JUDGMENT N.N. Sharma, J. - This is a defendant's appeal directed against judgment and decree dated 25-7-1974 by Sri S. B. L Kakkar learned IIIrd Additional District Judge. Kanpur who dismissed Civil Appeal No. 56 of 1972 with costs and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 13-12-1971 drawn by Sri J. M. Srivastava, she then learned Civil Judge, Kanpur in original Suit No. 84 of 1964 who had decreed the suit of, plaintiffs respondents for possession over the disputed premises and for recovery of Rs. 1800/- as mesne profits and for pendente lite and future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month. 2. The dispute relates to a portion of premises No. 96/6, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, The Mall, Kanpur as detailed at the foot of the plaint. 3. Plaintiffs were Sah Madan Mohan. Mukandi Lal Garg, in their capacity as trustee and managing trustee respectively of plaintiff No. 3 Lala Chhedilal Trust. 4. Contesting defendant is appellant Sri Ram Pyare Bajpai while defendant No. 2 was Sri Deo Dutta Mishra and defendant No. 3 P. D. Agarwal was a pro forma defendant as one of the trustees of aforesaid trust. 5. Plaintiffs' case was that the entire premises No. 96/6 was commonly known as Chandrika Prasad Bagh. It consisted of several residential units. This entire property originally belonged to Lala Chhedi Lal Agarwal who created the aforesaid trust under the will executed on 12-4-1917 and registered on 13-4-1917. 6. In the aforesaid premises, one Kothi is known as Bari Kothi and the other as Chhoti Kothi. 7. It was expressly provided that Chandrika Prasad Bagh was to be utilised by the general Hindu public as a Health Resort and the said two Kothies may also be used for marriages and other important functions of the Hindus but no individual or group of individuals should be allowed to use or occupy it for more than three days in continuation. These Kothies were not meant for letting out. 8. It was further averred that during the Second World War, the district authorities passed an order asking the Trustees of the trust to let out the Bari Kothi on rent. It was allotted to Sri Bal Mukund Sharma, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police and thereafter to Sri D. D. Sharma, Central Excise Inspector. Subsequently, defendant No. 2 Sri Deo Dutta Misra. It was allotted to Sri Bal Mukund Sharma, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police and thereafter to Sri D. D. Sharma, Central Excise Inspector. Subsequently, defendant No. 2 Sri Deo Dutta Misra. a Member of the Legislative Assembly, became the tenant of the entire Bari Kothi on behalf of trust on a monthly rent of Rs. 50/-. During the tenure of Sri Deo Dutt Misra, Sri Ram Pyare appellant occupied the disputed premises as detailed at the foot of the plaint. This occupation was done by him in 1954 through Sri Deo Dutta Misra. It was further alleged by plaintiffs that Sri Deo Dutta Misra abandoned his tenancy in the year 1961 and Smt. Kamla Kumari, wife of Sri Chhatra Sal Singh, who was then posted as Civil Judge, Kanpur, got the portion, which was previously in the occupation of Sri Deo Dutt Misra, allotted in her favour. However, defendant No. 1 Ram Pyare continued to occupy the portion during this period. 9. Plaintiffs requested defendant No. 1 to vacate the premises but on the request of Ram Pyare this permissive occupation was allowed for a period of six months more on account of the marriage of his daughter. However, he did not vacate the premises as promised by him, despite the marriage of his daughter in April 1961, and thus the permission granted to him stood automatically revoked. 10. Plaintiffs repeatedly asked defendant No. 1 to vacate the premises. They also served a notice dated 3-4-1964 upon Ram Pyare defendant No. 1 calling upon him to vacate and deliver possession of the accommodation. Ram Pyare gave an evasive reply. He was served with another notice dated 13-4-1964 through his counsel asking him to vacate the premises and to pay mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month from 11-7-1961. On receipt of this notice, defendant No. 1 Ram Pyare had a talk with the trustees and offered to pay rent and wanted that his occupation should be treated as a tenant. However, plaintiffs did not agree to it. Defendant felt annoyed. On 2-5-1964, he sent a wrong notice in reply alleging that he was the proprietor and owner of the disputed accommodation. Hence, the present suit had been filed by plaintiffs on 11-8-1964. 11. Defendant No. I Ram Pyare denied that he was in permissive occupation of the disputed premises. However, plaintiffs did not agree to it. Defendant felt annoyed. On 2-5-1964, he sent a wrong notice in reply alleging that he was the proprietor and owner of the disputed accommodation. Hence, the present suit had been filed by plaintiffs on 11-8-1964. 11. Defendant No. I Ram Pyare denied that he was in permissive occupation of the disputed premises. He also denied that Sri Deo Dutt Misra was the tenant of the entire building known as Bari Kothi. According to him Sri Deo Dutt Misra, occupied only a portion of Bari Kothi and the remaining portion of the Kothi was in possession of defendant No. l Ram Pyare even prior to the occupation by Deo Dutt Misra in Bari Kothi. He also denied that he occupied the premises in 1954. According to him, he was in possession from before. He also denied the allegation of plaintiffs that he requested them to permit his occupation for six months more on the pretext of the marriage of his daughter. He also challenged the right of plaintiffs 1 and 2 to file the suit pending the disposal of Civil Appeal No. 208 of 1960 in this Court about the Trust. Other pleas were also raised which are not necessary to be detailed for the disposal of this appeal. 12. Both the Courts below found that possession of defendant-appellant over the disputed premises was permissive and not adverse. They further found that possession of contesting defendant commenced in 1954 and not prior thereto. As the suit was filed in 1964, so there was no question of the suit being barred by time. They further found that the suit was not liable to be stayed; they further held that Mukandi Lal Garg was well entitled to institute the suit. In the result, the claim was decreed as given above. 13. I have heard learned counsel for parties at length and perused the record. 14. On behalf of appellant, it was strenuously argued before me that possession of contesting defendant was not permissive but adverse; it did not commence from 1954 but prior thereto; the Courts below misread the evidence and wrongly held that the possession of defendant No. 1 was simply permissive and commenced from 1954. 15. Both the Courts below have scrutinised the statements of Mukundilal Garg (P.W. 1) and Ram Pyare (D. W. 1) and they stigmatised Ram Pyare as unreliable. 15. Both the Courts below have scrutinised the statements of Mukundilal Garg (P.W. 1) and Ram Pyare (D. W. 1) and they stigmatised Ram Pyare as unreliable. In this connection, they referred to the shifting stand of defendant No. 1 Ram Pyare. In his written statement, defendant No. 1 did not mention the date of commencement of his occupation. In his statement under O. X R. 2. Code of Civil Procedure, he disclosed that he occupied the premises in 1950 and subsequently, through an amendment in his written statement, it was pleaded that he occupied the premises from Sept., 1951. On the other hand, the case of the plaintiffs on this point was consistent throughout. I find that the Courts below gave good reasons for believing the testimony of plaintiff Mukundi Lal Garg (P.W. 1). Moreover, there is nothing on record to show that possession of defendant No. 1 was adverse. He conceded that house and water taxes had to be paid by the owner in Kanpur and he was well aware of that obligation. He never paid any water or house tax during his occupation. 16. Defendant No. 1 Ram Pyare further conceded in his cross-examination that he did not know the actual owner of the property. He again conceded that the disputed accommodation belongs to Chhedi Lal Trust and he learnt this fact from one Munni Lal who was a trustee of the said trust. When he entered possession over the disputed premises. he had .an intention to pay the rent also. Mukandi Lal (P.W. 1) testified that after a letter has been issued to defendant No. 1 in 1961, defendant approached him and so Madan Mohan permitted his occupation for six months more till the marriage of his daughter was performed. That marriage was performed in April 1961. 17. So the aforesaid concurrent findings of fact does not suffer from any infirmity and are thus confirmed. 18. The next contention was that there is documentary evidence on record to show that Mukandi Lal Garg was not legally appointed trustee of the aforesaid Trust and so the plaintiffs could not maintain the suit. 19. It is correct that plaintiffs did not file any documentary evidence to show that Sri Mukandi Lal, as de facto trustee of the aforesaid Trust, had collected rent or paid house tax etc. 20. 19. It is correct that plaintiffs did not file any documentary evidence to show that Sri Mukandi Lal, as de facto trustee of the aforesaid Trust, had collected rent or paid house tax etc. 20. Learned Courts below found the testimony of Mukandi Lal reliable on the point that as de facto trustee, he was managing the trust property. Mukandi Lal and others had filed a suit against a tenant Parmanand in respect of the house in Bengali Mohal claiming themselves to be trustees of Chhedi Lal Trust and the courts below referred to the judgment (Ext. 9) in Appeal No. 549 of 1960 on the point that Mukandi Lal and others were the trustees and had right to sue. It is correct that it has been held in Suit No. 22/57 between Sri Krishan and others and Shah Madan Mohan and others under S. 92 of Code of Civil Procedure vide Ext. A4 copy of plaint, copy of the written statement Ext. A5 and copy of judgment Ext. Al, that Mukandi Lal and others were not duly appointed trustees but it did not debar a de facto trustee from bringing an action in name of Trust for ejectment of a trespasser or licensee from the trust property vide Vikarama Das Mahant v. Daulat Ram Asthana, 1956 All WR (SC) 373 : AIR 1956 SC 382 . Such decree would be in favour and for the benefit of Trust. A similar view was held in Lalta Prasad v. Brahma Nand, AIR 1953 All 449 , relied upon by the Courts below. It was open to the Courts below to have believed the oral statement of P.W. 1 and to have discarded the statement of D.W. 1 for which good reasons were recorded by them. I have given above names of all the plaintiffs. Under such circumstances, the aforesaid concurrent finding of fact by the Courts below cannot be faulted. 21. Learned Advocate for appellant next argued that P.W. 1 Mukandi Lal in his examination-in-chief conceded that during the second World War, this Kothi was requisitioned by the State for occupation by Deputy Superintendent of Police Sri Bal Mukund Sharma and thus Sri Bal Mukund Sharma became the first tenant in this Kothi. In cross-examination he conceded that it was never de-requisitioned. In cross-examination he conceded that it was never de-requisitioned. On the basis of this statement through an application dated 7-2-1973, defendant-appellant sought an amendment to the effect that since the property in suit has been requisitioned by the State and the same was not released so far, plaintiffs were not entitled to file and maintain the suit against the defendants and the same was liable to be dismissed. No oral or documentary evidence was adduced in support of this application by defendant. This application was opposed by plaintiffs-respondents. It was also disposed of by learned appellate Court by the judgment and aforesaid contention was repelled. 22. Learned Advocate for appellant argued that in a petition dated 12-4-1947 written by Shah Shree Krishan Das in his capacity as President of Lala Chhedi Lal Trust, addressed to the District Magistrate, Kanpur was a prayer that the property be not allotted to anybody; this petition is also indicative of the fact that this Kothi had been requisitioned by the District Magistrate during the IInd World War, and thus the present suit was not maintainable as the title and possession of the Kothi vested in the State. In this connection reliance was placed upon H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1984 SC 866 at p. 867 which brings out the distinction between the concepts of requisition and acquisition in following terms : "The two concepts, one of requisition and the other of acquisition are totally distinct and independent. Acquisition means the acquiring of the entire title of the expropriated owner whatever the nature and extent of that title may be. The entire bundle of rights which was vested in the original holder passes on acquisition to the acquirer leaving nothing to the former. The concept of acquisition has an air or permanence and finality in that there is transference of the title of the original holder to the acquiring authority. But the concept of requisition involves merely taking of "domain or control over property without acquiring rights of ownership" and must by its very nature be of temporary duration. Thus, the Government cannot under the guise of requisition continued for an indefinite period of time, in substance acquire the property, because that would be a fraud on the power conferred on the Government." 23. Thus, the Government cannot under the guise of requisition continued for an indefinite period of time, in substance acquire the property, because that would be a fraud on the power conferred on the Government." 23. A mere look at the aforesaid authority shall go to show that the title remains with the owner and does not vest in the State in the case of requisition. In requisition only possession over the property is taken for a limited period only. No issue was drawn on the point as to whether the possession of the disputed property was still with the State or not? 24. On the other hand, a perusal of para 27 of the written statement of defendant Ram Pyare shall go to show that after the vacation of the accommodation by defendant No. 2 in 1961, that portion was allotted to Smt. Kamal Kumari, Sri Sheo Dutt Misra vacated the accommodation in 1957. Thus, it is obvious that after the vacation of the premises by Sri Bal Mukund Sharma, it was let out to so many tenants under the orders of allotment. Sri Deo Dutta Misra used to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month. Thereafter Smt. Kamal Kumari wife of Sri Chhatra Shall Singh procured an order of allotment in her favour. It is obvious that the requisition, if any, came to an end and the premises were let out to tenants under U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act No. XIII of 1972) and other Acts which regulated the allotment and rent and eviction of such premises. The distinction between regulation, requisition and acquisition was pointed out in Mst. The distinction between regulation, requisition and acquisition was pointed out in Mst. Bhagwati Devi v. Sardar Balwant Singh, reported in 1955 All LJ 1 (FB) in following terms :- "When a property is requisitioned by the Government all that the person in possession of the house is deprived of is the actual physical possession thereof and not the legal right which had entitled him to remain in possession so that when the requisition order is withdrawn, it is only necessary to restore possession to the person from whom it was taken, but in the case of acquisition a right is acquired by the State and if the right, title or interest acquired is no longer needed it has to be legally transferred to whomsoever it is decided to give the right, title or interest. Regulation only means that the rights of the owner or the person entitled to possession are restricted and controlled by the requisite authority, the State Government neither acquiring possession nor the right to possession. It is, therefore. that while in the case of acquisition or requisition the State has to pay compensation for what the State has acquired, in the case of `regulation' of house accommodation no compensation is payable, obviously because no rights in the property are acquired or get vested in the State." 25. So the property continues to belong to the Trust and the plaintiffs were well entitled to maintain an action. Learned lower appellate Court rightly rejected the amendment application dated 7-2-1973 moved by defendant-appellant. 26. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Impugned judgment and decree are affirmed.