Ms. SUNANDA BHANDARE ( 1 ) IN this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioners seeks a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Estate Officer dated 11-11- 1974 made under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 in case No. EC/182/dd/lit/73 and the order dated January 12, 1976 of the Learned Additional District Judge, Delhi dismissing the appeal. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case as stated in the petition are as follows : ( 3 ) THE premises in dispute known as "manohar Bakery, York Hotel Building, Connaught Circus, New Delhi", were owned by the Hazi Mohd. Din Chhatriwala and were in the possession of one Mohd. Aashiquine as a tenant. The entire building No. 8792-8793, of which the said premises formed a part, was requisitioned by the Central Government in the year 1942 under the Defence of India Rules. 1942. Mohd. Aashiquine continued to be in possession after the requisition. In 1947 both the ownership of Hazi Mohd. Din Chhatriwala and tenancy right of Mohd. Aashiquine were declared as evacuee properties and as such vested in the custodian of evacuee property. Since the deceased Manohar Singh was a displaced person, on January 16, 1948, the custodian of evacuee property allotted on lease the said premises to him. Hazi Mohd. Din. Chhatriwala applied to the Custodian seeking a declaration regarding his title. In this application he stated that he was not an evacuee, however he offered to accept deceased Manohar Singh and other displaced persons occupying certain portions of the building as his tenants. Accordingly, the authorised Deputy Custodian passed an order on December 13, 1948 that since Hazi Mohd. Din. Chhatriwala did not want vacant possession and he was willing to accept the refugee tenants, his claim for possession was accepted. The deceased Manohar Singh became the successor in interest of Mohd. Aashiquine and acquired the tenancy rights of Mohd. Aashiquine in the premises in dispute. On June 7, 1949 an order was passed by the Custodian giving back propriety right to Hazi Mohd. Din. Chhatriwala. On May 12, 1950 deceased Manohar Singh entered into a licence agreement with the Central Government regarding the same premises. The Central Government charged licence fee from the deceased Manohar Singh @rs. 80. 25 per month. On June 7, 1949 an order was passed by the Custodian giving back propriety right to Hazi Mohd. Din. Chhatriwala. On May 12, 1950 deceased Manohar Singh entered into a licence agreement with the Central Government regarding the same premises. The Central Government charged licence fee from the deceased Manohar Singh @rs. 80. 25 per month. On November 19, 1960 a notice was issued by respondent No. 1 cancelling the licence of deceased Manohar Singh but the same was later withdrawn. Again, another notice was issued by the Deputy Director of Estate which was also withdrawn. A third notice for cancellation of licence was issued on July 30, 1973. This notice is challenged by Manohar Singh (since deceased) through his legal heirs in C. W. 1099 of 1973. ( 4 ) THE main contention of the petitioners is that the action of respondent No. 1 cancelling the licence and initiating proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 is a mala fide action taken by the Government in order to help respondent No. 4 herein who is the present owner and to give possession to him as an owner after de-requisitioning the property. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that respondent No. 1 having decided to de-requisition the premises, the petitioners being the legal heirs of deceased Manohar Singh are entitled to retain the possession of the same in their capacity as successors in interest of Mohd. Aashquine. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that under Section 6 of the Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1952) it is incumbent upon respondent No. 1 to deliver the property after release from requisition to the person from whom possession was taken at the time of requisition or to the successor in interest of such person. It is, therefore, submitted that the petitioners who are the successors in interest of deceased Manohar Singh cannot be dispossessed. It is contended that since the petitioners had never handed over the actual possession to respondent No. 1, an inquiry under the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act of 1952 need not, therefore, be held and the petitioner s continuous possession need not be disturbed. It is contended that since the petitioners had never handed over the actual possession to respondent No. 1, an inquiry under the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act of 1952 need not, therefore, be held and the petitioner s continuous possession need not be disturbed. It is stated that what respondent No. 1 has to do now is to only pass an order to de-requisition and leave the parties to their remedy under the ordinary laws. It is contended that on the cancellation of licence, by issuing notice dated July 30, 1973 the right of the petitioners as an extenant springs back to life. The subsequent proceedings initiated under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants), Act, 1971 after administratively having taken a decision to de-requisition, is a mala fide act designed in collusion with respondent No. 4 so that possession of the premises in dispute can be given to respondent No. 4 as an owner. It is further submitted that under Section 6 of the Act of 1952 on derequisitioning, the possession has to be given to the person from whom possession was taken after an order of requisition was made. The petitoners would, therefore, be in any event, entitled to possession. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao, AIR 1982 SC 1081 to show that the Government cannot resort to summary procedure for eviction when the question whether the title of the property actually vests in the Government or not is in dispute. Learned counsel submitted that A. P. Land Enforcement Act (3 of 1905) is pari materia with the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and, therefore, the summary procedure adopted by the Government in respect of the property which was in possession of the petitioners is bad. A reference was made to the judgment of this Court in the case of Mushtaq Ahmed v. Union of India, AIR 1972 Delhi 20 which is an inter-party judgment to show that competent authority should inquire only to ascertain the person from whom possession was taken at the time of requisition or his successor in interest and deliver physical possession to such person. Reference was also made to the judgments in the case of Tarabai Jivanlal v. Padamchand, AIR 1950 Bom 89. Reference was also made to the judgments in the case of Tarabai Jivanlal v. Padamchand, AIR 1950 Bom 89. K. Sriramulu v. Aswatha Narayana, AIR 1968 SC 1028 and Shivram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1974 Madh Pra 120 to show that on requisitioning, the tenancy right does not get extinguished and on de-requisitioning the property is to be handed over to the person from whom possession was taken. ( 6 ) ON the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that the question of handing over the possession to respondent No. 4 or the petitioners does not arise at this stage. Since deceased Manohar Singh had entered into a licence agreement with the Govt. and the Govt. having revoked the licence, respondent No. 1 was justified in initiating the proceedings under the public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. It is further submitted that Act of 1952 would come into operation only after an order of de-requisition was passed by the Govt. It is submitted that as yet there is no order of de-requisitioning passed by the Govt. in respect of the said property and the question of applicability of Section 6 of the Act of 1952 would not arise at this stage. It was further submitted that assuming the deceased Manohar Singh was the successor in interest of Mohd. Aashquine and was in possession of the disputed property he having entered into a licence agreement with respondent No. 1 had surrendered possession to respondent No. 1 on May 12, 1950. It is, therefore, submitted that the action taken under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 is perfectly valid. It is only when the Govt. passes an order of de-requisitioning that the Govt. will ascertain who was in possession when the requisition was made and the possession will be handed over to that person after the order of de-requisition is made. A statement was also made at the Bar by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that when proceedings under Section 6 of the Act of 1952 are initiated the petitioners will be heard and their claims will be considered according to law. A statement was also made at the Bar by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that when proceedings under Section 6 of the Act of 1952 are initiated the petitioners will be heard and their claims will be considered according to law. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for respondent No. 4 contended that the question of applicability of the Act of 1952 was not relevant for deciding whether the order made by the Estate Officer is valid or not. ( 8 ) IT is an admitted fact that a licence was executed by deceased Manohar Singh with the Govt. of India vide licence agreement dated May 12,1950. As per the agreement the licence was for the use of the premises for running of a bakery. The maintenance of the premises was to be done by the C. P. W. D. in accordance with the normal Public Works Department standards. Under Clause (10) of the said licence, on the licence being revoked, the licencee had to hand over the possession of the said premises to the Govt. ( 9 ) THE notice of revokation of licence does not anywhere state that the licence was being revoked because the premises were going to be de-requisitioned. Assuming that in view of the lease granted by the Custodian of the evacuee property, deceased Manohar Singh was in possession when the licence was executed with the Govt. the day deceased Manohar Singh entered into the licence agreement, he is deemed to have surrendered the possession to the Govt. A fresh licence could not have come into existence unless the lessor had surrendered or was deemed to have surrendered. Therefore, without going into the question of who was in possession and whether the property should go to the tenant who was in possession or the owner who owned the premises, it will be sufficient at this stage for me to find out whether. the action initiated by the Govt. under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 was valid or not. The authorities referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners are also, therefore, not relevant to decide the issue in question. In my judgment, since the licence agreement stands revoked there is nothing wrong with the proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The authorities referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners are also, therefore, not relevant to decide the issue in question. In my judgment, since the licence agreement stands revoked there is nothing wrong with the proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The petitioners were given notice under S. 4 of the Act and were also given an opportunity of being heard. An appeal was filed by the petitioners before the Additional District Judge, Delhi and the appeal also stands dismissed. There is no error of jurisdiction and the principles of natural justice are in no way violated. ( 10 ) DURING the pendency of the writ petition the petitioners were granted stay of dispossession. However, on November 4,1980 when the petition came up for hearing no one appeared for the petitioner. The petition, therefore, was dismissed for non-prosecution. On the dismissal of the writ petition, the stay order granted by this Court was automatically vacated and, therefore, respondent No. 1 immediately dispossessed the petitioners. It is only on January 9, 1984 that the petition was again restored to its original number. The possession of the premises thereafter has remained with respondent No. 1. ( 11 ) THERE is an allegation of mala fide made against respondent No. 1. An apprehension is also expressed during the course of the arguments that as soon as the order of derequisition is passed respondent No. 1 will hand over the possession to respondent No, 4 who is the owner. It is also submitted that the Estate Officer under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and the competent authority who will institute an inquiry under section 6 (1) of the Act of 1952 is the same and since the de-requisitioning is being made at the instance of respondent No. 4, the petitioners rightful claim will not be considered. Though a statement is made by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that once an order of de-requisitioning is passed and inquiry under section 6 of the Act of 1952 is initiated, the petitioner will be heard and the claim of the petitioners will be considered according to law, 1 find that in the counteraffidavit of respondent No. 1 it is admitted by the Estate Officer that an administrative decision regarding de-requisitioning was taken at the instance of respondent No. 4 who is the present owner. The fact that respondent No. 4 actively participated in the proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 lends support to the apprehension expressed by the petitioners. I, therefore, think that an order protecting the claim of the petitioners who are displaced persons and claiming continuous possession from 1947 till they were dispossessed in 1982 will have to be made. I, therefore, direct that in case the competent authority comes to the conclusion that the petitioners are not entitled to the disputed premises the order putting respondent No. 4 in possession will not take effect for four weeks after the passing of the order to enable the petitioners to seek appropriate relief according to law. ( 12 ) IN the result, with the above observations the petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.