ORDER S.K. Dhaon, J. - The petitioner has prayed for certiorari for quashing an order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U.P., Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) dismissing his application for revision in default of appearance and also its subsequent order refusing to recall the earlier order of the dismissal of the revision. 2. Admittedly neither the petitioner nor his counsel were present on the date fixed for the hearing of the revision. The tribunal on Nov. 3, 1978 passed an order:- "The revision is dismissed in default of t e revisionist." March 1, 1979 was fixed for the consideration of the application made by and on behalf of the petitioner for recalling the order passed on Nov. 3, 1978. The Tribunal passed the order in Hindi, the English rendering of which is somewhat like this: The applicant as well as his counsel are absent. The Reader has reported that the allegations made in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the application are incorrect. Counsel has sent an application praying for adjournment. The person who has brought the application has no connection with the case. As the application has not been legally presented it is being rejected. It appears, on the same date it rejected the application for restoration. 3. A two pronged attack has been made. First, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to dismiss the revision in default of appearance. Secondly, the Tribunal acted arbitrarily in rejecting the application for recalling its order. 4. The first submission is based upon an interpretation of the provisions as contained in S. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) The enacting part minus the three provisos-there, which are not relevant, may be extracted. Secondly, the Tribunal acted arbitrarily in rejecting the application for recalling its order. 4. The first submission is based upon an interpretation of the provisions as contained in S. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) The enacting part minus the three provisos-there, which are not relevant, may be extracted. "The State Transport Appellate Tribunal may either on its own motion or on an application made to it call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the order made by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal," the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit and every such order shall be final." The afore quoted provision, except the words underlined by me, are substantially the same as were originally inserted by Act No. 100 of 1956. The words underlined have been inserted by Act No. 56 of 1969. The contention is that the Tribunal is under a statutory obligation to pass an order on the merits of an application for revision and, therefore, the dismissal in default of appearance is impliedly prohibited. Stress has been laid on the words underlined. It is also emphasised that although sub-r. (6) of R. 71 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) provides that the Tribunal may for sufficient reason restore an appeal dismissed in default or for want of prosecution on an application moved by an appellant within fifteen days of the knowledge of the order of dismissal of the appeal; no such provision has been made in respect of an application for revision. It is also submitted that the rules maintain a distinction between an appeal and a revision as R. 71-A lays down the procedure to be followed in case of death of a party in appeal or revision. 5. Sub-r. (6) of R. 71, it appears, is not applicable to revisions in spite of it being trite that a revision forms part of the general appellate jurisdiction. 5. Sub-r. (6) of R. 71, it appears, is not applicable to revisions in spite of it being trite that a revision forms part of the general appellate jurisdiction. The scheme of the Act accepts the said proposition as it provides that the orders which are not appealable under S. 64 are revisable under S. 64A. In fact orders falling under enumerated situations alone are appealable and all other orders are amenable to the revisional jurisdiction. Furthermore, the powers of the revisional authority are not hedged in with any limitations as are to be found in S. 115 of the Civil P.C. 6. We have, therefore, to concentrate upon the phraseology used by the Legislature in the enacting part of S. 64A to discern the legislative intent whether a revisional authority is to sit like a silent spectator with folded hands even though it feels that a particular applicant before it has either chosen his own time for the hearing of the revision or is adopting dilatory tactics. Such a construction should be made as a last resort. In my opinion, such is not the intendment in S. 64-A. The words "may pass such orders in relation to the case as it deems fit" are wide enough to clothe the revisional authority with the jurisdiction to dismiss the revision in default of appearance of the applicant. An order dismissing the revision either in default of appearance or in default of prosecution will be an order disposing of the revision and such an order will be a final one. 7. In Arbind Kumar Singh v. Nand Kishore Prasad, AIR 1968 SC 1227 , S. 64 of the Act as amended by Bihar Act No. 17 of 1950, which authorised the State Government to call for from any authority or officer subordinate to it, the record of such proceedings and after examining such records pass such orders as it thinks fit, came up for interpretation. It was held:- "........The expression."pass such orders as it thinks fit" is not restricted to the passing of orders which are final in character." Their Lordships held in that case that the revisional authority had the power to accept additional evidence. 8. This problem can be approached from another angle. In S. 64-A a statutory duty has been cast upon the revisional authority to pass such orders as it thinks fit in the case. 8. This problem can be approached from another angle. In S. 64-A a statutory duty has been cast upon the revisional authority to pass such orders as it thinks fit in the case. The Tribunal should be presumed to possess such powers as are incidental to or consequential upon the carrying out of the statutory duty. Surely, the exercise of power dismissing a revision either in default of appearance or in default of prosecution will be an incidental or a consequential act. It is to be remembered that in S. 64A there is no provision either express or implied making it imperative upon the Tribunal to give its decision on the merits. I am, therefore, of the view that the revisional authority under S. 64A of the Act has the power to dismiss the revision either in default of appearance or default of prosecution. 9. In Smt. K.N. Sehgal v. Commr., Allahabad, AIR 1971 All 573 a Division Bench of this Court was called upon to interpret sub- s. (3) of S. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 and to decide whether under the said provision the revisional authority could dismiss the revision in default of appearance of an applicant before it. The said provision was:- "The Commissioner shall hear the application made under sub-sec. (2).......... and he may, if he is not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Magistrate or as to the regularity of proceedings held before him, alter or reverse his order, or make such other orders as may be just and proper." While holding that these provisions did not empower the Commissioner to dismiss the revision in default of appearance of a party, the Bench laid emphasis on the words "the Commissioner shall hear the application." In S. 64A of the Act we do not find such words, on the contrary, the revisional authority has been given a discretion to either call for or not to call for the record of a particular case. Of course, this discretion has to be exercised on judicial considerations. It is to be noted that the Division Bench overruled the judgment of Satish Chandra, J. (as he then was) who had taken the view that despite the provisions contained in sub-sec. Of course, this discretion has to be exercised on judicial considerations. It is to be noted that the Division Bench overruled the judgment of Satish Chandra, J. (as he then was) who had taken the view that despite the provisions contained in sub-sec. (3) of S. 3 the Commissioner had an inherent power of dismissing the revision for default of the appearance of a party. The reasoning of the Division Bench appears to be based on the well-known principle that when a matter or topic falls within the ambit of the express provision of the statute inherent power to that extent is regarded as abrogated by the Legislature. 10. In Hindustan Metal Works v. Sales Tax Officer, (1964) 15 STC 116 a learned single Judge of this Court held that R. 68 of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules which empowered the appellate Court to dismiss an appeal for default was ultra vires the Act. Accordingly, this Court quashed the order of the appellate authority dismissing the appeal in default of appearance. The learned Judge based his judgment on the provisions as contained in the second proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 9 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act which were :- "Provided, secondly, that the appellate authority shall not exercise any powers or perform any further function except those conferred on or entrusted to him as such authority." He also emphasised upon the contents of sub-sec. (3) of S. 9 which empowered the appellate authority to (a) confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or (b) set aside the assessment and direct the assessing authority to pass fresh order after such further enquiry as may be directed, or confirm or cancel the order imposing penalty or reduce the amount of penalty imposed. The learned Judge took the view that the second proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 9 ruled out any notions of the exercise of inherent powers which are presumed to vest in all judicial and quasi judicial bodies. He also took the view that the appellate Court under S. 9 of the Sales Tax Act was a watch dog in the general public interest and particularly on behalf of the public revenues and in so far as taxes were gathered through the instrumentality of the Sales Tax Act. He also took the view that the appellate Court under S. 9 of the Sales Tax Act was a watch dog in the general public interest and particularly on behalf of the public revenues and in so far as taxes were gathered through the instrumentality of the Sales Tax Act. He also held that the legislative intendment was that the appeal once filed by the assessee should be disposed of only on its merits. This case is not Opposite. 11. In Commr. of Income-tax, Madras v. Chenniappa Mudaliar, AIR 1969 SC 1068 sub-sec. (4) of S. 33 of the Income-tax Act which was to the effect that the appellate authority may after giving both parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit and shall communicate any such order to the assessee and to the Commissioner, came up for consideration. It was held after emphasising on the word "thereon" that the appellate tribunal was bound to give a proper decision on questions of fact as well as law which could only be done if the appeal was disposed of on the merits and not dismissed owing to the absence of the appellant. Accordingly, R. 24 of the Income- tax Rules, which provided for dismissal of an appeal in default of appearance of an appellant, was struck down as being in conflict with the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of S. 33. In S. 64-A of the Act the word "thereon" is conspicuously missing. Furthermore, the scheme of the Income-tax Act, particularly of S,33, as analysed by their Lordships, indicated a definite intention that the appeal had to be disposed of on merits. This case too, therefore, does not advance the cause of the petitioner. 12. The Tribunal while exercising power under S. 64-A exercises quasi-judicial powers. It is not a Court stricto sensu. Detailed procedures as applicable to Courts are not applicable to it. No rules have been framed as to the manner in which proceedings before it shall be conducted. It is true that the learned counsel for the petitioner adopted a somewhat odd procedure in sending the application for adjournment of the hearing of the application for restoration of the revision through some stranger. It is to be noted that the counsel was residing at Meerut and he sent that application from that place. It is true that the learned counsel for the petitioner adopted a somewhat odd procedure in sending the application for adjournment of the hearing of the application for restoration of the revision through some stranger. It is to be noted that the counsel was residing at Meerut and he sent that application from that place. It is also to be noted that the ground for seeking the adjournment was the illness of the counsel himself. Obviously the counsel had signed the application. The Tribunal had not expressed any doubt about the signature of the counsel on the application. The mere fact that the learned counsel had sent the application and had mentioned his personal illness as the ground was enough for the adjournment of the hearing of the restoration application on that particular date. The Tribunal not only took a hypertechnical view of the matter but also acted somewhat arbitrarily in rejecting the application for adjournment made by the counsel on his personal ground. Consequently the order rejecting the application for restoration was had. 13. This petition succeeds in part. The order dated March 1979, passed by the Tribunal dismissing the application for restoration of the Revision No. 440 of 1978 is quashed. The Tribunal is directed to dispose of Miscellaneous Application No. 57 of 1978 in Revision No. 440 of 1978 on merits and in accordance with law. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.