JUDGMENT - MASODKAR B.A., J.: - The petitioner was a member of the Local Police Force. He entered the same Force, as is apparent and not in dispute, having been appointed as Police Constable (Armed) under an order made by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Panaji, on June 27, 1967 as per the appointment order, Annexure R. I appended to the return. Eventually, the petitioner was confirmed as Police Constable and appears to have been promoted from September 1, 1974 to the post of Head Constable. 2. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner and other Police Constables numbering three, under the Rules titled as Government of Goa, Daman and Diu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975. As a result of those proceedings, the Superintendent of Police held an inquiry and eventually passed the impugned order imposing the penalty of dismissal from service with effect from the date of the issue of the order. That order was made on August 22, 1983. Under the Rules, an appeal is provided before the Inspector General of Police. The petitioner took an appeal before that authority. By order dated February 9, 1984, that appeal was rejected. Thereafter this petition has been failed challenging all this process. 3. One of the grounds urged in support of the petition is that on June 25, 1982, the Inspector General of Police, Panaji, by reason of the authority conferred by Rule 9 of the said Rules made an order directing the holding of “common proceedings” against all the delinquent Police Officers. That Order further appointed the Inspector General of Police to be the Disciplinary Authority for the purpose of those common proceedings and for the purpose also of imposing penalties, being minor or major penalties, as specified by Rule 3. It is submitted that once this order was made by the Inspector General of Police, as is evident from Exh. P.3, appended to the petition, there is no jurisdiction with any other authority either to initiate, conduct or continue and complete the departmental proceedings against the petitioner. The proceedings could have been only initiated and conducted, as was made clear by the Inspector-General of Police who was the nominated authority by reason of the order under Rule 9. As that was not done, the submission is that the entire proceedings are without the authority of law. 4. The proceedings could have been only initiated and conducted, as was made clear by the Inspector-General of Police who was the nominated authority by reason of the order under Rule 9. As that was not done, the submission is that the entire proceedings are without the authority of law. 4. As against this, the stand taken by the respondents is that although the order under Rule 9 was made notwithstanding such an order the Appointing and Disciplinary Authority being the Superintendent of Police, such common proceedings could be continued and completed under Rules 5 and 6 thereof. Particularly, Mr. Nadkarni, the learned Government Pleader, relied on the provisions of Rule 4 and submitted that Rule 4 could not be read as subject to Rule 9. The total field of Rule 4, in the learned counsel's submission, is for providing the authorities and those authorities having been named. Rule 9 could not be read so as to subject the other rules to diminution of any kind. In other words, it is contended that notwithstanding such an order, the Superintendent of Police, being the Appointing and Disciplinary Authority under Rule 4, was quite competent to continue and conclude the disciplinary proceedings. 5. We put it to the Counsel for the petitioner specifically and we have a clear statement from him that the petitioner is not in any manner challenging the order made under Rule 9 by the Inspector General of Police. On the other hand, the petitioner seeks to stand by that order and the consequences thereof. 6. Thus the provisions of Rule 9 are not in issue before us nor the validity of the order made by the Inspector General of Police. We proceed to set out the provisions of Rule 9 which read as under:- “Rule 9 : Common proceedings. - (1) Where two or more members of service are concerned in any case, the Inspector General of Police may make an order directing that disciplinary action against all of them may be taken in common proceeding. (2) Any such order shall specify: (i) the authority which may function as the Disciplinary Authority for the purpose of such common proceedings. (ii) the penalties specified in rule 3 which such Disciplinary Authority shall be competent to impose. (iii) wether the procedure laid down in rule 5 and rule 6 or rule 7 shall be followed in the proceedings.” 7. (ii) the penalties specified in rule 3 which such Disciplinary Authority shall be competent to impose. (iii) wether the procedure laid down in rule 5 and rule 6 or rule 7 shall be followed in the proceedings.” 7. As far controversy is raised, we do not find any merit in the submission of Mr. Nadkarni with regard to the competing field carved out by Rules 4 and 5 as juxtaposed by above Rule 9. No doubt Rule 4 provides for the Disciplinary Authorities having reference to the Appointing Authority or the authorities specified in the Schedule in that behalf, but as the terms of Rule 9 stand, the Inspector General of Police in all cases where common proceedings are contemplated is enabled to make an order which would thereafter govern the proceedings. Rule 9 which is a special provision concerning common proceedings enable the Inspector General of Police to make an order in terms of sub-rule (2). That sub-rule states that any such order made by the Inspector General of Police would specify the authority which may function as the Disciplinary Authority for the purpose of common proceedings and further the penalty as specified by Rule 3 that such Disciplinary Authority would be competent to impose. In other words, one the order is made under Rule 9 with regard to common proceedings, the other rules, and particularly Rule 4, will have no application as for finding of the authority and penalty. It will be the order made by the Inspector General of Police with regard to common proceedings which will determine the Disciplinary Authority and the penalties such authority would be competent to impose and the matter of common proceedings would be entirely governed by the terms of that order. We do not see any conflict between Rules 9 and 4, for it is ample to observe that Rule 4 is a general provision with regard to the authorities who can initiate disciplinary proceedings, while Rule 9 operates upon specific field where common proceedings are intended to be initiated and special order is made by the Inspector General of Police in that regard. With regard to the common proceedings that order will define the nominated Disciplinary Authority as well as the penalties specified in Rule 3 which such authority would be competent to impose. With regard to the common proceedings that order will define the nominated Disciplinary Authority as well as the penalties specified in Rule 3 which such authority would be competent to impose. It is pertinent that Clause (iii) of sub-rule (2) even permits the Inspector General of Police to provide by order as to whether the procedure laid down in Rules 5, 6 and 7 shall be followed or not in special proceedings. Reading all the clauses together of sub-rule (2) it would thus appear that Rule 9 is a complete Code in itself and when an order is made under that provision, that order will be determinative of all the matters specified by Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of sub-rule (2). 8. The question is whether after making the order under Rule 9 any authority other than the one nominated by the Inspector General of Police by making the order under this Rule could have initiated and completed the proceedings and the answer to this question must be in the negative. The order of the Inspector General of Police of June 25, 1982 shows, all the matters under Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of sub-rule (2) had been provided for and common proceedings were directed to be initiated against four members of the police force, including the present petitioner. The Disciplinary Authority for the purpose of those proceedings was nominated by office, being the Inspector General of Police. The order further provides that such Disciplinary Authority would be competent to impose minor or major penalties specified in Rule 3 and the order further provides that the procedure laid down in Rules 6 and 7 could be followed in those proceedings. There is no good reason nor any permissible one to follow any other procedure for the purpose of common proceedings. The only course open to the authorities was to initiate and complete the proceedings in accordance with this order. That admittedly has not been done. 9. In the result, we have to adjudge the proceedings initiated and continued by the Superintendent of Police after the making of the order by the Inspector General of Police on June 25, 1982 as one without jurisdiction. All those proceedings, including the imposing of the penalty, are therefore quashed and set aside. That admittedly has not been done. 9. In the result, we have to adjudge the proceedings initiated and continued by the Superintendent of Police after the making of the order by the Inspector General of Police on June 25, 1982 as one without jurisdiction. All those proceedings, including the imposing of the penalty, are therefore quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Inspector General of Police to continue the proceedings under Rule 9 by reason of the order of June 25, 1982 as may be permissible and according to law. It is made clear that the Inspector General of Police, the nominated authority, would now issue notice to all the deliquents and if any of them accept the proceedings initiated and concluded by the Superintendent of Police, then he may also consider as to whether to drop the proceedings against such persons. Rule absolute. No costs. Order accordingly. -----