Matsya Jivi Sahkari Samiti, Semari v. Addl. Commissioner (Admn. ), Gorakhpur — 1985 DIGILAW 875 (ALL)

ORDER B.L. Yadav, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the orders dated 14-11-84 and 27-7-84 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Gorakhpur in proceedings under S. 122-A(2)(k) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and under III proviso to R. 115-S of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). 2. The case has got a chequered history. On 25th Sept 1982, Dinesh Gramotthan Seva Sansthan obtained a lease for 10 years in respect of a tank situate in village Deeppur, Nyaya Panchayat Bagehi, Dhanghata, District Basti for a sum of Rs. 30,000/- and the said Sansthan has paid Rs. 3000/- But the permission of the Sub-Divisional Officer could not be granted. Later on the Sub-Divisional Officer granted lease by his order dated 20-10-82 on the recommendation of the Tahsildar. As the Dinesh Gramotthan Seva Sansthan was not a preferential Samiti vide order of the Tahsildar dated. 18-1-82 (Annexure-2 to Writ No. 6414 of 1984), the file of that petition was summoned along with the file of F.A.F.O. No. 353 of 1983 on the request of the learned counsel for the parties, as all the three cases involve the controversy about the validity of the lease between the parties. Writ petition No. 6414 has been filed by Matsya Jivi Sahkari Samiti, Semari, the present petitioner against the order of the Board of Revenue dated 15-2-84, which has been admitted on 6-8-84 and operation of the order of the Board of Revenue dated 15-2-84 was stayed. F.A.F.O. No. 3'53 of 1983 has been filed against the order dated. 11-5-83 passed by the Civil Judge granting temporary injunction in favour of Dinesh Gramotthan Seva Sansthan, the plaintiff in that suit. Respondent No. 4 Tappey Singh, who is a private individual, obtained a lease deed dated. 19-4-84 by the land Management Committee. The Board of Revenue by Order dated 15-2- 84 accepted the reference made by the Additional Commissioner and remanded the case to the Sub-Divisional Officer for deciding the case afresh and to initiate fresh proceedings for the auction of fishery rights in the pond. In case operation of the order of the Board of Revenue was stayed, there was no occasion for the Land Management Committee to have granted lease in favour of respondent No. 4. In case operation of the order of the Board of Revenue was stayed, there was no occasion for the Land Management Committee to have granted lease in favour of respondent No. 4. After the grant of lease dated 19-4-84 in favour of respondent No. 4 Tappey Singh the present petitioner filed a revision before the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur, which was ultimately decided by the Additional Commissioner, Gorakhpur by his order dated 14-11-84 holding that the revision was not maintainable. The petitioner has challenged this order. 3. The case of Tappey Singh, respondent No. 4 on the other hand, is that the approval granted by the Sub-Divisional Officer to the lease dated 19-4-84 in his favour by the Land Management Committee after the order of the Board of Revenue dated 15-2-84 was correct and legal and the approval granted by the Sub-Divisional Officer was not at all a judicial order, hence the Addl. Commissioner has correctly held the revision to be not maintainable. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that as earlier on 20-10-82 the lease vas granted in favour of the petitioner on the recommendation of the Tahsildar, who recommended that the petitioner was a preferential fishermen society to get the lease in accordance with the directions issued under S. 126 of the Act, amending para 60(2) (Kha) of the Gram Sabha and Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti Manual and against that a revision was filed by Dinesh Gramothan Seva Sansthan, who has obtained the lease on 25-9-82. As the possession of that Samiti was disturbed by the present petitioner and others, hence against that the Gramotthan Seva Sansthan filed a Civil Suit No. 8 of 1981 and obtained a temporary injunction on 11-5-83, against which the aforesaid F.A.F.O. was filed which was pending. Thereafter in the revision filed by the Dinesh Gramotthan Seva Sansthan the Additional Commissioner recommended the matter to the Board of Revenue that the revision may be allowed and the Land Management Committee may be directed to decide the question of grant of lease afresh in accordance with the directions issued under Section 126 of the Act. The Board of Revenue allowed the revision by an order dated 15-2-84, against which the present petitioner filed a Writ Petition No. 6414 of 1984, which was admitted and stay was granted on 6-8-84. The Board of Revenue allowed the revision by an order dated 15-2-84, against which the present petitioner filed a Writ Petition No. 6414 of 1984, which was admitted and stay was granted on 6-8-84. As the operation of the order of Board of Revenue has been stayed by this Court, hence there was no occasion for the Land Management Committee to have granted lease in favour of Tappey Singh, respondent No. 4, who was a private individual and to that lease the sub-Divisional Officer granted permission. Hence that was a proceeding under turd proviso to R. 115-S of the Rules emanating from S. 122A(2)(ka) of the Act and as such in any case that was a "proceeding for grant of lease in respect of tank. Hence the revision was maintainable under S. 333 of the Act before the Board of Revenue and under S. 333-A of the Act before the Additional Commissioner. He relied upon Mulraj v. Murti Raghunath Ji Maharaj, AIR 1967 SC 1386 and Chandrika Misir v. Bhaiya Lal, AIR 1973 SC 2391 . 5. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand urged that the order passed by the Additional Commissioner holding that the revision was not maintainable against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer granting approval to the lease dated 19-4-84 in favour of respondent No. 4 was just an administrative order and no revision lay. Hence the impugned order was correct. He placed reliance on the State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Sriniwas Naik, AIR 1982 SC 1249 , Gurdin v. Gaon Sabha, 1978 Rev Dec 122 : 1978 All J (NOC) 40 and Shiv Pujan Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1980 Pat 64 . 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The main controversy between the parties is whether the revision preferred by the present petitioner against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Basti granting permission to the lease dated 19-4-84 was revisable under S. 333 by the Board of Revenue and under section 333-A by the Commissioner or not. It is, therefore, better to set out the statutory provision of S. 333 of the Act. "333. It is, therefore, better to set out the statutory provision of S. 333 of the Act. "333. Power of Board to call for cases.- The Board may call for the record of any suit or proceeding decided by any subordinate court in which no appeal lies or where an appeal lies but has not been preferred, and if such subordinate court appears:- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it in law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the Board may pass such order in the case as it thinks fit." 7. The procedure for Revision before the Commissioner or Addl. Commissioner has been provided under S. 333A. 8. It is accordingly evident that the Board has got revisional jurisdiction to call for the record of any suit or proceeding decided by any subordinate court. In the instant case certainly the approval granted by the Sub-Divisional Officer to the lease in favour of respondent No. 4 was not a decision in the suit and it has to be examined whether the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer approving the lease dated 19-4-84 in favour of respondent No. 4 was a proceeding or not and whether this proceeding has affected the rights of the petitioner. 9. The word `proceeding' according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary connotes the instituting or carrying on of an action at law, a legal action or process; any act done by an authority or a court of law : any step taken in a case by either party. According to Websters III New International Dictionary, the word `proceeding' connotes a particular step or series of steps adopted for doing or accomplishing something, a legal action, a particular action at law, course of procedure in a judicial action or in a suit in litigation." 10. In view of Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, (Fourth Edition), the word "proceeding" connotes any action, and proceeding is used as meaning a step in an action. (See Smalley v. Robey & Co (1962) 1 QB 577 . It means a step forward and not one backward. Spencer v. Watts, (1889) 23 QBD 350, According to Words and Phrases Legally Defined. Vol. In view of Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, (Fourth Edition), the word "proceeding" connotes any action, and proceeding is used as meaning a step in an action. (See Smalley v. Robey & Co (1962) 1 QB 577 . It means a step forward and not one backward. Spencer v. Watts, (1889) 23 QBD 350, According to Words and Phrases Legally Defined. Vol. IV, the term proceeding is frequently used to note a step in an action, and obviously it has that meaning in such phrases as proceeding in any cause or matter. Proceeding is a general word meant to cover every step in an action and is equivalent to the word action. (See Prayor v. City offices Co, (1883) 10 QBD 504, Anything that precedes the final judgment or order is, in my opinion, a proceeding in the action. (See Blake v. Summersby, (1889) WN 39. 11. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the word "proceeding" obviously means an action at law, a process, or an act done by an authority, a step or a series of action taken for doing something, a particular action, a step in an action, and it is crystal clear, in my opinion, that an order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer was certainly a proceeding for the grant of lease in favour of respondent No. 4. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that against the administrative order no revision would lie. S. 333 of the Act is not couched in such a way as to warrant an inference or interpretation of S. 333 as made by the Additional Commissioner, or as suggested by the learned counsel for the respondents. 12. Where the jurisdiction under S. 333 of the Act has to be ascertained, the words of the section should be correctly interpreted. No words can be added or subtracted. Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition, at pages 64 and 65 has observed :- "The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. (See Capper v. Baldwin, (1965) 2 QB 53, The function of the Court is to interpret an Act according to the intent of them that made it. (See Corocraft v. Pan American Airways, (1969) 1 QB 616." 13. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition on page 28 observes : "The rule of construction is to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament." On page 29 it has been observed :- "Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to commonsense the result may be. The interpretation of statute is not to be collected from any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what is just and expedient." (See Cartledge v. E. Jopling & Sons Ltd., (1963) AC 758. 14. The permission granted by the Sub- Divisional Officer is certainly a proceeding for grant of lease in favour of respondent No. 4 which affects the right of the petitioner. What S. 333 requires is that a revision is maintainable against any suit proceeding decided by any subordinate court. In the instant case the proceeding for grant of lease in favour of respondent No. 4 by the Land Management Committee was certainly a proceeding and that was decided by the Sub-Divisional Officer by his order dated 19-4-84, who was a subordinate court to the court of the Additional Commissioner. Further this order by the Sub- Divisional Officer affects the legal right of the petitioner and as to whether a particular right is a legal right, it has been laid down in "A text book of Jurisprudence, 4th Edition by G.W. Paton" (Chapter XII page 284) as follows :- "From all these uses of the term there must be distinguished a legal right, of which the test is a simple one, is the right recognised and protected by the legal system itself?" On page 285 it has been further observed : "There are four elements in every legal right . (1) the holder of the right; (2) the act or forbearance to which the fight relates : (3) the res concerned (the object of the right); (4) the person bound by the duty." 15. In Smt. Krishna Devi v. Board of Revenue, 1972 All WR 409 : 1972 All LJ 658 a dispute was that an order was passed by the Magistrate in proceedings under rule 115N of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition And Land Reforms Rules in connection with an auction of abadi sites by the Land Management Committee. A question arose as to whether in passing the order in the proceedings under Rule 115N in respect of the abadi site the Sub-Divisional Officer can be deemed to be a subordinate to the Board of Revenue and a revision would lie against that order or not. It was held by the Division Bench that the Sub-Divisional Officer has passed the order in respect of an auction of the abadi site and all the points which were sought to be raised in the instant case including that it was an administrative action were raised and it was held that he was functioning as a court. In that case it was held that the Assistant Collector resolved alis between the two parties and he gave a decision in the case. His decision is final and the Assistant Collector discharges the judicial functions and not non-judicial. I am of the view that the case of Smt. Krishna Devi v. Board of Revenue (supra) applies on all fours. The aforesaid Division Bench case has been followed in Shiv Charan Lal v. Board of of Revenue, U.P., 1982 All WC 690 : 1982 All LJ 1285. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken in the aforesaid cases and hold that in the instant case revision was maintainable under S. 333A before the Commissioner and under S. 333 before the Board of Revenue. 16. The order of the Board of Revenue dated 15-2-84 was challenged in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6414 of 1984 which was admitted on 6-9-84 and the order of the Board of Revenue was stayed and thereafter the allotment was made afresh in favour of respondent No. 4. I have perused the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 4. 17. Writ Petition No. 6414 of 1984 which was admitted on 6-9-84 and the order of the Board of Revenue was stayed and thereafter the allotment was made afresh in favour of respondent No. 4. I have perused the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 4. 17. In paragraph No. 8 of the petition it was alleged by the petitioner that the earlier petition was contested by respondent No. 4 and he made an application that he was trained in the Science of Fishery and in collusion with the Land Management Committee he obtained a pasta from the same Sub-Divisional Officer who granted the same by order dated 19-4-84 against his own order dated 20-10-1982. Reply of this paragraph is given in paragraph No. 89 of the counter-affidavit filed by Gyanji, pairokar of respondent No. 4 in which it has been alleged that the Sub-Divisional Officer granted patta in favour of the respondents on 19-4-1984 and the matter was sub judice in this Court in the writ petition and the first appeal from order filed earlier. But the circumstances were not given in the counter-affidavit as to how the patta was granted when the operation of the order of the Board of Revenuewas stayed as indicated above. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that the counter-affidavit is totally silent in respect of the circumstances under which lease was granted to respondent No. 4 in spite of the interim orders granted by this Court. 18. In Mulraj v. Murti Raghunath Ji Maharaj, AIR 1967 SC 1386 (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner it was held that the stay was granted and communicated to the court against whose order the stay order was passed. In the instant case I am of the view that in view of the circumstances of the case the Sub-Divisional Officer was not right in granting the patta in view of the orders of this Court. 19. The case of Shiv Pujan Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1980 Pat 64 (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents was in respect of the scope of the writ of Mandamus against an order of administrative Tribunal. I am of the view that it does not hold field in the instant case. 19. The case of Shiv Pujan Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1980 Pat 64 (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents was in respect of the scope of the writ of Mandamus against an order of administrative Tribunal. I am of the view that it does not hold field in the instant case. Similarly State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Srinivas Naik, AIR 1982 SC 1249 (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents was a case in respect of a statement made before the High Court by the counsel and it does not help the respondents. Similarly in Gurdin v. Gaon Sabha, 1978 All LJ (NOC) 40, (supra) permission was granted by the Sub-Divisional Officer to enter into a compromise in his executive capacity. But the instant case was not a case of compromise. 20. In view of the discussions made above, I am of the view that permission granted by the Sub-Divisional Officer in connection with granting lease to Respondent No. 4 vide his order dated 19-4-1984 and the proceedings decided by him (Sub-Divisional Officer) in connection with the grant of lease is revisable under Sections 333 and 333A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. There could be no denying the fact that the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer passed in favour of Respondent No. 4 was certainly an order and the proceedings to grant lease has been decided and Sub-Divisional Officer is certainly a Court Subordinate to the Board of Revenue and the Addl. Commissioner and the grant of lease was made during the pendency of the Writ Petition, namely, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6414 of 1984 in which stay order was granted staying the operation of the impugned order. Hence unless the aforesaid interim order was vacated the Sub-Divisional Officer has no authority to grant lease ignoring the stay order passed by this Court. I am, therefore, of the view that the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer in connection with the proceedings granting lease and the order passed by the Additional Commissioner holding that the revision was not maintainable, are liable to he quashed by issuing a writ of certiorari. 21. I am, therefore, of the view that the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer in connection with the proceedings granting lease and the order passed by the Additional Commissioner holding that the revision was not maintainable, are liable to he quashed by issuing a writ of certiorari. 21. In view of the discussions made hereinbefore the present petition succeeds and is allowed, the impugned orders dated 27-7-1984 and 14-11-1984 are quashed and the case is remanded back to the Additional Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur to admit the revision to its original number and decide the same afresh. Propriety, however, requires that the revision may be decided by some Additional Commissioner other than Sri Bhuiya Din as he has already expressed his opinion. I, however, refrain from making any order as to costs.