JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - This writ petition challenges the order of the chairman, Prathama Bank, Moradabad, dated March 13, 1982, terminating him from service. The order reads : "I, in exercise of my powers vested in me under Regulations No. 8.3 (a) of Prathama Bank (Staff) Service Regulations, 1980 hereby terminate your services with immediate effect." 2. The petitioner's case was that the applications were invited for the Branch Manager, Prathama Bank in March, 1979. The petitioner was called for interview in pursuance of his application and, thereafter, on being, found suitable was selected for appointment as Branch Manager on 10th July, 1978. After undergoing training, the petitioner was appointed as Probationary Officer in the Bank on May 10, 1979 with effect from 15th April, 1979. He was placed on one year probation. Even after the expiry of one year, tire petitioner's term of probation was not extended. He continued to function as a Probationary Officer. Although the petitioner stood confirmed automatically since the term of his probation had not been extended but illegally he was asked by the Bank authorities to appear for interview before the Board on 11.4.1981. He complied with the direction. Subsequently, through a letter dated 14th April, 1981, he was informed that the Interview Committee had not found him suitable to confirm in the bank service. Consequently the probation was extended for a period of six months. Again through the latter dated 2.12. 1981, the petitioner was called upon to appear before the interview committee on 12.12.1981 for the purpose of being judged his suitability for confirmation. The petitioner complied with the direction. But instead of confirming him, the Syndicate Bank informed him through the letter dated 30th December, 1981 that the Committee had decided to give another opportunity to improve, hence, the period of probation was extended for four months i.e. upto 15.2.1982. After 15.2.1982, the petitioner received a letter dated Mach 13, 1982 from the Chairman intimating him that his service had been terminated with imediate effect under Regulation 8.3 (3). 3. By this petition, the validity of termination order has been challenged. 4. Two ground were urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of this petition. After 15.2.1982, the petitioner received a letter dated Mach 13, 1982 from the Chairman intimating him that his service had been terminated with imediate effect under Regulation 8.3 (3). 3. By this petition, the validity of termination order has been challenged. 4. Two ground were urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of this petition. The first was that after the expiry of initial period of one year with effect from the date of his appointment, he stood automatically confirmed and, as such; the respondents had no power to extend the probation period. The next submission was that Regulation 8.3 (a) of the Prathama Bank (Staff) Service Regulations, 1980 did not apply to him. Consequently, the impugned order termination his under Regulation 8.3 (a) was invalid. Apart from these two points, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the order termination him was malafide. 5. In exercise of the power conferred by Section 30 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (21 of 1976), the Board of Directors of Prathama Bank after consultation with the Syndicate Bank by which the said Prathama Bank had been sponsored and the Reserve Bank of India and with the previous sanction of the Central Government, made the Prathama Bank (Staff) Service Regulations. These Regulations came into force from 1st August, 1980. 6. The petitioner was appointed in 1979. At that time, the petitioner was placed on one year probation. The petitioner claimed that an neither was any provision . extension of probationary period nor was that done before the expiry of one year, he stood confirmed on the post on which he was appointed automatically. Neither was there any provision in the contract nor in any other law which could be shown by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the automatic confirmation of which the petitioner wants to take advantage. There is no right in the probationer to be confirmed merely because has completed the period of probation and had passed the proscribed training. He argument of the petitioner, therefore, about his entitlement to automatic confirmation does not appear to be correct. The present was not a case where there was any provision of any automatic or deemed confirmation. 7. There is no right in the probationer to be confirmed merely because has completed the period of probation and had passed the proscribed training. He argument of the petitioner, therefore, about his entitlement to automatic confirmation does not appear to be correct. The present was not a case where there was any provision of any automatic or deemed confirmation. 7. It is true that the Service Regulations case into force with effect from August 1, 1980 but it is not right to argue that the petitioner is not covered by it. After promulgation and implementation all the employees and the officers, who were in employment in the Bank came under it. It was in material as to whether the officer was appointed before 1st August, 1980 or after. The petitioner was in service on the 1st of August, 1980. As a result of the promulgation of the Staff Regulations, the petitioner case under it. His terms and conditions of service after 1st August, 1980 were to be governed by the Staff Regulations. Regulation 8 (1) of the Service Regulations provides that every officer on this appointment in a post in the Bank shall be on probation for a period of two years which shall be extendable upto a period not exceeding one year. It was in exercise of this power that the probationary period of the petitioner was extended from time to time. Even if the petitioners probationary period was counted from April, 1979, it would appear that the period of three years for which an officer can be kept on probation under Regulation 8 (Is) had not expired on 13th March, 1982 when he was terminated by the impugned order with respect of extension of period of probation, the Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with in Dhajibhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1985 SC 603 to lay down : "The power to extend the period of probation must not be confused with the manner in which the extension may be effected. The one relates to power, the other to mere procedure, merely because procedural rules have not been framed does not imply a negation of the power. In the absence of such rules, it is sufficient that the power is exercised fairly and reasonably, having regard to the context in which the power has been granted. The one relates to power, the other to mere procedure, merely because procedural rules have not been framed does not imply a negation of the power. In the absence of such rules, it is sufficient that the power is exercised fairly and reasonably, having regard to the context in which the power has been granted. There is no right in the probationer to be confirmed merely because he had completed the period of probation of two years and had passed the requisite tests and completed the prescribed training. The function of confirmation implies the exercise of judgment by the confirming authority on the overall suitability of the employee for permanent absorption in service." 8. In the instant case, when the petitioner appeared before the interview committee on two occasions, his work was not found satisfactory. It was precisely for this reason that he was given extension once for six months and thereafter for four months. It is not correct, as would appear from the above case of the Supreme Court in Dhanjibhai v. State of Gujarat, merely because that after the expiry of the period of probation, the petitioner had not been terminated, therefore, he would be deemed to have been confirmed. For confirmation, the provision is made in Regulation 9. It requires a positive order of the Bank in that regard, if in the opinion of the appointing authority the officer has satisfactory completed his probation. Unless and until an order is passed there could be no confirmation. The petitioners learned counsel, therefore, was not right in submitting that as within four months of the Second extension he was not confirmed, he acuired the right of a confirmed employee or that he should be deemed to be confirmed. 9. Petitioners learned counsel urged that as his non - confirmation amounted to casting aspersion or stigma on him, there was requirement of giving an opportunity .0 the petitioner before he was terminated. He urged that the termination in the instant case amount to imposition of penalty on him and, as such, was his dismissal from service. According to the submission of the petitioners counsel, it was not the case of simple termination. He urged that the termination in the instant case amount to imposition of penalty on him and, as such, was his dismissal from service. According to the submission of the petitioners counsel, it was not the case of simple termination. For the proposition that even a probationer is entitled to an enquiry and opportunity if the termination bears stigma, the counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Indra Pal Gupta v. Managing Committee, Model Intermediate College, Tohra, AIR 1984 SC 110 . 10. The decision relied upon is distinguishable. In that case, the Principal Indra Pal Gupta who was on probation was terminated on the basis of the report of the Manager which contained serious allegations against him. On the basis of the report of the Manager, the Committee resolved to terminate him. In the background of these facts, the Supreme Court held that the termination without opportunity was invalid. Since is not the position in the instant case. It was held in Purshottam Dongra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC page 3, that if the termination of service is found on the right flowing from contract of service Rules than prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequence. On the facts set forth in this case, we are not satisfied that the petitioner was terminated with a view to punish him. The petitioner had been given time on two occasions to appear before the interview board and when his work was not found satisfactory than he was terminated. Such a termination does not cast any stigma. 11. Counsel for the petitioner took us through certain paragraphs of the writ petition in support of his argument that the termination was mala fide. On the materials, we are not satisfied that such a finding could be recorded in the present case. 12. An objection was raised by the respondents' learned counsel to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy to the petitioner under Regulation 31 which provides for appeal against any order passed by any authority which injuriously effects his interest. The petitioner may file such an appeal now. 12. An objection was raised by the respondents' learned counsel to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy to the petitioner under Regulation 31 which provides for appeal against any order passed by any authority which injuriously effects his interest. The petitioner may file such an appeal now. If on the materials placed before the appellate authority, it is realised that the petitioner should have been given on more opportunity by extending probation period, it will be open to the appellate authority to do so. On merits also, if the appellate authority finds that the petitioner ought to have been confirmed, it would be entitled to set aside the termination order. Ours is a limited jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We could not go into all these controversies in the present proceedings and hence, we have not done so. We have confirmed ourselves to the legal aspects of the matter which were argued before us. 13. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. If the appeal is filed, we hope that the same would be decided by the appellate authority expeditiously. No order as to costs.