JUDGMENT K.P. Singh, J.- By means of this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the judgment of the Second Appellate Court dated 22-1-1982. The petitioner had claimed right in the dispute land on the basis of a will executed by Ramzani. 2. The trial court rejected the claim of the petitioner as the petitioner had failed to prove the loss of the will and the evidence led by the petitioner did not prove due execution of the will. Against the judgment of the trial court the appellate court gave judgment for the petitioner holding that the will was proved without addressing itself to the question of loss of the will. The second appellate court through its judgment dated 22-1-1982 has restored the judgment of the trial court. Aggrieved by the judgment of the second appellate court the defendant petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the second appellate court has exceeded its jurisdiction in reappraising the evidence on record and giving judgment against the petitioner. 4. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to support the impugned judgment. According to him the will set up by the defendant petitioner was not proved in accordance with law and the second appellate court has correctly arrived at its conclusion which cannot be termed as perverse or without any basis in evidence. Therefore, the impugned judgment is immune from attack by the defendant petitioner in the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties and I have gone through the impugned judgments attached with the writ petition. In my opinion, the second appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction in reappraising the evidence on record. In paragraph 10 of the impugned judgment the second appellate court has started with the assumption that the trial court had made a legitimate and detailed scrutiny of the will and the reasons given for not believing the same were quite convincing. The aforesaid approach is patently erroneous. In paragraph 11 of the impugned judgment the second appellate court has not accepted the theory set by the petitioner regarding the loss of the will on the ground that in a criminal case the theory set up by the petitioner was not accepted. The aforesaid approach is patently erroneous. In paragraph 11 of the impugned judgment the second appellate court has not accepted the theory set by the petitioner regarding the loss of the will on the ground that in a criminal case the theory set up by the petitioner was not accepted. To my mind, the aforesaid approach is also patently erroneous. Independent of the acquittal order the second appellate court should have weighed the evidence of the parties and should have arrived at independent findings. In not doing so the second appellate court has patently erred and its judgment cannot be sustained. 6. In the circumstances of this case the first appellate court has also patently erred in giving judgment for the petitioner. When the trial court had specifically dealt with the question that the loss of the will was not proved by the defendant petitioner, it was incumbent upon the first appellate court to have addressed itself to the question of loss of the will but without addressing itself to the question of loss of the will the first appellate court has held the will as proved in accordance with law. To this extent the first appellate court has also not performed its duty as contemplated by law. Therefore, its judgment also is not sustainable. 7. For the foregoing discussions I think that the ends of justice demand that the judgment of the second appellate court and the first appellate court should be quashed and the first appellate court be asked to re-examine the claims of the parties in the light of the pleadings and evidence on record as well as strictly in accordance with law. 8. Thus, I allow the writ petition and quash the judgment of the second appellate court and that of the first appellate court and direct the first appellate court to re-examine the claims of the parties in the light of their pleadings and evidence on record. The first appellate court will deal with all the contentions raised by the parties before it hereafter. There would be no order as to costs.