JUDGMENT A. Banerji, J. - These writ petitions have been filed by various employees of Indian Audit and Accounts Department working in the office of the Accountant General, U.P., Allahabad. They are aggrieved by the order passed by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India restructuring the cadres of the employees of the Indian Audit and Accounts Department into the cadres viz., (1) Accounts and Entitlement Office (A & EO) and (2) Audit Office (AC). The order and the scheme of restructuring of the cadres in Indian Audit and Accounts Department, hereinafter referred to as `IAAD', are contained in a booklet titled `Manual' of Instructions for restructuring of cadres in `IAAD', hereinafter referred to as the `Manual'. The date of the issue of the impugned order of the C & AG is the 19th Dec. 1963. The scheme outlines various changes in the service conditions of the employees of the IAAD. 2. The Accountant General, U.P. issued a circular dated 20th December 1963, which was circulated to all the employees of the IAAD. This notice required the employees to indicate their choice for allocation to one of the two offices mentioned above by 31st Jan. 1984. The petitioners by these writ petitions have challenged the authority of the C & AG in issuing the above order contained in the Manual and have also challenged the circular issued by the Accountant General, U.P. mentioned above. 3. Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 2981 of 1981 has been treated as the leading case. This petition has been filed by 365 petitioners on the 1st Mar. 1984, out of these petitioners, petitioners 1 to 244 are Auditors, petitioners Nos. 245 to 270 are selection grade auditors, petitioners Nos. 271 to 308 are Clerks; petitioners Nos. 309 to 341 are group D employees; petitioners Nos. 342 to 344 are Stenographers and petitioners Nos. 345 to 365 are Section Officers in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department under the Accountant General. The petitioners recounted that the Indian Audit and Accounts Department (TAAD') is an old and established Department of the Government charged with the maintenance and auditing of accounts of Union Government. Reference was made to the provisions of Article 148 of the Constitution of India where new status had been given to the C & AG and its role as the Auditor of Government accounts both for the Union and for the States. Reference was made to the provisions of Article 148 of the Constitution of India where new status had been given to the C & AG and its role as the Auditor of Government accounts both for the Union and for the States. Reference was also made to the various efforts made by the employees of the IAAD to secure for themselves better emoluments and service conditions. In 1983 the C & AG came out with a scheme for restructuring of the cadres in IAAD. The Scheme was contained in the Manual referred to earlier. A notice has been issued from the office of the Accountant General I, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad, dated 20th December 1983 which had been circulated to all the employees of the IAAD. This notice required the employees to indicate their choice for allocation either to Audit Office or to the Accounts and Entitlement Office, U.P. Allahabad. The notice also indicated that the employees should indicate their preference by 31st Jan. 1984. Reference was made to various provisions of the Manual to indicate which specific section of the office could go to the Audit Office or to the Accounts and Entitlement Office. New designations of Junior Auditor and Assistant Audit Officer were introduced in Group C staff which included Clerks/Typists/Auditor, Selection Grade Section Officer. Quotas by percentage were also indicated in the Audit Office for Junior Auditors and Auditors and also for Section Officers and Selection Grade Section Officers. The petitioners, (except Mr. D. B. Kauser) indicated their preference. There was a Screening Committee which sifted the names and ultimately announced a list of employees, who were to be taken in the Audit Office and those who were to be taken in the Accounts and Entitlement Office. After the announcement of the list a date was fixed for the enforcement of the scheme contained in the Manual. It was at this stage that the petitioners.filed the writ petition on the 1st Mar. 1984, with the prayer for a writ of mandamus, directing the respondents not to give effect to the Manual of Instructions for Restructuring of cadres in IAAD; directing the respondents to grant the revised pay-scale of Rs. 425-800 to all the Auditors as well as Selection Grade Officers and further directing the respondents not to bifurcate the office of the Accountant General, U.P. into the separate offices viz. Audit Office and Accounts & Entitlement Office. 425-800 to all the Auditors as well as Selection Grade Officers and further directing the respondents not to bifurcate the office of the Accountant General, U.P. into the separate offices viz. Audit Office and Accounts & Entitlement Office. A prayer was also made for issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the scheme of bifurcation. Lastly, a prayer was made for issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the Circular dated 20th December 1982 issued by the Accountant General. 4. The Scheme was challenged on the ground that the C & AG had no power to restructure the cadres of the employees of the IAAD as contained in the Manual nor had he power to frame the scheme regulating the service conditions of the employees of the IAAD under Article 148(5) of the Constitution. Further, the C & AG had no power to issue any executive instructions. The change in the service conditions of the employees of the IAAD could only be made by a Parliamentary enactment and not by executive instructions. The power to frame the scheme regulating the service conditions of the employees of the IA AD lay in the Parliament, but since no law had been enacted, the President had also no power to frame any Rules under the proviso to Article 209 of the Constitution. Another ground of challenge was that the scheme suffered from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power. Besides the above, the petitioners have taken a ground that there was violation of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as the scheme caused discrimination between the various employees similarly placed. Further, there were glaring discrepancies in the promotional avenues of those appointed in the Audit Office as compared to those retained in the Accounts and Entitlement Office. Apart from these major pleas, some of the petitioners have taken specific objection arising in their cases which will be referred to and dealt with at appropriate places. Suffice it to say that according to the petitioners, the scheme for restructuring the office of the Accountant General is not only beyond the jurisdiction of the C & AG but is also a move with some ulterior motive. 5. On behalf of the Respondents the Senior Deputy Accountant General (Administration) in the office of the Respondent 2 filed a counter-affidavit refuting the claim of the petitioners. 5. On behalf of the Respondents the Senior Deputy Accountant General (Administration) in the office of the Respondent 2 filed a counter-affidavit refuting the claim of the petitioners. It was stated that the Scheme for restructuring of cadres in the IAAD was designed to develop an organisational pattern suited to the alternate need of the Audit and to improve the maintenance of accounts of the State Government transactions as well as to improve the quality of audit and to give better service to the community of Government employees. The scheme was to promote efficiency and to improve the quality of work and also to effect economy. There was no intention of the C & AG to bifurcate the Department. The only intention was to bifurcate the existing cadre into two distinct cadres viz., the Audit; and Accounts and Entitlement. Bifurcating into two cadres did not mean that the Department run under C & AG was to be bifurcated. The Scheme was neither arbitrary nor contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. There was no violation of any provision of the Constitution. The S cheme of restructuring cadres in the IAAD was an administrative order and since there was no Parliamentary enactment or statutory rule the issuance of executive instruction was in accordance with law. Reference was made to the case of Accountant General v. Doraiswamy AIR 1981 SC 783 : (1981 Lab IC 184) where it was held that there was a single department of the IAAD and it was headed by C & AG, who was a constitutional functionary holding a special position under the Constitution. The power contained in Cl. (5) of Article 148 of the Constitution was not related to the power under the proviso to Article 308 and these two powers were separate and distinct from each other and not supplementary to one another. The 1974 Rules did not have any retrospective effect and also were not applicable in the instant case. There was no excessive delegation of power to legislate in the present case. There being neither any constitutional provision nor any statutory rule in regard to the service conditions of the employees it was open to the President to formulate rules in consultation with the C & AG. There was no excessive delegation of power to legislate in the present case. There being neither any constitutional provision nor any statutory rule in regard to the service conditions of the employees it was open to the President to formulate rules in consultation with the C & AG. This had been done in the instant case and the Scheme was finalised after the Cabinet had approved it and the staff represented by their Union had agreed to the terms of the Scheme. It was further stated that there was no violation of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 and there was no discrimination between different employees under the Scheme. The slight changes that had been made did not affect the interest of all those employees who had opted for the Audit office and had not been immediately absorbed, were to be put in waiting list and absorbed as and when the vacancies occurred and there would be no fresh recruitment to the Audit Office until all the names in the waiting list were exhausted subject to the condition that they could refuse and on their promotion to higher ranks in the Accounts and Entitlement Office. The promotional prospects in the Accounts and Entitlement office were bound to be different from that in the Audit Office but then changes of promotion would not constitute discrimination. Lastly, it was stated that most of the 4288 employees in the Accountant General's office had accepted the Scheme. Civil Misc. Writ No. 840 of 1984. 6. This writ petition has been filed by Shri . D. B. Kauser. He is one of those employees who did not exercise his option or preference , for Audit or Accounts and Enutlement Office. His stand was that, on the basis of his record. It was entitled to be absorbed in the Audit Office. According to him a duty was cast on the respondents 1 and 2 to examine his record and place him in the Audit Office. He was opposed to the bifurcation of the IAAD office into two cadres and was also opposed to the scheme contained in the Manual, for, according to him, it was not only against the interests of the employees but mala fide as well. He was opposed to the bifurcation of the IAAD office into two cadres and was also opposed to the scheme contained in the Manual, for, according to him, it was not only against the interests of the employees but mala fide as well. Apart from the questions which had been raised in the Writ Petition of Sudhish Chandra the petitioner sought to point out specific instances under the scheme where discrimination was likely and the promotional avenues were curtailed. He pleaded that there was no power in the C & AG to issue executive directions and in any event such executive directions would not be issued for bifurcation of the office and the creation of two cadres in the IAAD. The principal questions are the same as in the case of Sudhish Chandra. Civil Misc. Writ No. 1198 of 1984. 7. These petitioners, Bhullan, Banarsi Das Bhedkar and Abhai Kumar Upadhyaya, who were appointed as clerk and Auditors respectively, have filed this petition, raising similar pleas as in the case of Sudhish Chandra. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3032 of 1984. 8. Bhanu Pratap Misra is the sole petitioner in this petition. He was initially appointed to the post of Upper Division Assistant which is now redesignated as Auditor. He was promoted as Emergency Divisional Accountant andwas placed in the regular cadre of Divisional Accountant. He claimed that the Divisional Accountant should have been placed at a higher rank than that of Auditor, as they were treated so. The restructuring scheme was challenged as being arbitrary. Other pleas raised were the same as in the case of Sudhish Chandra. Civil Misc. Writ No. 3057 of 1984. 9. Shri Ram Pher Pasi and 403 others have filed this joint petition. The petitioners include Auditors, Clerks, Section Officers, Selection Grade Section Officers, Stenographer, Daftary, Peon and Class IV Employees. The pleas taken by them raise similar questions as in the case of Sudhish Chandra. Writ Petition No. 5906 of 1984. 10. This writ petition has been filed by Kripa Shanker Misra and 17 others, all Section Officers. Their main plea is that in screening the persons for the Audit office, senior persons have been allotted Audit office, who have no experience of audit work and those who have experience (e.g. the petitioners) have been placed in the Accounts & Entitlement office. This writ petition has been filed by Kripa Shanker Misra and 17 others, all Section Officers. Their main plea is that in screening the persons for the Audit office, senior persons have been allotted Audit office, who have no experience of audit work and those who have experience (e.g. the petitioners) have been placed in the Accounts & Entitlement office. Instead of suitability seniority has been given preference and the screening was discriminatory and violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. Other pleas were common. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4040 of 1984. 11. This petition has been filed by Keshav Prasad Pandey and 23 others, who are group `D employees. Group-D' employees consist of Junior Gestetner operator, Jamadar, Daftari and Peon. Their case was that prior to 1st Mar, 1984, 20 per cent of the posts of Clerks/ Typists in grade `G' were filled with promotion from Group `D' grade stands abolished. Their further promotion from clerk to Auditor also stands abolished. Consequently, it was urged that their chances of promotion to group `G' posts and to that of Section Officer has been taken away and this constitutes a change in their service conditions. Other pleas are similar to those raised in Sudhish Chandra's case. 12. Counter-affidavits in all these writ petitions were duly filed. The stand taken by the petitioners was refuted and the stand taken by the Respondents in the case of Sudhish Chandra was reiterated. Rejoinder affidavits and in some cases even supplementary affidavits were filed as also their reply. Since the points in all these writ petitions were more or less similar, we have heard them together. 13. The hearing of this case, which lasted for a week, was attended by a large number of petitioners. Various interests were represented by learned counsel appearing in all these writ petitions. We have heard Sarvshri S. S. Bhatnagar, R. C. Srivastava (Senior Advocates), Ashok Khare, U.S. Bhist, and we permitted Shri D. B. Kauser, a petitioner to argue his case. The respondents were represented by Shri Raja Ram Agarwal, Senior Advocate and Shri K. C. Sinha, Standing Counsel for the Union of India. 14. A number of points have been canvassed before us by the learned counsel for the petitioners in all these writ petitions. Most of the points are common and some only emphasised different aspects of the questions. We formulate them as under. 1. 14. A number of points have been canvassed before us by the learned counsel for the petitioners in all these writ petitions. Most of the points are common and some only emphasised different aspects of the questions. We formulate them as under. 1. The C & AG had no power to frame a Scheme regulating the service conditions of the employees under Article 148(5) of the Constitution. The power lay in the Parliament and since no law had been enacted hence even the President had no power to frame any rules. 2. In any event there is an excessive delegation of power to the President of India. Article 148(5) gave no power to the President to bifurcate the cadre. 3. Rules regarding service conditions of employees under C & AG and the bifurcation of the cadre could not be made under executive orders and were thus wholly without jurisdiction. 4. The discrimination between the employees on the Accounts side and on the Audit side in the matter of emoluments, service conditions, promotion after bifurcation under the Scheme was violative of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 5. Whether the placement of Divisional Accountants as Auditors is justified under the Scheme and whether they had been discriminated against. We now take up the above points one by one. Point No. 1 15. The question whether the C & AG has no power to frame the scheme regulating the service conditions of the employees under cl. (5) of Article 148 of the Constitution is the moot question. The associated question is whether Parliament alone has power to make changes in the service conditions of the employees under the control of the C & AG. 16. Even before coming in force of the Constitution, the Government of India had an Auditor General of India to look after the audit and accounts of the Central Government. The office of the Auditor General of India had been in existence for nearly four decades before the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India was established. But the Auditor General of India had nothing to do with the auditing of accounts of the State or Provincial Government. The Constituent Assembly had deliberated on the question whether there should be one or more authority for auditing the accounts of Central Government and the State Governments. But the Auditor General of India had nothing to do with the auditing of accounts of the State or Provincial Government. The Constituent Assembly had deliberated on the question whether there should be one or more authority for auditing the accounts of Central Government and the State Governments. The framers of the Constitution recommended that there should be only one authority for the auditing of Government accounts throughout India. The entire staff for thu purpose of auditing of accounts was placed under the control of the C & AG. All the Accountant General's offices were also placed under the control of the C & AG. 17. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India had been accorded a very high status under the Constitution. His salaly and other conditions of service would be such as may be determined by Parliament by law and until so determined would be as specified in the Second Schedule. During the terms of his office neither the salary nor his rights in respect of leave or absence, pension or age of retirement shall be varied to his disadvantage. He is, however, not eligible to any further office under the Government of India or any State Governments. 18. As regards the conditions of service of persons serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department and the administrative powers of the C & AG, relevant provisions are contained in Article 148(5) and (6) of the Constitution, which are reproduced below. 148(5). Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of any law made by Parliament, the conditions of service of person, serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department and the administrative powers of the Comptroller and Auditor General shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the President after consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor General. (6) The administrative expenses of the office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, including all salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of persons serving in that office, shall be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India." 19. Clause (5) of Article 148 pertains to the conditions of service of persons serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department and the administrative powers of the C & AG. Clause (5) of Article 148 pertains to the conditions of service of persons serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department and the administrative powers of the C & AG. It lays down that subject to the provisions of the Constitution and any law made by Parliament the conditions of service of persons serving in IAAD shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the President after consultation with C & AG. Similarly, the administrative powers of the C & AG shall be subject to the provisions of the Constitution and of any law made by Parliament and these may be made by the President after consultation with the C & AG. In other words, the Constitution provides that the conditions of service of persons serving in the IAAD and the administrative powers of the C & AG shall be such as may be contained in the Constitution itself or as prescribed by the Parliament. There is power in the President also to make rules subject to the Constitutional provisions and the law made by the Parliament, but it will be done after consultation with the C & AG. If the Parliament has enacted any law as regards the conditions of service of the employees in the IAAD then the President would not have any power to make rules regarding the service conditions of the IAAD employees contrary to law made by the Parliament or any provision of the Constitution. In the absence of constitutional provision or a law made by the Parliament, it is open to the President to make rules regulating the service conditions of the employees of the IAAD in consultation with the C & AG. Similarly, the President may make any rule about the administrative powers of the C & AG provided there is neither any constitutional provision nor any law made by the Parliament in that regard but after consultation with the C & AG. It is apparent from the above that the Constitution has given ample power to the President to make rules regulating service conditions of the employees of the IAAD and also the administrative powers of the C & AG. As noted earlier, however, if there is a constitutional provision in this regard, or if there is a law made by the Parliament then the President's power to make rules, shall be likewise curtailed. As noted earlier, however, if there is a constitutional provision in this regard, or if there is a law made by the Parliament then the President's power to make rules, shall be likewise curtailed. If the field is occupied by an enactment, the President will not have any power to make rules in regard to the same subject or same matter. However, if there is neither any enactment nor any constitutional provision, the President is at liberty to make rules in consultation with the C & AG. 20. Great emphasis was laid by Mr. Bhatnagar, learned counsel for some of the petitioners that the President had no power to make rules regarding service conditions of the employees of the IAAD, as this power vests in the Parliament. There being no constitutional provision in regard to the conditions of service of the persons serving in the IAAD, the legislative power to prescribe their conditions of service lay only in the Parliament. In other words, Parliament alone is competent to make law in regard to service conditions of such employees and the President could not frame rules in this regard. This argument of the learned counsel does not appeal to us for the simple reason that the provisions of Article 148(5) of the Constitution are clear. If the field is occupied by legislation, then in that event the President will have no power to frame rules, but where the field is not occupied by any legislation, the President is free to frame rules in consultation with the C & AG. 21. Mr. Bhatnagar argued that if there is no law made by the Parliament in regard to the service conditions of the employees of the IAAD, the President would have no power to make any rules. If that be correct, Article 148(5) of the Constitution would be rendered nugatory. In such an event, the President will also not be able to frame rules. The result would be chaotic. It was never intended by the founding fathers of the Constitution that a provision of the Constitution should remain inoperative or unavailing. There is nothing to indicate that the President's powers are not to be exercised even in a case where the Parliament had not made any law on the subject. 22. In B. N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore AIR 1966 SC 1942 , Mr. There is nothing to indicate that the President's powers are not to be exercised even in a case where the Parliament had not made any law on the subject. 22. In B. N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore AIR 1966 SC 1942 , Mr. Nambiar, learned counsel for the petitioner had argued that until rules were made for recruitment to the service, no recruitment could be made. The Supreme Court repelled this contention in the following words : We are unable to accept this contention. First, it is not obligatory under proviso to Article 309 to make rules of recruitment etc. before a service can be constituted or a post created or filled. This is not to say that it is not desirable that ordinarily rules should be made on all matters which are susceptible of being embodied in rules. Secondly, the State Government has executive power, in relation to all matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power, to make laws, it follows from this that the State Government will have executive power in respect of List II, Entry 41, State Public S ervices W e see nothing in the terms of Article 309 of the Constitution which abridges the power of the executive to act under Article 162 of the Constitution without a law. It is hardly necessary to mention that if there is a statutory rule or an act on the matter, the executive must abide by that act or rule and it cannot in exercise of the executive power under Article 162 ignore or act contrary to that rule or Act." 23. In Lalit Mohan v. Union of India, AIR 1972 SC 995 : (1972 Lab IC 543). The Supreme Court held that in the absence of statutory rules regulating the selection of Assistants to the Selection Grade, there was no bar to the administration giving instructions regarding promotion to the higher grade as long as such instructions are not inconsistent with any rule on the subject. This question was again considered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Sant Ram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910 . and it was declared that in the absence of statutory rules regarding promotion to selection grade posts the Government is competent to issue administrative instructions as long as those instructions are not inconsistent with the rules already framed. 24. and it was declared that in the absence of statutory rules regarding promotion to selection grade posts the Government is competent to issue administrative instructions as long as those instructions are not inconsistent with the rules already framed. 24. The decision in B. N. Nagarajan's case ( AIR 1966 SC 1942 ) (supra) was referred to with approval in V. T. Khanzode v. Reserve Bank of India AIR 1982 SC 917 : (1982 Lab IC 1217). The Court held that so long as staff regulations were not framed under S. 58(1) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, it was open to the Central Board to issue administrative circulars regulating the service conditions of the staff, in the exercise of power conferred by S. 7(2) of the Act. It was made clear by the Chief Justice who spoke for the Court, that the decision in B. N. Nagarajan's case was useful for illustrating that the power to frame rules or regulations does not necessarily imply that no action can be taken administratively in regard to a subject-matter on which a rule or regulation can be framed. The Court observed that the only precaution to observe in the cases of statutory corporations is that they must act within the framework of their charter. This express provision and necessary implications must at all event be observed scrupulously. These decisions leave no room for doubt on a parity of reasoning that the administrative or executive power of the President is available under Article 148(5) of the Constitution for prescribing the conditions of service in the IAAD, in the absence of any Act or statutory rules. 25. It is not in dispute that Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in Item 76, List I of the Seventh Schedule, Item 76 thereof reads as follows : 76. Audit of the accounts of the Union and of the States." Apart from the power conferred under Article 246(1) of the Constitution, the power is also vested in the Parliament under Article 148(5). If some doubt is raised as to whether the service conditions of the employees of the IAAD and the administrative power of the C & AG would be governed under Item 76 of List of the Seventh Schedule, then the position is aboundantly made clear by virtue of Article 148(5) of the Constitution. 26. If some doubt is raised as to whether the service conditions of the employees of the IAAD and the administrative power of the C & AG would be governed under Item 76 of List of the Seventh Schedule, then the position is aboundantly made clear by virtue of Article 148(5) of the Constitution. 26. Admittedly, there is no law made by the Parliament in respect of the service conditions of the employees under IAAD up to the rank of Section Officers nor is there any law made by the Parliament regarding administrative power of the C & AG. There is one Act by the Parliament regarding service conditions, pay and emoluments of the C & AG which is of the year 1953, but it does not contain anything about the service conditions of the employees of the IAAD. It would, thus, be evident that there is complete absence of any law made by the Parliament in regard to service conditions of the employees of the IAAD or in regard to administrative power of the C & AG. 27. We may now examine whether there are statutory rules in this regard. Reference was made to the Rules made by the Secretary of State in Council under S. 96D(1) of the Government of India Act, 1919, Auditor General Rules, 1926, Indian Audit and Accounts Department (Administrative Officers, Assistant Accounts Officers and Assistant Audit Officers) Recruitment Rules, 1964 and Indian Audit and Accounts Department (Subordinate Accounts Service/ Subordinate Railway Audit Service) Service Rules, 1974. 28. Rules 28 to 31 of the Auditor General Rules were framed by the Secretary in Council under S. 96D(1) of the Government of India Act, 1919. Rule 28(i) empowers the Auditor General to transfer, suspend or degrade any such officer lower than Class I or withhold from him any increment or increments of pay and grant him any leave that may be admissible under rule and may delegate to any officer of the Indian Audit Department the power of granting such leave. Rule 29 empowers the Auditor General to sanction the grant to any officer of the Indian Audit Department of such pension as is admissible under S. 96B of the Act and the rules made thereunder. Rule 29 empowers the Auditor General to sanction the grant to any officer of the Indian Audit Department of such pension as is admissible under S. 96B of the Act and the rules made thereunder. Rule 30 empowers the Auditor General to dismiss from service any officer of the Indian Audit Department other than an officer appointed thereto by the Secretary of State in Council or the Governor-General in Council. Rule 31 lays down that nothing in this Part shall be deemed to affect any right of appeal which any officer of the Indian Audit Department may possess under the Act or the rules made thereunder or under any general or special orders of the Secretary of State in Council or the Governor-General in Council. There is nothing in the above rule which affected the subordinate staff in the Indian Audit Department. Rules 28 to 31 refer only to officers. 29. The 1964 Rules are in respect of regulating the method of recruitment to the post of Administrative Officers, Assistant Accounts Officers and Assistant Audit Officers in the IAAD. Subsequently, the nomenclature was changed and the posts of Assistant Accounts Officers and Assistant Audit Officers were redesignated as Accounts Officers and Audit Officers. These had no application to the petitioners in these writ petitions. They do not belong to any of the three classes of officers viz., Administrative Officer, Accounts Officer and Audit Officer. 30. We may now refer to the 1974 Rules. These rules were framed in exercise of the power conferred by proviso to Article 309 and cl. (5) of Article 148 of the Constitution after consultation with the C & AG. These Rules pertain to the Subordinate Accounts Service and Subordinate Railway Audit Service. Rule 3(1) lays down that the cadres of the Subordinate Accounts Service shall be as specified in Part A of the Schedule and that of Subordinate Railway Audit Service shall be as specified in Part B of the said Schedule. Proviso to R. 3(1) says that if the Comptroller and Auditor General is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient in public interest so to do, he may from time to time (i) add to the said Schedule such cadres of the service as he may think fit, or (ii) amend the said Schedule by making such alterations, variations or other modifications therein as he may think fit. (iii) amalgamate two or more cadres, or divide one or more cadres, specified in the said Schedule into such number of cadres as he may think fit. Rule 4 pertains to the constitution of the service and classification. Rule 5 pertains to the method of recruitment to service. Rule 6 pertains to the appointment to the service which shall be made from the list prepared in accordance with the orders and instructions issued by the C & AG from time to time. Rule 7 pertains to seniority; rule 8 to confirmation and R. 9 to residuary matters. Rule 10 authorises the C & AG to issue such general or special instructions or orders as may be considered by him necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to these rules. Other rules are not relevant for the purposes of this case and therefore have not been referred to. 31. Mr. Kauser one of the petitioners arguing his case urged that provisos (i), (ii) and (iii) to R. 3(1) of the 1974 Rules are ab initio ultra vires the Constitution. This argument is not acceptable to us for the reason that Article 148(5) of the Constitution empowers the President to frame rules regulating the service conditions of the employees of the IAAD, in the absence of constitutional provision or a law made by the Parliament. Admittedly, there were neither any such constitutional provision or law made by the Parliament. Secondly, the President could make rules in exercise of his power under Article 148(5) of the Constitution. 32. Reference was made to number of rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. It was urged that these rules govern the service conditions of the employees of the IAAD, and could not be altered to the detriment of the employees of the IAAD. This argument is also not acceptable to us for in Accountant General v. Doraiswamy, AIR 1981 SC 783 : (1981 Lab IC 184), it was held that there was a single department of the IAAD and it was headed by C & AG, who was a constitutional functionary, holding a special position under the Constitution. The power contained in cl. (5) of Article 148 was not related to the power under the proviso to Article 309. These two powers are separate and distinct from each other and not complementary to one another. The power contained in cl. (5) of Article 148 was not related to the power under the proviso to Article 309. These two powers are separate and distinct from each other and not complementary to one another. The reference to the Proviso to Article 309 in the recital of the Notification issued by the Government of India Ministry of Finance, dated 4th Nov. 1974 publishing 1974 Rules was meaningless and has to be ignored. In view of the above, Proviso to Article 309 has no application to the employees of the IAAD. They are exclusively governed by Article 148(5) of the Constitution. 33. During the course of argument, it was conceded on behalf of the petitioners that there was neither any law made by the Parliament nor any statutory rules governing service conditions of the employees of the IAAD. It was further admitted that their service conditions have been governed all through by administrative orders. It is apparent from the above that the field of legislation contemplated under Article 148(5) remains vacant. In such an event it is open to the President to frame rules regulating the service conditions of the employees of the IAAD and the administrative powers of the C & AG under Article 148(5) of the Constitution after consultation with the C & AG. It is trite that one set of administrative rules can be amended, modified, substituted by another set of administrative rules. 34. It would thus be evident that the entire service conditions of the employees of the IAAD are governed by executive or administrative orders. Although they are in the shape of rules, they are nothing but executive orders. This position has already been conceded to on behalf of the petitioners. 35. If the entire conditions of the petitioners are governed by the executive orders, is it open to them to challenge the change in service conditions merely on the ground that it has been made by another executive order? An executive order can always be substituted by another executive order. Unless the service conditions are part of statute or are in the form of statutory rules, these rules made under executive orders are amenable to change or modification by executive orders. 36. It may be that the existing rules may have given an impression that they are statutory rules, but in fact they are not. Unless the service conditions are part of statute or are in the form of statutory rules, these rules made under executive orders are amenable to change or modification by executive orders. 36. It may be that the existing rules may have given an impression that they are statutory rules, but in fact they are not. Statutory rules come into existence when there is a constitutional or statutory provision enabling the framing of rules. Statutory rules are delegated legislation empowered by the statute itself. Executive orders are also in the nature of delegated legislation but are not based on any statute. If any executive order appears to exceed the power of the President, it may be modified, deleted or abrogated by a Parliamentary enactment. Such executive orders can be struck down where they are found to be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution itself. Nothing could, however, be shown before us that the executive orders passed in the present case and indicated in the Manual are contrary to any constitutional provision. Even if they are harsh or appear to change the service conditions substantially, they are not amenable to being struck down in a judicial proceedings. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that the existing service conditions of the employees of the IAAD or those in the C & AG can certainly be rescinded, altered, abrogated, amended or re-enacted by executive orders. 37. Another question that arises for consideration is : what is the nature of the power exercised by the President under Article 148(5) of the Constitution? Undoubtedly, it is in the nature of executive power. This power can be exercised by the President in the absence of an enactment by the Parliament or any statutory rule or any constitutional provision but in consultation with C & AG. In other words, if the field is not occupied by any constitutional provision, any statutory provision or any statutory rule then the power can be exercised by the President. However, there is only one condition precedent for the exercise of the above power viz., consultation with C & AG. This power can only be exercised by the President to frame rules for the condition of the service of the persons serving in the IAAD and to prescribe rules regarding the administrative powers of the C& AG. 38. Article 53(1) of the Constitution provides for the executed power of the Union. This power can only be exercised by the President to frame rules for the condition of the service of the persons serving in the IAAD and to prescribe rules regarding the administrative powers of the C& AG. 38. Article 53(1) of the Constitution provides for the executed power of the Union. It is provided that it vests in the President and is to be exercised by him and either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. Executive power is not defined in our Constitution. It may not be possible to give an exhaustive definition of what executive function means and implies. "Ordinarily, the executive power connotes the residue of Governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away, subject, of course, to the provisions of the Constitution or of any law. The executive function comprises both the determination of the policy as well as carrying it into execution, initiation of legislation, the promotion of social and economic welfare, in fact, carrying on or supervision of the general administration of the State." Another attribute of the executive power is that it is not dependent on prior legislation. It is not necessary that in order to enable the execution of function in respect of any subject there must be a law in existence. In the case of Rai Sahib, R. J. Kapur v. State of Punjab (1955) 2 SCR 225 at p. 235 : ( AIR 1955 SC 549 at p. 555) it was observed : It was not possible to give an exact definition of executive power, ordinarily it connotes the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away". 39. A question may arise whether the President would be entitled to exercise the executive power under Article 33(1) of the Constitution in respect of a matter which involves in part the affairs of the Union and in part the affairs of the States. But there should be no difficulty on this point for the provisions of Article 148(5) are clear. It gives specific power to the President to prescribe rules regarding the service conditions of the employees of the IAAD as well as the rules for the administrative powers of the C & AG. The exercise of the power, as seen above, is subject to certain conditions. It gives specific power to the President to prescribe rules regarding the service conditions of the employees of the IAAD as well as the rules for the administrative powers of the C & AG. The exercise of the power, as seen above, is subject to certain conditions. Where the conditions do not operate as a bar the President has full powers under the said provision. The rules prescribed by the President under the aforesaid provision would be binding on all concerned, until the Parliament enacts a law on the subject. The President thus has ample power under Article 148(5) to exercise his executive power in the given circumstances specified in the said Article. 40. One of the imperatives in the exercise of the above power by the President is to consult the C & AG before making the rules or laying down the administrative powers of the C & AG. From the material on record it is clear that the President has consulted the C & AG before making the rules as contained in the Scheme or the Manual. The point as to who initiated the proceedings for consultation is immaterial. Unless there is a meeting of two minds there would be no consultation. The material on record shows that not only was the matter considered by the executive but even the Union Cabinet had discussed the Scheme and approved it. Thus the requirement of consultation with the C & AG before prescribing the rules has been fulfilled in the present case. Consequently, it cannot be said that the President has acted in excess of his power nor can it be said that he has acted entirely of his own. The Scheme has been published only after the requirements of Article 148(5) have been fulfilled. 41. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the contention that the conditions of service of the employees of the IAAD can be laid down by the Parliament alone and not by the President is without substance. In our view, the President has ample power to frame rules regarding the service condition of the employees of the IAAD and also in regard to the administrative powers of the C & AG subject to the provisions of Article 148(5) of the Constitution. We accordingly answer point No. 1. In our view, the President has ample power to frame rules regarding the service condition of the employees of the IAAD and also in regard to the administrative powers of the C & AG subject to the provisions of Article 148(5) of the Constitution. We accordingly answer point No. 1. Point No. 2 Whether there is an excessive delegation of power under Article 148(5) of the Constitution and whether it gave no power to the President to bifurcate the cadre? 42. Mr. S. S. Bhatnagar, learned counsel for some of the petitioners argued that there is an excessive delegation of power under Article 148(5) of the Constitution. The second leg of the argument was that the said Article gave no power to the President to bifurcate If the cadre in IAAD. In support of his contention he referred to the proviso to Article 309, Article 229(2) and Article 146(2). We may as well quote them here. 309. Recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State : Provided that it shall be competent for the President or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and for the Governor of a State or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, to make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to such services and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate Legislature under this article, and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act." 229(2). Officers and servants and the expenses of High Court. - (1).................. Officers and servants and the expenses of High Court. - (1).................. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of the State, the conditions of service of officers and servants of a High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice of the Court or by some other Judge or officer of the Court authorised by the Chief Justice to make rules for the purpose : Provided that the rules made under this clause shall, so far as they relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, require the approval of the Governor of the State." 146(2). Officers and servants and the expenses of the Supreme Court. (1)............ (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament, the conditions of service of officers and servants of the Supreme Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice of India or by some other Judge or officer of the Court authorised by the Chief Justice of India to make rules for the purpose : Provided that the rules made under this clause shall, so far as they relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, require the approval of the President." 43. Learned counsel contended that as far as the Supreme Court is concerned, the conditions of service of officers and servants of the Supreme Court shall be such as may be prescribed by Rules made by the Chief Justice of India and the said rules are also to be made by some other Judge or officer of the Court authorised by the Chief Justice of India subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament on the subject. The proviso to Article 146(2) lays down that the rules in relation to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, shall require the approval of the President of India. A distinction is there between this provision and Article 148(5). In the latter provisions the President is empowered to make the Rules in consultation with the C & AG subject to any constitutional provisions or any Act made by the Parliament. Under Article 146(2) the President has no power to make any rule. But any rule made by the Chief Justice of India or any Judge or officer authorised by the Chief Justice would hold the fieldsubject to two reservations. Under Article 146(2) the President has no power to make any rule. But any rule made by the Chief Justice of India or any Judge or officer authorised by the Chief Justice would hold the fieldsubject to two reservations. Firstly, it would be subject to the provisions of any law made by the Parliament and secondly, if the rules made by the Chief Justice relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions it would require the approval of the President. It would thus be seen that except in the last clause the President's powers in regard to these service conditions of the officers and servants of the Supreme Court are entirely in the domain of the Chief Justice of India provided there is no law made by the Parliament. 44. Article 229(2) is pari materia with the provision of Article 146(2) of the Constitution except that in place of the President the power of approval has been given to the Governor of the State. The provisions of Article 309 ares lightly different. The proviso to Article 309 empowers the President of India to make rules regulating the recruitment and condition of service of persons appointed to such services and posts until the law is made by the appropriate Legislature under Article 309 and where the Act has already been made subject to the provisions of the Act or any rules made under the Act. This also gives power to the President to make rules regarding service conditions of the employees in public services and posts in connection with the Union or any State but the limitation is this that if there is an Act of the appropriate Legislature and the Act empowers the making of rules then the presidential power will be limited in such a way that he would be precluded from making any rule in regard to the existing provisions of law and the statutory rules. But where the field is not occupied by any Act of Legislature or any statutory rule the President is empowered to make the appropriate rules. Article 309. therefore, gives the President wider power than is contemplated under Article 146(2) or Article 229(2) of the Constitution. 44A. For the purpose of carrying out the duties given to the Supreme Court, the High Courts, the C & AG or the various offices of the Government of the Union and the State, manpower is required. Article 309. therefore, gives the President wider power than is contemplated under Article 146(2) or Article 229(2) of the Constitution. 44A. For the purpose of carrying out the duties given to the Supreme Court, the High Courts, the C & AG or the various offices of the Government of the Union and the State, manpower is required. The persons employed there are recruited and are supposed to carry out their duties in accordance with the directions given by their superior officers. It is imperative that all these employees should have a settled and declared service condition. For the entire duration of their service they are governed by the service conditions applicable to them. Our Constitution makers were of the view that the Supreme Court, the High Courts and the C & AG must be kept on a different pedestal so that their independent status is maintained. For this purpose these institutions were given additional powers for the recruitment of the staff and also to frame their service conditions if no law was enacted for the same. It is for this reason that the language of the provision of Articles 146(2), 229(2) and 148(5) is different from that of Article 309 of the Constitution. However, it will be noticed that there is some affinity in the provisions of Articles 309 and 148(5) of the Constitution. In both the provisions the President has been given power to make rules. The President has not been given any power to make any rule in the case of the Supreme Court in regard to salaries, allowances, leave and pensions but the rules so made by the Supreme Court are to be approved by the President. Similarly, the Governor of the State has been empowered to approve the rules made by the High Court in respect of the salaries, allowances, leave and pensions of the employees of a High Court of the State. There is, however one reservation in the making of such rules viz., the appropriate Legislature had not enacted any law in regard to the same. 45. A question arises at this stage whether the constitutional provisions of Article 309 apply in the case of employees of the IAAD. There is, however one reservation in the making of such rules viz., the appropriate Legislature had not enacted any law in regard to the same. 45. A question arises at this stage whether the constitutional provisions of Article 309 apply in the case of employees of the IAAD. It was urged that they hold civil posts under the U nion and all those statutory rules made for the employees under Article 309 of the Constitution would be applicable to the employees of the IAAD. This argument cannot be sustained in view of the clear pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Accountant General v. S. Doraiswamy, AIR 1981 SC 783 : (1981 Lab IC 184). Their Lordships were considering whether the persons serving in the IAAD were holding office in connection with the affairs of the union exclusively. Their Lordships held that the authority vested in the C & AG ranges over functions associated with the affairs of the Union as well as over functions associated with the affairs of the States. Their Lordships held that there is a single office viz. the office of the C & AG and there is a single department viz., IAAD. It could not be said that the C & AG was concerned with the affairs of the Union exclusively. Consequently, the regulation of the recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving in the IAAD could not be regarded as a matter falling within the domain of the President within the terms of the proviso to Article 309. Their Lordships further held that there is a specific provision in the Constitution viz. Article 148(5) in this regard and the said provision was not related to the power under the proviso to Article 309. Their Lordships held that the provisions of Article 309 have no application in the case of employees in the C & AG. 46. Their Lordships were also considering whether R. 7(2) in regard to the fixation of seniority under the IAAD (Subordinate Accounts Service and Railway Audit Service) Service Rules (1974) suffers from the vice of excessive delegation and answered the question in the negative. 46. Their Lordships were also considering whether R. 7(2) in regard to the fixation of seniority under the IAAD (Subordinate Accounts Service and Railway Audit Service) Service Rules (1974) suffers from the vice of excessive delegation and answered the question in the negative. Their Lordships observed : The argument is that the fixation of seniority has been made by R. 7(2) to depend on the order in which appointments to the service are made under R. 6, and that, it is pointed out, depends on an arbitrary power conferred on the Comptroller and Auditor General to pass orders and instructions. We see no force in the contention. The Comptroller and Auditor General is a high ranking constitutional authority, and can be expected to act according to the needs of the service and without arbitrariness. He is the constitutional head of one of the most important departments of the State, and is expected to know what the department requires and how best to fulfil those requirements. We are unable to hold that the power conferred on him under the Rules violates the principle against excessive delegation." 47. We will now examine the argument of the learned counsel that the Scheme (contained in the Manual) as framed by the C & AG regulates not only the conditions of service of the IAAD but it further bifurcates the Accountant General's office in two offices viz. Accounts and Entitlement and Audit and further it bifurcates the chdre in two. The employees have been chosen arbitrarily and without any guidelines for the two offices and their chances of promotion and grade of pay etc. have been vastly changed which was beyond the powers- contemplated under Article 148(5). 48. We are not satisfied that the contention of the learned counsel has any substance. The reason is this. There is no constitutional bar nor any law made by the Parliament and there is no statutory rule either. The entire field is vacant. The President can make rules in regard to the service conditions in consultation with the C. & AG. The power to prescribe conditions of service is wide in scope to include power to create different cadres to add or modify existing cadres and to lay down conditions for recruitment, promotion, retrenchment etc. The entire field is vacant. The President can make rules in regard to the service conditions in consultation with the C. & AG. The power to prescribe conditions of service is wide in scope to include power to create different cadres to add or modify existing cadres and to lay down conditions for recruitment, promotion, retrenchment etc. The President has, therefore, power to provide for splitting of one cadre into separate cadres which can also prescribe conditions for absorption in the two newly created cadres. 49. When the Constitution itself confers power on the President to frame rules regulating the service conditions of the employees working under C & AG and the latter proceeds to frame rules in accordance with the constitutional provisions, it cannot be said that the exercise of that power by the President is excessive. The power to frame rules is tantamount to the power of legislating on the subject. This can be done if the field is vacant. In other words, if there is no constitutional or statutory provision or statutory rules to the contrary on the subject, field will be deemed to be vacant. Admittedly, there is neither any constitutional or statutory provisions nor any statutory rules on the subject and as such, the President can undoubtedly exercise his power. The rules framed in the present case make marginal changes in the service conditions of the employees and bifurcates the cadre into two cadres. The President could make these changes. It is, therefore, clear that the power exercised by the President in this regard does not amount to excessive delegation of power. If the power has been granted by the Constitution itself, it cannot be urged that there has been excessive delegation of legislative power. We are, therefore, of the view that this part of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners has no substance. 50. The second part of the question as to whether the President could bifurcate the cadre has also, in our opinion, no merit. At the most, this amounts to a change in the service conditions of the employees of IAAD. Even if it be so, it will not impinge on the power to the President to do so, for it has been noticed that there being no constitutional or statutory provision nor any statutory rules to the contrary, the President could certainly change the service conditions. Even if it be so, it will not impinge on the power to the President to do so, for it has been noticed that there being no constitutional or statutory provision nor any statutory rules to the contrary, the President could certainly change the service conditions. Whatever rules exist are also rules made under the executive power of either the President or the Governor General. It is well settled that one set of rules made in exercise of executive power can also be changed by another executive order. 51. In view of the above, we find no merit in any of the arguments raised under point No. 2. We decide the point accordingly. Point No. 3. 52. The question under this point is whether the rules regarding service conditions of the employees under C & AG and the bifurcation of the cadre could not be made under executive orders and were thus wholly without jurisdiction. We have already examined the constitutional provisions of Article 148(5) and we have seen that the President has ample power under the said provision to make rules for the service conditions of the employees under C & AG. The only remaining question would be whether it could be done under executive orders and whether such order would be wholly without jurisdiction. 53. The President was exercising his power under Article 148(5) of the Constitution. A specific provision has been made in the Constitution to deal with the C & AG and those working under him. The President has been given power under Article 148(5) to make rules for the service conditions of the employees under the C & AG and also lay down administrative power of the C & AG in certain given conditions. Those have been enumerated earlier and need not be reiterated. Specific power has been given to the President to be exercised in specific conditions and when he exercises it, it cannot be said that the orders so passed are without jurisdiction. If there be any procedural error (sic)., where the President does not consult C & AG, a question may arise whether the rules so framed are valid in law. Specific power has been given to the President to be exercised in specific conditions and when he exercises it, it cannot be said that the orders so passed are without jurisdiction. If there be any procedural error (sic)., where the President does not consult C & AG, a question may arise whether the rules so framed are valid in law. Similarly, if the rules are framed by the President and the C & AG is consulted in respect of such rules, but there exists statutory rules from before, then a question may arise whether the exercise of the Presidential power under Article 148(5) is valid or not. But where the field is vacant and the President has made rules for the service conditions of the employees under C & AG then it cannot be said that the framing of such rules is without jurisdiction. 54. We may now come to another aspect of the matter : whether such rules can be made in exercise of executive power of the President. It may be said that the power of the President exercised under Article 148(5) is equivalent to exercise of his executive power. Article 53(1) of the Constitution is in respect of executive power of the Union. It is stated therein that the executive power of the Union shall be vested in the President and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. It is evident from the above that the President has the right to exercise executive power of the Union. Exhaustive definition of what executive function means and implies is perhaps not possible, but ordinarily the executive power connotes the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away subject of course to the provisions of the Constitution or of any law. 55. In Ram Jawaya v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549 their Lordships said that executive power comprised both the determination of the policy and carrying it into execution. This evidently include initiation of legislation, maintenance of order, promotion of social and economic welfare and carrying on supervision of the general administration of the State. In the above case their Lordships rejected that the executive power can be exercised only when the Parliament or the State Legislature has legislated on certain items pertaining to their respective lists. This evidently include initiation of legislation, maintenance of order, promotion of social and economic welfare and carrying on supervision of the general administration of the State. In the above case their Lordships rejected that the executive power can be exercised only when the Parliament or the State Legislature has legislated on certain items pertaining to their respective lists. It is, therefore, evident from the above that the executive power can be exercised both for laying down the policy as well as carrying it into execution. 56. The Manual in the present case contains both the policy as well as the scheme for carrying it out. This can be said to be in exercise of the executive power of the President, but Article 53 pertains to the executive power of the Union which vests in the President. The constitutional provision in regard to C & AG shows that he has to deal with matters of accounts pertaining not only to the Union Government but also in relation to State Government. The President's power under Article 53 can be exercised when it pertains to matters relative to a Union. The framers of our Constitution have provided a specific provision in regard to C & AG and the employees under him. The provisions of Article 148(5) specifically provide for making rules for the service conditions of the employees under C & AG who deal with the accounts and audit of the funds of the States as well. Specific power is provided under Article 148(5) of the Constitution. We see no particular reason to hold that the power under Article 53 of the Constitution was utilised for framing all these rules. For the aforesaid reasons we hold that the Rules contained in the Manual were made by the President in exercise of his executive power under Article 148(5) in this case but we do not find such exercise of power to be invalid. 57. Another argument raised in this context was that the scheme contained in the Manual seems to have emanated from the C & AG and not from the President. In other words, the argument was that the power has been exercised by the C & AG and not by the President. This argument is wholly untenable. 57. Another argument raised in this context was that the scheme contained in the Manual seems to have emanated from the C & AG and not from the President. In other words, the argument was that the power has been exercised by the C & AG and not by the President. This argument is wholly untenable. Article 148(5) of the Constitution lays down that any rule regarding the service conditions of the employees under C & AG can be made after consultation with the C & AG. If there is consultation between the President and the C & AG or vice versa, it does not make any difference. What is required is the consultation between the two constitutional functionaries. If the rules were initiated by the C & AG and were framed after due deliberation with the President then it will not suffer from the vice of no consultation at all. It may be made clear here that consultation with the President does not necessarily mean that the person holding the office of the President. Article 53(1) of the Constitution makes it clear that executive power is to be exercised by the President either directly or through officers subordinate to him. Article 77 says that all executive actions of the Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President. If the officers subordinate to the President in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution proceed to have consultation with the C & AG before framing the rules as contemplated under Article 148(5), it cannot be said that there has been no consultation with the President and the rules are bad on that account. On the contrary, the material on the record shows that there was full consultation between the C & AG and the Government representing the President in regard to the rules which are to be found in the Manual. As a matter of fact, it is well established that the scheme was approved by the Union Cabinet itself. It is, therefore, evident that the framing of the rules cannot be faulted on the ground that there was no consultation between the President and the C & AG. 58. For the reasons indicated above, we do not find any merit in the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners under point No. 3. We decide the point accordingly. Point No. 4 59. 58. For the reasons indicated above, we do not find any merit in the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners under point No. 3. We decide the point accordingly. Point No. 4 59. The argument under this point as raised by various learned counsel for the petitioners was that the scheme caused discrimination between the employees on the Account side and on the Audit side in the matter of emoluments, service conditions and promotions after bifurcation and the scheme was violative of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It was urged that some of the employees after being transferred to the Audit side are to enjoy better emoluments, better promotional avenues whereas those that remain on the Account side did not have similar facilities and opportunities. It was urged that the non-selection of all those who had opted for the Audit side adversely affected their interest and they would suffer immediate loss of pay and emoluments. It was further urged that future absorption in the Audit side would affect their seniority. 60. Learned counsel for the respondents refuted the argument saying that there was no discrimination and there was only marginal difference in the grade. As a matter of fact, the scales of pay of employees of the IAAD including Group "D" employees had become better. There was some pay scale both on the Audit side as well as on the Account side except in two cases. Apart from it, all those who were to be given preference on the Audit side and had not been placed on the Audit side were to be considered in due course and absorbed on the Audit side as and when vacancies occurred and new recruitment on the Audit side would not be resorted to until the entire waiting list had been exhausted. It was urged that the petitioners could not challenge the Scheme on merits, as their representatives had agreed to the Scheme before it was approved by the Government. 61. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners on this point and at some length, but we are not impressed by the arguments. The Manual clearly lays down the objects and the need for restructuring of the two cadres. 61. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners on this point and at some length, but we are not impressed by the arguments. The Manual clearly lays down the objects and the need for restructuring of the two cadres. The Scheme spells out the reasons for having two separate wings in the cadre so that there is an improvement in the maintenance of accounts of the State Government transaction as well as to improve the quality of Audit and to give better service to the community of Government employees. The basic aim of the Scheme was to promote the efficiency and to improve the quality of work. The intention was that by creating two separate wings in the cadre the work may proceed with the expertise needed. The scheme has been referred to earlier in this judgment and it will only suffice to say that the Scheme aims at streamline the system in the Accountant General's and similar offices so that there may be prompt and efficient disposal of the matters that come before it. The employees are there to do the work that comes before them. They are not really concerned as to how the C & AG and the Government want the work to be done. The employees would only be concerned if they were adversely affected in regard to pay, emoluments and other service conditions. 62. An examination of the Scheme contained in the Manual shows that option has been given to all employees to indicate their choice either for the Audit office or for the Accounts & Entitlement Office. It is not that the option has been given only to a limited number of employees. Secondly, the basic principle for selection is seniority-cum-fitness. Thirdly, Screening Committees were appointed for considering the options given by the employee. These Screening Committees were analogous to the Departmental Promotion Committees. They had to consider the suitability of the applicants for transfer to the Audit office or the Accounts and Entitlement Office, as the case may be, and for preparing the lists based on seniority. The Scheme also provided that all those persons, who were not selected for transfer to the Audit Office, were to be placed in the waiting list for absorption as and when vacancy occurred. The Scheme also provided that all those persons, who were not selected for transfer to the Audit Office, were to be placed in the waiting list for absorption as and when vacancy occurred. The scheme further provided that the employees who were on the waiting list when called upon to join the Audit office had an option to decline to go there. What is significant is the provision that all vacancies in the Audit office are to be filled up in future from those who gave their option but were not absorbed initially, until the list was exhausted. This by itself is indicative of the fact that those who had given their option for the Audit office are to be absorbed in the Audit office, some immediately and some later. Where is the discrimination then? The Screening Committee is also required to prepare a list of those who are to be transferred to the Audit office immediately depending on the number of posts available there. There is a provision in the scheme for reviewing the waiting list after a year. This provision has been made taking into consideration such cases where a person, who has opted for the Audit Office and has not been selected for immediate transfer thereto, may have been promoted in the Accounts office itself or may have died or even retired. Names of such persons are to be deleted from the waiting list so that the names of other applicants on the waiting list may be considered. The scheme further envisages that the existing scale of pay would not be affected at all for those who would remain in A & E Office. Those who are transferred to the Audit office carry with them their existing pay scale and they are not likely to be affected. It would, therefore, be noticed that the scheme itself does not create any discrimination between the employees who have been transferred to the Audit Office as against those who remained in the A & E Office. 63. Two more aspects may be considered. Firstly, it has been noticed above that it is open to the Government to create as many cadres as may be required from the administrative point of view. 63. Two more aspects may be considered. Firstly, it has been noticed above that it is open to the Government to create as many cadres as may be required from the administrative point of view. In the case of C. P. Damodaran Nayar v. State of Kerala, AIR 1974 SC 1 343 : (1974 Lab IC 994), their Lordships observed : It is open to the State Government to constitute as many cadres as they choose according to administrative convenience and expediency. There is, therefore, no merit in the objection to the creation of a separate cadre of District Magistrate and Sub-Divisional Magistrates of executive origin. The submission of the appellant is without any force." 64. In the case of Mohd. Shujat Ali v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 1 631 : (1974 Lab IC 1103), Bhagwati, J., speaking for the Court enunciated the doctrine of reasonable classification as follows : This doctrine recognises that the legislature may classify for the purpose of legislation but requires that the classification must be reasonable. It should ensure that persons or things similarly situated are all similarly treated. The measure of reasonableness of a classification is the degree of its success in treating similarly those similarly situated..... ....................................... But the basic principle underlying the doctrine is that the legislature should have the right to classify and impose special burdens upon or grant special benefits to persons or things grouped together under the classification, so long as the classification is of persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the legislation, so that all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike by law. The test which has been evolved for this purpose is and this test has been consistently applied by this Court in all decided cases since the commencement of the Constitution that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes certain persons or things that are grouped together from others and that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation." A note of caution was sounded by Krishna Iyer, J. in the case of State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa, AIR 1974 SC 1 : (1974 Lab IC 1) "Mini-classifications based on microdistinctions are false to our egalitarian faith and only substantial and straightforward classification plainly promoting relevant goals can have constitutional validity. To overdo classification is to undo equality." 65. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant, AIR 1981 SC 1990 , the question for consideration before their Lordships was whether there was a denial of "fair and equitable treatment" within the meaning of sub-sec. (5) of S. 115 of the States. Reorganisation Act, 1956 in the matter of determination of relative seniority and equation of posts as between the Assistant Sales Tax Officers from the former State of Madhya Pradesh and Hyderabad and Sales Tax Inspectors from the former State of Bombay, who were allocated to the new State of Bombay and their right to promotion to the post of Sales Tax Officer. Their Lordships laid down that the Central Government had been constituted to be a final authority in the matter of integration of services under sub sec. (5) of Section 115 of the Act. Their Lordships referred to the case of Union of India v. P. K. Roy, AIR 1968 SC 850 and observed that the matter of equation of posts is purely an administrative function. The Court then observed : It is not open to the Court to consider whether the equation of posts made by the Central Government is right or wrong. This was a matter exclusively within the province of the Central Government. Perhaps, the only question the Court can enquire into is whether the four principles agreed upon at the Chief Secretaries conference has been properly taken into account. This is the narrow and limited field within which the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court can operate." Their Lordships then observed : In the present case, not only the State Government had laid down the principles for integration but also considered the representations and passed the final orders and the provisional gradation lists were prepared and published by the State Government under the direction and with the sanction of the Central Government." Their Lordships set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismissed the writ petition filed by the respondents. 66. What is significant in the above judgment is that the matter of classification of posts is purely an administrative function and it has been left open to the Central Government to deal with the question. 66. What is significant in the above judgment is that the matter of classification of posts is purely an administrative function and it has been left open to the Central Government to deal with the question. In the present case also, this has been dealt with by the Central Government, who affixed their seal of approval on the scheme prepared by the C & AG. Thus, the administrative function of the C & AG cannot be said to be violative of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 67. It will be relevant to refer to a decision in the case of State of Kerala v. Krishna Nair, AIR 1978 SC 747 : (1978 Lab IC 723). This was a case where the State of Kerala thought of bifurcating its judicial services into two wings civil and criminal and further thought of framing separate statutory rules governing the recruitment and conditions of service of the incumbents of each wing. The question was whether this violated the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Their Lordships held that it was open to the State Government to bifurcate the services into two wings - Civil and Criminal - and to provide for a particular type of option specified therein and there was no violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The further argument that the Government Orders amounted to hostile treatment was found to be devoid of any substance. The view taken in the above case makes it clear that it is open to the ' Government to bifurcate the services into two wings and that by itself would not violate the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 68. The other aspect of the matter is whether the chances of promotion of those not allocated to the Audit side are affected by the bifurcation in the present case. We do not think that their chances of promotion are; Bat affected by the bifurcation. Those who opted for the Audit side and were absorbed there in the first instance would get promotion according to vacancies arising there, provided they were found fit and selected for promotions. Similar is the position with those who remain in the Accounts side. There is no question of discrimination in such a case. Those who opted for the Audit side and were absorbed there in the first instance would get promotion according to vacancies arising there, provided they were found fit and selected for promotions. Similar is the position with those who remain in the Accounts side. There is no question of discrimination in such a case. It is true that some of the transferees to the Audit side who would get the nomenclature of Assistant Audit Officer, have a better scale of pay but at the beginning of the scale of pay there would be no difference in pay or emoluments. Only the higher limit of the pay scale is different. This would be the position with all those who are transferred subsequently too. This, in our opinion, does not create any discrimination. 69. In view of the above, it is not really necessary to examine the question in detail whether there has been any discrimination in the service conditions under the scheme of restructuring between the employees of the IAAD placed on the Accounts side and those on the Audit side. However, since the matter was argued, we will refer briefly to the same. 69-A. Reference may be made to two Charts Annexures XI and XII to the affidavit of Sri B. K. Chattopadhya in support of the application dated 4th December 1984. The charts show that of the 228 Selection Grade Section Officers 44 have been assigned to the Accounts side. Their pay scales are the same as of Selection Grade Section Officers on the Audit side. Of the 735 Section Officers 191 have been assigned to the Accounts Office and 544 to the Audit side. On the accounts side 28 of them would be come Selection Grade Section Officer and the rest 163 would continue as Section Officer. On the Audit side 29 per cent would remain Section Officer and 80 per cent would get new posts of Assistant Audit Officer in the pay scale of Rs. 650-1040. This is the bone of contention. The petitioners claimed that all those who had been transferred to the Audit side 80 per cent of them would get enhanced grade of Rs. 650-1040 whereas the employees on the Accounts side would get the grade of Rs. 500-900. Amongst Auditors 212 have been assigned to the Accounts side and 794 to the Audit side. The petitioners claimed that all those who had been transferred to the Audit side 80 per cent of them would get enhanced grade of Rs. 650-1040 whereas the employees on the Accounts side would get the grade of Rs. 500-900. Amongst Auditors 212 have been assigned to the Accounts side and 794 to the Audit side. There is absolutely no change in the grade except that the auditor on promotion would get the nomen calture of Senior Auditor in the grade of 425-800 whereas the Selection Grade Accountants would get the grade of 425-700. This is another bone of contention. This situation is not going to arise unless one reaches the pay Rs. 700/-. As far as the Clerks and Stenographers are concerned, the condition remained exactly the same on both Accounts and Audit side. In group D, so far there is no avenue of promotion but under the scheme post of Record Sorter has been provided with a pay scale of Rs. 225-308. It is better than what they had earlier. Earlier the maximum pay scale was 210-270. Under the scheme there is new pay scale of Rs. 200-250 for peons and this is the same on both sides. 70. It is, therefore, evident that 80 per cent Section Officer transferred to the Audit side would get a new pay scale i.e. 650-1040. This has been explained in the scheme as essential, for the audit work requires specialised work. The other change is that the Senior Auditors would get the scale of Rs. 425-800 but the point is that all those who have opted for the Audit side are to be considered for the Audit side unless they decline to go to that side when their turn comes or they get a promotion in the Accounts side itself. We do not see any discrimination in this. With regard to the other pay scales, they are the same for both sides. There is a better pay scale for group D peons. We see no discrimination there too. We may reiterate once again that all those who have opted for the Audit side and have not been placed on that side, their names are included in a Waiting List and they are to be considered before any direct recruitment is resorted to. There is a better pay scale for group D peons. We see no discrimination there too. We may reiterate once again that all those who have opted for the Audit side and have not been placed on that side, their names are included in a Waiting List and they are to be considered before any direct recruitment is resorted to. This is ample safeguard for all those who have not opted for the Audit side but have not been absorbed at present in the Audit side. It is also clear that all those who have applied for the Audit side cannot be absorbed immediately - the number being in excess of the posts available on the Audit side. It is, therefore, reasonable for the C & AG to have provided in the Manual for this alternative arrangement for them. In our opinion, there is neither any discrimination nor any illegality in this part of the scheme. Consequently, we find no merits in the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners on this point. 71. Another argument raised was that promotional avenues of the employees of Groups C and D were adversely affected by the Scheme. We have examined the matter carefully and we see no merits in this argument. As a matter of fact a new pay scale has been provided for some of the employees of Group `D' There is absolutely no difference in the pay scale between the employees of Group D on the Accounts side and the Audit side. Their promotional chances are also not affected. Promotion is not a matter of right. Promotion depends on many factors. One of them is his past service record, another is suitability, a third is seniority-cum-fitness. Apart from merit he must be qualified to hold the post. A peon with a class VI or VII educational qualification may not be suitable to hold the post of a clerk or Auditor or Accountant. It is not a question of providing employment. The C and AG knows better what type of staff is required for doing the work. The scheme provides for the same. A certain amount of educational qualification is necessary for doing the complicated work of Accounts and Audit in the offices of Accountant General and similar other offices. Every employee may not be thus qualified for promotion. The C and AG knows better what type of staff is required for doing the work. The scheme provides for the same. A certain amount of educational qualification is necessary for doing the complicated work of Accounts and Audit in the offices of Accountant General and similar other offices. Every employee may not be thus qualified for promotion. The question whether employee of one Group should have a chance of promotion to a post in a higher pay scale Group, is again a matter of policy. Rules can be made by the President in this regard and this has been done in the present case. As seen earlier this matter cannot be challenged in Writ Jurisdiction. The point is accordingly disposed of as bereft of merits. Point No. 5 Divisional Accountants 72. Another contention that was raised before us was that the persons, who were Divisional Accountants, have been placed at a lower status than that of Auditors and they have been adversely affected by the Scheme. The petitioner Bhanu Pratap Misra pointed out in the writ petition No. 3032 of 1984 that the Divisional Accountants are required to undergo rigorous training course which the Auditors are not required to undergo. Thereafter, the Divisional Accountants have to appear in a qualifying examination viz. Divisional Accountant Grade Examination before they are allowed to hold charge of any division while there is no such requirement for the Auditors. Further, the duties of the Divisional Accountants are supervisory in nature and the entire account organisation of the Division is under their supervisory control. The Divisional Accountant writes confidential reports of the subordinates working under him. According to the petitioner, Divisional Accountants in consideration of their expertise in audit work are entitled to be posted as Section Officers in the Audit Office. 73. The petitioner Bhanu Pratap Misra was initially appointed as Upper Division Assistant which is now redesignated as Auditor. He had been promoted as Emergency Divisional Accountant. His case was that the Divisional Accountant had been treated superior in rank and status than that of an Auditor and as such higher and better pay scale should have been provided under the Scheme. The Auditors have been given better scale of pay under the scheme, whereas the Divisional Accountants have been deprived of this benefit. 74. A counter-affidavit has been filed by Shri Rajib Sharma, Deputy Accountant General (Admn.). The Auditors have been given better scale of pay under the scheme, whereas the Divisional Accountants have been deprived of this benefit. 74. A counter-affidavit has been filed by Shri Rajib Sharma, Deputy Accountant General (Admn.). He has enumerated therein the duties and functions of the Divisional Accountants as Accountant, Internal Checker and Financial Assistant. It has been squarely denied that the Divisional Accountant performed predominantly the duties of auditor that the post of Divisional Accountant is a promotional post for auditors. It has stated that the post of Divisional Accountant has never been a promotional post for employees of the IAAD, inasmuch as Divisional Accountants constitute a separate cadre, and recruitment to the said cadre is done from three sources viz., (1) Public Works Division, Accounts Clerks, (2) Auditors of the Audit office and (3) Direct recruits. The Divisional Accountants' cadre is filled through initial Recruitment Examination only in vacancies, which could not be filled by qualified Divisional Accountants, and ad hoc appointment on purely temporary basis was made as I Emergency Divisional Accountants. It was further stated that the petitioner as Divisional Accountant was not entitled to be promoted on as Section Officer in the Audit Office. Reference was made to a writ petition filed by the U. P. Divisional Accountant's Association through its President which was dismissed by the Lucknow Bench of the High Court on 22nd February, 1984. Lastly, it was stated that the restructuring of the cadres in IAAD is purely administrative in nature and is neither arbitrary nor contrary to any rule. 75. Having considered the matter in depth, we are of the opinion that the Divisional Accountants do not have any promotional avenue in the Audit Office. They have no right of appointment to Subordinate Accounts Service posts. Specific provision for Divisional Accountants has been made in para 3.11 of the Manual. All that is stated therein is that the Divisional Accountant's cadre will vest with the Accounts & Entitlement Office. Paragraph also says, that the system of posting of divisional accountants as section officers will not apply for posts in the Audit Officer's." We see no manifest incongruity in this part of the Scheme. After all the Manual is an administrative order and there is no question of the order struck down. Paragraph also says, that the system of posting of divisional accountants as section officers will not apply for posts in the Audit Officer's." We see no manifest incongruity in this part of the Scheme. After all the Manual is an administrative order and there is no question of the order struck down. The order is also not affected by the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution for the reasons given, earlier. Promotion is not a matter of vested right and consequently no one has an absolute right to be promoted much less to a superior post in a particular office. Further, as noticed above, one administrative order can always be replaced by another administrative order. Therefore, there is no question of any vested right under the previous administrative order. 76. For the reasons indicated above, we find no substance in any of the contentions raised by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3032 of 1984 Bhanu Pratap Misra v. Union of India and others. CONCLUSION 77. Having given the matter our full consideration, we are of the view that the impugned order (Manual) disclosing the scheme for restructuring of cadres in IAAD is not liable to be struck down. On our opinion, there is no constitutional or legal infirmity in the said order. We do not find any merits in any of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The writ petitions must, therefore, fail. 78. In the result, therefore, all the Writ Petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. 79. Immediately after the judgment was pronounced, counsel for the petitioner made an oral prayer for the grant of a certificate to file appeal before the Supreme Court under Article 133 of the Constitution. In our opinion the judgment does not involve substantial questions of law of general importance which may need decision by Supreme Court. We have only followed the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases which have been referred in the judgment. Most of the questions by the principles laid down by Supreme Court (sic). No certificate can, therefore, be granted. 80. The prayer for leave to appeal is, accordingly rejected.