JUDGMENT S.S. SANDHAWALIA. C. J. A difference of opinion betwixt the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench has necessitated this reference. Since the divergence of views extended to all points of fact and law (as stands noticed by them in their order no.13 dated the 20th of February, 1984), the Hon'ble Judges did not deem it necessary to formulate the difference specifically. 2. The facts stand already recounted in considerable detail in both of the exhaustively separately recorded judgments. Nevertheless, to maintain the homogeneity of this judgment, it becomes necessary to give the factual matrix thereof. These have been marshalled in so admirable a manner by Uday Sinha, J. that the recapitulation thereof can not be improved upon. Even at some risk of plagiarism I would with to virtually quote them verbatim “The petitioner has moved this Court for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to correct the date of birth of the petitioner in the Civil List of the Appointment Department so as to accord With the correction in the date of birth of the petitioner corrected by Health Department Notification No.701 (2) 2M 3-20386/69 dated 13- 2-1971 and from disturbing the services of the petitioner. The petitioner has spent her whole life in metropolitan cities. She is not a rustic illiterate Indian worn and who may not know her age. According to her own & averments, she stated her schooling from Girls, Junior High School, Kanpur, Thereafter, she shifted her studies to Delhi where she joined Indraprastha Hindu Girls, High School, declaring her date of birth as 25.8.1925. She passed matriculation examination from the aforesaid High School. Later she joined Lady Hardinge Medical College, New Delhi. There also her date of birth remained 25.8. 1925. She obtained M.B.B.S. degree in 1949 from that College. Thereafter, she joined Bihar State Medical Service in 1952. Her own declaration at tile time of her appointment was that her date of birth was 25.8.1925. In 1962 she obtained M.S. (obstetrics and Gynaccology) degree from Bihar University. In 1969 it dawned upon her that 25.8.1925 as her date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate and subsequent similar declarations in her own bund and pen were wrong. The petitioner has not enlightened us how she realised that the date of birth me in the matriculation certificate was wrong. In 1969 it dawned upon her that 25.8.1925 as her date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate and subsequent similar declarations in her own bund and pen were wrong. The petitioner has not enlightened us how she realised that the date of birth me in the matriculation certificate was wrong. Thus in 1969 she filed a representation that the date of birth recorded in her service book be corrected as 25.8.1927 instead of 25.8.1925. The petitioner has not enlightened us the ground and materials on which she filed the representation for correction of her date of birth nor have we been told in what circumstances how and for that respondent the application was entertained more than ten year after her appointment. That has been with held from us. I have great difficulty in accepting that the petitioner is not possessed of a copy of the representation filed by her in 1971. It is, however, useless to probe into those aspects because the files relating to her date of birth in the Secretariat have disappeared. To cut matters short ker representation was accepted and her date of birth was corrected from 25.8.1925 to 25.8.1927 by Notification No. 701 (2)/2M3-20386/69 dated 13.2.1971 addressed to Accountant General, Bihar. The petitioner thus got two years extra lease of tenure on the teaching staff of Patna Medical College. The aforesaid extra lease in her tenure probably trod on the toes of Dr. D Singh and Dr. Anmola Sinha, teachers in the College. They also, there fore, moved the State Government (or the same favour by correction/alteration of their date or birth all well by two year. Government probably found that the malady or correction or date of birth was getting contagious/infectious and, therefore, took a policy decision by Annexure -A dated 10, 9, 1973 addressed to Accountant General Bihar that the date of birth shall be in accordance with the date of birth recorded in matriculation certificate in terms of this policy decision the correction of date of birth of the petitioner done previously was cancelled. Her date of birth was again restored to 25.8.925. Curiously this file has also become traceless from the Secretariat. The representations of Dr. D, Singh and Dr. Anmola Sinha were thus rejected. According to the State, the second alteration in the age of the petitioner, i.e. back to 1925 was communicated to her and matters stood there. Her date of birth was again restored to 25.8.925. Curiously this file has also become traceless from the Secretariat. The representations of Dr. D, Singh and Dr. Anmola Sinha were thus rejected. According to the State, the second alteration in the age of the petitioner, i.e. back to 1925 was communicated to her and matters stood there. No step was taken by the petitioner to agitate the question of her date of birth after 1973 till 1983 nor did she ever challenge the correctness or propriety of Government decision contained in Annexure-A. The issue of the petitioner's date of birth again become & live issue in 1982, By letter dated 8.12.82 (Annexure 3) Deputy Director, Health Services called upon the petitioner to affirm her date of birth and to file matriculation certificate. In reply thereto the petitioner wrote to the Deputy. Director informing that her date of birth had been corrected in 1971 from 25.8.1925 to 25.8.1927. Annexure-A was probably & sent to the Health Department on 14.12.1982. In reply thereto the Deputy Secretary Health by Annexure-6 dated 24.2.1983 again called upon the petitioner to file matriculation certificate along with photostat copy of the matriculation certificate. By Annexure-6 (1) the petitioner expressed her inability to produce any photostat copy or her matriculation certificate but again sent a copy thereof. By Aunexure-7 dated 2.6.1983 the petitioner pressed her claim for entry of 25.8.1927 as her date of birth in her service book. The State Government considered the question of correct date of birth of the petitioner and by order contained in Annexure B referred to Accountant General, Bihar, the State Government decided that the petitioner's date of birth shall be in accordance with the matriculation Certificate and there was no reason to alter it and on that basis she would superannuate on 31.8.1983. A copy or this letter was sent to the petitioner as well. That led to the filing of the present application, No prayer has been made for quashing Annexure A or B. In accordance with Government decision contained in Annexure A and B the petitioner superannuated on 31.8.1983” 3. A copy or this letter was sent to the petitioner as well. That led to the filing of the present application, No prayer has been made for quashing Annexure A or B. In accordance with Government decision contained in Annexure A and B the petitioner superannuated on 31.8.1983” 3. Ere one comes to other issues, the thereshold question forcibly pressed before Division bench on behalf of the respondent State was one of gross and unexplained laches of more than a decade in approaching the writ Court and thus going to the very root of the matter of entertaining the name in its discretionary jurisdiction. On behalf of the respondent State the learned Advocate General on the basis or categoric pleading on the point had taken the stand that the petitioner had been squarely and personally communicated the governments order (Annexure A) of the year 1973 through a peon and in token of the receipt of the letter she had herself signed the Peon Book. Equally she had been served by the Department of Health with the same. Thus she had the clearest knowledge of the adverse order against her but she slept over the matter for more than a decade. On this preliminary ground she would be disentitled to the grant of relief in the writ jurisdiction apart from merits. Faced with this stand the writ petitioner had hesitantly and evasively sought to deny the categoric claim of the respondent State with regard to the service and receipt of the communication (Annexure A) by her. The parties squarely joined issue on this crucial question, 4. Sanyal, J. did not accept the stand of the petitioner that she had no notice of the impugned order. Indeed upon the state of the pleadings it was impossible to arrive at such a conclusion. However he recorded a somewhat hesitant finding in these terms. "For these reasons it will be unsafe to hold that the respondents have been able to establish beyond doubt that Annexure ‘A’ the decision of the year 1973. was communicated to the petitioner” However Uday Sinha, J. examined the matter in greater detail and with incisive depth. However he recorded a somewhat hesitant finding in these terms. "For these reasons it will be unsafe to hold that the respondents have been able to establish beyond doubt that Annexure ‘A’ the decision of the year 1973. was communicated to the petitioner” However Uday Sinha, J. examined the matter in greater detail and with incisive depth. He accepted the sworn testimony of Bhola Paswan a peon in the Health Department, who swore the affidavit that he duly delivered the impugned order to the writ petitioner in the premises of P.M.C.H. and she herself received the letter addressed to her and in token thereof she put her signature in the peon book in his presence. He also accepted the statement of Hari Narain Ram, the routine clerk (dispatcher) in the Department of Health, who stated on oath that Annexure-A was sent to the petitioner which was received personally by her and in token of the receipt she put her signature with date. He found that these employees had no axe of their own to grind nor any animus against the petitioner, whilst she herself was deeply interested to deny the receipt thereof. He summed up his under: "In my concluded view, the letter mentioned at serial 23 bearing her name was sent to her and was received by her. He, denial in this behalf is rather unfortunate. This gives an inkling, into the petitioner's metal.” 5. Before me the learned Advocate General more than amply buttressed the aforesaid finding, if indeed it was at all necessary, by pin-pointing the unequivocal and categorical pleading filed on behalf of the respondent State. Though the pleadings categorically stated that the signature in the peon book, was in the writ petitioner's own handwriting, she in her affidavit in reply tried to evade the issue by refusing to aver a specific denial. In her affidavit there is a plain attempt to skirt the issue of her signature in the peon book and she rested herself content with vague denials that letter no. 5999 (2) and no bearing on the petitioner's date of birth etc. Along with the mass of other evidence On the point Uday Sinha, J. had further reassured himself by comparing the signature of the writ petitioner on the vakalatnama with the disputed signatures in the despatch register and the peon book. 5999 (2) and no bearing on the petitioner's date of birth etc. Along with the mass of other evidence On the point Uday Sinha, J. had further reassured himself by comparing the signature of the writ petitioner on the vakalatnama with the disputed signatures in the despatch register and the peon book. He found that her characteristic style of writing 'R' in 'Rohatgi' is exactly similar therein. 6. Mr. Basudeo Prasad had attempted to vainly assail this reassurance by the learned, Judge along with other basic testimoney on the ground that this could not be done except by calling a handwriting expert as a witness. It is well settled that in conjunction with other testimony there is no legal bar to the Judge using his own eyes to compare a disputed signature with admitted signatures. Reference in this connection may be instructively made to the Division Bench judgment in Riseswar Poddar v. Nabadwip Chandra Poddar and another and Bhupendra Narain Mandal v. Ek Narain Lal Das. 7. The learned Advocate General then highlighted the fact that consequent to the impugned decision of the Government the Civil list was duly amended and the matter given the fullest publicity by being published in the Official Gazette. In the totality of the circumstances to hold that the petitioner was unaware of the order (annexure A) in 1973 seems wholly untenable. I would, therefore, unhesitatingly agree entirely with the conclusion arrived at on this aspect by Uday Sinha, J. 8. However, even assuming that the writ petitioner bad been duly communicated with the State's decision way back in 1973, Sanyal, J., opined that because the principles of natural justice were alleged to be violated, the delay of more then a decade in approaching the writ Court was irrelevant to the issue. With the greatest respect to him. I am unable to subscribe to this line of reasoning because it seems to run against the very grist of a long line of decisions of the final court with regard to the gross and unexplained laches in approaching the writ Court and the impropriety of its entertaining patently stale causes. With respect to Sanyal, it herein also I am inclined to agree entirely with the forthright enunciation of his view by Uday Sinha, J. 9. With respect to Sanyal, it herein also I am inclined to agree entirely with the forthright enunciation of his view by Uday Sinha, J. 9. In a field so well trodden, it seems unnecessary to multiply authorities and it suffices to refer to only a few basic judgments of the trial Court. In Ravindra Nath Bose anti others v. Union of India and others it was held in unequivocal terms that no relief can be given to a petitioner who, without any reasonable explanation, a approaches the Writ Court after inordinate delay. A reconsideration of this case was later sought but the ratio was resoundingly affirmed in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi. Again in Jagdish Narain Maltiar v. The Stale of Bihar and others their Lordships upheld the judgment of the Patna High Court which had dismissed the petitioner's application on the criminal ground that the had approached the Writ Court after a delay of 3 years. Equally categoric are the observation in M.K. Krishnaswamy and others it. The Union of India and others. The aforesaid view has thereafter been consistently adhered to by the Supreme Court. 10. In fairness to Mr. Basudeva Prasad, the learned counsel for the petitioner, one must notice his reliance on Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and others v. The State of Maharastra and others. However, I am unable to read that judgment as in any way deviating from the consistent line of precedent noticed above. In fact, express reference to Tilokchand was made approvingly therein. It was in terms held that the petitioners therein did not lose any time in filing the petition when they were adversely affected and the cause of action arose qua them. It was further noticed that the challenge therein was to the validity of the procedure for making promotion which was not a thing of the past but was still being continued and followed by the State Government, the constitutionality of which was under challenge. It was on these grounds that it was held that there was no delay or laches in the particular case. 11. In order to buttress his alleged stand that the impugned order was a nullity because of the alleged violation of the principles of natural justice. Mr. Basudeva Prasad placed reliance on Kiran Singh and other, v. Chaman Paswan and others and Nawabkhan Akbarkhan vs. State of Gujrat. Both the judgments, however are distinguishable. 11. In order to buttress his alleged stand that the impugned order was a nullity because of the alleged violation of the principles of natural justice. Mr. Basudeva Prasad placed reliance on Kiran Singh and other, v. Chaman Paswan and others and Nawabkhan Akbarkhan vs. State of Gujrat. Both the judgments, however are distinguishable. In Kiran Singh's case the issues raised were with regard to the territorial or the pecuniary jurisdiction of a court and its effect on the decree. Consequently, the observations made in this context, to my mind, have hardly any relevance in the present situation Similarly, Nawabkhan Abbaskhan, Case was a criminal matter where the order of externment and the consequential prosecution were put in issue. It is plain that the examination of the issue in the context of the criminal law would not, strictu sensu, be attracted in the present case. In fact, the judgment far from helping the writ petitioner seems to run counter to her stand that the violation of the principles of natural justice would make the order void and thus nullity. It has been observation therein as under : "In other cases, the order in violation of natural justice is void in the limited sense of being liable to be avoided by court with retroactive force." 12. In the light of the long line of binding precedent noticed earlier, it seems to me as wholly untenable to hold that merely because the principles of natural justice have been violated the writ petitioner would be entitled to approach the Court after an inordinate and unexplained delay of more than ten years. With the deepest deference, therefore, I am unable to agree on this aspect with S.B. Sinha, J. and would wholly endorse the stand of Uday Sinha, J. Once that is so, on this ground of gross laches alone all further considerations of merits would indeed be precluded. 13. However, since the learned judges constituting the Division Bench have opined on the merits of controversy as well, I would wish to endorse and affirm the findings of Uday Sinha, J. which have been admirably summarised by him as under: "46. My concluded findings are that the order of alteration of the petitioner’s age in 1971 was patently unjust and improper. The State Government had the power to take a policy decision and clear the cob-web in regard to the age of petitioner accordingly. My concluded findings are that the order of alteration of the petitioner’s age in 1971 was patently unjust and improper. The State Government had the power to take a policy decision and clear the cob-web in regard to the age of petitioner accordingly. The order passed in 1973 was communicated to her. There are adequate materials to show that she knew is 1973 and certainly in 1980 much before her date of superannuation that Government had cancelled Annexure -1 and that her date of birth bad been restored as 25-8-1925. The petitioner has moved this Court with inordinate delay, ten years after the passing of Annexure A. This by itself is sufficient to throw out her application. The technical defect, if any in re-correcting her date of birth was removed by issuance of Annexure-3 by which she was called upon to produce all materials in support of her stand that her real date of birth was 25.8.1927 and not 25.8.1925. Rules of natural justice even if not complied in 1973 were complied in 1982 by issuance of Annexure-3. It is idle to contend that Government had no jurisdiction in 1982 to issue notice in regard to the correct age of the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, has no case for issuance of a writ as prayed for. There was no contravention of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitutional. 14. Before parting with this judgment, it must be noticed that Mr. Basudeva Prasad had also assailed the ancillary finding of Uday Sinha, J. (in paragraph 47) that the writ petition must be rejected on the added ground that no prayer for specifically quashing annexure A and B has been made, learned counsel pointed out that Annexure B had comes into existence during the pendency of the writ petition and, therefore there could be no question of assailing the same at the original stage of the filing of the writ petition. My attention was drawn to the rejoinder to the counter affidavit of the respondents filed by petitioner on the 30th of August, 1983 where in paragraphs 8 and 9 a specific prayer for quashing both Annexures A and B had been made. It wou1d appear that these pleadings were not pointedly brought to the notice of the Division Bench. My attention was drawn to the rejoinder to the counter affidavit of the respondents filed by petitioner on the 30th of August, 1983 where in paragraphs 8 and 9 a specific prayer for quashing both Annexures A and B had been made. It wou1d appear that these pleadings were not pointedly brought to the notice of the Division Bench. With respect therefore, Uday Sinha, J.’s. observation for the rejection of the writ petition on this added but technical ground is, perhaps, not sustainable. However, in view of the failure of the writ petition even on the basic and primal grounds on which it was tested, this issue would no longer affect the result and is thus rendered academic. 15. In the result. I find no merit in this application and it is hereby dismissed with costs. Application dismissed.