribed authority and is not a,mere busybody or meddlesome interloper. The apprehension that this view may lead to innumerable appeals and may vitally affect the rights of those who have obtained the permission from the prescribed authority by prolonging the period during which they maybe locked up in litigation and give a handle to anyone on the street to hamper the initiation or progress of the work pursuant to the permission granted, may, ostensibly, be justified but, on closer scrutiny, it would be clear that unless sufficient interest is established by the person assailing the grant of permission, and he approaches the appellate authority within a reasonable period, an appeal at his instance would not be maintainable. The circumstance that the grant of permission may be assailed in various appeals may undoubtedly cause some harassment to the recipient of the permission in a number of appeals, yet the consideration of ensuring redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty and arbitrary decision affecting the rights of public generally by a statutory authority far over-weighs the consideration of harassment to the recipient of the permission. The extraneous influences and considerations which quite frequently affect the action of statutory authorities in our social set up today impel the Courts of law not to ignore the current realities of life while interpreting the provisions of a statute. The appellate authority would invariably examine at the very inception a grievance about the standing of the appellant before proceeding to deal with the matter on its merits. The appellate authority would invariably examine at the very inception a grievance about the standing of the appellant before proceeding to deal with the matter on its merits. Any error on its part can be corrected through suitable statutory remedy. 16. The question in each case whether a person assailing the grant of permission in an appeal before the Controlling Authority upon a Revision before the State Government is a mere busybody or meddlesome interloper or has he sufficient interest to do so, would necessarily be answered upon the facts of each case. The nature of objections that are raised by the appellant or the likely effect of the execution of the work or development under the permission granted upon him or persons like him, would be considerations upon which would depend the right to maintain the appeal or the revision. For example, if the execution of the work-permitted to be done is likely to result in greater hazards for the people living in the vicinity or is likely to substantially affect the convenience of life to their prejudice or may result in enhancing the chances of pollution or unhealthy disturbance to tranquil existence, it may afford a person the necessary standing to assail the action of the public authority. The circumstances justifying the grant of `standing' to an appellant or denying it may be so diverse and numerous that it is difficult to enumerate them. However, the reasonable test of there being a public injury and existence of sufficient interest in the person challenging the action of the statutory body can always be applied before determining the question whether the appeal or revision should be entertained. 17. A look at annexure CA-8 which is a copy of the grounds of appeal filed by the President and Secretary of the Parishad before the Controlling authority against the grant of permission to the Samiti, would be enough to satisfy any reasonable person that the appellant Parishad is not a mere busybody or meddlesome interloper in the matter. Whether the grounds raised in the appeal are justified on merits is not being gone into in these proceedings for they have to be judged by the authorities under the Act in the first instance. The limited question is whether an appellant raising these grounds can be characterised as a person who does not have sufficient interest to maintain an appeal. The limited question is whether an appellant raising these grounds can be characterised as a person who does not have sufficient interest to maintain an appeal. To that, the answer is clearly in favour of the appellant. 18. The revisional order of the State Government says that the appeal before the controlling authority was barred by limitation. This view has been assailed as incorrect by the petitioner Parishad before me. It has been justified as correct by the Samiti. 19. In paras 3 to 7 of the writ petition it has been asserted by the Parishad that on Sept. 7, 1983 when the President and Secretary of the Parishad visited the office of Dayalbagh regulated area, they found the proposed Dayalbagh Master Plan from which they learnt that there was provision for residential area, near Swaminagar. After further inquiry and discussion amongst the residents of Mohalla Swaminagar, an application for copy of the sanctioned plan was made by the Parishad on Sept. 15, 1983. The copy was ultimately received by them on Oct. 13, 1983, and the appeal before the Controlling Authority was filed on Oct. 21, 1983. The appeal was thus within the prescribed limitation of thirty days from the date of the knowledge of the order of sanction dated Aug. 9, 1983. The counter-affidavit has dealt with the question of limitation in paras 32, 33 and 34. It has been said in these paragraphs that an application for a copy of the sanctioned plan was filed by the Parishad on Sept. 14, 1983 and on the next day an application for inspection of the sanctioned plan was made before the Prescribed Authority by Gurdas Mal, a member of the Parishad who actually made inspection of the plan on Sept. 16, 1983. The appeal having not been filed within thirty days of the date of the knowledge of the order of sanction, was barred by limitation. The order of the State Government of June 15, 1985 says that the appeal should have been filed within thirty days of Aug. 9, 1983 which was the date of the sanction of the plan. It further says that the Controlling Authority was in error in condoning the delay in the presentation of the appeal under S. 5 of the Limitation Act without there being any application or prayer for condonation. 9, 1983 which was the date of the sanction of the plan. It further says that the Controlling Authority was in error in condoning the delay in the presentation of the appeal under S. 5 of the Limitation Act without there being any application or prayer for condonation. The revisional order relies upon the decision of this Court in Lakhan Lal Jhunjhunwala v. State of U.P., Civil Misc. Writ No. 8300 of 1975 decided on May 9, 1984. 20. The submission of the Parishad is that the period of limitation would start running not from the date of the order i.e. Aug. 9,1983 but from the date when the Parishad, which was aggrieved by the decision, came to know about it. The argument is based upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Harish Chandra Roy v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 where it has been held that the date of the award for purposes of proviso (b) of S. 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively and further it will be unreasonable to construe the word in a literal or mechanical way. Reliance was also placed upon Lal Chand v. Distt. Judge, Mathura, 1967 All LJ 48 in which the date of the order under S. 11(2) of the U.P. imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1961 was interpreted to mean the date when the aggrieved party came to have knowledge of the order applying the decision of the Supreme Court in Raja Harish Chandra case and further upon the decision of this Court in Ghanshyam Upadhyay v. State of U.P., (1984) 10 All LR 642 : 1984 All LJ 649, to the same effect. 21. The counsel for the Samiti says that the question whether the date of commencement of limitation should be from the date of the knowledge or it would be the date of the sanction, namely, Aug., 9, 1983, need not be gone into as, even on assumption that limitation shall start running from the date of knowledge, the appeal was, in any case, barred by limitation. Assuming, proceeds the argument, that the Parishad came to have knowledge of the sanction order dated Aug., 9, 1983 only on Sept. Assuming, proceeds the argument, that the Parishad came to have knowledge of the sanction order dated Aug., 9, 1983 only on Sept. 15, 1983, there was no justification for not filing the appeal within thirty days thereof. Further, the appeal filed after Oct. 13, 1983 i.e. on Oct. 21, 1983 was clearly barred by limitation. Section 5 of the Lim. Act does not apply nor does S. 12(2) thereof. The time taken in obtaining the copy of the order of sanction could not be excluded. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 8300 of 1975 which lays down that the provisions of S. 5 of the Lim. Act are inapplicable in proceedings under the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958 is binding upon me as a single Judge. The condonation of delay in the presentation of appeal by the Controlling Authority under that provision was, therefore, bad. The question is whether the time taken by the Parishad in obtaining a copy of the order could be excluded in computing the period of limitation. The exclusion is permissible under S. 12(2) of the Lim. Act, which, according to the learned counsel for the Parishad, was applicable in the instant case on account of S. 29(2) of that Act. Several decisions were cited. It is not necessary to notice them in view of a very recent decision of the Supreme Court in Sakuru v. Tanaji (Civil Appeal No. 1852 of 1979, decided on July 10, 1985) (reported in AIR 1985 SC 1279 ), In that case, the question was whether the provisions of S. 5 of the Lim. Act, 1963 could be invoked for condoning delay in the filing of an appeal before the Collector under S. 90 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. The Supreme Court, after noticing several of its earlier decisions took the view that in the absence of any express provision in that regard, the provisions of the Lim. Act, 1963 would not apply to proceedings which are not proceedings before a Court. This is what the Supreme Court said : "It is well settled by the decisions of this Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, (1970) 1 SCR 51 : AIR 1969 SC 1335 Nityananda M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corpn. Act, 1963 would not apply to proceedings which are not proceedings before a Court. This is what the Supreme Court said : "It is well settled by the decisions of this Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, (1970) 1 SCR 51 : AIR 1969 SC 1335 Nityananda M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corpn. of India, (1970) 1 SCR 396 : AIR 1970 SC 209 and Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad, (1976) 2 SCR 845 : AIR 1976 SC 177 that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings in `Courts' and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than Courts such as quasi-judicial Tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on Courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. The Collector before whom the appeal was preferred by the appellant herein under S. 90 of the Act not being a Court, the Lim. Act, as such, had no applicability to the proceedings before him. But even in such a situation the relevant special statute may contain an express provision conferring on the appellate authority, such as the Collector, the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown by laying down that provisions of S. 5 of the Lim. Act shall be applicable to such proceedings. Hence it becomes necessary to examine whether the Act contains any such provision entitling the Collector to invoke the provisions of S. 5 of the Act for condonation of the delay in the filing of the appeal." 22. The decision of the Supreme Court in Commr. of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Madanlal Dan & Sons, AIR 1977 SC 523 was also rendered in a case where the revision lay before the Judge (Revision) who was a Court. The Supreme Court had upheld the applicability of S. 12(2) by virtue of S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in the case of a revision under the U.P. Sales Tax Act filed before the Judge (Revisions). Who was admittedly a Court, under S. 10 of the Act. 23. In the instant case, there is no dispute that there is no express provision in the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958 making provisions of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under it. Who was admittedly a Court, under S. 10 of the Act. 23. In the instant case, there is no dispute that there is no express provision in the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958 making provisions of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under it. Quite clearly, therefore, provisions of S. 12(2) would not apply to an appeal or revision filed before the Controlling Authority or the State Government. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to examine the correctness of the objection raised on behalf of the Samiti that copy of the order of sanction is not required to be filed before the Controlling Authority while filing an appeal before it so that there is no justification for the Parishad to seek exclusion of time taken in obtaining the copy of that order in computing the period of limitation for the appeal. Even on the assumption that the filing of a copy of the order was necessary, the appeal before the Controlling Authority not being a proceeding before a Court and there being no specific provision in the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958, to exclude the time so taken or to condone the delay in the presentation of the appeal by recourse to S. 5 or 12 of the Limitation Act, the appeal filed on Oct. 21, 1983, by the Parishad before the Controlling Authority was clearly barred by limitation. The State Government was not in error in taking that view. 24. The revisional order of the State Government is also challenged on the ground that it could not be passed by an officer lower in rank to the one who passed the order as Controlling Authority. This argument is sought to be founded upon the provision contained in S. 15-A(2) of the Act which says that the State Government could delegate its power under sub-sec. (1) to any officer or authority who shall not be inferior to the Chairman of the Controlling Authority. It is said that the Chairman of the Controlling Authority was an officer of the rank of Commissioner while the impugned order of the State Government was passed by a Special Secretary who was inferior to the Chairman of the Controlling Authority. (1) to any officer or authority who shall not be inferior to the Chairman of the Controlling Authority. It is said that the Chairman of the Controlling Authority was an officer of the rank of Commissioner while the impugned order of the State Government was passed by a Special Secretary who was inferior to the Chairman of the Controlling Authority. The submission appears to be made without appreciating the fact that the State Government itself has passed the revisional order and has not delegated its power to any other authority. The Special Secretary may have been entrusted with the function of dealing with the revision application under the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act in the allocation made of its different functions under the rules of business under Article 166(3) of the Constitution. Such allocation does not amount to delegation of power as seems to be understood by the petitioner. See : Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192 , In that case, it was, inter alia, observed, in para 35, that : "When a civil servant takes a decision, he does not do it as a delegate of his Minister. He does it on behalf of the Government. The Officers are the limbs of the Government and not its delegates. Where functions are entrusted to a Minister and these are performed by an official employed in the Ministry's department, there is in law no delegation because constitutionally the act or decision of the official is that of the Minister." The order of the State Government cannot be treated to be invalid on this account. 25. The Parishad also says that the Samiti got some land transferred from persons belonging to scheduled caste which was void on account of S. 157-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The Addl. District Magistrate, Agra declared these transfers of land comprising of an area of 18 bighas 11 biswas and 4 biswansis bad by order dated Aug. 27, 1984 and possession thereof was taken by the State Government in which the land had vested under S. 167 on Jan. 31, 1984. While challenging the order of the Addl. District Magistrate in Writ Petitions Nos. 12801 and 12802 of 1984, the Samiti and the transferor's suppressed the fact that the State Government had already taken possession and obtained an ad interim order from this Court staying their dispossession. 31, 1984. While challenging the order of the Addl. District Magistrate in Writ Petitions Nos. 12801 and 12802 of 1984, the Samiti and the transferor's suppressed the fact that the State Government had already taken possession and obtained an ad interim order from this Court staying their dispossession. However, a substantial portion of the land covered by the scheme of the Samiti for colonisation had vested in the State Government which had taken possession thereof, the State Government could not possibly approve the scheme which had, of necessity, to be rejected on this ground. Even though the attention of the State Government was drawn to this aspect of the matter through application dated Jan. 18, 1985, supported by an affidavit filed on behalf of the Parishad, the State Government did not touch this point in the impugned order. These facts are contained in paras 17 to 21 of the writ petition. The Samiti has met these allegations in paras 42 to 46 of its counter-affidavit. It says that the transfers were valid because at the time of the transfers, the transferor's had ceased to be members of the scheduled caste and had become Buddhists. The actual possession over the land in question was of the Samiti. And, in any case, the matter is sub judice before this Court. 26. The invalidity of the transfers on this particular ground is yet to be gone into by this Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 12801 and 12802 of 1984 which are still pending. At this state, it would not be appropriate, in the present petition, to hold in favour of the petitioner Parishad on this ground. More so, when the State Government has chosen not to go into the matter on merits on its view that the appeal filed by the Parishad before the Controlling Authority was barred by limitation and that view of the State Government has been found not to suffer from any apparent error of law. 27. In consequence, the petition fails and is dismissed but, in the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. The ad interim order shall stand discharged.